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Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs. But this implies that every state must 
do nothing to interfere in the internal affairs of any other. However, anyJalse or pernicious 
step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this 
consequent disturbance of another state's repose constitutes an interference in that state's 
internal affairs. Therefore, every state - or rather, every sovereign of a great power - has the 
duty, in the name of the sacred right of independence of every state, to supervise the 
governments of smaller states and to prevent themftom takingJalse andpernicious steps in 
their internal affairs. 
(P. Schroder, Classic Readings in International Relations, Williams P., Goldstein, M., Shafritz, 
J., eds., p. 196). 
Abstract 
This study attempts to contribute to the debate of the role of threat perception for the 
management of European Security in the post Cold War era by developing a model which 
aims to demonstrate the need for identifying perceptions of threat, similar to the situation 
pertaining during the Cold War. It is argued, among other matters, that a perception of threat is 
a major requirement for European defence in the 1990s, as without such a perception, the 
management and effectiveness of European security becomes questionable. This argument is 
examined in two parts: a review of the literature and a case study. The second part is also 
aiming to identify questions of concern relating to European defence. Building upon previous 
work related to the field, an analytical framework is developed and tested with data collected 
from a sample of informed elites from Greece. 
The empirical findings support the view that threat perception is an important factor and a 
requirement which can shape the nature of a security organisation in which a state participates. 
Due to differences in national interest, threat perceptions may vary according to each state's 
particular security concerns, and this can create problems in reconciling the diverse and 
possibly conflicting requirements of the members of any security organisation. However, the 
evidence examined supports the view that security mechanisms are necessary even in the 
absence of a clear threat. International cooperation is sought as the elites in the field study 
indicated that such cooperation can alleviate their security concerns. The field work suggests 
that European security should gradually be led by Europeans, despite the fact that their 
Atlantic partners should also continue to be involved, albeit to a reducing level. 
For the purposes of validation, a number of interviews were undertaken among London - based 
elites from six European states. Their comments supported the empirical findings of this study 
and it was felt that the absence of clear threat perception did effect the management of 
European security, and that threat perception is an important factor determining the choice of a 
security option. 
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Introduction 
The Topic: 
This study examines the question of European security. The rigid military confrontation of 
past decades is increasingly giving way to a concern for enhanced security and to the active 
pursuit of peace using a combination of military and political elements. The European 
Continent has become the home of many newly formed states and the topic of European 
security requires adjustments. 
European security is a matter that must now be looked at afresh. Observers are generally 
agreed that European security has entered a period of transition - between Cold War stability 
and an uncertain future. The passing of communist rule in Eastern Europe was bound to leave 
wreckage which needs to be cleared up, and as well to engender political, economic and 
nationalist tension. The Yugoslav crisis, the general instability in the Balkans and the 
continuing unrest in the former Soviet Union are just a few examples of the problems that have 
surfaced after the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the various threats perceived 
during the Cold War have become irrelevant. Perceptions of threat have changed and so may 
have the roles of institutions. NATO's character has evolved towards a crisis management 
mechanism, the WEU is seen as a Europeanised solution for security through Maastricht, and 
the EC has opened its borders to most of Scandinavia. In addition, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 suggested the unpredictability of world events. 
0 Can NATO adjust and successfully work as a crisis management mechanism? 
0 Can the EC create a security dimension through the WEU? 
* Who, which, or what are the new European challenges? 
0 Do Europeans have to have a threat to perceive? 
These are just some of the questions that concern the topic of European security. A case study 
shall be analysed with a view of exploring the reasons behind the instabilities and whether threat 
perception continues to be as important for the stability of Europe in the 1990s as it was for 
Europe during the Cold War, 
7 
The Purpose: 
The purpose of this study is to identify some of the problems created after the unpredictable 
events of 1989 and to demonstrate the importance of threat perception as a major requirement 
for the management of security organisations, through the analysis of empirical evidence. 
Gianni De Michelis parallels the situation of Europe in the 1990s with that after World War 
two: In psychological terms, 1989 was very much like 1945. It marked the end of a period of 
war and division. "Unfortunately, the way we set about reconstruction in 1946 - 47 created 
the basisfor the next war" (Freedman, Europe Transformed, 1990, p. 5 14). 
The above citation suggests the sensitive nature of the 1990s. By researching the topic of 
European Security, an effort is made to emphasise the importance of threat perception through 
history as well as for the 1990s. The study is an attempt to present specific threats through the 
case study, their importance and how these threats should be managed, according to a sample 
of elites from Greece. How do Greek elites feel about institutions such as the EC, NATO, or 
the CSCE providing for their security concerns? To what extent should the United States be 
involved in Europe's defence? How have perceptions of threat changed since 1989? What are 
the threats for Europe and for Greece in the 1990s according to Greek elites? These questions 
are some of the topics examined in this study. By analysing the relevant literature, raising a 
number of questions through the field work, the findings may provide useful information about 
the state's security concerns which may, in turn, help in the quest for European security and / or 
raise the demands for the 1990s. 
Note: The structure / outline of the work undertaken in this thesis is presented on page 11. 
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NOTES 
1. The concepts of "security" and "defence" are used in this study. According to Wolfers 
(1962), "security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in 
the subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Discord and 
Collaboration, p. 150). "Defence", according to Feld (1994), "is much narrower and focuses on 
the utilisation of military activities and strategies to assure the attainment of pertinent security 
structures" (The Future of European Security and Defence Policy, p. 4). Despite the fact that 
the concepts of "security" and "defence" could be defined differently, they are used to 
characterise organisations such as NATO, the WEU and/or the WTO, without specific 
reference as to which organisation provides more "security" or is more "defensive" in character. 
Organisations such as the above are considered defensive (not necessarily by counting 
weapons) and were created to enhance security by perceiving threats and collectively dealing 
with them. Therefore, because the study is concerned with threat perception as a stimulus 
towards international cooperation and "defence" or "security" mechanisms, these terms are 
used with similar meanings, although their difference has not been completely ignored. 
2. Threat perception has been examined in relation to states and defence mechanisms. It is not 
the primary concern of this study to examine perception of threat(s) in psychological terms, i. e., 
what leads a state or a defence institution to perceive a threat and why, as the study discusses 
threat perception as a stimulus towards international cooperation and the evaluation of security 
structures. For example, Communism was a threat perceived by the West during the Cold War 
which stimulated the West to search for and create a defence mechanism. It is the importance of 
perceiving such a threat which led to that specific defence mechanism which is of concern to 
this study, not the psychological state of the decision-maker, although such aspects have also 
not been completely ignored. 
3. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is also known as the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as of 5 Dec. 1994. However, 
9 
owing to the recent nature of this change and the fact that the abbreviation CSCE has been 
used in the field study, its original name shall be retained in this project. The abbreviation EEC 
(European Economic Community) has also been used in the analysis of the field study (chapters 
7,8), instead of EU (European Union), or EC (European Community), as it was used in the 
Greek translation of the questionnaire and was the abbreviation widely used in Greece. For 
reasons of consistency and comprehension, the analysis of the data (chapters 7,8) uses "EEC" 
to refer to the respective questions where the term has been used ("EU" became more 
commonly used after December 1993, around the time in which the field work was completed). 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
collective Security 
Alliances, such as NATO, the Western European Union, (WEU) or the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO), are structures that are based on the concepts of collective security and 
Interdependence. In the case of the WTO, however, this is arguably irrelevant as the Soviet 
domination upon its member states demonstrated its forceful character towards collective 
security. 
Collective security implies states coming together through an inter-governmental 
organisation (i. e. NATO, WEU) in which member states retain their full sovereignty and 
independence. The organisation should provide the forum in which they consult together 
on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters 
affecting their security. The CSCE can be considered a collective security arrangement as 
debates on security issues take place, but it cannot act militarily as it is not a military 
structure. The essential purpose of a collective security structure is to safeguard the freedom 
and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the 
principals of the United Nations Charter. In addition, the member states of a collective 
security arrangement must be liable to be co-operative and committed to the security of its 
members. The arrangement assures (as in NATO's case) that no member state is forced to 
rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. 
Through collective effort, the Alliance (NATO) enables them to enhance their ability to 
realise their essential national security objectives. 
NATO Handbook, 1992, p. 12 
This chapter examines the concept of collective security, its requirements and the major 
reasons that lead towards collective security arrangements. 
The Problem of Security 
For the first forty years after the end of the Second World War, European Security was a 
lively but well focused political issue as Booth and Wheeler (1993) discuss. There was a 
consensus, in both the East and West, on priorities and parameters. When people opened a 
book or attended a seminar on "Security in Europe", they knew what to expect. Questions 
about the Soviet Union, the NATO / WTO confrontation and the US nuclear guarantee now 
seem outdated. "Security in Europe" seems ambiguous and it is no longer well focused. It 
has become apparent that "security" cannot be sensibly conceived along its previous narrow 
confines. 
Between 1945 and 1989, as Booth and Wheeler (1993) point out: 
... security implied some or all of the 
following: that a state is free from the threat of war, 
that it is able to pursue its national interests and preserve its corevalues; andthatit 
feels safe against potential aggressors (that is, war is believed to be unlikely, but should one 
ever occur, the state in question does not expect defeat). 
Security and Strategy in the New Europe, ed. McInnis, p. 4 
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These traditional ideas concerning security were based on the assumption that security policy 
seeks to preserve the status quo and on the belief that security is based upon states coming 
together in order to face common threats. Therefore, the concept of security focuses not 
just on one state but on many states collectively. 
Security is an essential precondition of an ordered human existence; it is accepted as natural 
for people to take precautions against danger. Governments must provide a secure 
environment which would allow people to pursue their economic and social goals without 
undue anxiety and fear. " The concept of security covers every facet of life, and 
governments find it difficult to meet every contingency which might arise" (Pick and 
Critchley, 1974, Collective Security, p. 15) 
States may find security in cohort with other states, which on the whole share some of their 
values and interests. Historically, these combinations, as Pick and Critchley (1974) argue, 
have been more cohesive when they were formed for a very specific purpose and with a 
'preferred enemy' in mind. This was the case of NATO and the WTO. The systems of 
regionalised collective self-defence, which have grown out of the alliance institutions on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain, had served to stabilise the military and political position and 
in this sense had contributed before 1989 to the consciousness of security in both camps 
(Eastern and Western blocs). 
Collective security in Europe can be considered to have been effective through alliances for 
a certain period of time as NATO and the WTO never confronted one another. An analysis 
of collective security and collective security structures is therefore relevant to the problem of 
threat perception, and particular emphasis has been placed on the gradual transformation of 
the international environment which has made it possible for Europe to complement 
confrontation with negotiation. 
1.2 Collective Security Evolution - Definition 
States can inflict enormous destruction on their enemies. As a consequence, national security 
remains elusive. To defend themselves, states have the option to form alliances to combine 
their armaments with those of other states while maintaining a balance of power and 
negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements so as to reduce the threat of adversaries' 
weapons. 
The idea of collective security has excited the minds of both statesmen and scholars for most 
of this century. The development of international organisations has been preoccupied with 
the achievement of collective security to such an extent that one scholar was moved to 
describe the relationship between them in these words: 
ne twentieth century hope that international organisations might serve to prevent war, or, 
failing that, to defend states subjected to armed attack in do7ance of organised efforts to 
maintain the peace, has been epitomised in the concept of collective security. 
International Conflicts and Collective Security, Zacher, 1979, p. I 
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Conservatives and reformers, realists and idealists alike, affirm the sad truth of Hans 
Morgenthau's 1978 observation that throughout history, 
... nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised violence in the form of war. 
(Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System, 1992, p. 57) 
Kakonen (1973), argues that the concept of security is independent of the time and place. 
All states in different historical periods have had common interests to protect their integrity 
and independence. The belief in the intrinsic value and necessity of collective security has 
been apparent in Europe since 191.9 with the formation of the League of Nations. In 1945, 
the United Nations was created, relying on, "... great power unanimity" . Soon after the formation of the United Nations, it became apparent, according to Zacher (1979), that the 
UN could not institutional ise the idea of collective security in the form of concerted 
diplomatic, economic and military action to deter and terminate all armed attack. Thus, 
many scholars and statesmen began to search for alternative ways of utilising the UN's 
potential in conflict situations (International Conflicts and Security, p. 3). There were also 
movements in the direction of establishing regional collective security systems with the end 
result being the formation of NATO, the Western European Union and the French proposal 
for the creation of the European Defence Community between 1948 and 1950. 
Erich Hula (1959), discussing the evolution of collective security, argues that by realising 
that the ideal of an international community of power, organised upon the pattern of the 
national community, is beyond reach... 
We [the US] have turned to the device, employed in traditional diplomacy, of balancing 
power against power. We try, accordingly, to ensure the global equilibrium between our 
forces and those of potential enemies by means of national armaments and defensive 
alliances. 
Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Ed. by Arnold Wbftrs., 1959 p. 75 
Hula's argument is reinforced by Thompson (1965) who stated that the rock bottom 
principle upon which collective security if founded provides that an attack on any state will 
be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the simple doctrine of one for 
all and all for one (balancing power against power). Thompson partly explains why states 
should join collectively for their security by adding: "War anywhere, in the context of 
article 11 of the League of Nations, is the concern of every state" (From Collective Security 
to Preventative Diplomacy , Ed. by Laurus, J. v p. 
287). 
Self-help and neutrality, according to Thompson (1965), are the antithesis of such a theory. 
However, in a more integrated world such as Europe of the 1990s, a conflict in any part of 
the world can affect conditions of peace in other parts. A disturbance at one point can upset 
the equilibrium at other points, and the adjustment of a single conflict often restores the 
foundations of harmony at other points of the world. The war in the Gulf is a recent 
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example of a war outside Europe which also affected the continent of Europe (in economic 
terms). 
Collective security could be paralleled with what police action does for the domestic 
community. If the individual is threatened or endangered, he/she turns to the legitimate 
agents of law enforcement: the police. Similarly, if a state which is a member of a 
collective security alliance feels threatened, it seeks help and protection from the other 
member states. The legitimate agents of law and enforcement in this case are the binding 
agreements (i. e. article 5 of NATO) and the military help of the other member states. 
Collective security arrangements of the 1990s include NATO, the WEU, the CSCE, as well 
as the EC. Unattributable sources have characterised them as collective security structures 
despite the fact that not all enjoy the characteristics discussed earlier for collective security; 
These options and their likely problems over the next decade are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Collective security may not necessarily be related to sources that suggest the concept 
promoting peace and cooperation through interdependence and common interests. This may 
be the case within the structure but it is often not so outside the structure. Based on Karl 
Von Clausewitz's definition of war as "... the continuation of policy by other means", 
Brezinski (1992) suggested that by extension, the Cold War can be defined as warfare by 
other (non-lethal) means (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, Vol. 7 1, No. 4, p. 48). The main 
actors of the Cold War, NATO and the WTO, were collective security arrangements that 
made policies. In that sense, during the Cold War, collective security organisations, by 
opposing themselves and perceiving each other as threats, were involved in a non-lethal war. 
Therefore, although not promoting peace, the Cold War brought stability to Europe. As 
John Lewis Gaddis (1993) discusses: 
We can now see that the Cold War, the most dangerous, bitter, and protracted rivalry 
between Great powers in modern history, did in time become the most protracted period of 
freedom from Great power war in modern history. Whether or not one approves of the 
means by which it happened, whether or not one even agrees on the way in which it 
happened, the simple fact is that the Cold War did evolve into a Long Peace. Whether the 
Long peace can survive the end of the Cold War is, however, quite another matter. 
(The End of the Cold War, ed. by M. J. Hogan, 1993, p. 21) 
Thompson (1965), refers to the "real issue of collective security" by questioning why the 
implementation of a system logically so flawless, and enjoying such impressive official 
devotion and popular support, should have been accompanied by a period of virtually 
unprecedented collective security. It is a sobering fact that the 19' century was perhaps the 
most peaceful of modern times while the 20th century, by contrast, has been an epoch of 
unparalleled bloodshed ( two World Wars, the Wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan where 
hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives). 
NATO, although an organisation promoting peace as claimed in its preamble, most probably 
caused the creation of its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, and became an important actor in 
the Cold War era of 1949 to 1989. It seems ironic that NATO was formed to create 
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security and stability for Europe but also contributed to the development of the Cold War. Would the WTO have been created if NATO had not existed? What are the reasons for the 
gap between theory and practice, the promise and the performance of collective security? 
Part of the answer is related to threat perception, arms enhancements and not being able to 
predict the future. At the time of NATO's creation, the world was not in peace. Western 
Europeans were perceiving Communism as a threat and the chief consequence of the Second 
World War was the shift from a multi-polar system of dispersed power to bi-polarity (Pugh 
and Williams, Superpower Politics, 1990, p. 176). Therefore with (a) no political solidarity 
in the world; (b) with no common interests for the whole of Europe; and (c) at a changing 
time for the Continent, the promise of collective security and peace promoted 
counter-collective security arrangements and insecurity. If these three points were positive, 
then Europe might have had the major variables mentioned below that deal with the 
preconditions for collective security. At first sight, the task of maintaining external security 
would seem to be a simple one - to defend the state against attacks, to make provision for 
such a contingency and to maximise the state's position in relation to that of potential 
aggressors. By paralleling the state's position with that of an alliance, the objectives have 
more similarities than differences. The alliance, however, though theoretically and 
logistically equal (that is, each member is considered equal), is in fact a hierarchy, the 
order of which is determined by the capability and power potential of individual states, such 
as the case of the Soviet Union in the WTO, or the US in NATO. So far, security policy, 
according to Kakonen (1993), has been dominated by the preferences of those in power. 
There are two approaches to the idea and the reality of collective security that have vied 
with one another in recent years, according to Thompson (1965). The one demands in the 
name of a principle that all nations at all times resist aggression. Its adherents maintain that 
only in this way can the national interests of independent states be protected and served. 
Another approach reaches other conclusions on the basis of opposing concepts and 
principles. In the present state of world affairs, ".. we are told, a policy of collective 
security leads inevitably down the road of general war and universal catastrophe" (Classic 
Readings of International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, p. 301). 
Thompson's approach may seem logical, however can be considered outdated, since the 
policies of the WTO and NATO, as collective security arrangements, did not eventually lead 
to general war and universal catastrophe. However, if the general transformations of 
Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union are seen as the consequence of the 
break-up of a bi-polar collective security world, then tensions in the East could possibly be 
described as catastrophic and war-like, reinforcing Thompson's approach. 
In sum and based on the above discussion, collective security can be defined as "the method 
by which states with common interests combine their efforts to work top-ether in order t 
face a common threat. through an institution of an organisation. " A collective security 
arrangement can provide security for a specific state based on the assumption that an attack 
on that state is considered as an attack on all states included in the collective security 
arrangement. 
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Claude Jr. (1994) states that the definition of collective security may be approached by the 
process of elimination: 
It represents the means for achieving national security and world order which remain when 
security through isolation is discarded as an anachronism, security through seolhelp is 
abandoned as a practical impossibility, security through alliance is renounced as a snare 
and a delusion, and security thrbugh world government is brushed aside as a dream 
irrelevant to reality. 
(Classic Readings of International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shaffitz; 1994, p. 211) 
As Claude Jr. continues (p. 211) v 
... it is the principle that, in the relations of states, everyone is his brother's keeper; it is an international translation of the slogan 'One for all and all for one', it is the proposition that 
aggressive and unlaKful use offorce by any nation against any nation will be met by the 
combinedforce of all other nations. 
Kegley and Wittkopff (1994), offer another definition of collective security with reference to 
alliances: Collective security through alliances are formal associations of states for the use 
(or non use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandisement of their 
members, against specific states. Alliances thus are correlations that adhere to realism's first 
rule of statecraft: to increase military capabilities. States can do this by acquiring arms or by 
acquiring allies, and, throughout history, states have vigorously pursued both methods. 
(Kegley and Wittkopf, 1994, World Politics, p. 466-467). 
Collective security is often viewed as an alternative to competitive alliances and the balance 
of power as a method for preserving peace. Collective security, according to Kegley (1994), 
asks each state to share responsibility for every other state's security. They are to take joint 
action against any transgressor, and all are to act in concert. (World Politics, p. 513). 
During the Cold War, NATO and the WTO were the most popular examples of collective 
security organisations. They were regional alliance systems designed to deter a common 
external enemy. According to Haas (1969), alliances usually come into existence when the 
members are agreed on the identity of the enemy and wish to insure each other against him 
(When knowledge is power, Berkely, University of California Press, 1990). 
1.3 Preconditions of Collective Security 
In contrast to pacific settlement, which is mainly concerned to evoke peaceful attitudes, 
collective security depends upon a positive commitment to the value of world peace by a 
great mass of states. 
According to defence analysts such as Laurus (1965), Pick and Critchley (1974), and 
Cuthbetson and Robertson (1990), the three main preconditions generally accepted among 
others are: 
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- Collective enforcement assumes a situation of peace, on which states with predominant 
strength agree. The unresolved conflict between East and West during the Cold War era 
had prevented the establishment of peace and this is a reason why the 1990s, is characterised 
by many analysts as a unique decade. The WTO no longer exists, Communism is no longer 
perceived as a threat and the states of Europe have developed more promising relations. It 
is a promising time to bind states together for common purposes. 
For example, since the CSCE's creation in 1973, the institution has brought together dozens 
of states to discuss security issues during the time of the Cold War and East - West 
confrontation. It provided an important step for debating such issues on a wide platform. 
- Collective security demands*that states subscribing to the status quo be willing and able 
at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defence at successive points of 
conflict. NATO is probably the best example of this despite the fact that it actually never 
fought a war. NATO, as it included the United States, was considered able militarily to 
confront the WTO and used bases in member states of the alliance such as Greece, Turkey 
and Germany among others. 
The distribution of burden was unequal, however, with the US undertaking major 
responsibilities and the other states operating mainly in a supporting role. This may need to 
change in the 1990s as the demise of the Soviet threat permits a narrower and unilateral 
definition of the national security of the United States; they may replace couective security 
with selective security. "Tired of the Cold War burden, they will look to others to take the 
lead in ensuring the subsequent peace" (Luck-, 1992, Foreign Policy #89, Winter 1992 - 93). 
Contributions from every member of the alliance is a necessity even when - and if - Europe 
takes the lead in any one of the options discussed. The CSCE and the EC do not have 
military objectives or military contributions to their structures which makes it even more 
difficult to stand on their own. The WEU, through NATO, can probably make such a 
provision eventually, whereas NATO enjoys this requirement. 
- Finally, collective security requires, in Thompson's (1965) words: "... that at least the 
major powers enjoy a minimum of political solidarity and moral community". Arguably, the 
US and the Soviet Union lacked this requirement and became opponents on almost every 
level. It is essential that in the 1990s, the US, as the major remaining superpower, helps 
Russia, as well as other Eastern European states, in order to develop a partnership that 
would make both powers acceptable and allow peaceful coexistence under a collective 
security mechanism. America and the West seem in favor of a strong, prosperous and 
democratic Russia that, for the first time in history, will want to be able to live in accord 
with the laws of the civilised, democratic community. According to the Economist (May 6, 
1995), Russia is suspicious of the West while Russia seems unreliable for the West (as a 
partner), parralleling the situation with the one after World War 11 and despite Russia's 
initial stance after the events of 1989. 
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Russian strength will allow us [the Russians] to contribute meaningfully to stability and 
peace 
(Foreign Policy, #88, Fall 1992, Essay, Lukin, V., pp. 74 -75) 
McNamara (1968), explains the importance of political solidarity and moral community at a 
national level, by looking at the United States and Canada: "Here are two modern nations, 
highly developed technologically, each with immense territory, both enriched with great 
reserves of natural resources, each militarily sophisticated and yet divided by an unguarded 
frontier of thousands of miles. There is not the remotest set of circumstances in any tangible 
time frame of the future in which these two nations would wage war on one another. But 
why is that so? Canada and the United States are at peace for reasons that have nothing to 
do with mutual military readiness. We are at peace, because of the vast fund of compatible 
beliefs, common principles and shared ideals" (The Essence of Security, p. 142 - 143). 
Claude Jr. (1994), discusses that the basic requirement of collective security is that the 
premise of the 'indivisibility of peace' should be deeply established in the thinking of 
governments and peoples. The geographical remoteness of aggression is irrelevant; 
Kant's prophetic insight that " the intercourse which has been everywhere steadily 
increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation 
of right in one part of the world is felt all over it" (Classic Readings of International 
Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, p. 213) must be universally acknowledged. 
Examples supporting the above statement can be found when examining the situations in the 
former Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia and Haiti. 
In summary, collective security assumes political solidarity, peaceful cooperation among 
states, the subjective requirement of ft wanting" peace, military option to enforce and protect 
a state's rights (this implies economic vulnerability), and an institution to legally (by 
providing the necessary articles), express these basic principles. 
1.4 Collective Security and Political Union 
The chief practical obstacle to collective security is the political problem deriving from the 
conflict of independent foreign policies. The loyalties and interests of states participating in 
international organisations and collective security systems are of a different order from those 
of individuals taking part in the more intimate communities of the family and state. 
Political Union is what the European Community has tried to achieve throughout the years. 
However, by assuming the difficulty of fifteen different, even interdependent states to reach 
common objectives, then the idea of a more complex collective security system such as 
NATO having to fight a war and requiring some sort of decision-making abilities becomes 
unlikely. 
By examining dec, is ion- making, NATO has enjoyed a good record due to the fact that the 
United States was generally accepted as the superpower leader. In the fear of losing its US 
partner, Europeans backed away from instances such as the European Defence Community 
(EDC) or the WEU and it would be logical to say that if a war occurred in Europe, the 
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United States would probably be able to lead and unite Europeans for a common purpose. The United States presence is still an issue, with governments such as the Netherlands and Great Britain applauding the idea of continuing US involvement in Europe through NATO 
(Algeri, 1993, The European Upion in the 1990s, eds. Wessels, Engel). 
Even though the changes of 1989 have brought about the democratic reform for most states 
in Europe, this does not mean that it would be an easy task for the Continent to unite 
politically. Such an undertaking requires identical threat perceptions and common foreign 
policies and although the setting to do just that is more ideal than that of 1945 which created 
the bi-polar world, it remains a difficult task. It is a unique epoch, as the whole world has 
embarked into a form of cooperation, either political, economic or defence-related, and thus 
gradual steps are necessary as politics and foreign policy matters of each state differ in 
priorities. In addition, it is most likely for Europe to find a "leader" for defence, generally 
accepted, only when, arguably, political union has become a more plausible reality. 
1.5 Summary: Collective security, a necessity 
Security organisatioris such as NATO, the WEU and the WTO have been based upon the 
concepts of collective security and interdependence: 
... recognition of this interdependence means that nations must begin to organise their 
security policies in cooperation with one another. 
(The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982, p. 6) 
The European* environment is changing, and indeed always has and will continue to do so. 
Furthermore, this change is not orderly and moderately predictable like, for example, the 
growth and ageing process of a human being. "It is chaotic, disorderly and difficult to 
predict... " according to Nicholson (1981), (Change and the study of International Relations, 
ed. Buzan and Jones, 1981, p. 173). Collective security can be a way of being able to face 
a possible threat and can provide for stability for Europe, the way NATO and the WTO had 
during the Cold War era. 
The primary benefit of "collective security" through an alliance is security. Security 
benefits, in a mutual defence alliance include chiefly a reduced probability of being 
attacked, greater strength in case of attack and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's 
adversary. The "success" of a collective security mechanism is arguably a difficult matter to 
measure. NATO is considered a successful organisation and has never overtly faught a war. 
It could be that because of this, (never faught a war), it has enjoyed success. The WTO can 
most probably be seen as successful by the Soviets (during the Cold War era), as they were 
the ones leading by force. Arguably, it depends on who is judging a particular institution 
and if that states security concerns could be alleviated through that mechanism. 
Understanding the concept of collective security is essential towards the comprehension of 
the requirements and challenges that the collective security options face in the 1990s. 
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Chapter two deals with European attempts towards collective security between 1945 and 
1989. 
* The concept of Europe, its definition and which states are considered "in or out it, is 
discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The European politico-strategic situation has changed since the late 1980s. This chapter traces 
the problem of European security since the end of WW 11. It discusses the various reasons for 
the formation of NATO, the WEU, the attempt of creating a European Defence Community 
and the division of Europe into superpower blocks. 
European states, although satisfied with the presence of NATO and the United States and their 
involvement in European security after its formation in 1949, embarked on two European 
projects for security, influenced through the treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and the Brussels Treaty 
of 1948. These projects concerned with security were the Western European Union (WEU) 
and the European Defence Community (EDC). Both attempts to build a "Europeanised" 
security structure failed in different ways and for different reasons which will be discussed in 
this chapter, and these only served to reinforce the view that post World War II Europe needed 
a superpower such as the United States on its side. 
The WEU and the EDC were two attempts made to unite Europeans through concern for 
security. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, as well as the European 
Economic Community (EEC), demonstrate other integrative and interdependent in character 
unions whose roles also related to the security of the Continent, albeit indirectly. Collective 
security as well as alliances, whatever their nature, are based on the theory of interdependence. 
Europeans attempted to pool their resources together, therefore limiting the possibility of an 
attack on one another. 
Furthermore, this chapter deals with the reasons for the break-up of the old security order. The 
grip of Soviet imperialism which held Eastern Europe together has now relaxed, releasing 
nationalist energies. Defence structures and military doctrines of states are being re-defined: 
"Everywhere, familiar but outdated ideas from the past are mixed with the uncomfortable but 
inescapable demands of the future" (Klaus Kinkel, German Nfinister of Foreign Affairs NATO 
Review, #5, October 1992, p. 3). 
2.2 Background: Post 1945 Era - Overlay 
The European security complex between 1945 and 1989 became the nut in the nutcracker of a 
global rivalry dominated by the two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The attitude of the Soviet Union to Europe in general, and the problem of Germany as a legacy 
of the War in particular, gave the Europeans the two major reasons to feel threatened by the 
danger of war inherent in the superpower rivalry. In addition, the wars in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan promoted additional tension for the Continent of Europe. 
Fursdon (1980) suggests that the signing of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco on 26 
June 1945 had raised the hope& of the world that at last a formula had been devised which 
could somehow keep the peace for years to come. However, speeches by the Soviet President 
Kalinin in August 1945, followed thereafter by Stalin and Molotov, ominously foreshadowed 
the line of Soviet policy to strengthen "... co-operation between the peace-loving socialist 
powers and to overtake and surpass the most developed countries of Europe and the United 
States. " (The European Defence Community, 1980, p. 20). 
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Keenan, of the United States, stated in 1945: 
1945 - 1989: Europe and European Security 
A basic conflict is ... arising over Europe between the interests of Atlantic sea power, which demand the preservation of vigorous and independent political life on the Eurasian peninsula, and 
the interests of the jealous Eurasian land power which must always seek to extend itself west and 
will never find a place, short of the Atlantic Ocean, where it can, from its own stand-point, safely 
stop. 
Riste, Western Security, 1986, p. 60 
Keenan's assessment of the post-war situation made it clear to the Americans that something 
had to be done to protect Western interests. 
Bown and Mooney (198 1) and Rubinstein (1989) generally agree with the assumption that the 
Europeans were caught in the middle of a "Soviet-Western suspicion". The Soviets were 
interested in extending their military power westward into the centre of Europe and 
transforming the social, economic and political order of the states influenced. In addition, 
President Truman stated on 12 March 1945 that it must be the policy of the United States to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. "I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own 
way" (Cold War to Detente, 198 1, p. 16 - Soviet Foreign Policy since 1945, p. 69 respectively) 
Fursdon (1980) and Riste (1986) argue that Germany, as a legacy of war was also a perennial 
preoccupation not only of European statesmen, but also of the two superpowers. Furdson 
argues that it was clear that the key to the future of Europe lay in a solution to the German 
problem (Fursdon, p. 12). A joint US chiefs-of-staff analysis in April 1947 summarised the 
dilemma that without German aid, the remaining states of Western Europe could scarcely be 
expected to withstand the armies of their ideological opponents. Riste (1986), adds that the 
complete resurgence of German industry was essential for the economic recovery of France 
whose security is inseparable from the combined security of the United States, Canada and 
Great Britain (Riste, Western Security p. 72). 
According to Buzan (1990), by the late 1940s, Europeans were appealing to the United States 
to rescue them from a threat of a continental empire, posed by the Soviets and the fear of 
Germany. The Soviets had taken their military position at the 1945 cease-fire line as an 
opportunity to reconstruct in their own image the governments of the five states (Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania) plus East Germany under their occupation. 
The "assistance" Truman had mentioned in his speech was the initial step of American 
involvement in European affairs. The second step that effectively promoted US interests in 
Europe was the Marshall Plan. Hogan (1989) and Kirsanov (1975) suggest that the Marshall 
plan rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential 
to the long-term interests of the United States. Policy makers in the Truman administration 
were convinced that a "dynamic economy" at home required American trade and investment 
abroad, which in turn required the reconstruction of the major trading partners in Europe and 
their reintegration into a multilateral system of world trade. By doing this, the US would be 
able to play a role in the Continent and also promote their own interests. Gimbel (1976) also 
suggests that action on European recovery was urgent as George Marshall, the one who 
proposed of the plan, was convinced that the Russians wanted to delay European recovery - 
perhaps for the political advantage that economic chaos would provide to the communists 
(Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, 1976, p. 8). 
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The Marshall plan through its economic character can be perceived, apart from a mere charity 
offer to Europe, as an American action that could give them a reason to promote their own defence concerns, a thought discussed by Hogan (1989), Gimbel (1976) and Lane (1987). 
The Soviet pressure on the straits, Iran and Northern Greece made possible a Soviet break-through 
which might open three continents to Soviet penetration. 
Under-secretary of State Acheson, (Lane, The Post War World, 1987, p. 26 1) 
According to Gimbel (1976), the Marshall plan could possibly control or serve as a German 
stabiliser. The United States, through the Marshall plan, would publicly declare its willingness 
to have its zone of Germany collaborate in European recovery. Transactions between 
Germany and other European states as well as German production could be monitored by the 
US (Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, p. 250). 
The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall aid plan and the later formation of NATO on one hand and 
the formation of the WTO and COMECON on the other were the steps that cut Europe in half, 
creating the basis of the Cold War and made the question of European security one to be dealt 
with by outsiders: The US and the Soviet Union respectively. 
Pugh (1992) argues that the apparent durability of the Cold War was attributed to the division 
of Europe and the creation of two German states, the conventional military power of the two 
alliances and the threat of nuclear war (European Security- towards 2000, p. 7). Essentially, the 
European security complex was dominated by "non-Europeans" between 1945 and 1989. 
NATO, as Kaplan (1970) argues, was both a cause and a consequence of developing 
international bipolarity (Great Issues of International Politics, p. 124). 
Despite both structures' (NATO - WTO) membership policies as stated in both treaty preambles 
(open to all states of Europe), their memberships were limited and became a main factor 
causing the division of Europe into superpower blocs. Did not the Europeans seek a security 
structure of their own without outsider influence? The post-1945 European security complex 
had as a requirement the need of superpower assistance generally accepted in the literature. 
However, the Western Europeans made two attempts to acquire European security by 
Europeans, for Europeans: the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defence 
Community (EDC). Did these structures have the requirements needed at the time of their 
formation to become critical for European security concerns? And what are their similarities 
with the post- 1989 era? 
The Western European Union (WEU) 
The WEU was an idea suggested before the formation of NATO and has its origins in the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948, Cahen (1989) states that the origins and immediate purpose of the 
Brussels Treaty were concerned with security, but the circumstances in which it was conducted 
as well as its title and content clearly indicate its role in the general process of building a United 
Europe (The WEU and NATO, p. 2). The 1954 Protocol, modifying and completing the 
Brussels Treaty, admitted the FRG and Italy to the Organisation and replaced its explicit 
anti-German dedication with an anodyne statement of purpose: "To promote the unity and 
encourage the progressive integration of Europe. " 
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It went on to establish a Council of Western European Union, giving each member state one seat, which would in turn direct the mechanism that was the WEU's real raison defre - the so-called Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA). 
However, with the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1948, the treaty's implementation and the subsequent establishment of NATO, the organisation gave up the defence structures and transferred its military activities to NATO. This was achieved through Article 4 of the protocol 
modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty on October 23,1954 which prevented the WEU from duplicating the work of NATO staff. 
Analysts such as Alford and Hunt (1988), and Cahen (1989), argue that due to the fact of the WEU not being able to take on responsibilities from NATO made the WEU subservient to NATO and in a way made it fall into oblivion. At the time of the WEU's creation (1948 - 1954), the Europeans were reconstructing and the time was ripe for Europeans to secure 
themselves. Communism was looming and the idea of breaking away from NATO, or giving 
the WEU additional responsibilities could have made the Americans withdraw from Europe, 
and the Europeans did not seem ready to take that chance. As Ullman (1991) and Frost and 
Mchallan (1992) argue, the elaborate institutional arrangements and processes set in motion by 
the WEU protocols were scarcely necessary. West Germany's rearmament (a major concern 
for Europe's security after World War 2) proceeded slowly. By the time its forces came 
anywhere near their stipulated WEU ceiling, they had become mainstays of NATO's strength, 
and a solid community of trust had developed between Bonn and its WEU partners, who were 
also partners in NATO and, following the British entry in 1973, the European Community. The 
WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), far from being the ever-vigilant 
watch-dog that the drafters of its charter had in mind, soon found itself a bureaucracy without a 
mission. 
Unwin (1990) describes the WEU as an "essentially paper organisation" demonstrating its lack 
of dominance in the European scene and reinforcing its subservience to NATO. However, 
analysts suggest a new, dominant and responsible role for the WEU in the 1990s, due to the 
change of the European scene and to further assist European integration. The Maastricht 
Treaty of 1991 (in articles JI and J2) sets a deadline (1996) for the WEU to take over - up to a 
certain point - new tasks and replace the old security structure, by providing a European 
platfofm for security. 
The interesting point to make about the WEU is the structure's attempt to become an actor in 
European security despite its limited membership (Figure 1) and lack of superpower assistance 
at the time that hampered its achievements. 
The European Defence Community (EDC) 
The EDC was the object of a long series of negotiations stretching from the presentation of the 
Pleven Plan on October 24,1950 to its final rejection by the French National Assembly. 
The EDC was a far-reaching architectural scheme - not only for European Security but for 
European governance, The Pleven Plan called for a European army in which contingents 
supplied by the participating states would be incorporated ... at the 
level of the smallest possible 
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unit. " and controlled by a European Minister of Defence, (Frost and Mchallan, In Search of Security, 1992, p. 48). 
The land-force components of the so-called European Defence Forces would consist of fourteen French divisions, twelve German, twelve Italian, and five from the Low states, all 
under one flag, wearing a common uniform, and brought together in mixed corps. 
Because the sphere of responsibility lay at the core of national sovereignty, the EDC was 
widely regarded as the embryo of a true European government. Sovereignty seemed so much 
at stake as the French National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC treaty on August 30,1954. 
Professor G. L. Williams (1991) parallels the EDC attempt of 1950 - 54 with 1990s European 
quest towards security. The essential question, according to Williams, is whether the so-called 
"Europeanist approach" which would, in practice, entail little or no involvement by the United 
States in the defence of Europe, would (at the time) or should (in the 1990s) prevail over the 
"Atlanticist" approach which stresses European defence links with the United States, and the 
ascendancy of American strategic doctrines (The Logic of Diversity, p. 5). The similarities of 
both eras are discussed. 
American troops at the time of the EDC proposal were engaged in a war in South Korea, 
re-awakening fears of communism in the Western world and leaving a gap in America's military 
presence in Europe, a fact which raised doubts as to the effectiveness of trans-atlantic security 
in the event of an attack on Europe. Europeans had their first reason to search for a more 
"Europeanised" approach to European defence. 
The Germans were pressing for rearmament and the EDC was a proposal to rearm Germany 
and give Europeans a defensive dimension. Monnet (1978) argues that the United States 
would be prepared to listen to France if she expressed such ideas in the form of a positive and 
practical plan ( Memoirs, p. 340). 
Van der Harst (1986) and Furdson (1980) demonstrate the fears of certain European states of 
breaking away or scaring away United States' assistance and NATO. Despite the ambitious 
scheme of the EDC to operate in accordance with the undertakings of the Atlantic Pact, the 
Netherlands thought that their interests would be better promoted within NATO, fearing the 
plan would bring about a cleavage in the Atlantic Community (The Netherlands and the 
European Community, p. 2). Experiments such as the EDC might have hampered the 
execution of plans within NATO and placed certain states' commitments to NATO at stake, as 
well as their state's defence. 
Similar fears of breaking away fiýom NATO and searching for a more "Europeanised" security 
structure face Europeans in the 1990s. Williams (1992), Buzan (199 1), Pugh (1992) are some 
of the analysts who state the difficulties, even for the 1990s, of breaking away from NATO. 
Their observations deal with the uncertainties of Europe in the 1990s, the new states being 
formed and the possibility of dealing with nationalist tensions and external threats as illustrated 
by Iraq. 
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Four years after the French proposal for the creation of the EDC, the French assembly voted 
against it, shelving the whole idea and stimulating Fursdon to state that "... the EDC was dead , without even having the honour or the dignity of a funeral oration. "' (The European Defence 
Community -A History, 1980, p. 297). 
The major reasons for the EDC's failure could be seen in a context where a parallel with Europe 
in the 1990s can be drawn. 
1. At the time the EDC was debated, there was no dominant political leadership in 
Europe. The question of who would be in charge and which state would lead the 
possible security structure were left un-answered. There was uncertainty about 
what the next British government would do. The British were also tied up in 
conflict situations around the world. 
France's situation was also rather uncertain; the 4' Republic was left to solve 
problems left by the 3' republic thus creating an unstable French government. The 
Germans were the ones in question of being rearmed, and were thus on probation, 
and this therefore left no generally accepted political leadership in Europe able 
enough to form and run the EDC, without creating possible disputes among its 
European partners. - 
Similarly, the question of leadership is apparent in the 1990s. If the Europeans 
decided to create their own structure and break-away from NATO, or even lead an 
existing structure (NATO or WEU), does it seem possible to do so without raising 
any doubts of leadership? Europe in the 1990s is dealing with existing problems of 
the EC and the implementation of Maastricht. Is it feasible for the Europeans to 
embark on such a project (leading to a European defence structure) without creating 
problems and being acceptable by all European statýes? Lacouture (1993) stated in 
Time Magazine (July 12,1993): "In the history of the world, I cannot think of a 
period where they have been so few great leaders. Are they here and we are not 
aware of them? " The American Enterprise Alfagazine (1993), documents the case. 
Large majorities of polling samples in every G-7 state except Japan express 
unhappiness with the directions their nations are taking: 71% in the US, 70% in 
Canada, 63% in Britain and 61% in France. The surveys bear out a growing sense 
that electorates see their leaders not as temporarily lost path-finders but rather as 
"Empty suits". (Time Magazine, July 12,1993, p. 14). 
2. The EDC discussed the idea of a United Army but did not set political objectives. 
Who would command the army? In order to have a military strategy, political 
objectives and methods are required. According to Stares (1991), a major 
component for a security structure concerns the adequacy of the command system 
that an alliance can establish to warn of threatening developments, harness its 
collective military power to deter attack and orchestrate its defensive operation 
should deterrence fail (Command Performance, p. 1). The EDC lacked these 
requirements and could be characterised as an optimistic attempt for European 
security only half a decade after the end of WW` H. 
Similarly, these requirements need to be met in the 1990s for Europe and need to be handled 
with sensitivity. The topic of leadership and command with set political objectives require 
common foreign policies up to a certain point creating an additional problem for Europeans, 
who have been trying to reach economic integration for almost four decades now. 
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The EDC planners seemed not ready to take the responsibility of replacing the Americans by 
creating their defence community. The pressing question of abandoning American support lies 
with Europe today and is discussed in chapter 4. 
Membership figure I 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
WEU: Western European Union 
CSCE: Conference in Security and Co-operation in Europe 
EU: European Union 
Membership of North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(D Associate member of WEU 
(D Observer at North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(D Observer in WEU 
0 Observer in CSCE 
(D Participation mspcnded Sourcc: 77mens, Junc 9,1994, P. Z3 
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Europe's second attempt towards a European defence structure had failed and the lessons 
drawn from the EDC adventure must be analysed to parallel them with the situation in the 
1990s and avoid similar problems. 
2.3 Europe in the International System - Interdependence and Europe 
What is Europe? .... Thought that is never contended. 
P. Hazard, The Recovery ofEurope, 
ed. R. Mayne 1970 
The question of Europe is essential for the overall understanding of the Continent's security 
pressures. After WW II, the Continent found itself in the middleof two opposing superpower 
structures: The United States and the Soviet Union. The US emerged undisputedly as the 
strongest military and economic power. Its leaders had to come to accept, as Unwin (The 
Community and Europe, 1992, p. 13) argues, that it had, even if only for the sake of its own 
security and prosperity, global responsibilities which could not be evaded. 
Europe had an identity which was divided into two opposing blocs. Its geographical security 
was dependent upon two outside superpowers. Therefore, Europe's security was affected by 
the character and structure of the international system. Buzan (1990), argues that the stability 
and character of the international system are deeply affected by what happens in Europe. "At 
no point in this century, or the previous one, has European security been a subject confined to 
the interests of Europeans" (The European Security Order Recast, p. 45). 
Arguably, with the formation of European communities such as the ECSC and the EC, the 
member states emphasised the alienation of Eastern Europe by its absorption into the Soviet 
sphere after 1945. The European communities were becoming a narrow European vision and a 
new possibility to count as a great power, based and built on the theory of interdependence. 
Rosenau (1980) suggests in a theoretical context that: 
... the more societies, cultures, economies and politics 
become interdependent, the less do the 
resulting conflicts lend themselves to resolution through military threats and actions. 
The Study of Global Interdependence, p. 41 
Keohane and Nye (1977, p, 75) state* 
In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by 
external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. 
Interdependence in world politics refers to the situations characterised by reciprocal effects among 
countries or actors in different countries. 
A characteristic of complex interdependence stated by Keohane and Nye which is relevant to 
the study has to do with military force. The assumption is that military force 
is not used by 
governments towards other governments within the region, or on the 
issues, when complex 
interdependence prevails. The ierm "complex interdependence" entails various characteristics 
of an alliance such as economics and politics along with defence. 
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Unattributable sources suggest that European Security since 1945 was believed to be 
achievable though economic interdependence. This was the case of the ECSC and the EEC. 
The ECSC was the first major post-war step towards European integration. Borchard (1990) 
states that the ECSC's preamble expressed the resolve firstly to create "real solidarity" through 
practical achievements and by establishing an Economic Community to create the basis for a deeper and broader community among peoples, thus suggesting the treaty's defensive concerns 
between France and Germany, channelled though economic interdependence. 
Duchene and Cockfield (1990) reinforce the above argument and add that the whole idea of 
European integration was to achieve political union and thus have commonly accepted 
European security. Political union was to be achieved through economic integration. The 
member states had enmeshed themselves in a network of interdependencies which press even 
more tightly on their freedom of action, therefore suggesting less probability of members 
coming against each other. 
In more recent studies, Martin (1991) and Pinter (1991) argue that the movement towards 
Political Union was not abandoned with the creation of the EEC; "It was instead channelled 
into the economic field. " Political union which is a requirement for common European security 
was - and still is -a key factor missing from the puzzle of a common European defence 
structure and the member states are aware of this fact, as their attempts to reach PU through 
the EC suggest. 
The preambles of both the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty demonstrate their concern for 
European security: 
ECSC: 
Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts ... convinced that the 
contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make ... is indispensable to the maintenance 
of peace relations ... to raise the standard of living and further works of peace ... to substitute 
for 
age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create a broader and deeper 
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts ... 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 1987 
Abridged Version, p. 19 
EEC: 
... resolved 
by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and 
calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts. 
Treaties establishing the European Communities, 1987 
Abridged version, p. 120 
Martin (1991), in his study Europe, an Ever Closer Union, argues that "European Political 
Union has been the theoretical goal ever since the first modern conception of the European 
Community" which supports the argument of the EEC being not only an economic union, but 
more than that. 
It has taken the EC several decades to reach this goal and part of the explanation lies with the 
assumption that Europeans felt comfortable with the idea of NATO acting as a deterrent not 
only from external threats, butalso among themselves. Only after 29 years (1957 - 1986) of 
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efforts towards economic union did the Europeans discuss common foreign policy and political 
union explicitly through the Single European Act (SEA). 
Article 224 of the EEC treaty obliges member states to consult each other with a view to taking 
united steps to minimise disturbance to the functioning of the common market by measures that 
a member state may need to take in the event of 
0 serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order; 
0 war or serious international tension constituting the threat of war; or 
in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining 
peace and international security. 
Lodge (1989, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, pp. 224 - 225), 
commenting on Article 224, argues that the term "security" was recognised as having economic 
dimensions with the result that the member states could not credibly reserve exclusively to 
themselves the pursuit of high politics and diplomacy, a reality privately recognised years ago 
through the Article, and a degree of cooperation in defence matters may be inferred from this. 
The ECSC, EDC, EEC, WEU and NATO are "interdependent" structures in nature, that 
qualify as examples of Rosenau's, and Keohane and Nye's theories of interdependence. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the broader the security structure, the less likely the threat 
since within a broad structure states would not act against one another. 
Roland Stromberg (1965), reinforcing the interdependent nature of collective security, 
associates with it the following assumptions: 
All international disputes are subject to peaceful, just, satisfactory settlement; 
Nations are for the most part inclined to peace, not war; 
The inclination to war is everything: war results only when at least one side is guilty 
of a deliberate aggressive action; 
Since wars are always caused by a deliberate aggressor, this must be checked in its 
first stages if it will lead on to even greater aggression; the incipient criminal will 
certainly become a hardened one if not caught in time. 
As an inference from the last two points, all states have an obvious stake in a war no 
matter where it may 9ccur, and will, if they understand their interests properly, join 
in helping to suppress it (Joel Laurus, editor, Erom Collective Security to 
Preventative Diplomacy, p. 277). 
Undoubtedly, NATO enjoyed these characteristics and these also existed up to a certain point 
in the EEC and the ECSC. The EDC as well as the WEU were not prepared to handle an 
international dispute, as both European attempts failed (literally in the case of the EDC), to 
satisfy all member states. The above assumptions include political thinking and appropriate 
leadership. Only NATO, as an example, satisfies most requirements. 
When states pool resources to form an economic or political union, they need one another to 
face external threats, or in other instances would most probably consult one another before 
harming anyone in order to keep the union in peaceful terms. An example arises by suggesting 
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the unlikely event of one member threatening another of the same union either in the EU or NATO. Whether this is achieved successfully or unsuccessfully is a different question. Analysis of each structure is required before an attempt is made to answer the above question. 
2.4 The Post WWH Era Transition: Reasons 
The transition of the post World War 2 era was a rapid phenomenon taking place immediately 
after 1989. A whole array of internal and external forces, some of them in the making for 
several decades, had been pushing in that direction. The internal forces in Eastern Europe, 
according to Buzan (1990) included: 
The growing demoralisation, corruption and incompetence of community parties 
(e. g. Rumania, Soviet Union); 
2. The loss of economic momentum, and 
3. The consolidation of civil society against communist rule. 
During 1989, the internal balance of forces in Eastern Europe underwent fundamental change. 
From late 1989 onwards the process of German unification bridged Eastern and Western Europe 
and dealt a massive blow to overlay by removing its keystone. 
Buzan, 1990, p. 41 
The external forces are related with the "change" in attitude of the former Soviet Union under 
President Gorbachev which lowered threat perceptions in both Eastern and Western Europe, 
the different stance that the United States needed to take in order to blend in with their 
improved and developed Western allies - which had also closed the gap between them, and the 
end of the Cold War, with the East conceding and recognising Western political ideals. 
Furthermore, the European Community played its role as an institution that promoted the 
concept of European integration attracting other European states into its system. As Serfaty 
(1992) argues, the revolutions of 1989 celebrated the victory of the Atlantic Community: "the 
end of Europe's ideological division after the liberation of Eastern Europe and the unification of 
Germany, together with (and because oo a mellowed Soviet state anxious to join Europe by 
consent after it had been shown that Europe could not be conquered by force" (Europe in 
Ttansition, Jackson, ed., p. 75) 
The Cold War ended, according to Jackson (1991), when two conditions were fulfilled. First, 
Soviet stakes in Central and Eastern Europe drastically diminished in importance. That 
occurred when the government of Mikhail Gorbachev made clear that the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) would no longer use coercion to maintain in power the Communist 
regimes that Moscow had once imposed upon much of the region. Second, the Federal 
Republic of Germany became a power committed to preserving Central Europe's territorial 
status quo rather than revising it. For the first time, neither the Soviet Union nor the Federal 
Republic of Germany face any problem whose solution might lie in the use of military force 
beyond its own state frontiers (Jackson, Europe in Transition, 199 1, p. 13 8). 
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The change in the Soviet attitude under Gorbachev brought with it the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War, and the decline of Communism. "Even a year ago, we could scarcely have imagined the extent and the speed of the changes which have since swept the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and now East Germany" (Thatcher in Freedman, Europe Transformed, 
1990, p. 359). 
The failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union had given the final blow to the tumbling 
communist empire and thus to the post-war world order. In the wake of the coup, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formally dissolved. The legality of the communist party in the Soviet Union on the former territory of the USSR was suspended, and the party was 
outlawed in some of the republics. As Gorbachev pointed out, "The three days in August were 
a real watershed. I sometimes say that what happened before the coup was, so to speak, before 
the new era., and after it was the beginning of a new epoch. " (Rummel, Towards Political 
Union, 1992, p 3). The above citation demonstrates the recognisable change not only for the Soviet Union, but for the whole of Europe. 
Europe is entering a new epoch, the old one shattered by the metamorphosis of Eastern 
Europe. The breakup of the old European structure through the various reasons mentioned 
have created uncertainty and new questions deriving from these reasons need to be examined. 
What would be the new position of NATO and the United States commitment 
towards Europe? 
2. What will be the new role of the European Community as far as security and 
defence matters are concerned? 
3. Which security structures (CSCE, WEU, NATO, EU) merit to be chosen, 
authorised and accepted by European states? 
4. The identification of*a possible threat(s) in order to formulate and organise the 
chosen security regime, 
5. And finally, who will lead the new security arrangement in Europe? 
Kliot ( 1992), characterised the decade of the 1990s as "a world of many consortia in which no 
single actor can dominate the rest, a world of forging coalitions and agreements. " (Kliot and 
Waterman, The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace, 1992, p 38). University of Chicago 
political scientist John J. Mearsheimer discussed in his article "Back to the future* Instability 
after the Cold War" in 1990 that the decade of the 1990s will not enjoy the stability of the Cold 
War era. The future, he hypothesises, will indeed resemble the past. European international 
politics in the decades ahead will be more reminiscent of the turbulent periods before the two 
world wars than the stable period between 1945 and 1990. Europe will be transformed to a 
multipolar system of shifting alignments and complex manoeuvrings for power that will be "far 
less stable than the one the world has known since 1945. " ( Jackson, Europe in Transition, 
199 1, pp. 13 9- 140) 
As the Cold War has come to an end, the post world war two alliances are either disintegrating 
or undergoing profound transformation, promoting a symbiosis of the two Europe's. "... the 
real Europe", as President Mitterand wrote, "... that of history and geography" (Crouch and 
Marquard, The Politics of 1992,1990, p. 38). 
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Cohen (1992), based on the assumption that power is becoming more diffused across the globe, 
draws two diametrically opposed conclusions about prospects for peace. One view is that the 
decline of superpower domination and the rise of economic interdependence means not only far 
less risk of global war, but also presages a general condition of peace and prosperity. The other 
is that there is every reason to assume that the 1990s will be even more unstable, as clashes of 
economic interest supersede or exacerbate territorial or ideological disputes (Khot and 
Waterman, THe political Geography of Conflict and Peace, 1992, p. 18). This view suggests 
that economic interests of regions or states are more likely to trigger conflict than possible 
military threats. 
Hegemonic powers are declining and there is an international reorganisation of our world. 
Hegemony is a condition in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules 
governing interstate relations and is willing to do so (Kliot and Waterman), such as the 
Netherlands (17' century), Britain (18'- 19' centuries) and the United States (mid 20' century). 
Sir Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Prime Minister John Major of Britain, as well as 
Dominique Moisi, Associate Director of the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris, 
reinforce the above argument of a "decline of hegemonic power". At a recent conference in 
Berlin (1991), both Powell and Moisi characterised the United States as a slowly fading 
presence on the European scene. Moisi stated that the Europeans should be prepared for the 
time when there is less America in Europe. "In the immediate future there is no alternative to 
NATO. But in the long-run, the United States interest is to help Europeans to get their act 
together. (Time Magazine, December 9,199 1, p. 2 1), 
With hegemonic power declining in our era, and with the bi-polar world vanished, "Europe" is 
becoming more and more difficult to identify and states are sceptical about taking on 
responsibilities over security concerns. 
With the Eastern European states on their way towards democracy, the Continent, in security 
terms, has acquired new boundaries. Arguably, the European Community member states could 
form one version of "Europe", or the area from Poland to Portugal. Another could suggest 
Europe as the area from the Atlantic to the Urals (based on de Gaulle or on Gorbachev's 
Common European home Perestroika), or the states of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Therefore when the term 
"European security" is analysed, the boundaries of Europe have to be specifically set and 
objectives established. 
The difference between the various security structures are presented. The 16 states that have 
membership in NATO include the United States; the W`EU has a membership of 10 European 
states; the EU, based on article 257 of the Treaty of Rome, consists of 15 states, and 
membership in the CSCE, according to NATO review (1994), has reached 54 states. All of 
them include the term "European" but all set their own different boundaries (Figure 1). 
As far as the EC is concerned, article 257 of the Treaty of Rome states: "Any European state 
may apply to become a member of the EC". It has therefore mattered to governments of 
Turkey and Malta, for example, whether they are considered by their neighbours to 
be included 
in the accepted definition of Europe. The article demonstrates the ambiguity of the 
definition of 
Europe. 
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All these structures could be usied as stepping stones towards the creation of a new security 
structure, or could be transformed and adjusted to meet the needs of the Europe of the 1990s. 
Based on these different options Europeans have in concentrating on an institution, the boundaries of a possible new European Security structure would most probably be based on 
member-states of institutions rather than maps. Security and common defence are matters of 
great concern. If a possible applicant state could contribute towards defence issues or if a 
possible applicant state could be controlled by becoming a member then its acceptance is most 
probable (e. g. US and Germany respectively for NATO in the late 1940s and the newly formed Eastern Republics for NATO's PFP plan in 1994 - discussed in chapter 4). 
2.6 Summary: Time for Europeans to lead their own security? 
The political upheavals of the past few years have fundamentally altered Europe's security 
landscape. Just as after the Napoleonic Wars or in the post-war years after 1918 and 1945, 
Europeans in the 1990s have the task of developing a permanent and just order of peace in 
Europe. Europe is faced with a double challenge. Geographically, it is no longer between two 
unitary military blocs. Instead, to the East of the area covered by the former WTO, new states 
have emerged some of which are still searching for identity and stability. To the West, NATO 
continues to exist. But since the East-West confrontation, which originated primarily from the 
tension between two different value systems and ideologies has concluded, Europe, according 
to many analysts, has to acquire more responsibilities in its quest towards security. After all, 
Europeans are the ones needing security directly. The two attempts for a dominant security 
structure through the WEU and the EDC demonstrate the sensitivity of matters. More 
"European" responsibilities might trigger US support in the wrong direction and the question of 
leadership is also important. By including the various problems discussed in chapter three 
(namely nationalistic tensions, threat perception, Germany and outdated security structures), it 
becomes apparent that the Europeans need to work in order to find a feasible and "accepted by 
everyone" security architecture for the next decades. 
As Manfred W6rner, Secretary General of NATO (1988 - 1994) had argued: 
Indeed, small risks that our democracies find difficult to handle can prove more dangerous in the 
end than massive threats, such as that from the Warsaw Pact, which tend by their very enormity to 
generate political solidarity and military means of deterrence needed to counter them. 
What is European Security after the Cold War?, PMl publication, December 1993, p. 5 
Finally, the various attempts towards security between 1945 and 1989 were all based on a 
possible, but clear, threat, Germany and the former Soviet Union for NATO, the WEU, the 
EDC, the ECSC and the West for the WTO. A number of the above organisations continue to 
exist, but clear threats are not evident, making the whole issue of European security uncertain. 
Chapter 3 deals with the various issues Europe may face in the 1990s, as well as the essential 
topic of threat perception. European attempts towards common security were based on 
perceptions of threat, The major changes in the European Continent since 1989 have created a 
new Europe, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, has the importance of threat 
perception effaced despite the end of the Cold War? 
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The European political-strategic situation has changed over the past few years. The threat 
of massive attack from the USSR and its satellites has receded and the emergence of new 
risks - the violent nationalist sentiments associated with instability , intrinsic to the historic 
changes - are taking place in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Gulf crisis proved that 
threats now facing Europe no longer come from only one direction, and has provided 
tangible evidence of the danger of a proliferation of weapons of man destruction. (NATO 
Review, #3, June 1992) 
The aftermath of the Cold War has created new problems for Europe. The Continent in the 
1990s is required to deal with various pressures that require solutions and close attention: 
What will happen to European Integration and the Maastricht agreement? How should 
Europeans deal with the nationalist tension in the former Yugoslavia? Should NATO 
continue to be involved? Should NATO continue to exist at all, since its former opponents, 
the WTO and Communism no longer exist? What about the threat of Germany which seems 
(as a state), much stronger re-unified and lies in the centre on the Continent? These 
unprecedented questions/developments have convinced even hard-headed pragmatists that a 
crucial turning point in world affairs has now been reached. 
Arguably, the Continent has entered an era of insecurity and a period of "cold peace" (a 
character isation by M. Pugh, 1991). This chapter deals with four major problems 
confronting Europeans today: 
- The problem of perceiving new threats (vital for the organisation and management of a 
security structure); 
- The problem of choosing between a Europeanist or 
Atlanticist response, (e. g. should 
NATO depart from Europe along with US assistance? ); 
- The problem of German unification as a threat 
for stability in Europe; and finally, 
- The problem of Europe in the post Cold 
War era being managed by Cold War structures 
(e. g. NATO, WEU). 
By examining these problems, a picture of European security dilemmas can be acquired to 
comprehend the nature of the problems being faced by the alternatives discussed 
in chapter 
4. 
3.2 Threat Perception: A Definition 
Research in international crisis takes it for granted that a perception of threat is central to the 
overall phenomenon. Hermann (1979) cites the threat to 
"high-priority goals of the 
decision-making unit as one of the three defining characteristics of International crisis" 
(Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis p. 3). Threat perception is, if anything, the 
decisive intervening variable between event and reaction in international crisis. 
For when 
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threat is not perceived, even in the face of apparently objective evidence, there can hardly be a mobilisation of defence resources. Conversely, threats may be perceived and measures 
taken, even when the supposed opponent possesses no malicious intent. This could enable 
alliances or states to have the appropriate readiness. 
Similarly, states form alliances to pool resources with others facing a common threat. For 
example, emerging from World War 11, the common threat to the Western democracies was 
two-fold according to Sharp (1991, After an American Withdrawal): a resurgent Germany 
and an expansionist USSR . Initially, the German threat loomed larger, as reflected in the language of the 1947 Anglo-French treaty of Dunkirk and the 1948 Brussels Treaty. After 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the communist-controlled coup in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
the Soviet threat began to dominate West European perceptions, and statesmen on both sides 
of the Atlantic looked for certain structures that would secure them defensively. Hence, 
NATO and the WTO were created. 
When there is a reasonable idea of both the nature of threats, and the vulnerabilities of the 
objects towards which they are directed, the importance of common security as a policy 
problem may become easier to comprehend. As Buzan (1991) states, 
"insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities, and the two cannot 
meaningfully be separated. " 
The European Security Order Recast, p. 112 
The period of the Cold War was probably the most dangerous phase of the "imaginary" war 
(as KaIdor characterises it), a period when the two sides, the US and the Soviet Union, 
seemed closest to real war. Both sides could be said to have been testing out the boundaries 
of their systems, exploring limits, feeling their way towards the set of rules and regulations 
which would govern their behaviour. Both the Soviets and the Americans perceived each 
other as threats, and when threat perceptions are clear, as they were between the Soviets and 
the Americans, security structures can become a more plausible reality. 
By defining threat perception as "the expectation that another state will be harmful in a 
specific way" this could be elaborated, adding that it also involves evidence of two kinds: of 
capability to do harm and on intent to do it. Knorr (1979), one of the first theorists to 
analyse the topic suggests: "Threat perceptions rest on estimates of the past and present. 
These estimates are inferences from usually fragmentary, opaque and contradictory bits of 
information. Second, these perceptions concern the future, and there can be no reliable 
information about this future" As Cohen (1979) adds, "... thus, threat perception is above 
all cognitive construct which creates an image of reality; it is a device, a hypothesis" (Threat 
Perception in International Crisis, Cohen, ed., p. 9). 
The US hypothesis after the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the communist-controlled coup in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was concerned with the Soviets and communism as the perceived 
threats towards Western Europe, which in turn could also become threats to the United 
States. As Lister (1974) states (commenting on the "rules" of the Cold War game), in his 
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third rule: The Herman Kahn rule - "Each side must act on the assumptions that the other harbours the worst possible intentions towards it" (The Cold War, p. 65). Cohen also discusses that threat perception in international crisis is doubtless analogous to threat 
perception in everyday life. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics peculiar to international politics which suggest that caution is required when rigidly applying 
conclusions taken from the spheres of individual and social psychology. On the whole, for 
example, threats perceived in international crisis are to central value of the state which the decision makers represent, rather to the state's own private interests. However, it is of value 
to note that common perceptions of threat among states - through alliances - may affect a 
state's initial perception or level of importance of a certain concern due to the socialising 
effect of legislation. Through the platform of an alliance, a number of states are called upon 
on giving their views and possible ways of confrontation on possible scenarios. In the 
process, a whole array of views are closely looked at and in order to reach common 
positions and speak with one voice (that of the alliance), a state may require to give 
additional importance to a matter that most probably would not affect that specific state 
directly, but would affect another member. Legislation therefore can also affect a state's 
perception of threat, through the "social" nature of an alliance or a collective security 
mechanism. 
Border threats and invasions are recurrent and familiar objects of international concern, and 
state perceptions are likely to be-widely analogous. In many cases, the threatening event or 
constellation of events can be found to contain wholly new elements. One may be able to 
discover historical precedents for the crisis, but this does not alter the likely originality of 
the phenomenon from the point of view of the perceiver (Threat perception in International 
Crisis, p. 13, Cohen, R. ). The above citation implies the unpredictability of world events. 
Examples such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 
and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 suggest the uniqueness of events, substantially 
different from anything that had gone on before. Thereforel the difficulty defence analysts 
have had throughout the century - and are constantly having in trying to perceive future 
threats - becomes somewhat clear. The bottom line, according to analysts such as Knorr, 
Cohen (1979), and Lister (1974), is to work one's assumptions and defend yourself. 
Jervis (1989), relates the perception of threat with psychology. In order to determine what 
leads states to perceive others as threats, it is necessary to examine cases in which this 
perception is absent as well as cases in which it is present. The most obvious way, according 
to Jervis, for states to judge whether others are a threat would be by monitoring capabilities. 
Although capabilities are rarely ignored, they do not determine the image that is formed. On 
one hand, the United States could easily destroy Britain, France and Germany, yet those 
states do not fear a United States attack. Britain and France could inflict grave damage on 
the United States, but the United States wants to see those states increase rather than 
decrease their arms. In the same way, as Jervis continues, "it is extremely worrisome to find 
another state spending great sums of money for a project that can be justified only if war 
occurs" ( Psychology and deterrence, Jervis, Lebow, Stein, 1989, p16). Singer (1958) 
argues that for another state to be perceived as a threat, it must be seen as having both the 
capability and the intent to interfere with goal attainment. "Why would they have all those 
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arms if they didn't intend to attack us? " (Classic Readings in International Relations, Pruitt 
and Snyder essay, Williams, P., Goldstein, D., and Shafritz7 J., eds., p. 358). 
Singer (1957), provides a definition of threat which summarises the above arguments: Threat, according to his estimation, "arises out of a situation of armed hostility in which 
each body of policy - makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further, 
each assumes that such designs will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated 
gains seem to outweigh estimated losses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its national 
security and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. 
To state the relationship in quasi - mathematical form: 77treat perception = Estimated 
capability x Estimated intent" (Threat Perception in International Crisis, Cohen, ed. p. 5). 
Knorr (1976), provides the factors that may lead to a underestimation of threat, facilitate the 
perception of threat and encourage, as pointed out by Jervis (1988), misperception. There is 
some overlapping here, but the following predispositions seem to be of recurrent 
importance: First, there are the predetermined expectations and beliefs of individuals 
(emotional factors, personality of the decision maker); 
Second is the past experiences of societies that have been subject to repeated attack and 
military pressure. Conversely, societies that are basically unfamiliar with the new opponent 
may disregard evidence of danger; 
Third is the present experience of societies faced by an opponent whose military strength is 
either greater or growing relative to that of the perceiver (Threat Perception in Historical 
Dimensions of National Security Problems, Knorr, ed., p. 78). The above arguments of 
threat are related to threat perception of common security structures and alliances, as when 
threats are common, and common interests exist among the various member states, these 
states may pool their resources together to face that common threat, as stated in chapters I 
and 2, even if it is misperceived. 
The above discussion may suggest that capabilities can affect a states' perception of threat 
when the impact of international history is also examined. Furthermore, people are strongly 
influenced by events that are recent, that they or their state experienced first-hand, and 
events that occurred when they were first coming to political awareness. The lessons people 
learn are usually oversimplified and overgeneralised - they expect the future to resemble the 
past. "So if a state recently fought an aggressor, it will be prone to see states it later 
encounters as threats" (Jervis, 1976, Threat Perception in Historical Dimensions of National 
Security Problems, Knorr, ed., p. 22). If a states' political history can characterise the state 
as an aggressor at one recent time, other states cannot easily refuse to take that into account. 
This is why Germany remains a topic that is examined as it concerns European Security, 
and why the United States, at least as far as the West is concerned (especially during the 
Cold War) is not seen as a threat despite the state's capabilities. History and impact in 
international politics play a role in the perception of a threat. 
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" We will soon miss the (stability of) Cold War" 
Mearsheimer (1990), The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 26, #2, p. 35 
The question of restoring even an independent European security dynamic, let alone a 
globally dominant one, was quickly swept aside as the new bipolar power structure made 
itself felt after 1945. Perceptions of threat became more clear and the European security 
complex was defined primarily by the common fate of its overlay by the superpowers. 
Western Europeans were appealing to the United States to rescue them from the threat of a 
continental empire, posed by the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, 
currency reform in West Germany, the Berlin Crisis, the founding of COMECON, the 
founding of NATO, the failure of the EDC, the recruitment of West Germany into NATO 
and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact rapidly drew nearly all of Europe into rival 
superpower blocs. Many analysts argue that the bipolarity formed was the major deterrent 
factor that avoided a third world war: One state threatens harm to another state (US-NATO) 
in order to get the latter to do (or refrain from doing) an aggressive act (SU - WTO). 
Sometimes threat works as the threatener intends. A relevant example is the Cuban Missile 
crisis of 1962. American threats to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba by force led the 
Soviets to dismantle their missile bases as the United States demanded. 
Like the Soviet Union, the United States had interpreted the second World War as justifying 
a need for a forward defence policy in the post-war era. The Soviets had not hesitated to 
establish their own bases in Eastern Europe, and the United States did not take long to blend 
the NATO commitment into its own security desire for forward defence (Buzan, 1991, 
People States and Fear, p. 37). 
If there is a historical analogy to NATO, it is to the other basic kind of alliance, which is 
typified by the coalitions engaged in the conflict between Athens and Sparta. In both cases, 
as Cuthbertson and Robertson (1990) suggest, quite large numbers of sovereign states allied 
over relatively lengthy periods, with some sort of peacetime structure. (The Treasury at 
Delos represents the organisation in the Greek case). In both cases, one side (Athens/United 
States) headed a relatively democratic alliance, dominating by economic strength rather than 
military-political supremacy. The other side (Sparta/USSR) led more tightly controlled, 
much weaker client states. Even the languages of conflict, centring on the values offreedom 
and pluralism is common with the situation during the Cold War (Cuthbertson and 
Robertson, Enhancing European Security, p. 69). 
In both situations (Ancient Greece and the post World War 11 era), the organisations and the 
pooling of resources were made to face clear threats. Their perceptions were evident and 
it 
seems logical to assume that the organisation, role definition and 
institutional structures are 
easily formed facing clear and common threats, unlike the situation 
in Europe after 1989 
where Europeans, as well as the United States are 
having trouble "finding" an enemy. 
Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada 
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stated on the eve of the superpower summit in Moscow in 1988: "We are going to do 
something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy " (Pugh, 1992, European Security - Towards 2000, p. 1). Indeed this deprivation, and the political dramas in central and Eastern Europe during 1989-90, were important reasons that caused the Cold War system to disintegrate. 
Threat Perception in the 1990s 
Ramsbotharm and Miall (1991) state that the nature of any security policy is conditioned by 
the nature of the perceived threat or threats that it is there to meet. They discuss three types 
of threats in the 1990s: 
I Threats within Europe; 
2 Threats to Europe from the outside; and 
3 Global threats. 
Among threats within Europe they include the residual Soviet Union along with its nuclear 
power. Although the demise of the Warsaw Pact was welcomed, there is great uncertainty 
about the future. In central and'Eastern Europe the resulting security vacuum increases 
nervousness about a re-nationalisation of local armed forces at a time of mounting pressure 
from ethnically displaced peoples. And there are two hundred-year-old fears of Russian 
military power on one side and German revanchism on the other. The increasing economic 
power of Germany arouses deep apprehension -a fear, it must be said, also shared by some 
observers in the West such as Gunter Grass ( 1990, The Case Against Unification, ). 
A relevant example among threats to Europe from the outside, according to Ramsbotharm. 
and Miall (1991) would be Middleastern fundamentalism. Culture and religion are widely 
seen to have been scorned and violated by the West, the economic interests of the bulk of 
the Arab populations to have been thwarted by the unholy alliance between Western 
capitalists and oil-rich sheiks. A possible attack against Turkey would trigger NATO to 
become involved. In addition, the situation that led to war in the Gulf in 1991, drew in 
many European powers as well as the United States. Europeans need to be ready to deal 
with these at any certain point in time. A study by Newsweek argues that Europe is 
becoming the new frontier of Islam. "NATO secretary - general Willy Claes and Stella 
Remmington of Britain's M15 have gone so far as to call radical Islam the geopolitical 
menace of the future... Muslims have become a favourite target for racist attacks by skin - 
heads and neo - fascist rhetoric from right wing politicians. " According to Newsweek, there 
are 8 to 10 million muslims living in Europe. "Until they learn to live with eachother, 
Europe may face countless years of turmoil" (Newsweek magazine, May 29,1995, p. 12). 
Finally, global threats concern the environment, population growth, food crisis, resource 
scarcity, nuclear abuse and the tendency of science and technology to run beyond human 
control. A relevant example is the US aid towards Somalia in 1992 - 1993. (Note: Such 
global threats are not examined in this study as it is concentrated on threats that are related 
with traditional defence mechanisms (which were concerned mostly with military threats 
from states, based on capabilities and the perception these structures had of intent to use 
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these capabilities). However, if such global threats affect these traditional security 
organisations, these are examined. 
Jacques Delors in an interview to Time magazine, (Dec. 28 1992), summed up his view on 
the threats to Europe's future: 
Nationalism is resurgent. The positive aspect is that there is an identification between 
nationalism and the decline - the disappearance of totalitarianism. But nationalism also has 
a negative aspect. It is like a contagious disease that is spreading everywhere in Europe. 
And that is another reason why there is so much reluctance when it comes to building 
Europe. 
As far as what the EU can do to ease the tensions of nationalism, Delors' response is 
optimistic stating the idea of mustering the political ability to spread the idea of peace and 
mutual understanding. 
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has concentrated people's minds. While it is unlikely 
that ethnic quarrels and nationalistic confrontations elsewhere in Eastern Europe could 
deteriorate in the same way, there are areas of concern such as the fate of the large 
Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia, the disputes among Poles, 
Lithuanians and Ukrainians, Moldova's tendency to seek a closer alignment with Romania, 
the presence of large Russian populations in the Ukraine and some of the Baltic Republics, 
the Turks in Bulgaria and the residues of German minorities almost everywhere else. 
(NATO review, #2, April 1992). 
There exists enough material to alarm even the most optimistic politician. This is one of 
the reasons why a purely regional collective security arrangement faces great difficulties. 
According to Hopple, Rossa and Wilkenfeld (1979), each society has an agenda of active 
issues; "The threat agenda is that part of the general agenda which features issues with a 
potential or actual capacity for harm and ruin. " (Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy, 
McGowan and Kegley, eds., 1979, p. 44). Accordingly, NATO, from 1949 to 1990 
(paralleling the defence structure with a society with a threat agenda), had pin pointed 
threats such as the Soviets and Communism which gave the structure the opportunity for 
readiness at all-times. 
The end of the Cold War offers more than a pressing reason to focus on the future. 
It also 
provides an opportunity to reflect on the lessons of the past. A critical re - evaluation of 
NATO's military posture and policy toward the Soviet threat may seem unwarranted since 
aggression was successfully deterred and the West ultimately prevailed. 
However, NATO's 
practical value can be argued, as the situation in Europe has radically altered. 
The passing of communist rule, as Pugh (1991) states, in Eastern 
Europe, was bound to 
leave wreckage to be cleared up, and to engender political, economic and nationalist 
tensions. In addition, the hopes for a new European security order were 
dented by two 
great crises: 
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First, turmoil in the Soviet Union threatened to unbalance the European system by 
enlarging the power vacuum in the former Eastern bloc. The promise of a reliable Soviet 
partnership in European and global security was threatened by Mikhail Gorbachev's rule by 
decree and deferring to conservative and military support to save the Union. (European 
Security, Towards 2000, p. 1) 
The second crisis, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2 1990, also threatened not only 
to disrupt Europe's integrating processes but in addition, made them (Europeans) think more 
seriously about external threats and their place in the international system. Europeans dealt 
with the problem through the EC, supporting the US commitment to free Kuwait. Had the 
Europeans vital interests to fight in the war? And should European security institutions deal 
with external problems such as the one in Kuwait? 
It is essential for Europeans to identify these threats to help answer the above questions. 
Threat perception can be considered as one of the most important characteristics of a 
security structure. Knowing who to arm against and knowing capabilities are necessary in 
order to formulate policies. NATO and the WTO enjoyed these characteristics and survived 
for four decades, even though they had not fought a war. Possible scenarios for defence 
preparation between NATO and the WTO was a concern for the two structures during the 
Cold War era as Europeans knew their enemies. 
3.3 "Europeanist" or "Atlanticist" 
Two well established schools of thought dominate the current defence debate in Europe. 
The first, as Williams (1992) states, has traditionally been called "Europeanist" stressing the 
so-called "European dimension" -of defence and strategic thinking; the second has, also 
traditionally, been described as "Atlanticist" stressing the European - Atlantic relationship 
and the ascender of American strategic doctrine. (Williams, The Logic of Diversity, #56, 
p. 8) 
Undoubtedly, up until the end of the Cold War, European defence had been character ised as 
"Atlanticist", through the domination of NATO on European Defence matters. Europeans 
made an attempt to Europeanise their defence between 1950 and 1954 with the Pleven Plan 
(EDC) but their attempt was unsuccessful. 
In the 1990s, a twin-pillar European - Atlantic defence effort would link the two in 
perpetuity and equality -a link which arises naturally from the strategic, economic, political 
and cultural convergence between Europe and North America. 
Miguel Herrero de Mino (1992) provides his version of the term "Atlanticism": "In my 
opinion, Atlanticism means promotion of common values which exceed any 
institutions, 
even NATO. Atlanticism means defending the interests and capabilities of the 
Atlantic 
powers, which hold the main responsibility for international security, 
but it does not mean 
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believing in the general usefulness of NATO, and, of course, Atlanticism means maintaining NATO as the cornerstone of Western Security, but without forgetting that the West already has a trilateral structure and the Pacific is its Eastern flank" (Reshaping Europe in the 21st 
century, p. 221, Minon, 1992 ed. by Robertson) 
Minon reinforces Williams' definition but also stresses the point of the member states of NATO having more at stake than defence when leaning towards the US. The problem when 
trying to provide a solution as far as what model to use, has to do with experience as well. NATO, (Atlanticist version) is, historically, an unusual entity. Few alliances have lasted 40 
years in "peacetime", yet NATO shows every possibility of lasting as long again, or longer, 
and never fighting a war. States in Europe would not want to experiment with something 
new when NATO could provide for their defence - at least not yet. Europe in the 1990s 
seems to be preoccupied with the EC and economic integration, therefore it is difficult to 
shift attention in two different areas however interrelated they may be. Maastricht has 
provided new optimism for a "Europeanist" defence, reviving the WEU by setting deadlines 
in the mid 90s. The question is whether NATO can adapt to a post Cold = War 
environment and if the Alliance can become the central element of a transformed security 
organisation. What happens if the EC fails to develop a common foreign and defence policy 
by the turn of the century and the CSCE does not provide the institutional isation required for 
collective security amongst its members? 
Williams (1992), argues that it is crucial, that the pursuit of a possible "Europeanist" 
defence, 
... does not lead to a total rapture with the United States, which is still the centre piece of 
what can be regarded as a nascent international security system upon whom edifice the new 
world political order might yet be erected in the 21' century. 
The Logic of Diversity, p. 10 
As the Atlanticist response to the European security problem, Pugh (1992), Kinkel (1992) 
and Robertson and Cuthbertson (1990) argue that there are many changes to be made to the 
structure. They suggest European command, new relationships with new states and 
amendments on their security concerns (NATO, as an option is discussed in chapter 4). 
NATO continues to be considered irreplaceable for many analysts such as Kinkel (1992): 
It would be foolish for us to think we have no further need of NA TO, an organisation which 
has proved more effective than any other as an instrument of collective defence and in which 
so many common efforts, so much money and so much political energy has been invested. 
NATO Review, Oct. 1992 #5 
Europeans sense the difficulty of providing alternatives, or a Europeanised structure, when 
NATO still provides the best forum for reconciling the differing tendencies which lie in the 
heart of the contemporary defence debate in post Cold-War Europe. The same way NATO 
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dominated the EDC era, when Europeans were sceptical about abandoning NATO, in the 
1990s the thought of abandonmept is related with experience, weak alternative 
"Europeanist" structures and NATO's achievements through 40 years of existence. 
Both versions (Europeanist / Atlantisist), call for certain requirements: 
1. Identity of interests among member states; 
2. Identity in threat perception; 
3. Military option; and finally 
4. Identity in values and beliefs. 
By analysing these points, adjusting them to possible "Atlanticist" or "Europeanist" 
approaches for defence (i. e.. NATO and EU - EPC), the problems that both versions carry 
unfold: If NATO, a 40 year defence structure with such experience needs to acquire these 
points, then the EU , the WEU or even the CSCE, all without NATO's pedigree, have a 
plethora of further adjustments to make. Identity of interests is a difficult task even within 
the EU and the sensitive area of European defence may be unrealistic when national interests 
are considered. The EC's record during economic integration and problems that European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) faced at the time of the Gulf war suggest the difficulty of the 
first point. 
The problem of threat perception is another requirement. NATO is concerned living 
without an enemy, and the end of the Cold War has raised the problem on where to focus. 
Similarly, in a possible Europeanised version of defence, the problem of focusing on a 
threat will most probably still exist. 
A military option to meet the threat is needed, but who would manage the military option? 
Cuthbertson and Robertson ( Enhancing European Security, 1991) argue that "no national 
government could rationally hope to manage". The United States would not have so much 
"pull" as they had at the time of the Cold War and this point, although ambiguous, stresses 
the argument of leadership. The Pleven Plan lacked leadership at the time, and Political 
Union was not achieved. A possible European structure, requires leadership from Europeans 
for Europeans, and this could raise a debate as to which equal partner should manage. 
Identity of values and beliefs in the populations "so that there are no legitimate grounds of 
disapproving of any means" used or of any burden imposed, is related to cooperation in the 
interrelated fields of defence, economics, politics and foreign policy. Time is certainly 
required for Europeans to achieve these optimistic goals, therefore possibly creating 
additional problems for the "Europeanist" version of defence. 
The interest exists (through the Maastricht Treaty's goals, and earlier through the SEA). 
However, Europeans have the task of "pulling together" to achieve these points. The 
European interest in defence has existed since the time of the ECSC. Attempts such as the 
EDC, the WEU, the EC, EPC and Maastricht suggest so. But can the Europeans break 
away from the interrelated Atlanticist version of 
defence? 
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3.4 The German Question 
New Challenges for Europe 
"Now Germany is united again. Even if history does not tend to repeat itself, fundamental 
questions therefore arise: Is there any proof that the Germans possess a distinct personality 
that makes them essentially differentfrom other nations? Does thefact that the unified Reich 
of 1871 exercised supreme power, challenging the European equilibrium of 1815 until it was 
destroyed, indicate that the unified Germany of the 1990s could once again become a 
destructive force in Europe? And will the geopolitical position of such eminent magnitude in 
the past, be a destabilising factor again, or could the geographic location of Germany also 
be turned into an advantage for both the Europeans and the Germans themselves ? 
(Unifying Germany 1989 - 1990, Gortemaker, p. 2,1994). 
The European borders have changed significantly since October 3 1990 when the division of 
Germany came to an end and added new dilemmas to the security debate. The so-called 
German problem had again been put on the European Agenda. Buzan (1990) and Havel 
(1990) argue: "The elements of the problem are diverse and complicated, but two essential 
aspects stand out. One relates the problem to issues of power and security, the other relates 
it to culture and ideology" (The European Security Order Recast, Buzan, p. 107) 
It is conceivable that the two Germanies will be brought together in thefuture. A 
democratic system in Germany is more important than the possibility that it might become 
one nation. 
Havel, Time, Jan. 3,1990 
The possibility of a United Germany providing for its own defence and achieving a certain 
military autonomy, a goal pushed since the Adenauer years through the Western European 
Union, the European Defence Community and eventually NATO, can be considered a 
threat to Europe given the state's great economic potential. According to a Time Magazine 
panel discussion held in December 1991 in Berlin, Germany, now 80 million strong, of all 
members of the EU with a dominating currency was considered the most anxious to shed 
parts of their sovereignty, if only to ease the burden of their history. As German Chancellor 
Kohl has repeatedly argued in speeches and interviews, "Fears are understandable because 
of our history. So I tell our neighbours, we all need Europe, and Germany needs Europe 
more than anyone else. " (Time, Dec. 9,199 1). Kleiber (1994) , argues 
"we are part of the 
European Union and we must do our duty as such" (The Rusi Journal, February 1994, p. 
38) 
The lessons learned through Nazism, the Holocaust, a lost war and a searing separation 
have been absorbed and the Germans seem committed in becoming an integral part of 
European stability and peace. However, Germany's unification has complicated the problem 
of Europe's security equation. Former US president George Bush stated the need to keep 
Germany within NATO, arguably a statement demonstrating the need to control Germany. 
In June 1990, Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the former Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev, argued that Germany should become a military non-aligned state and a 
demilitarised state in the sense that it ought to possess the lowest possible military capability 
sufficient for defence (NATO's 16 Nations, June 1990, p. 
22). 
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The danger that history might once again become a present reality cannot be ruled out. The 
end of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe, combined with German unification, signals a 
renaissance, at least in the short term, according to Hans-Joachim Spanger (1991), of a 
classical nation state. This is counterbalanced in the West by political-military and 
political-economic integration, having proved their ability to function in conditions of 
confrontation but not in a situation of opening up to the East. Germany in the 1990s, 
re-unified and still among the members of NATO and the EU, has shifted from its position 
on the PERIPHERY of the two European blocs - where its containment was guaranteed - to the CENTER of the Continent, where its scope for action is enlarged. 
John (1992) argues that the Eastern European revolution of 1989/90 has confronted us with 
the oldest and most critical problem in modern European history, that is, how to balance 
Germany's national interests against the claims of European security and stability (The End 
of the Cold War, Armstrong and Goldstein eds. 1992). 
Germany, after the events of 1989, remains a member of NATO as the US, British and 
French governments have supported the idea. The case according to John (1992) in his 
essay The re-emergence of "The German question ": a United Germany and European 
Security and stability, is twofold: 
First, accepting the view that NATO has at least been and may still be a key factor in the 
maintenance of the security of Western Europe and the peace and stability of Europe on a 
whole, then the role of Germany is vitally important. Without their armed forces, strategic 
location and territory, NATO would most probably be unable to have a flexible response 
strategy. In addition, if Germany goes, then most likely, the US go. Their commitment to 
Europe since 1949 has been linked with Germany and NATO without Germany might lead 
to a Europe without the US. If the United States depart from Europe totally, the Atlanticist 
approach mentioned earlier does not seem feasible, leaving Europeans with only one option: 
a Europeanist structure. Bearing in mind the various European problems of our decade 
(i. e.. nationalist tensions, EC integration) and adding the departure of the US, the situation 
becomes difficult. 
Second, NATO was, and still is anessential vehicle for containing Germany. For its own 
sake no less than for the sake of its neighbours and other European states, a united Germany 
should be firmly anchored in the Western alliance, which would reinforce other constraints 
and encourage self-restraint on the part of the German's themselves. 
The ironic point about the German problem is the fact that since the end of World War two, 
Europeans have made a number of attempts in order to control them and even after almost 
five decades, the fears are apparent: 
- 1949: NATO. 
- 195 1: ECSC (French fears of the 
German legacy covertly presented through an economic 
agreement) - 
- 1951-54 : EDC proposal 
(to control German rearmament) 
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1954 : WEU (to control German rearmament) 
1954-55 : WTO (To control East Germany). 
-1957: EEC. Arguably, another economic pact with covert defensive intentions 
Professor Williams (1992) argues that the collapse of Soviet power has heightened the 
awareness of Germany's overall strength. The old age that NATO existed to keep the 
Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down clearly no longer applies. Today 
NATO's primary, yet not exclusive role, is in providing an institutional framework for 
keeping America in Europe as a counter-balance to the possible exercise of a restrained 
German power in the new century. Williams (1992), provides another point: 
Germany is unlikely to become a military threat again, as she now possesses enough 
economic power to make it unnecessary for her to use war as an instrument of policy. 
Equally, a liberal, democratic state - which Germany undoubtedly is by its nature, threatens 
no one through overtly coercive means. German economic ascendancy and political 
dominance may, however, eventually become a real problem. 
The Logic of Diversity, pp. 47 - 48 
The fears of Germany as a legacy of war is a fact generally accepted by a significant number 
of analysts, such as Buzan (1990), Pugh (1992), John (1992), Williams (1993). The state 
has grown significantly, has a greater population and is placed in the middle of Europe 
between the transforming Eastern side and the capitalistic West. Its military arsenal has 
grown since it inherited weapons and machinery left by the former Soviets in the Eastern 
part of Europe. It has also supplied forces to others such as Israel; an arms deal worth DM 
I billion ($ 700 million; The Economist, Feb. 16,1991, p 55). 
The German question as far as security is concerned functions today as an accelerator, 
pressuring the Europeans and the United States to find solutions to the security debate 
involving or controlling Germany, but at the same time functions as a potential brake for 
Europeanization, due to the various different fears other states may have for Germany. 
Based on capabilities, geographical location, population and economic dominance, the 
Germans may pose a well justified threat that has to be closely looked upon in the process of 
creating a new European security structure. 
A significant development in Germany's favour has been the state's relation with France. 
Franco - German military cooperation has its roots in the friendship treaty signed 
in 1963 by 
Chancellor Conrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. For Adenauer, according to 
Feld (1994), a policy reconciliation with France was important for continuous economic 
recovery at the time and it meant support for new foreign policy initiatives toward Eastern 
Europe. Military cooperation between the two partners has gradually developed since the 
1970's, especially with the creation of the Franco - German Defence and Security Council. 
The functions of the Council are: 
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- tile elaboration of common concepts regarding defence and security; 
- the assurance of increasing concertation between the two states in all questions 
respecting the security of Europe, including arms control and disarmament; 
- decisions with respect to mixed military units to be formed with mutual consent; 
- decision making relative to common manoeuvres, the training of military personnel and 
agreements of support for strengthening the capabilities of the forces of both countries in 
peace and in the times of crisis or war; 
- improvement in the interpolarity of weapons and equipment between both military 
forces; and 
- the development and deepening of the cooperation on armaments 
(The future of European Security and Defence policy, Feld, 1994, p. 102). 
In the military field, another step was taken reflecting the organisation of the two states: the 
agreement to establish a joint brigade of German and French soldiers, which was completed 
in 1990 and encompasses 4,200 troops. This cooperation between the two states evolved 
further, when in October 1991 the brigade was expanded to 30,000 troops and in May 1992 
when the brigade was characterised as "Eurocorps" and would operate outside the NATO 
command and would be open to other EC members. This defensive cooperation between 
France and Germany has been an important development for Europe in general, as well as 
for the EC, since it is a "European" in character effort in close cooperation with the EC, 
that could eventually become the back-bone for a future European security mechanism 
through the EC. The new government in France (May 1995), should not cause any problems 
for the two states according to the Economist (May 6,1995 - May 27 1995): " Resolving 
differences has become second nature to German and French diplomats. Basic goals on 
defence and security converge, though Germany's will to remain close to America is in all 
respects stronger than France's" ( Economist, May 6,1995, p. 46). 
Through the maintenance of NATO, Germany could be closely looked upon and controlled. 
The panic is fading today, eroded under the reality of a Germany burdened and preoccupied 
by the unexpected, debilitating cost of unity, and European integration. 
3.5 Cold War Establishments to Manage Post-Cold War Era 
By examining the security structures existing in Europe, there exist arrangements that were 
established to secure the Continent from the Soviet threat, communism or to control 
Germany. NATO, the WEU and the CSCE are establishments of bipolar Europe. In the 
1990s there exists a move from a bi-power structure into a specific uni-power structure. 
The United States seems to be the only superpower that can possibly influence and attract 
other states to support them militarily to face a common threat (e. g. the war in the Gulf). 
Many analysts suggest that if Cold War confrontation was indeed to be transcended in 
Europe, then the vast military establishments on both sides, programmed to react to 
worst-case scenarios of each others' capabilities, would have to be overborne. There 
is a 
demand, as Miall and Ramsbotharn state (1992) for statesmanship able to envisage 
commonly desired goals and capable of working effectively towards them. 
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By examining the membership of NATO, the WEU and the CSCE (Figure 1), the 
dominance of Western European states is reflected, except in the case of the CSCE where 
although Eastern European states are included, the organisation's achievements, experience 
and defensive capabilities have been limited. Therefore the problem is unfolded: The West European states continue in the 1990s to be members of NATO and have considerable 
security, whereas Eastern European states, after the 1990-91 dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
have nothing binding to secure them. If there is a Pan- European Security interest, Eastern 
Europe should be included. The Eastern Europeans such as the Poles, Czechoslovaks and 
Hungarians have expressed their interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Poland's Pavel Ziolek (leading member of Poland's forum for a democratic right) sees 
NATO as essential because it includes the US in the European security equation: "We need 
to construct a Europe where Germany and Russia would be balanced; US involvement in 
NATO is a factor securing that balance " (Time magazine, October 8 1990, pp. 19 - 20). The Economist, (June 15,1991), characterised the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians as 
"NATO hopefuls" (their signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace Plan, discussed in 
Chapter 4, supports the above citation). 
The end of East-West polarisation, according to Heurlin (1992), has entailed a new 
geopolitical, regional, military and economic situation for Europe. The role and capabilities 
of the main actors have changed, both objectively speaking and in their own perceptions. It 
is essential for Western Europe to include Eastern Europe in their common security 
concerns, even though this may be difficult to achieve when one takes into consideration the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union into more than a dozen different Republics. Adding on 
the former Warsaw Pact states, NATO could be receiving applications for years to come 
(European Security, towards 2000, M. Pugh ed., 1992). 
Furthermore, NATO and the WEU would need to transform their agreements and articles. 
NATO, in 1949 was formed to secure Western Europe from the states now applying to join 
them. It has been generally agreed that NATO's structure does not fit Europe of the 1990s. 
It can be used as it has been tested through time and has the required institutions. NATO 
actually won the Cold War without going to war. A relevant example of an establishment 
not being able to fit in our changing world is the WTO, created in 1954-55 to fit the old 
European challenges and deter Western perceived "aggression". Its disolvement in 1991 
demonstrates its inability to continue to exist in the 1990s. If it had continued to exist, the 
Soviet Union would most probably have to re-establish its position within the structure: 
Plurality in views among its member states, democratic relations based on non- interference 
in each others internal affairs, the principle "... that was purely declarative in the past" as 
former Soviet foreign affairs minister Slievardnadze mentions and a natural structure of 
sovereign equal nations where no one claims hegemony or monopolies the truth when 
needed (NATO's 16 Nations, June 1990). 
The problem of NATO and the WTO being used in Europe in the 1990s does not only lie in 
their articles or their limited contracting parties. By paralleling NATO's problem from a 
business-like marketing view, alongside the WTO, the continuing existence of NATO and 
the dissolution of the WTO seem logical evolutions. 
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NATO and the WTO could be paralleled with two companies that sell a certain product (security) as illustrated in Figure 2. Company A (NATO) used to serve area a (Western Europe), while company B (WTO) used to serve area b. After a specific point in time, (1989, end of the Cold War, fall of Berlin watt) the two areas which used to consume, unite 
and the demand becomes greater. Company B cannot keep up with the demand and goes out 
of business. (WTO, Soviet Union). Company A becomes a monopoly for the product 
(NATO/defence) and has to transform to meet the new demand. The United area a and b 
(Europe as a whole) produces new competition for company A (NATO), in companies C, D 
and E/EC, CSCE and WEU). The old context needs to be abandoned and transformations 
need to be made to meet the new challenge . Europe needs to adapt to the transition in the international system, which might include having to take on a more global role. As stated 
by Kenneth Waltz (1991), the transformation from a multi-power to a bi-power system in 
the 1940's created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation 
among the states of Western Europe. "They became consumers of security" (M. Pugh, 
European Security- Towards 2000, p. 3 1) 
As all that has now changed, Europeans can work on the new demand and use NATO and 
the WTO as stepping stones. Even though both structures do not fit in Europe of the 1990s, 
the lessons derived are many. Building on Waltz's point of Western Europe becoming 
"consumers of security", East European states, including the newly formed republics of the 
former Soviet Union will most probably examine what the existing security structures have 
to offer, before applying for membership. In re-shaping the conceptual framework within 
which nationalism will be tackled (as far as Eastern European tensions), the perceptions 
formed in Eastern Europe about the whole of Europe's future, and the level of interest 
shown and assistance offered by the wider European policy, will have vital functions. 
NATO was formed to secure its member states from perceived threats, but its involvement 
in the Yugoslav crisis, by debating whether to get involved, (Ethnos Newspaper, Monday, 
Feb. 8,1993, p. 23) and eventually getting involved, suggests its dilemma in trying to 
acquire a new look to transform into a structure for the " new" Europe without its old 
opponent (the WTO). NATO, the WEU or the CSCE also require to adjust. And in their 
process of adjusting, they require to take into consideration the new needs of Europe and the 
possibility of enlargement. There is also a possibility of various Soviet Republics coming 
together to create their own security agreement or certain states not wanting to align 
themselves with any establishment. Whatever the case, the structures that managed the 
security scene between 1945 and 1989 are being pressed to transform and attract new 
member states while gradually enhancing security. 
3.6 Sum-mary: From the Cold War to new uncertainties 
The disintegration of the Cold - War security system in Europe requires a reappraisal of 
Europe's security needs. In trying to find options and alternatives it is necessary to first 
deal with the various problems confronting Europe in the 1990s. 
-Threat perception is vital; collective security requires 
identifying possible threats and 
this is why Cold War stability became effective. Knowing who to secure against can make 
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management and response to threats more flexible. Europe in the 1990s lacks clear threat 
perception and if the existing security structures continue to exist, they need to adjust and 
perceive. 
-Europeans in the 1990's need to decide between retaining the United States' assistance 
through the Atlantic view for security, or break away and become more Europeanised. 
Their dilemma has to do with debating whether the United States are needed in Europe's 
security equation. Bi-polarity is no longer a fact and the United States has remained the 
only superpower in the world, suggested by most defence analysts. 
-German unification has caused tension among Europeans and many experts have been 
concerned about the newly formed state acquiring a dominant role. They require to deal 
with the problem by examining how to control the state through defence structures and 
through cooperating with Germany in a peaceful manner. 
- Europeans need to take into consideration the former East European states in their 
security equation. Analysts talk about "Europe as a whole", "Peace in Europe" and 
"European integration", but the existing security structures include only West European 
states (apart from the CSCE with its debative, but not binding platform). 
The Cold War stability ( between 1949-1989) has given rise to more problems for Europe 
and despite Europe's transformation and no actual overt threat such as Communism or 
another superpower, the Continent seems more unstable than during the Cold - War. Below 
is a list of major problems Europeans may have to deal with in the next decade, derived 
from the literature examined: 
European Integration (EQ; 
Threat perception; 
Transforming security structures (adjusting them for the 1990s); 
Choosing a security structure (NATO, WEU, CSCE, EEC 
Including the US? (continued US assistance? ); 
Nationalist tensions (Former Yugoslav ia-Sov iet Republics) 
Germany as a threat to European stability; 
Leadership within the security structure / command; 
All of the above are real possibilities, as Heisbourg (1993) discusses, and US leadership 
cannot be expected to compensate for European insufficiencies. 
The current political weakness and economic difficulties of nearly all European governments 
make a prompt, decisive and well co-ordinated reappraisal of security policy unlikely 
The Future Direction of European Security Policy, Paper No. 37, PMI Publication 
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4.1 Introduction 
As the nature of the security agenda facing the Europeans in the 1990's evolves, the 
security structures of the Continent may also evolve. The post-war security system - based 
on the bipolar arrangements of the Cold War era -have been suggested as no longer 
appropriate for a Europe in which there is no credible Soviet threat; in which Germany is 
united; and in which Communism is a spent force (Hyde-Price 1992, Frost and Mchallam, 
eds. In search of Security). These developments have altered the existing bi-polar East-West 
system into a unipolar one, with the United States considered as the only remaining 
superpower. The decline in the perceived threat of the Soviet military had already begun, 
since the late 1980's to modify European and US. views of the role of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) for European security and had sparked considerations of new 
missions for this Atlantic alliance and even alternatives to NATO. A number of Western 
Europeans, according to Feld (1994) "began to see the Western European Union (WEU) and 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a potentially useful base 
upon which to build an all - European security and defence policy system. -Thought has also 
been given to a possible expansion of the EC institutional framework to accommodate a 
fully integrated foreign and security policy set-up" (The future of European Security and 
Defence policy, p. 1-2). 
A majority of defence analysts have identified the European security problem of our decade 
including Williams (1991), Pugh (1991), Buzan and Kelstrup (1990), and Frost and 
Mchallam (1992). By taking into consideration the various problems examined in chapters 
two and three, namely the importance of threat perception for a security structure, and the 
importance of choosing between remaining "Atlantic" or becoming clearly "European", four 
alternative structures are examined: 
0 NATO 
0 WEU 
9 CSCE 
0 ECTPC 
Although it is difficult to predict with any certainty the precise nature of Europe's post-Cold 
War security arrangement, a number of broad alternatives are emerging. Price (1992) 
suggests that it is apparent that the new European Security system will be structured around 
three key institutions - NATO, the European Community and the 
CSCE. And tile precise 
nature of Europe's future security system will depend on what sort of relationship 
develops 
between these three crucial bodies. 
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Introduction - History and Transformation 
The Options - NATO, WEU, CSCE and EEC/EPU 
NATO has been an important defence institution since the end of world war two, and has 
been the chief contributor according to an important number of analysts for creating stability 
during the Cold War era (1945-1989). Since NATO's formation in 1949, the alliance took 
on the responsibility of securing Western Europe but also "created" its own opposition, the 
Warsaw Pact. Williams (1977), states that since its formation, the alliance members 
committed themselves not only to the defence of Western Europe but to a strengthening of 
their political systems as well as such steps as would improve general stability and viability 
(The Permanent Alliance, p. 24). 
Archer (1990) and Smith (1990) state that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation reflected the need of the West European states to side with the United States in 
order to secure themselves against what, in 1948, they considered to be the Soviet threat. 
The governments of these states saw themselves at risk internally from political and 
economic collapse and menaced by the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. 
Western Europeans felt unable to defend themselves against this insecurity as they were still 
suffering from the deprivations of war. Article 5 has been characterised as the touchstone of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. It is agreed by the parties that: 
... an armed attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or north America shall be considered an 
attack against them all... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security 
of the North Atlantic Area. 
NATO, created at the end of WWII to fit the requirements of Europe's security concerns 
during the Cold War, is still in existence, and current analysts have called upon the structure 
to continue its services despite the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet 
Republic. However, The Economist (May 23,1992) stated: "For those mesmerised by 
NATO's one obvious triumph - its success in defending the West against the Soviet menace 
- its job is over", creating scepti cism concerning continuing US assistance and 
involvement 
in European affairs. 
Both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty which institutional ised the Cold War 
can be considered out-dated, despite the fact that the preambles of their treaties can be 
considered applicable in the 1990s. 
The contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European 
collective security based on the participation of all European States irrespective of their social and 
political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of 
Europe. 
Remington, The Warsaw Treaty, Document 1, The Warsaw Pact p. 201 
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The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. 
The North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, p. 264 
The above preambles of NATO and the WTO, drafted after the end of World War two, 
imply identical "good intention" views - in antithesis with what evolved later on in Europe 
as two different opposing structures that established the "Cold War" and a bi-polar world. 
NATO and the WTO state their desires towards collective security based on peace and 
participation of ALL European States. Whether the WTO or NATO would accept the 
Federal Republic of Germany or Poland respectively in their organisations during the 
post-war era is an arguable question. The scepticism deriving from such a question 
demonstrates the notion that what was on paper (treaties) was not always --and most 
probably still not is - the only factor for the acceptance of states in security structures. 
Despite both structures' official open-minded membership policies, their memberships were 
limited and became main factors (NATO, WTO), for dividing the world in super-power 
blocs. NATO's area is well defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty; but because of 
developments since its inception, the meaning of these limits have changed somewhat since 
1949. As Minon states (1992), when NATO was created in 1949, the USA refused to 
extend its guarantees further than the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean in the colonial 
conflicts of European allies. Years later, when those same allies wrongly believed in the 
divisibility of security and the possibility of replacing global responsibilities with regional 
interests, they invoked the limits established in Article 6 to avoid sharing USA's world-wide 
responsibilities while maintaining its benefits. (Reshaping Europe in the 21st century, 
Robertson, 1992) 
Reinforcing Minon Is observation, in the 1990s there are economic, military and political 
powers in the world. Ethnic conflicts, migration and imperialism dangers derive from areas 
out of NATO's responsibilities and capacities and from NATO "hopefuls" such as Poland, 
Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Should NATO expand? Or simply, is NATO required in 
Europe as an option? And what are the requirements for its transformation? These questions 
will concern the next section. 
The Need to Transform 
NATO has been one of tile most important alternative security structures discussed for 
Europe since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990, NATO has achieved a drastic reduction 
in nuclear stockpiles; has adopted a new strategy, command structure and force structure; 
has formulated a new concept of multinational forces, new types of crisis management 
exercises and has participated in peace-keeping. (NATO Review, no 6, Dec. 1992). 
According to Manfred Wdrner, former NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North 
Atlantic Council (1992), NATO has to face the fact that as fast as the alliance transforms, 
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new challenges emerge and new expectations are aroused that obliges NATO to question 
whether enough has been done. The Cold War is behind, but a "Hot War" is going on in the Balkans. The political division of Europe is another challenge, and in tile former Yugoslavia new ethnic divisions are in the making. 
Throughout the Euro-atlantic Community, war has been devalued as an instrument for deciding 
disputes between constituted states; but sadly, in relations between ethnic communities it is 
making a tragic come-back. 
WOrner, NATO review, #6, Dec. 1990 
The US has good reason to break-away from Europe in the 1990s as the communist threat 
has receded and Europeans have made vital steps towards integration through the process of 
the EC. However, the US has been one of the few states, if not the only one, that has been 
able to unite states under a common cause. The Gulf War is an example of this. Helmut 
Sonnenfeld (1991), scholar at the Brookings Institute stated: 
Washington believes that the United States is the only pole - in a so-called multi-polar world - that is able to attract a lot of people for whatever cause or reason. We must look for allies and partners 
wherever we can and Europe is going to end up being the principal one. 
Time, March 11,1991, p. 36 
Most research undertaken on the subject of NATO generally agrees to the fact that NATO 
has been the major, most successful defence establishment of the Cold War and suggest 
NATO as an option for the future. The long term prospects for NATO are uncertain, and 
the need, according to Feld (1994), for defensive action by NATO forces on the Continent 
has been reduced substantially. A major feature in the assessment of NATO's future may be 
its cost, which is estimated at about $144 billion for the fiscal year 1992. This figure 
includes the cost of the forces allocated to NATO; nevertheless, even the expenditures for 
the administrative and logistical overhead of NATO headquarters are substantial (Feld, The 
future of European Security policy, p. 8). The War in the Gulf gave one of the reasons for 
NATO's continuation: "We reiterate our firm commitment to the security of the entire 
Southern region, the strategic importance of which is highlighted by the crisis" (NATO 
review, # 6, December 1991, p. 5). Chapter three suggested and outlined the basic 
requirements for any structure in the 1990's to exist and be accepted by its member states; 
(Identity of threats, military options, interests and values among member states). 
Specifically, defence researchers such as Pugh, (1991), Cuthbertson and Robertson (1990), 
Buzan (1991,1990) and Clark (1990) generally agree on the following major requirements: 
1. NATO needs a new raison d'etre. There are suggestions that the decline of the 
traditional threat from within Europe will be replaced by regionally more diverse challenges 
to Western interests and that NATO must increasingly re-define its security role on a global 
basis. Clark (1990), doubts whether an Atlantic alliance is really the best structure for such 
an undertaking, given that historically the relationship between the US and its European 
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allies has been severely tested whenever out of area issues have confronted the 
organisation. 
Clear objectives for such a security establishment require threat perception such as the 
continued nationalist and religious pressures generated by the unresolved problems of the 
Third world (Williams, The Logic of Diversity, 1992). External threats such as the 
example of Iraq should also be taken into consideration. A raison d'etre would mean 
focusing on where and when should NATO be involved. The pin-pointing and intensity of 
new threats should be agreed by all members and this will probably require modification of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. The 1991 Gulf war, according to Hogan (1992), demonstrated 
that NATO cannot serve as an adequate organisation to co-ordinate European involvement in 
external conflicts, even when European action is sanctioned by UN resolutions. 
Hogan argues that this will not change in the future. Despite German preparations to make 
constitutional changes so that it can participate in UN efforts to enforce peace and security 
in the world, the German people ".. will not sanction the sending of German troops under 
NATO command outside of the NATO area. Thus, although NATO is theý only viable 
option currently available for maintaining peace in the "Old World", there is no chance that 
the passing of the Post War era presages an expanded role for either Germany or NATO 
outside the European area". (The End of the Cold War, Hogan, p. 183). 
NATO needs to clarify where and when and under what circumstances it should get involved 
and take action in out-of-area issues. 
2. NATO, as the Atlantic option for European security suggests American involvement 
in European affairs. United States support was inevitable and required after World War 
two, according to Williams (1977). Loth (1988) discusses "European requests for military 
protection in 1948; but is it required in the 1990s? Despite the halting of the Cold War, 
"nobody is arguing ... ", according to the Economist 
(May 25,1992), "... that America 
should halt the planned withdrawal of more than ha4f of its troops from Europe. Onthe 
contrary, on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO's military indolence in Europe's new time of 
trouble raises again the question of whether West Europeans and Americans still need their 
old defence alliance. " Bertel Heurl in (1992) in his essay on "the roles of the USA and the 
USSR" argues that Europe is still important in American forward defence, raising the 
suggestion that even if the Europeans chose to scrap US support, the choice is not only 
theirs. The war against Iraq demonstrated the importance of American military and political 
support. (Turkish, Greek and German bases were used during the war in the Gulf). 
Naturally, any deterrent to a Soviet use of force such as an attempt, however unlikely, to 
re-establish Soviet control over former Eastern Europe (or even newly established 
independent states emerging from a dissolution of the Soviet Union) must have its base in 
the European arena. (European security, towards 2000, M. Pugh, p. 24). 
President Clinton of the United States is aware of possible problems in Europe: "We are 
seeing the flip side of the wonder of the end of the Cold War. The bi-polar world gave the 
US and the Soviet Union a limited capacity to contain some of what we are now witnessing 
in Bosnia. I am worried about what is happening in Russia. I think it is all eminently 
predictable that there would be some set-back" (Time Magazine, Jan 4,1993). 
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Whether tile US 'departs' from Europe in any way (namely limited leadership and less bases) will depend upon what both sides agree upon. Clark (1990) offers three important 
points supporting the degree of difficulty for Europe breaking away from the US: 
a) The United States remains pre-eminent. There are no alternatives to US leadership. The 
United States remains the only power with global range and presence in all political, 
military and economic realms, though its ability to meet the long-term costs of the Gulf war 
may be in doubt. 
b) The US requires Europe's support, while sharing the burden of world leadership. 
Although the European powers will be mainly regionally oriented, the Middle East crisis 
reminded Europeans that there continue to be interests outside Europe which can best be 
tackled in cooperation with the US. 
c) A European-American community in values remains intact. Although the US and Europe 
have many divergent interests and the relationship between the United States, and the 
European Community has been characterised by bitter and harsh competition resulting in 
trade wars, there exists a common ground of democratic, capitalist and pluralistic values. 
Former Prime Minister of England Thatcher reinforced these points in the International 
Herald Tribune (March 13,1991) by saying that "America must lead the free world, and no 
European confederation will emerge to help it". The Americans seem to be aware of these 
points and realise that "NATO's continuation is feasible" (Former US defence Secretary 
Dick Cheeny, International Herald Tribune, Thursday, May 30,1991). Antony Hartley 
(1992, Securing Europe, ed. by Ullman) argues that it is inconceivable that any autonomous 
military operation of any scale could be carried out by member states of the European 
Community without, not merely the approval, but also the active co-operation of the United 
States, reinforcing the importance of the US support in European affairs. The question 
which arises concerns a positive consequence from the Gulf war: How many of the above 
points would Europe focus upon, if the Gulf war had not existed? Operations "Desert 
Shield" and "Desert Storm" enabled the world community to expect the unexpected and this 
can be seen as a reason to perceive threats and achieve the readiness required. 
Hartley argues that in out-of-NATO situations, the use of force would be entirely dependent 
on American transport planes and logistical facilities. Its autonomy would, therefore, be 
purely nominal. Nor is it probable that European governments, under pressure from an 
increasingly pacifist public opinion would be able, or willing, to afford the public resources 
needed to build up a defence infra-structure which could function independently of the 
United States - particularly if there was no apparent threat to their security 
(Securing 
Europe, Ullman ed., p. 367). Former US president Richard Nixon gave his own view on 
supporting the United States' continuing role in Europe and the World in general: 
Only the US has the combination of military, economic and political power a nation must 
have to take the lead in defending and extending freedom and in deterring and resisting 
aggression. Germany and Japan may have the economic clout, but they lack the military 
muscle. China and Russia have the potential military might, but they lack the economic 
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power. None has sufficient standing with all the world's great powers, none has the record 
of haýf a century of leadership. As the only great power without a history of imperialistic 
claims on neighbouring countries, we also have something all these countries lack. - the 
credibility to act as an honest broker. 
Nixon, Beyond Peace, Time Magazine, May 2,1994 
NATO requires to be Europeanised, if it continues to exist and this does not necessarily 
mean loosing American support. Having "won" the Cold War, and needing to focus on 
their own domestic economy, the United States seem likely to pass the leadership on to 
Europeans as European defence concerns Europe to a greater extent. According to NATO 
Review (# 3,4,5 and 6,1992) NATO has realised its need to transform into a more 
European structure choosing something between an "Atlanticist" and an "Europeanist" 
security structure. 
Other Points 
NATO defence ministers met in Brussels in June 1991 and approved a drastic overhaul of 
the alliances military structure and a 22% overall reduction in NATO's personnel force. 
(Time, June 10,1991). One important question will be whether the US, still functioning as 
a generator of European military security, will extend its military deterrence to include East 
European states and up to what point would they leave some military and political role for 
the new Republics of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, assuming they participate. 
As far as NATO cooperating closely with the European Community, such overlaps are 
becoming more apparent, according to Murray (1992). The Rome EC Summit of December 
1990 identified security issues for consideration by the Twelve in the framework of Political 
Union. Tile question asked is whether US's European partners will choose to harmonise 
their policy on overlapping issues first among the twelve, and then bring an agreed position 
to NATO; or whether NATO will be the focus of both primary and conclusive policy 
formulation among 16 allies (Rummel, Towards Bilateral Union, 1992, p. 215). 
A more Europeanised NATO could also be achieved through a cooperation format with the 
Western European Union, suggested as a defence establishment in the Maastricht treaty for 
the near future. Hence, NATO will have to give up some leadership power over to the EC 
or the WEU (as examples) if Europeans desire a more dominant role in their defence. 
However, as Manfred W6rner, the former Secretary General of NATO pointed out (1992), 
a European Defence Community, acting through the Western European Union, would not 
possess the intelligence or logistical capacity to undertake operations on its own. Within the 
NATO area, any European force would have to be subordinated to the NATO command if it 
were to be effective (NATO Review, #1, Feb. 1993). 
The changing nature of the relationship between the US and its Western European partners 
does not simply arise from the collapse of the Soviet power and the formal ending of the 
Cold War, according to Williams (1992), but arises also from pressures within the alliance 
itself. These have been building up for some time and have much to do with the notion that 
the rich and highly developed states of Western Europe should be capable of playing a 
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primary role in their own defence. A "Europeanised" NATO suggests command positions 
to Europeans (perhaps even a European supreme Allied Commander Europe - SACEUR); by expanding the competence and remit of the Euro-group; or associating the WEU more 
closely with NATO. 
NATO requires the creation of an identity of values and beliefs among its populations so 
there are no legitimate grounds for disapproving of any means used. This may seem a 
vague point since it requires NATO members to cooperate and agree on matters of defence 
with not only its 16 current states, but with more states in the future, as Eastern European 
states may eventually join. The Partnership for Peace Plan of January 1994 (PfP) was seen 
as a solution towards the gradual enlargement of NATO. As at 30 April, 1995,26 states 
have signed the Partnership For Peace framework document (Appendix 2- PfP states). 
Logically, if more states join, and US leadership decreases, NATO will have difficulty in 
reaching agreements, the same way the EC has had trouble over the years reaching 
unanimous decisions. Although Economics are interrelated with politics and defence, it has 
taken the EC four decades to actually include Political Union and European Political 
Cooperation in their agenda. NATO will have to make positive that all interests are taken 
into consideration and all members considered equal. 
At the NATO summit meeting in July 1990, NATO suggested the establishment of a series 
of formal diplomatic links between the Alliance and individual Warsaw Pact states. In this 
respect, NATO has been building on the recommendations of the 1967 Harmel Report, 
which called for the Alliance not only to provide deterrence for its members, but also to take 
responsibility for developing detente and managing the co-operative aspects of the East - 
West relationship. 
If NATO could develop diplomatic and political links with the East Europeans, then it could begin 
to function as a focus for broad-ranging discussions and consultations on security issues affecting 
the continent. 
Price, European Security - Towards 2000,1992, p. 126, Ed. by Pugh 
Therefore, in a changed international environment, NATO is required to take on several 
new roles and missions: 
0 as an instrument of crisis management in the context of the new international order-, 
0 as the cornerstone of a security community encompassing both East and West; 
0 as an element of stability in Europe from which the new democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe will also benefit; (Worner, NA TO Review, # 6, Dec. 1992) 
The Partnership for Peace (Pf*P): The Partnership for Peace plan, issued by the 
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 10 -II January 1994 has paved 
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the way towards NATO's enlargement. Up until January 1995,24 states have 
signed. Russia had decided to set new conditions for signing the Partnership for 
Peace and this has created new concern about Russia as a threat: "It is time for the 
West to rethink the limits of its relations with Russia" (The Economist, May 14, 
1994, p. 17). 
Due to the current nature of the PfP, there is limited bibliography on the subject and only 
possible scenarios could be drawn from analysing the agreement's goals. The objectives of 
the plan are: 
0 facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; 
0 ensuring democratic qontrol of defence forces-, 
0 maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional 
considerations, to operations under the authority of the US and/or the responsibility 
of the CSCE; 
0 the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of 
joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake 
missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, 
and other that may subsequently be agreed; and 
0 the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with 
those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. (NATO Review, #1, Feb. 
1994) 
The Partnership Programme was devised as a way of preparing some states for eventual full 
membership in the alliance without drawing new lines across Europe and without locking 
out Russia entirely. Russia wants NATO to accord it "a special status" (Economist, May 
147 1994) however, trouble may arise if Russia is given a veto over military actions. The 
plan can be seen as a way of securing the 26 NATO hopefuls from one another or as a way 
of the United States "keeping an eye" on Eastern developments through NATO's umbrella. 
Stepachin (1993), argues from a Russian point of view that Russia and NATO is a vital 
partnership for European security. "First and foremost we do not want to set the United 
States against other NATO states and vice versa, not mentioning past attempts to play on 
traditional contradictions between NATO members. Thus considering NATO is a 
consanguineous entity, and as we plan to become part of it in the future, we would 
like to 
avoid a sagging of our (meaning NATO - Russian) Eastern security 
flank. This is also 
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completely in the interests of the Euro - American component of a prospective global 
security system" (The Rusi Journal , August 1993, p. 13). 
The issue of NATO expansion is crucial to the alliance's strategy for the future but 
anathema to Moscow, which views such a policy as divisive and a potential threat to Russia's security, according to the Times (June 1,1995). Kozyrev, the Russian foreign 
minister said - in the same article - that "hasty moves towards enlargement could threaten 
the establishment of mutually advantageous and constructive relations between Moscow and 
the alliance". NATO has yet to announce the actual requirements for full membership and it 
seems that NATO is more occupied with the "how" and "why" instead of the "who" and 11 when". 
In January 1994 NATO decided to create "Combined Joint Task Forces", CJTFs. These task 
forces enable the alliance to mount military operations outside Western Europe and North 
America; and troops from non - NATO states such as Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, might 
join these operations. Each taskforce would consist of chosen units from various states, 
depending on the nature of the job to be done. To save money, according to the Economist 
(February 25,1995 p. 25), the taskforce would be controlled by an existing headquarters, 
such as that of a national army corps, or the Eurocorps, or the British - led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, or the French - Spanish - Italian Mediterranean fleet. These "borrowed" 
headquarters would be adopted - adding Frenchmen, say, or dropping Germans - according 
to whose soldiers were involved'. NATO is changing into a "crisis management mechanism", 
(as characterised by its former Secretary - General Manfred Wurner in 1992 - NATO 
Review, #2 April, 1992), but what is a crisis management mechanism? 
According to Snyder (1972), "The primary aim (of ctisis management) is to serve their 
common interest in peaceful settlement; the constraint is to do this while minimising 
sacrifice to their self interest. Thus, the 'mixed motive' character of any bargaining situation 
- the coexistence of conflict and common interest - appears in a crisis as a complex 
interaction between two sets of goals and constraints: coersion versus disaster avoidance, 
and accommodation versus loss avoidance. Achieving an optimum mix among these four 
elements may be conceived as the ideal goal of "crisis management" (Classic Readings in 
International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz, eds., p. 327). Whether NATO could 
survive in becoming the above is yet to be seen, however the alliance's "deepening" 
involvement in Bosnia (The Times, May 31,1995), suggests NATO's new role for at least 
the short run. 
Conclusions - NATO: A dominant alternative 
NATO is more than just the sum of its military parts. America's commitment to Europe's 
freedom has been the foundation on which European prosperity and integration have been 
built. It is not just that US presence prevented any prospect that Europe could again be 
dominated by a menacing power, a prospect almost as worrying to America as to Europe; it 
was also that American troops gave West Europeans the security they needed to settle their 
old rivalries and build a new. Sir Richard Vincent (1993), provides another NATO 
achievement: "One of our greatest achievements over the past 44 years, is not only that we 
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kept the Warsaw Pact out, but that we kept the peace within the NATO area" (The Rusi Journal, December 1993, p. 11). This achievement could be related to the reasons of the 
creation of the PfP plan. By broadening the structure, NATO could continue to keep the 
peace in its area by "controlling" the new members. 
Despite NATO's positive characteristics, its negative ones are also important (Table 1). Whether NATO can continue to provide for Europe's security concerns is yet to be seen. The requirements mentioned are 
, necessary and will overshadow many of the negative points stated. Possible coexistence (with sustained US leadership) with the WEU or the EC is 
another possibility. However, newly changed Europe will have to take gradual steps in 
choosing any alternative to prevent new revolutionary transitions. As Williams concludes, 
"only NATO is capable of providing a credible defence posture in present circumstances" 
(The logic of diversity, p. 49). In relation to this, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth 
office has stated: 
NATO is still needed to promote continuing stability and security during a period of great political 
uncertainty in Europe. Britain also believes that NATO provides the most effective forum for 
transatlantic cooperation and consultation on security and arms control, for co-ordinating the 
implementation of arms control agreements and for establishing the basis for further negotiations. 
Britain's Defence Services, 1992, Published by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK. 
Based on the literature examined, NATO's positive and negative points could be 
summarised: 
TABLE 1- NATO IN THE 1990s 
POSITIVE * NEGATIVE 
Experience US involvement in European affairs - 
US support slows down European autonomy 
Open membership Designed to "keep the Russians out, the 
Effective military structures 
Americans in, and the Germans down". 
Binding treaty Does not include Eastern Europe (Does 
Institutionalised (unlike CSCE) 
it fit Eastern European concerns? ) 
Helps prevent re-nationalisation of 
Not legitimate in regional crisis outside 
the North Atlantic Area. 
German defence policy 4 No actual threat. 
Provides assurance and stability for 
Europe 
4.3 The WEU 
Introduction - The European Alternative 
The Western European Union has come into focus once again as a European defence 
solution for the future, as it offers two basic advantages: Its long existence (since 1954 
despite its limited achievements), and its "European" character. However, Burrows and 
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Irwin, (1972, p. 39) state three elements concerning its creation which makes the WEU "unfit" in Europe of the 1990s. 
0 First of all, the WEU was created to invite Germany and Italy to the Brussels 
Treaty; 
a secondly, it was created to ensure that certain arms restrictions on behalf of 
Germany were maintained; and 
0 thirdly, the WEU gave another reason for increasing NATO's powers, as eventually 
Germany became a member and the WEU transferred its defence functions to 
NATO. 
Furthermore, the Western European Union, since its creation in 1955, has not had any 
major achievements in the field of defence. Since its defence functions were shifted to 
NATO, the organisation was stagnated until 1989, when the changes in Europe provided a 
better "scene" and "reason" for its existence. As Mackay stated (1961), the organisation 
has no executive power and it would be difficult to find any case where it has had any 
influence over any recent political developments in Western Europe (Towards a United 
States of Europe, p. 102). The Council of the Western European Union has, indeed, 
consistently taken the view that so long as existing arrangements apply, the North Atlantic 
Council of NATO is the power forum in which to discuss strategic planning and defence 
policies. The WEU was considered only part of a wider defence structure and can only be 
considered against that background. 
NATO and the WEU have similar tasks on paper, but in reality, the WEU is working for a 
group of states which belong within NATO, (as the ten member states of the WEU are also 
among NATO's 16). This is what has made the WEU subservient to NATO and has left it 
with the fear of overlapping matters which have been or eventually will be discussed within 
NATO. Therefore, its obligations have become limited stimulating Jordan and Feld (1980), 
to characterise the WEU as a "European manifestation of NATO" (Europe in the Balance, 
p. 5 5). 
The WEU was reactivated (using Calien's description) in 1984, but even then, Richard Bust, 
the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs had sent a letter to the 
seven - at the time - member states cautioning them that "they should not seek a common 
position on arms control matters outside the NATO framework" (Kessing's Contemporary 
Archives, Volume 31, p. 33879). 
What can the WEU can do as an option for European defence as it has been a structure with 
limited achievements and one that has always been supported by the United States? Despite 
this question, Europeans share optimism for the structure, something evident through the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991. Article J. 4 of Title 5 calls upon the WEU to develop, elaborate 
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and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, 
however, still in respect to the obligations of certain Member States under the North 
Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established 
within that framework (The Maastricht Treaty, 11. Oct. 1992, The Sunday Times, p. 16). 
Laursen, (1993), commenting on the Maastricht treaty's articles stated: "The Treaty 
constitutes a step forward, but only a relatively minor one" (Policy in Europe ed. by 
Anderson and Eliassen, p. 236). 
Can the WEU play a dominant role in Europe of the t990s? And what are the requirements 
for its future existence? Can it stand on its own or does it still require guidance from NATO 
or the European Community? 
Positive and Negative Points 
Based on the assumption that the WEU remained a "European" organisation and provided 
solely for the defence of Europe, it would most probably face a few drawbacks: 
It would need to break away from NATO and the United States. The distribution of burdens 
within NATO were unequal: The United States was the dominant power in the partnership, 
a fact justified on the grounds of its relative economic strength. Europe's reliance on the 
US strategic nuclear deterrents and conventional US military forces had cemented European 
military dependence on the United States. Moreover, the forward deployment of 
conventional US forces in Europe has served the military interests of the United States by 
providing it with a stronger defensive posture and by giving it greater political leverage in 
Europe. (NATO Burden - sharing, Golden, p. 3,1983). 
With the USs continuing influence in Europe, the WEU faces the difficulty of overcoming 
this point. Europeans require superpower assistance and it seems unlikely that the WEU 
will stand alone with such a limited membership. Robert Hunter, the United States 
ambassador to NATO, commenting on the US's policy towards Europe stated: "The Cold 
War argument that the alliance (NATO) needed centralised military direction, and that a 
robust WEU could interfere, no longer applies. We support the WEU as a means of 
preventing the renationalisation of defence. The WEU will help to focus minds on security 
policies; and it will, like NATO, provide a home for the Germans. Furthermore, the more 
the European allies help themselves, the more Congress is likely to pay for transatlantic 
defence " (The Economist, February 25,1995, p. 2 1). 
The WEU serves 10 states, all from Western Europe. It would most probably require to 
broaden its structure and serve the security needs of a much larger Europe. Being the 
smallest among the options discussed (ten members compared with NATO's 
16, the CSCE's 
54, and the EC's 15) it has the most adjustments to make. States united 
for a common 
purpose seem most likely to call upon the broader structure 
for help instead of the smaller 
one. If a state such as France, a member of both the 
WEU and NATO faced a threat, it 
seems more likely that they would prefer NATO to tackle the problem at this certain point 
in 
time as NATO infers US assistance, experience, is 
broader and is binding as a treaty, 
through article 5. 
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The WEU would most probably need to modify and change the central part of tile Paris Agreements which modified the 1948 Brussels Treaty by adding Article 4 which expressed 
tile intention of the parties to work in close cooperation with NATO and promised to rely on the Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. This 
article requires the WEU to be subservient to NATO and gives it no actual power. Breaking 
away and enhancing its responsibilities may make the WEU a more influential organisation 
and one member states could rely on if it becomes binding through certain articles such as 
article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Finally, the WEU would need to "expand" institutionally. It has a Consultative council and 
a Consultative assembly as the main bodies, an Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(ACA) and various committee - type agencies which deal with security questions. Taking 
into consideration its limited structure member wise, and institutionally wise, its problem 
about being a binding source, its achievements and it being "a manifestation" of NATO, the 
difficulty of the WEU becoming dominant in Europe in the 1990s becomes apparent. 
Despite all these negative drawbacks, the Western European Union does have a few basic 
positive points: 
- It is a "Europeanist" approach for security and one European visionaries were keen since 
1948. When the states of Europe feel prepared to depart from US assistance, the WEU 
provides them the gradual and systematic step in doing so. Working closely with NATO 
during the years has helped the structure acquire experience and in the sense that the US 
would applaud such a step and ýtill have a role in Europe leaving both sides satisfied. The 
WEU member states have agreed on the need to develop a genuine European Security and 
defence identity and a greater responsibility on defence matters through the treaty on 
European Union. (Declaration on Western European Union, p. 24, the Maastricht Treaty, 
The Sundo Times, Oct. 11 1992). This identity may be pursued through a gradual process 
involving successive phases. The WEU can form an integral part of the process of the 
development of the European Union and could enhance its contribution to solidarity within 
the Atlantic Alliance. WEU members States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the 
longer term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. 
In November 1994, France and Britain have agreed to set up a joint planning group for their 
air forces in Southern England. In addition, Britain plans to join France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain to make the "Future Large Aircraft", a military transport (The Economist, February, 
25 
ý 1995). 
-A second positive point is that the WEU member states have already taken certain steps 
through the treaty of European Union and through conference declaration which enhance the 
organisation's operational role and relations with other organisations. Point C of the 
declaration calls for the strengthening of its operational role by examining and defining 
appropriate missions structures and covering: 
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0 closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance; 
0 meetings of WEU chiefs of Defence staff, 
0 military units answerable to WEU 
Arguably, these steps demonstrate the necessity for a European approach towards defence, 
identified by European states. Cooperation can be a positive aspect and this is another 
reason why the WEU has been seen as an "option". The French insist that it makes no sense 
to talk of a "European Identity" -unless the WEU can decide whether to mount an operation 
without NATO strings attached. They worry that Congress would not want American 
military equipment to be used in a confrontation over which America had no control. "one 
lesson of Bosnia is that joint authority does not work", runs the French argument. "There, 
the problem has been the tug-of-war between the United Nations and NATO. We do not 
want that to happen between NATO and the WEU" (The Economist, February 25,1995, 
p. 25). 
However, there is also another difference between NATO and the WEU. NATO's article 5 
(Appendix Q binds the member states to assist one another in the case of an armed attack, 
but this assistance is not automatic. Discussions take place and there could be disagreement 
leading to a state's withdrawal from specific military action (as Greece did in NATO's 
involvement in Bosnia in 1994). The WEU, however, automatically calls its member states 
to assist the threatened state. Therefore, this point should also be taken into consideration by 
European leaders an adjusted accordingly. In reality and in present circumstances most 
WEU military operations will most probably need some sort of American support (transport 
aircraft, command and control systems and other means). If European defence evolves as a 
matter of concern of only Europeans, this would require increases in spending on, among 
other things: 
a. The vital thing called logistics, especially air transport; 
b. Intelligence, inclLiding spy satellites; 
C. Europe's nuclear forces and probably an anti - missile defence system-, 
d. Computerised communications systems; 
e. More ships, including aircraft carriers, for the Mediterranean and beyond; and 
f. The creation of common standards for tanks and heavy weapons. 
The Royal United Services Institute in London estimates that such a policy might require the 
European states to raise the proportion of GDP they spend on defence, now 2.5 % on 
average, by 1.5 percentage points - $107 billion a year at current prices - and sustain that 
figure at least for the rest of the decade (The Economist, February 25,1995, p. 25). 
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The role of the WEU in the integration of Europe has been paradoxical. Created after the failure to build a European Defence Community on the ECSC's foundations, the WEU had 
wide powers in its constitution. However it had limited achievements due to article 4 of the 
protocol modifying the 1948 Brussels treaty which gave NATO additional responsibilities 
and in a sense, WEU's guidance. 
More recently, as Archer (1990) argues, it has again become an institution of convenience 
for the mooted West European defence identity. It is West European enough - and limited in membership - to make such an effort worthwhile and yet its intimate links, in its creation 
and subsequent existence, with NATO, help to insure against a divide forming between 
European and American defence efforts (Organising Western Europe, 1990). 
The role of the WEU has changed since its reactivation in 1984. According to Archer 
(1994), the WEU's reactivation was due to European distrust for U. S. foreign security 
policies. The U. S. - Soviet INF agreement, European reservation about SDI led Europeans 
to call for greater West European defence cooperation. This could be considered as a step 
which meant less NATO involvement in European affairs. Three other points support the 
above assumption: 
- WEU member states coordinated their naval presence in the Iran - Iraq war (1980 - 1988); 
- WEU member states did hold meetings with their observers during the Kuwait crisis (1990 
- 91); As Freedman and Karsh (1993), point out about "out - of - area" involvement in the 
Gulf War of 1990 - 1991: "A narrow interpretation argued that participation in alliances 
covered only the NATO area, but a broader interpretation saw possible support for wider 
collective security arrangements, including the WEU, which, unlike NATO, did allow for 
operations outside the European Area" (The Gulf War Conflict 1990 - 91, p. 118). 
- By the end of 1992, WEU was coordinating the naval vessels of its members in their 
contribution to the UN blockade of Serbia / Montenegro. (Archer, Organising Europe, 1994 
ý EUI Working Papers, No. 
94 / 18). WEU's role is changing and the structure seems to be 
breaking away from its NATO partner. Taking into consideration the Maastricht Treaty's 
optimistic goals for a dominant WEU iii the late 1990s, the structure could take over as a 
more European "NATO". 
If the Europeans feel that they have common defence problems to discuss, the WEU seems 
likely to be able to contribute in the European scene. It has a few drawbacks which make it 
almost impossible in the short run to exist on its own. However, its positive points are those 
which have brought it again to the surface of European defence and it seems likely that it 
can continue to contribute during the 1990s through cooperation with other institutions such 
as NATO and the EU. 
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"If European Defence Identity (EDI) is to move beyond, then it is to be obliged to reproduce NATO on a European scale" (Birch and Crotts, 1990, The State of the European 
Community, 1990, Cafurny, Rosental, eds., 1993, p. 272). 
4.4 The European Community 
Introduction - History and movement towards Security 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome does not provide for a common foreign and security policy. The 
fathers of the treaty did not think in categories of foreign policy, let alone defence policy 
(Rhein, 1992). After the 1954 European Defence Community (EDC) debate, it was natural 
that the new integration effort was concentrated solely on economic, rather than political 
integration. The European Community, according to Cockfield (1990), Rhein (1992) and 
Lodge (1989) was to become the instrument of the Continent's political uitification as well. 
The first step towards some sort of European Integration was made through the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 195 1. European 
visionaries had in mind eventual political union whichcould lead to common foreign policy 
and defence, but regarded economic integration as the first necessary step towards their 
goal. As Paul-Henri Spaak rem. inded the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
in 1964 : "Those who drew up the Rome treaty did not think of it as essentially economic; 
they thought of it as a stage on the way to political union". Walter Hallstein, the West 
German representative at Messina and the first President of the EEC Commission, had 
earlier stressed the same point: "We are not integrating economies, we are integrating 
politics (Unwin, The Community of Europe, 1990, p. 76). 
Political union was to be achieved in the long run through a sustained effort at economic 
integration across a broad front. The sector by sector approach of the ECSC had proved 
uncertain. In the end the ECSC was still trying to integrate only one part of complex 
industrial economies, and could not possibly pursue its aims in isolation from other 
economic segments. 
The EEC was the next major step which, while ambitious, was on the surface less 
revolutionary than the European Political Community. It placed an economic dressing over 
the political goals in the hope that it could accommodate as many interests and groups as 
possible. However, the overarching concept of political union remained undefined, and 
sufficiently vague to be acceptable to member-states, until 1986, with the inclusion of the 
Single European Act which became part of the legal bed-rock on which the Community rests 
and on which European Union is built. As Borchardt states (1989), 
The task now is to make full use of the new opportunities which it opens up in order to further the 
cause of integration for the good of everyone in the Community. 
74 
Chapter Four The Options - NATO, WEU, CSCE and EEC/EPU 
European Unification, p. 76 
The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992 goes further than any previous European Community agreement and provides for a common foreign and security policy, in 
a way elaborating on article 30 of the 1986 Single European Act. The plans for a common foreign policy and a single security policy have been characterised by many analysts as 
much too ambitious "given the deep divergencies on issues of international relations and the 
use offorce which the Yugoslav crisis has made obvious " (International Herald Dibune, 
Oct. 5,1992, W. Pfaff). 
However controversial Maastricht's attempt for common defence may be, it is a further step 
towards European security, taking on from where and what the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSQ, the Treaty of Rome (EEC) and the Single European Act (SEA) had 
left behind and this is the context in which the EC as an option for security will be 
examined. 
Europe's Systematic Movement Towards Political Union 
The ECSC and Security 
European security has not been a topic where much has been discussed in previous European 
treaties - at least not overtly. Since the ECSC (Paris, 1951) and the EEC treaty, (Rome, 
1957) there are limited steps taken on the topic of European Security. 
The ECSC treaty did not give any overt hint on security, a concern that had been treated 
earlier (1948) only through the Brussels treaty. The preamble to the ECSC treaty expressed 
the resolve first to create "real solidarity" through practical achievements and by establishing 
an economic community to create "the basis for a broader and deeper community among 
peoples". (European Unification, the Origins and Growth of the European Community, 
Documentation, K. D. Borchardt, 1989, p. 24). 
The signs of concern towards Germany were evident and to many, the ECSC is considered a 
defence pact between France and Germany, even though no overt proof exists. The treaty's 
preamble reads as follows: 
Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts ... convinced that the 
contribution which an organized -and vital 
Europe can make ... 
is indispensable to the 
maintenance of peaceful relations ... to raise the standard of 
living and further works of peac ... 
to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create a broader and 
deeper communi among peoples long divided by bloody conflict ... 
(Treaties establishing the European Communities, 1987, Abridged edition, p. 19). 
The fears of a possible new uprising are evident, however the whole treaty dealt with the 
problem in a cooperative economic matter. The word "peace" is mentioned a considerable 
amount of times in the preamble of an "economic" treaty for it to be coincidence. The 
underlined sections demonstrate fears and call for an end to bloody conflicts giving the 
treaty a concern and a "securitat. ive" character. Archer (1994), argues that the French feared 
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that Germany, unrestrained, might come to dominate politically and militarilly (Organising 
Europe). 
However, the ECSC treaty was the first step towards European integration that dealt 
covertly with security. The motivation underlying this approach was the conviction that the 
causes of war lay in economic rivalry and that by substituting economic co-operation for 
economic rivalry the causes of war would be removed. "It was the treaty of Paris and the 
Treaty of Rome which preserved the peace between the nations of Europe whose differences 
and divisions had been the source of so much conflict over the century " (The Politics of 
1992, essay by Cockfield, p. 2 Edited by Crouch and Marquand). 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1971), reinforce the ECSC's "covert" concern with security, apart 
from its Economic concern: "The preconception in this case, was, I believe, that integration 
was good by definition since it was directed at economic reconstruction and permanent 
reconciliation between nations whose bloody conflicts had led to major wars engulfing 
significant portions of the world" and "The consensus that the founders perceived in the 
ECSC lay in the future. Their economic goal was not simply to utilise integration as an 
agent of economic construction but also to exploit a single continental-sized market to 
increase the rate of economic growth which had sagged badly during the interwar 
period ... Affluence, in its turn, was to undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies, thus 
simultaneously insuring political stability" (Regional Integration, Lindberg and Scheingold, 
p. 376,378). 
In essence, the ECSC represented a revolutionary approach to international relations. It put 
the seal on France - German reconciliation by linking the destinies of the two states. After 
the failure of the EDC, the Fouchet talks, Suez and Hungary in 1956 it became clear to 
Western Europeans, according to Tsakaloyiannis (1989) that "there were no anodyne 
shortcuts to European Unity" (The EC and the Challenge to the Future, ed. by Lodge, pp- 
242-243). 
The six ECSC members along with the UK, aware of the difficulty in providing for a 
European defence structure, thought the logical place to resume the task of European 
unification was at the point where the ECSC had left off, in other words with the less 
emotionally charged question of economic integration. Borchardt (1989), argues that this 
aim was more modest, but more realistic (European Unification p. 14). It was apparent that 
a defensive structure would require closer political union and the Europeans were not ready. 
The EC and Security 
The preamble of the EEC treaty speaks of the determination "to lay foundations of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe". (Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities, 1987, p. 119). Pinter (1991) suggests that it was clear that the movement 
towards Political Union was not abandoned. "It was instead channelled into the economic 
field" ('The single market: a step towards European Union, p. 94, Edited by Lodge The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 1991). 
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The second step towards European integration had been taken. The topic of defence was 
not overtly discussed in the treaty of Rome even though arguably, integration in any sense, 
as well as cooperation among states, create a sense of safety and this was believed to be 
achieved through economic cooperation. Another part of the EEC preamble states: 
... resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and 
calling upo the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in the efforts. 
Treaties establishing the European Cornmunitiesý p. 120 
The key words underlined suggest defensive fears and those who signed the treaty seem 
conscious of this reality. Martin (199t) in his study Europe an ever closer union , argues that European Political Union has been the theoretical goal ever since the first modern 
conception of the European Community supporting the argument of the EEC being not only 
and economic union, but much more than that. Political Union was - and still is - the key 
factor missing from a common European defensive structure. The fact that it has taken the 
EC so long to reach their goal has to do partly with the fact that they felt relaxed with the 
idea of NATO acting as a deterrent not only from external threats but also between 
themselves. Only after 29 years (1957-1986) did the Europeans discuss common foreign 
policy and political union formally through the Single European Act (SEA). 
A common defence policy achieved and run "by Europeans for Europeans" was considered 
not feasible during the Cold War with the Soviet threat looming on Western democracies. 
The US and NATO were considered necessary. Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the 
European Commission (1985 to 1988) states: 
The motivation underlying this approach was the conviction that the causes of war lay in 
econornic rivalry and by substituting economic co-operation for economic rivalry the causes of war 
and conflict would be removed. 
The Community started life endowed with a determination to achieve economic union (with 
the ECSC, and when the EDC failed, with the EC); indeed many analysts argue political 
union as well. 
SEA and Security 
The Single European Act (SEA) contains one of the most fundamental reforms of the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities undertaken since their creation in 1957. 
The SEA is designed to bring ever closer union among the European states in accordance 
with the original treaties. In achieving this goal the SEA considers operating on two fronts: 
the original treaties themselves and in the sphere of foreign policy. 
Defence is considered of importance for Europe's self definition. Article 30 of the SEA 
addresses tile issue of cooperation in foreign affairs but only of external problems outside 
the EC, such as the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91. Unfortunately, in the case of the Gulf War the 
EC seemed unable to reach common grounds. Jacques Delors stated: Judging by the 
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public opinion, I think Europeans drew the lesson that they must move faster toward political 
Union (Time Magazine, Star Crossed, April 22,1991, p. 28). 
The above example demonstrates the difficulty in achieving political union, because of the 
differences in national interests. "National interest is understood to mean a state of affairs 
valued solely for its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism which leads men to 
seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own 
nation; it is self love transferred to the national group". According to Ifestos (1987), the 
controversy surrounding the concept of national interest lies in the fact that, when we speak 
about it, we refer to values to which we should not expect all people or groups of people to 
subscribe (European Political Cooperation, p. 97). Building on the above, Nuttall (1992), 
argues that there is a limited degree of penetration it achieves within national administration. 
"This is a result of the fact that political cooperation is confined to foreign ministries. 
Accidents can occur when national positions are set out by those who have not been 
involved in the co-ordination process" (European Political Cooperation, p. 312). The 
various changes of government and cabinet shuffling can also create probLems due to the 
change in direction of their national policies which in turn make common approaches a 
difficult task in institutions such as the EC. There is a need for the national governments' 
interests to adjust in order to better deal with issues through the EPC platform. "it should be 
noted that that the pattern of foreign ministry adaptation is much more closely related to the 
bureaucratic traditions of each state and diplomatic service than to its government's attitude 
to European unity" (European Political Cooperation, Wessels, Allen, Rummel, p. 56). 
Therefore, it could be implied that when this convergence is achieved, EPC could become a 
useful institution. Security through the EC has become an important concern for Europeans 
as Martin (1991) states: 
What is becoming clearer and clearer is the need for the European Community to speak with one 
voice on foreign policy matters. The European Community must be the democratic rock, the 
beacon of hope, which keeps Europe stable. 
Europe, an ever closer union, p. 49 
It is essential for the world's largest commercial power (EQ, to assume more responsibility 
in world politics. "We cannot strive to be an economic giant and yet be content to remain a 
political pygmy". (Martin, An Ever Closer Union, p. 50). The ECSC was the formal 
starting point which dragged with it the covert topics of European defence and political 
Union (only to be formalised thirty five years later. ) 
The SEA has contributed to European integration and has made the European members 
consider common security with greater effort. Article 30 (6) of the SEA states that closer 
cooperation on questions of European security "would contribute in an essential way to the 
development of a European identity in external policy matters" and confirms the High 
Contracting Parties readiness to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and 
economic aspects of security . These are 
important commitments even though no direct 
reference is made to military aspects. As Lodge (1989) argues, these aspects were 
implicit in 
the form of words chosen. 
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Overall, the Single European Act exhibits continuity both in its content and the highly 
qualified presentation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) goals. 
Jacques Delors, describing the Single European Act stated- "It is a compromisefor 
progress giving us a sober reminder that Rome was not built in a day". Delors is 
known for his great optimism in many European matters and knows that such 
matters take time. On March 7 1991 he expressed his optimism for common 
defence policies within the European Community by saying that it should be written 
in the Treaty of Rome (1957) ",.. even if it would take several years to achieve. " 
(Financial Times, March 8,1991). In March 1991 Delors also stated that the Gulf 
War revealed the limitations of the European Community. Another example of those 
limitations occurred with its response to the civil war in that erupted in the former 
Yugoslavia in 1991. More than in any previous conflict, according to Kegley and 
Wittkopf (1994), the Community played a central role in monitoring cease-fires and 
mediating between the central Yugoslav government and the Croats and Slovenes. 
Nonetheless, divisiveness not only between contending forces in Yugoslavia but also 
among Community members themselves postponed a concerted, effectual European 
response to the conflict (World Politics, p. 186-187). 
Since the SEA, EPC has shown some signs that it may work: The Community has explored 
more active measures through EPC both to combat international terrorism and international 
crime with a degree of success. It is somewhat clear that the member states are developing 
a degree of convergence and joint purpose towards single states (India, China, Australia) 
and it also proved to be a useful debative platform during the Gulf crisis even though it did 
not take rapid action. 
The political and economic impact of the Gulf war, the problems associated with the reform 
process in some Eastern European states, civil war in Yugoslavia, but, above all, the 
precariousness of the economic and constitutional situation in the Soviet Union make further 
development in Europe more uncertain. The European Community, according to Buzan 
(People, States and Fear, p. 287) has clearly reached a level of rare cohesion sufficient to 
insert a powerful political, economic, societal and military presence between the declining 
superpowers. The SEA had introduced the 1992 deadline, and therefore to fill in the gaps 
and finally achieve the levels of cooperation required, the Maastricht Treaty was introduced. 
Forty years have gone by since the ECSC and a series of integrative attempts: ECSC, EDC, 
WEU, EEC, SEA, Maastricht. Step by step, the Europeans felt committed to the idea of a 
common defence policy, evident in the treaty of Maastricht. 
Maastricht and Security 
"It is fully acknowledged that the logic of an integration process includes inevitably foreign 
and security policy" (Vladimir Handil, The European Union in the 1990s, Wessels and 
Engel eds. P. 227). 
One month before the summit in Maastricht (January, 1992), a conference was held at 
Berlin's Aspen Institute by eight experts to discuss and argue over the future of a Continent 
torn between apparently conflicting trends: one toward greater unity, another toward chaotic 
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nationalism. (Time magazine, December 9 1991). It was believed that not since the end of WW2 have the states of Europe reached such a turning point. The United States was discussed as a slowly fading presence on the European scene. Moisi, associate director of the French institute for International affairs in Paris commented: 
We must be prepared for the time when there is less and less America in Europe. In the 
immediate future there is no alternative to NATO. But in the long run, the US interest is to help 
Europeans get their act together. 
Anderson, director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin also agreed that the US is at this stage looking more inward than outward (Time Magazine, December 9,1991). 
The 1945 to 1989 bipolar security order was clearly dying and although the outlines of a 
new one were only barely discernible, they suggested an ever closer Union. 
On February 7,1992 the Maastricht treaty was signed, where foreign and security policy is 
clearly written in. Title 5 is a particularly controversial one. Article J. I spells out 
explicitly the objectives of the common foreign and security policy: 
0 "to strengthen the security of the Union... " 
0 "to preserve peace and strengthen international security... " 
0 "to promote international co-operation.. " 
Article J2 calls on "concerted and convergent action" when necessary, while article J4 states 
that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), shall include all questions related to 
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to common defence. The Maastricht treaty calls upon the 
Western European Union, in a way reactivating it, to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence implications. It characterises the WEU as an 
integral part of the development of the Union boosting its prestige and giving it credibility. 
Cooperation on foreign policy matters is spelt out in Article J2 of the Maastricht Treaty: 
"Member states shall inform and consult one another within the council on any matter of 
foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is 
exerted effectively" (Articles taken from "The Maastricht Treaty", The Times, Oct. 11 1992). 
Birch and Crotts ( 1993), argue that the steps taken at Maastricht were notable insofar as they 
addressed the institutional arrangements governing Europe's future defence. While the process 
remains intergovernmental in nature, the Union Treaty envisages the gradual development of a 
European Defence Identity (EDI) within the WEU. Two competing visions of EDI have been 
advanced. First, the British have argued that EDI should avoid duplication of NATO's defence 
function, From this perspective, WEU functions as a bridge to NATO, while serving as the 
forum through which a more efficient European defence capability can be developed within the 
Atlantic Alliance, A second view associated with French and EC Commission ambitions, calls 
for a merger between WEU and the European Union. Prior to Maastricht, the French had 
argued that WEU should be accountable to the European Council. "Further, Delors had made it 
plain that he regards WEU as transitional in nature, a vehicle to overcome 'national sensitivities 
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on the road to defence integration " (Birch and Crotts, The State of the European Community, 
p. 265-266). 
Arguably, there seerns to be optimism in the treaty concerning a topic with limited success in the past. CFSP is only one part of the treaty, which also deals with single economy, 
social issues, monetary policy, education and a series of amendments of the EC treaty as 
well as new provisions and concepts. 
According to Norgaar, Pedersen and Petersen (1993), the differences between the CFSP and 
the EPC are: 
The objective is common action, rather than coordination of national foreign policies; 
Joint action aims at establishing more elaborate and deliberate policies than the EPQ 
Joint action involves a higher degree of commitment on the part of member states; and 
Joint action implies the possibility of majority votings. 
Therefore, the Maastricht treaty introduces an authentic qualitative change in the 
community's handling of foreign and security policy questions. Arguably, it could be 
assumed that the confusing approach of the EU during the Gulf War and through the EPC, 
gave the rationale for strengthening cooperation. 
The 'jist" of the treaty is progressive, based on the visionaries of the fifty's. Security and 
possible common defence are introduced once again and judging from the great European 
changes of the early 90's, the WEU could arise and become the major actor in such matters. 
In the Final Act declarations of the Maastricht treaty, the WEU member states "agree on the 
need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European 
responsibility on defence matters". The objective is to build up the WEU in stages as the 
defence component of the European Union". This entails closer co-operation between the 
WEU and the European Community's institutional framework. Whether the WEU could 
break away, up to a certain point, from NATO is yet to be seen, but certainly the measures 
for such a task have been written in the Maastricht treaty: The objective is to develop WEU 
as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The time for the 
WEU to take a protagonistic role in European security is evident and desired. The reason 
for its limited success since its birth was that it became subservient to NATO. In the 1990's 
the scene has changed. Europe is cooperating as a whole, NATO's role is being redefined 
and the communist threat is gradually fading. The US seem to applaud the idea of gradually 
helping the Europeans "get their act together" as mentioned by David Anderson, the director 
of the Aspen Institute in Berlin (Time Magazine, December 9,1991). 
The Maastricht treaty is one that deals with many issues apart from security and calls for 
Union among its member states that member states seem threatened by. UK Prime 
Minister John Major said that "Defences of national culture are instincts rooted deep in the 
blood. They are not to be swept away by rhetoric about growth or slogans about Unity" 
(Time magazine, September 21,1992). France's narrow vote in favour of the treaty on 
September 20th proves this: Douglas Hurd, minister for foreign affairs believes that 
"changes should be made in the treaty in orderfor it to be possibly ratified in Britain 
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(Economist, September 26,1992). The treaty is a necessary step towards Political Union 
and closer cooperation on defence matters. Europeans require a "Europeanised" security dimension to provide for their own self-definition. How fast and how far from acquiring 
one is yet to be seen. 
Can the EC, through EPC / CFSP, Provide a Security Option for Europe? 
The EC has been suggested by research as a possible option for European security. Can it 
provide the requirements of Europe in the 1990s? 
Schmit (1992) argues that European Integrationists want to use defence even as a "federator" 
for a new Western Europe. They claim to charge the Community with all the defence duties 
at present within the competence of member states and/or NATO. (Essay, A defence role 
for the EC, Reshaping Europe in the Twenty-first Century, Robertson ed. ). 
Schmit (1992) and Williams (1992) argue possible cooperation between the EC and NATO 
in the future as one option of thinking of the EC as dealing with defence. However, as 
Price (1992) points out, proponents of such a "Europeanist" alternative argue that it provides 
the only reliable long-term basis for a durable and robust security regime in Europe. 
NATO, they argue, was a product of the Cold War. A West European Defence Community 
(through the EC), linked to a dedicated inner grouping of EC members, could provide the 
solid core of a proposed Europe of non-centric circles (Reshaping Europe in the twenty-first 
century, Robertson ed. ). 
By focusing on the feasibility of the EC as a provider for European defence, a few problems 
arise: 
0A "European" security structure suggests integrating Eastern Europe into the 
Community system as the 15 will deal with their own affairs-, 
The EC is still a substantially "economic" union; 
0 The EC lacks any "defence" experience; and 
The ECs attempt towards common foreign policy has not demonstrated any notable 
results (i. e.. poor performance in the Gulf War. ) 
Historians may judge the Community's political performance in the 1990s by its ability to 
associate Eastern Europe and to establish a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. 
This means cooperating with Eastern Europe economically and politically. In the longer 
term, according to Rhein (1992), it will require a Community position on the question of if 
and when to admit those East European states which want to join the EC and which 
demonstrate the ability of living up to the commitments of full membership. 
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To state it more boldly, the Community's major responsibility during the 90s is to re-define the 
governance of the whole of Europe, from the Soviet union to the Atlantic and from the 
Meditcrranean to the North Cape 
Toward Bilateral Union, Rummel, ed., p. 27 
This entails widening the EC, and creating relationships with those states that do not wish to join. Therefore, in summarising the requirements needed for the EC to establish a defensive 
character, it seems to require: 
1. To enlarge, in order to encompass Eastern European states in their framework; 
2. To acquire efficient political cooperation among its member states, to avoid reaching 
deadlock on agreements; 
3. To find a common platform for agreements. (Given the general German reluctance to 
do anything with a military touch, the French hesitation to do anything alongside the 
Americans, and the British eagerness to support the Americans, the difficulty becomes 
apparent. ) 
4. To become European, meaning breaking away from American dependence. 
A European Defence Identity through the EC "may not, after all, be a European decision to 
make, but rather may be forced by a reorientation of United States policy. Complete US 
disengagement from the defence of Europe could have catalytic effects upon the current 
debate" (Birch and Crotts, The State of the European Community, 1993, p. 279). 
A survey taken in October 1990 in the EC member states to probe the impact of the Gulf 
crisis on the attitudes of EC citizens regarding security and defence aspects of the European 
Community showed that 61 % of the respondents stated that a common defence organisation 
for the European Community was now necessary, 29% did not consider it necessary, and 
10% did not know (Frost and Mchallan, In Search of Security, 1992, p. 58). As pointed out 
by Leo Tindemans in his 1975 report on European Union, European integration will not be 
complete until the Community draws a common defence policy. "Identifying the basic 
strategic determinants, in the context of which European integration operates, is therefore as 
important as any legal or institutional issue of European integration" (Ifestos, 1987, 
European Political Cooperation, 1987, p. 581). 
Since 1990, the EC has been faced with two major crises, one in the Gulf and one closer to 
the Continent in Yugoslavia, which provide an opportunity to analyse - up to a certain point 
- the state of EPC. According to Woods (1993), during tile Gulf War and the Yugoslav 
crisis, economic and diplomatic actions were coordinated through EPC, and the Europeans 
were able to agree to certain common responses, such as trade embargoes and diplomatic 
sanctions. However, "Europe's fragile political cooperation remains dependent on interstate 
bargains between member governments to protect national interests ... Throughout the two 
crises, the degree of coordination achieved by the EC depended on the type of action 
contemplated" (Woods, The State of the European Community, Birch and Crotts, eds. 1993, 
p. 241-242). The EC was able to agree to various embargoes against Iraq and the former 
Yugoslavia. However, the biggest problem facing EC unity continues to be the lack of a 
security or military arm. According to Woods (1993), it was this military inability and 
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certain EC members' preference for the UN that propelled the Yugoslav issue into the UN 
forum. TPC will continue to express the interests and objectives of its most powerful nation 
states" (The State of the European Community, p. 242). 
Conclusions - Adjustments Required For The European Community 
John Major, Prime Minister of the U. K, speaking in the British Parliament on Oct. 20, 
1992 (BBC 2, Westminster Live) stated: "European Union has had many definitions since 
the first day of the Treaty of Rome ." This comment not only demonstrates the difficulty of the concept of European Union, but also of achieving the concept in practical terms. 
Europe since the ECSC has changed. In the early days the European Community had a very 
restricted role in international politics. Until the Single European Act came into force in 
July 1987, the dominant view was that the EC had a role in external relations but not in any 
aspect of international affairs impinging on the traditional diplomatic endeavours of the 
member states. According to Pugh, (1992), "the military aspects of security were certainly 
considered taboo" (European Security Towards 2000, p. 49). 
However, gradual optimism and organisational stepping stones towards European security 
exist. The ECSC played its own role in deterring Germany, the EDC made an attempt for 
European defence but not at the right time. It made Europeans think about possible 
solutions for cooperation in the sphere of defence. The WEU demonstrated the European 
persistence on creating something more European but became subservient to NATO, at the 
time when NATO was needed due to the US presence in Europe (Cold War and 
Communism). With the European Community came the change in method towards 
achieving security dimensions: economic integration could bring political cooperation, the 
necessary prerequisite for common defence. The SEA grouped together a series of 
amendments to the existing treaties. Title 3 (Provisions on European cooperation in the 
sphere of foreign policy) constitutes an important landmark in the evolution of the EC's role 
in security matters. And finally, Maastricht went further on providing for joint action in 
specified foreign security matters which will be binding on all member states; it also 
discusses objectives of common foreign policy and requests the WEU to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions which have defence implication. Europe has gone through 
a series of changes and despite tile great optimism in the treaty, it seems that only if all the 
member states work towards the Maastricht Treaty's goals, will the vision of European 
Union live on. 
As H. Van den Brock, the Dutch Minister for foreign affairs stated on 17 February 1986: 
We know from experience that the best and even most ambitious texts can remain a dead letter, if 
the political will is lacking. If on the contrary it is present, apparently modest or impregnable texts 
can pave the way for a decisive advance. 
The SE 4, A Transnational Study Church and Keogh, eds. p. 26 
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4.5 The CSCE 
Introduction -A broad alternative 
The Options - NATO, WEU, CSCE and EEC/EPU 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), created in 1973 as a debative 
platform on security issues, is the broadest of any type of structures that deals with the topic 
of European Security. 
The entrenched patterns of cooperation that developed in Western Europe through the 
ECSC, the EEC, the WEU, NATO were extended to Eastern Europe with the establishment 
of the CSCE. It's collective commitment to the inviolability of current European borders 
and the peaceful resolution of disputes, as well as its promotion of human rights and 
political self-determination, provides the solid foundation for a true pan-European security 
regime. (Stares, Command Performance, 1991, p. 218). 
Following the changes that swept through Eastern Europe in 1988-89, NA-TO no longer 
faces the threat of a Soviet- led Warsaw Pact attack. Although a revival of Cold War 
antagonisms is not considered likely, great uncertainty persists about the fate of the East. 
The CSCE came into focus again after these changes and is seen by many analysts as the 
possible solution towards European security. However, the CSCE is still in an embryonic 
stage and has yet to prove that it can function collectively to deal with security threats 
towards its members defensively. The structure's achievements and experience, although 
important, force the CSCE to transforin as it lacks the institutional isation required to 
become a binding common defence mechanism for its broad range of members. Would the 
CSCE become a major actor for common defence if institutionalised? The first step in that 
direction was taken following the Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed on 21 
November 1990, but again its political efforts proved disappointing, particularly when faced 
with the civil war in Yugoslavia and the resurgence of the problem of national minorities. 
Historical Roots - The CSCE Process 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has its roots in a 1954 
Soviet proposal for a grand Conference on Security in Europe. Goetze (1987) states that the 
proposed conference was viewed by the Soviets as an effort to forestall the integration of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance, and to isolate the states of 
Western Europe from the United States and Canada which were to be accorded no place at 
the conference table or in the pan-European "security system" (Security in Europe, p. 68). 
The idea of such a security conference was "thrown around" in Europe throughout the 
sixties as the major diplomatic effort from the Soviets who always mentioned that the 
participating states of the conference should not include the United States. But the scope of 
the CSCE had changed significantly from the original Soviet aim to consolidate the USSR's 
own position in Eastern Europe and to inhibit Western cohesion. It actually evolved quite 
differently. 
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Questions such as the unification of Germany, military matters between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), had been addressed in 
other forums, leaving the CSCE to evolve in a political negotiation about ways and means of 
easing the burden of Europe's East - West split and alleviating some of the human hardships 
resulting from it. 
The topics suggested for the agenda had been greatly expanded to include concrete questions 
of co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and environment, and 
the key human contacts, information and cultural issues, as well as the formulation of 
general principals guiding interstate relations and certain limited confidence building 
measures (CBMs) in the military security field. (Goetze, Security in Europe, 1987, p. 71). 
The CSCE was held in three stages - respectively. 
0 In Helsinki on July 3 -7,1973; 
In Geneva from September 19,1973 to July 21,1975; and 
again in Helsinki from July 30 to August 1,1975. (Helsinki final act) 
It was attended by representatives of Canada, the United States and 32 states of Europe. 
CSCE's hnportance for European Defence 
In the 1970's the CSCE process had been the chief diplomatic instrument for discussions on 
security and cooperation among all European States, with the addition of the two North 
American allies of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. Its consensus rule is not 
only a symbol of the sovereign equality of its participants but also an indication of the 
difficulty in producing clear-cut decisions on distinctly controversial issues. Andren and 
Birnbaum (1980) have characterised the CSCE as a "powerless" organisation with 
conceivably some potential influence. "In the CSCE the nominal equality of 35 states (at the 
time of the statement] is refZected in an equitable diplomatic practice with more than 
symbolic significance" (Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective). 
The above factor of sovereign equality among its participants, in a way democratising 
international politics, can be deceptive; smaller European states may have been looking upon 
the CSCE as a way to acquire influence in international politics. As Andren and Birnbaum 
continue, equality arnong unequals adds to the difficulty of enhancing the political 
influence of the CSCE process. 
Valsalice (1980), argues that it would seem difficult to deny the fact that the real importance 
of the CSCE has to be gauged by the efficiency of the implementation of the follow-up 
clauses and if the follow-up process still means something in the fabric of a lively East - 
West debate in Europe; or whether the CSCE has been a diplomatic experiment, which had 
its roots in a different period of infra-European relations, and is no longer relevant in the 
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present situation. Valsalice, The CSCE Follow-up Process: An Assessment, p. 75 from 
Belgrade and Beyond, Andren and Birnbaum eds. ). 
By redressing the same questions concerning Europe in the 1990s, it becomes apparent that 
the CSCE faces challenges. Between 1973 and 1989 the CSCE functioned as an instrument 
to overcome the artificial division of Europe. The break-up in the East and the process of 
German unification have had implications for the CSCE as well as other structures such as 
the EC, NATO and the WEU. All these institutions are under the stress of adapting to the 
new relationships that are developing in Europe. 
The complex pattern of interactions which characterises the 54 state CSCE process is 
perhaps the most hopeful political development in Europe since the end of World War two. 
It's broadness is unique and greater than any institution created after the wars. There exists 
an evident desire that its participants wish to keep the process alive after more than twenty 
years since its existence. The CSCE process before the revolutionary changes of 1989 in 
Europe was dependent on being not institutional ised; and thereby retaining a dynamic nature 
from the force of constant concessions. The different actors had different hopes for the 
CSCE as Buzan (1990) states, but for these different reasons they all attempted to keep the 
process alive. In order to do this the different states took turns to present their demands. 
"Under cold war conditions, the old CSCE would probably have died if it had been 
institutionalised". (Buzan, The European Security Order Recast, 1990, p. 158). 
Under Cold War conditions, it would have been difficult for the CSCE to "compete" with 
existing and established security structures such as NATO, even if it had tried to be 
institutional ised, due to its great broadness in equal participants from the Eastern bloc as 
well, where a "Cold War" within the CSCE could have been possible. The CSCE as such 
could have been risky for humanity. For example, article 2 from the Helsinki final act 
states that: 
... the participating states will refrain in 
their mutual relations, as well as in their international 
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political 
independence of any state ... 
It seems that possible "Cold War era" disputes between the US and the Soviet Union would 
have been altered by this clause and not through NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's deterring 
mechanisms. It demonstrates the CSCE's optimistic nature among many different states, but 
does not bind these states together. Tile question is whether it can do so in the 1990s. The 
CSCE's importance is related to* the process's' great broadness in membership, including 
European states plus those who have forces in the region such as Canada and the United 
States; the fact that it survived the Cold War and contributed to the fall of the Iron Curtain 
through its useful debative platform; and finally, its progress towards the creation of 
Conference building measures (CBMs) reducing misunderstanding between states. 
The CSCE in the 1990s, Useful for the future of European Defence 
The CSCE in the 1990s continues to exist as a grand forum for European Security matters. 
As in its earlier days, it does not have tile operational resources 
it requires for a Europe in 
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which the risk of a of conflict" is still around. If a major crisis blew up, the CSCE with its 
current character of a debative platform with no actual binding agreements among states as 
far as foreign policy is concerned, would most probably not be able to cope. All 
experiences with the League of Nations and the United Nations, as examples of broad 
structures, seem bleak. A Conference diplomacy with some loose organisational structure is 
usually not worth much in a major crisis. Following the charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
signed on 21 November 1990, which recognised the end of the Cold War and 
institutional ised the CSCE, its political efforts proved disappointing, particularly when faced 
with the civil war in Yugoslavia and the resurgence of the problem of national minorities, 
re-emphasising the above point of it not being effective in major crisis. 
In a fragmented Europe, the CSCE could be useful, and for some period free of major crisis 
it could cultivate interesting ways of cooperation. But what happens when this cooperation 
develops into alliances among member states within the CSCE as a relationship between, for 
example Germany and the Russian Republic? The danger is that process breakdown could 
lead to the German trigger, and thus to power balancing, rather than an important and 
efficient European Security structure. 
At the same time, the CSCE is still dealing with another reality: tough institutional 
competition from NATO, the European Community, the Western European Union and the 
Council of Europe. The question is can it continue to exist at the same time as these other 
collective security structures? The European Community seems to be under pressure through 
the Maastricht treaty and this may be the right time for the CSCE to try to expand its 
powers. The Western European Union would most probably require four to five years until 
it can stand alone (based on the target date suggested in the Maastricht treaty), and the 
Council of Europe is dealing with its own problems (Eastern European observers) 
emphasising on human rights, a topic also discussed in the CSCE. Would the Europeans 
benefit from these structures existing together, and possibly cooperating? On which ones 
would specific states rely on? Some states are members in all these structures while many 
are only members of the CSCE. 
By examining the above structures that exist among others in Europe in the 1990s, (EC, 
WEU, NATO, CSCE) the question to ask is what has the CSCE to offer to its members or 
new applicants more than the other structures. And what is the point of a state being a 
member of all of these at the same time? 
It's differences derive partly from its dozens of participants compared to the EC's 15, the 
WEU's 10 and NATO's 16. NATO in the 1990s has no clear reason of still existing in 
Europe carrying with it the American presence. The WEU is too limited for a common 
European structure and would probably evolve within the European Community which 
lacks clear security regulations. In addition, although NATO (and the WEU as subservient 
to NATO) had perceived threats'such as Communism and the Warsaw Pact, the CSCE 
including the former communist states and without the threat of the Warsaw Pact seems to 
be around to secure "Europeans from Europeans"; or 
in other words a United Nations of 
Europe, for Europe. 
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Improving the CSCE's Institutional Structures 
The CSCE participants, aware of the above problems and the limited institutional structures 
met in July 1992. Entitled the Challenges of Change, the Helsinki Document makes some 
innovative proposals on improving the CSCE's institutions and structures, rendering its 
security capabilities operational, and developing the framework of activities relating to the 
human dimension. (NATO Review, # 4, Volume 40, August 1992). 
Decisions were taken on opening the CSCE's meetings to Japan, the establishment of 
practical working relations with -other European and transatlantic organisations (NATO, EC, 
WEU, Council of Europe) the strengthening of relations with revision of the scale of 
contributions to CSCE expenditure. Furthermore, the Helsinki document specifies that the 
CSCE approach (in the sphere of security) is based on the concept of Global security and 
implies co-ordinated cooperation at the various international levels: regional, sub-regional 
and even trans-frontier. Even though the Document seems to recognise the unstable and 
uncertain period of time, it decided on tile creation of the function of a High Commissioner 
for National Minorities (HCNM), the empowering of the CSCE to conduct peace-keeping 
operations, and the setting up of a Forurn for Security Cooperation. (NATO Review, # 4, 
Volume 40, August 1992, p. 5). 
The HCNM is close to what the European Political Cooperation (EPQ is for the EC. It 
calls on the participants to provide early warning of a possible threat or problems to states of 
the CSCE. The inclusion of peace-keeping operations in the document transforms the 
CSCE, for the first time in its history into an institution with operational functions. 
However, tile operations must conform to the major principles of UN practice, not using 
force and requiring the full consent of the parties concerned. This part seems ambiguous; 
as ambiguous as tile terms "parties concerned" is. It can also call for help through the direct 
resources of the EC, WEU or NATO. Tlierefore, the CSCE is accepting the fact that the 
effective management of post-c(immunist Europe requires the joint action of an interlocking 
set of European and transatlantic institutions, (answering in part the question on why a 
certain state should be a member of all these other institutions but at the same time putting 
the burden on those states, members in all of them. ) 
Finally, the Document deals with disarmament creating committees and various forums. 
These steps are still in their embryonic stages in order to evaluate them. 
Conclusions - An option used in cooperation with other 
institutions 
Will the Helsinki decisions enable the CSCE to evolve into a prestigious and dynamic 
institutional ised security structure? It seerns that Greater Europe can look forward to the 
conclusions of the major CSCE meeting (Budapest 
1994) with a reasonable degree of 
optimism. In Budapest, the structure's name was changed to 
OSCE (Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) and member states expressed their 
desire to further 
acquire a more important role in Europe's 
defence. Russia stated that there should be a 
decision making body specially tasked for conflict management 
(as the UN's security 
council), of permanent and non permanent members and 
"regional tables" (Balkans, 
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Mediterranean etc. ), on security stability and cooperation matters. Furthermore, Russia 
proposed another central role for the CSCE: to coordinate all other security institutions of the area from Vladivostok to Vancouver (NATO Review, #2, March 1995). Certain 
combinations may come into existence such as NATO and the CSCE working together. But 
there are problems to be solved within NATO over what justifies it. The durability of NATO is likely to lead not to a fusion of CSCE and EC, but to a development where the EC is pushed away from the military sphere, and gains hegemony in the politico-economic 
sphere, according to Buzan ( 1990, The European Security Order Recast, p. 277). This is 
when the WEU could come in, possibly replacing an unjustified NATO. 
It seems unlikely for the CSCE to stand alone in the near future as a security structure. Its 
loose framework has not allowed it to become a "binding" defensive structure. 
Undoubtedly, it has been useful as a "grand European" platform and it can continue to be in 
the spotlight in the post Cold War Europe. 
4.6 Co-operation - Working Together 
Most research has suggested the possibility of these options, or some of them, working in 
close cooperation. However the researcli does not provide in actuality how this should be 
done structure wise, as the future European security system is not something that will just 
occur on its own. Europeans would most probably have to endure a certain process of trial 
and error in their search for the best forinula. 
The concept of interlocking institutions lias in this respect only just begun to take shape. It 
will require time to make such institutioils function properly in accordance with their new 
responsibilities. As former Secretary General of NATO Manfred Worner had stated: 
Set-backs are unavoidable. NATO was not created overnight or without some hard negotiation 
either. I do not draw the conclusion tha( we should abandon our efforts but rather that we have to 
redirect them. 
NATO review, # 6, December 1992 
Working together entails one basic requirement for all these organisations: Common 
interests and identity of values. 
Williams (1992), states that a reduction of the US presence is as certain now as was their 
deployment in Europe at the outset of t1le Cold War, yet it is nonetheless as well to 
remember that America's role in NATO rernains indispensable, as the sole condition for the 
final reconciliation between the AtlantIcIsts and the Europeanists. He adds that this 
reconciliation is necessary due to Germany's new found role in Europe. Germany is, 
arguably, the most dominant power in Europe: supreme in the EC and now NATO's most 
salient power. Without Germany, neither institution - it could be said - has any meaningful 
role. A "deeper" as opposed to a "wider" European Community runs the risk of making the 
Community an adjunct of German power. Therefore, Williams' suggestions requires NATO 
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continuing to exist, and cooperating with the WEU and the European Community. Tile 
question is how? 
NATO's success in containing the Cold War and surviving through it demonstrates its 
essence in European security concerns. The US is still the only power which could possibly 
succeed a new "Desert Storm" without a inassive increase in defence expenditure from 
Europe. The WEU provides the Europeým version of NATO and gives Europe the possibility 
of inheriting their own security in the future. The question of what the Europeans would 
have come up with if the WEU had not been reactivated or had not existed is an interesting 
one .A new EDC could have been in the making with a similar conclusion. 
The CSCE as a regional organisation provides a wide debative platform where many states 
can discuss security issues. It requires to interact more with NATO in order to peacefully 
settle disputes, as its institutional structure does not call for military options. 
The EC through EPC is an essential step towards EC foreign policy but what happens if an 
Eastern European state is threatened? Hu ngary, for example, is not a member of NATO, nor 
the WEU, nor the EC but of the CSCE. The CSCE could not provide for its defence, 
however, its problem could be debated dirougli its structure. Or what would happen if 
Ireland had a defensive problem? It would most probably first proceed through the EC 
platform but possible immediate action iiiay be necessary. The EC does not provide military 
objectives, and in the event of failure, responsibilities must be taken. Could NATO handle 
such a matter, on the grounds that sucli a crisis may disrupt European affairs? 
Certain Institutional liaison committees between these organisations are essential, but then 
again, even if this step by step procedure is feasible, it only serves Western Europe. Europe 
in the 1990s is searching for a Pan-European Security structure and as long as the US is 
included in the European equation, at least states such as Russia, Poland or Hungary feel 
more secure. Closer cooperation entails distinct responsibilities between these structures. 
For example, a strong WEU means a WEU that is closely associated with NATO. To 
operate meaningfully, it would probably iieed to be able to use NATO's assets or NATO's 
assigned forces in cases where NATO does not chose to act. 
It is essential for all the structures exaimiied in this chapter to redefine their roles before 
they begin to cooperate. NATO has started to discuss broadening, the WEU has tried to 
increase cooperation with NATO and the EC, while the CSCE has tried to enhance and 
evolve its institutional structures. But tlieii, against who? A threat is required. Scenarios 
must be laid out such as what would Impl)eii in certain events. 
It is important to understand the nature of the dynamics of change within the European 
security system. Cooperation among thcse structures is an advantageous scheme, but not in 
loose terms. 
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4.7 Summary: Pressing challenges for existing structures 
Chapter 4 dealt with options and alternatives for European security in the next decade. A 
new security frarnework will not emerge as the result of a conscious plan - either in the form 
of Gorbachev's "Common European Home", Mitterand's "European Confederation" or 
Bush's Europe "whole and free'. The words of Thomas Schelling are even more 
appropriate in the 1990s than when they were first penned twenty five years ago: "The time 
for the Grand Schemes is over. We are moving out of our architectural period in Europe 
into the age of manoeuvre " (Price, 1992, European security, Towards 2000, Pugh, ed., p. 
137). 
In this "age of manoeuvre", European security analysts are dealing with an important 
number of issues: role definitions for the existing structures; threat perception; cooperation 
among institutions; institutional isation; objectives for these options and analysing possible 
responses. Taking into consideration the overall problems that Europe faces in the 1990's, 
and the fact that all these structures were formed during the Cold War era-, this age of 
transition becomes even more challenging. Various failures in trying to achieve such 
dimensions might prove vital for Europe's security future. The EDC failure of 1951-54 
demonstrates this point. 
The political and strategic situation in the Continent is likely to remain fluid for years to 
come and Europe's post - Cold War security system will thus evolve organically on a 
piecemeal and incremental basis, as the result of ad hoc and largely pragmatic responses to 
specify security challenges. And this is why most analysts argue NATO as the only 
structure that could offer security in this transformational era. Threats posed by the Soviet 
Union break-up, the various nationalist teiisions, Yugoslavia, ethnic minorities, Germany 
and external possibilities (such as Iraq) cýiii only - at this point in time be counterbalanced by 
NATO and the United States' assistance. NATO has been able to define over the past 40 
years and establish a link between capability and commitment within the context of the 
prevailing economic and political situation. The WEU as well as the EC would most 
probably require additional time, while the CSCE, would require the necessary 
institutional isation. 
Should the basis for the next future security framework be built on the assumption of a new 
war coming into existence? Williams (1992), believes it should not, adding that this piece 
of conventional wisdom may prove a fragile assumption on which to base our security 
policy. The unpredictability of events over the years can prove fatal for this assumption and 
it would in turn be fatal if Europeans do iiot organise - in any way - and set military 
objectives to meet the possibility of a new war. 
Finally, European security has the task m the next years of searching for all these 
requirements. Therefore, the Continent seems more and more 
likely to continue to witness 
NATO as a major actor in European affairs despite less US assistance. 
NATO has less 
negative aspects and its experience in cooperation with the 
WEU might be the first step in 
the systematic problem of "Europeanising" security. 
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A highlighting of a few concepts examined in the literature review: 
To feel secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety or danger. Security is therefore a state of 
mind in which an individual, whether the highest political leader or the land of the average 
citizen, feels safe from the harm of others. Therefore, a state believes itself secure (its 
leaders and its citizens) when it fears that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states. 
In this sense security depends on the perceptions people have of their position in their 
nvironment. If these perceptions are common among more than two states, then a collective 
security relationship could be formed, known as an alliance. Alliances are seen as a way for 
states to increase their security in response to an external threat. The greater the threat -a 
function of relative power, geographic proximity and aggressive intentions - the greater the 
tendency for states to ally against it. This threat can endanger not only the state's 
population, but the state's ideology, commitment to democracy, or economy (i. e.. 
communism was a threat for the West during the Cold War, while the Gulf war affected the 
Continent economically). Threats may be classified according to their nature, their 
magnitude, their imminence. Perception of threat is therefore linked with the security of 
states and a reason for the formation of alliances. 
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Conclusions to the Literature Review 
The end of the Cold War has brought to a close the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs and, as regards the West, eliminated the massive threat represented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 
However, these developments have also led to the breakdown of the mechanism that 
previously kept hotbeds of crisis under control. As a result, Europe has witnessed the 
emergence of new risks and tensions which, far from being controllable, have been 
multiplying and spreading. The end of the Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. Nor 
does it promise that the current configuration of power and influence will remain. Many 
analysts have speculated about the range of new problems and potential threats caused by the 
end of the Cold War. Meearsheimer (1992) stated on the great power relations after the 
Cold War: 
"The prospects of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase-dramatically now 
that the Cold War is receding into history" 
Steele (1992), commenting on the same subject stated: 
"We are witnessing today in Europe a return to history ... a return to ethnicity, to 
nationalism, to seýf determination, to the struggle for influence and power" 
(Both citations, Kegley and Wittkopf, eds. World Politics, 1992, p. 112) 
Therefore, the current strategic context, characterised by instability and tension, requires a 
high degree of political and military commitment. The various small wars, regional crises 
and areas of ethnic and religious tension call for a rethinking of traditional security 
guarantees, especially at the collective level. The era of 'confrontation' of the Cold War 
has ended and Europeans are moving toward a much more complex international structure in 
which numerous organisations might interact in order to ensure stability. 
The review of literature has identified a number of security problems in the 1990s for 
Europe, inherited generally from the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the 
unification of Germany. Based on these challenges, Europeans are called upon to create 
their new character for their defence mechanism: 
- Europeans are faced with tile problems of identifying a new threat, necessary as 
discussed, for the formation of an adequate security mechanism. Collective security 
implies states coming together in order to be able to face a possible threat or threats, as was 
the case of NATO and tile WTQ with their nuclear and conventional arsenals. The apparent 
stability Europe enjoyed, despite the WTO and NATO opposing each other is explained by a 
great number of defence analysts through their clear perceptions of threat. The threats 
perceived between 1949 (formation of NATO) and 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) no longer 
apply in Europe of the 1990s, and therefore the search for new threats is on. For some 
years since 1989, Europeans have been seeking to identify new threats in order to justify the 
continuing existence of NATO or to build other institutions such as the WEU, the CSCE or 
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the EC. Knowing who or what to arm against is a major factor in ensuring stability. 
Threat perception in the 1990s is proving a difficult task: 
Various questions need to be answered: 
Who is a threat to Europe? 
Should Europeans take into consideration 'out-of-Europe' (out - of - area) threats? 
Does the threat have to be from other states ? 
Based on the answers given to the above questions about threat perception, European 
defence may acquire a new character and role. 
- European affairs have, since 1945, been characterised by the involvement of the United 
States. After 1949, with moves such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the 
formation of NATO, the United States has been the major actor, through NATO, in 
European defence matters. Therefore, the defence of Western Europe was, in geographical 
terms, a matter of a non-European actor. Attempts for a more 'European' defence 
mechanism such as the European Defence Community and the Western European Union 
were eventually hampered by tough US competition and the necessity of a superpower for 
the West in their attempt to confront the Eastern Bloc. 
Is it time for Europeans to break away from American assistance and lead their own defence 
matters? Can Europeans, despite the instability of the Continent, risk sending Americans 
home? In other words, even if the US agrees to limit its influence in European affairs, is it 
time to abandon the 'Atlantisist' approach to defence and take the 'Europeanist' approach? 
This is another problem which r'emains to be answered. 
- German unification has stimulated researchers to place the states' potential of 
becoming 
a dominant power in Europe politically, economically and defensively on the agenda of 
possible threats, bearing in mind Germany's history. What role will Germany acquire in the 
1990s? And is Germany a threat to Europe or a specific state? 
Moreover, Europe has new borders, and new states have emerged- Do any of these newly 
formed states present a threat to other European states? Should they be incorporated 
collectively in the future security arrangernent for the whole of Europe? If the answer is 
yes, how? 
- Europeans, since 1989, have been 
left with a number of security structures such as 
NATO, the WEU and the CSCE. These security related arrangements were created in the 
time of the Cold War and are therefore arguably, considered unfit in their current state to 
defend Europe. 
The emergence of a new framework on the Continent and the 
increasing frequency of crisis 
of a different nature from those * 
for which NATO, for example, was originally conceived, 
have sparked a debate on the subject commonly known as out-of-area problems. 
Can 
96 
Chapter Five Conclusions to the Literature Review 
NATO adjust? What will its new character be? The structure's involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia in 1993 demonstrates NATO's change of character by undertaking what might 
be labelled humanitarian and peace-keeping operations on behalf of the United Nations. 
Can NATO continue to defend Europe? The EC has not yet been given a defensive 
dimension and thus adjustments here need to be made also. Chapter Four of the literature 
review dealt with the options for European defence and discussed their various positive and 
negative points (i. e. US assistance and experience through NATO, broad membership in the 
CSCE, the European Character of the WEU and the EC to name a few). But which will 
take on the task to defend Europe in an adjusted version? Who will lead and, most 
importantly, against what threat will this future alliance be based upon? 
- European security for the 1990s becomes even more complex and uncertain when 
consideration is given to the possibility of such institutions (options), working together, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. Can the various structures work together? If these institutions 
do continue to exist and find the formula for cooperation, what will happen to the states 
which are not members in all structures? Does it mean that Germany, for- example, is more 
secure than Sweden, since Germany is a member in all these options whereas Sweden is not 
a member of the WEU? In addition, the major economic problems facing the EC (i. e. 
monetary Union, ECU, implementation of Maastricht) are procrastinating the questions of 
European security which need to be addressed. 
As discussed through the review of the literature, during the bipolarity of the Cold War, the 
superpowers could maintain discipline among their allies and protoges. The fault lines were 
unambiguous, the behaviour of the adversaries predictable, and incentives to drive enemies 
into submission weak. Arguably, the Cold War induced caution, because the risk of a 
nuclear exchange exceeded any benefits either superpower could derive from upsetting the 
status quo. The threat was clear even though according to Jervis (1991), the rules of 
prudence developed between the superpowers to assure that the frictions between them did 
not become unmanageable (Jervis, R., Soviet - American relations after the Cold War, 
1991). 
The Post Cold War era promises to be different. In part this is because the emergent 
configuration of power itself introduces greater uncertainty. The issues may also be 
different, as discussed in chapter three of the literature review. "Security" will still be at 
issue, but tile definition of security rnight change, depending on the new threats perceived 
and the new challenges that need to be dealt with. It is essential therefore, to determine if 
there is a general feeling towards the importance of threat perception, whether the threat(s) 
has receded, which are the new threats for tile Continent and if there is a need to adjust or 
dissolve existing security arrangements, or which ones are preferred. 
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Conclusions to the Literature Review 
The problems and issues addressed in the literature review may be examined in a variety of 
ways. An empirical investigation of such problems can also be undertaken from a variety of 
perspectives. It is therefore necessary to specify in detail the central objectives of enquiry, 
the methods and sources of data, and the theoretical perspectives which underpin both the 
subject matter from the research and the particular approach adopted. The literature review 
made an attempt to provide an understanding of the theoretical framework and historical 
process of European security in structural terms. However, in order to clarify images of 
possible 'futures' or anticipate consequences, it is necessary to know the direction of 
change. 
Much of the work and studies on European security are concerned with the shape European 
security might take in the future. Much of the work appears in journals, reviews and books 
with emphasis is on definitional disputes, the changing nature of the topic in theoretical 
terms, and much less on how these developments may or may not affect a specific state, 
(through statistical explanation from a large sample of elites from that state). Although these 
studies provide a wealth of information on specific problems and recent developments of 
some significance at the policy level, they frequently do so without sufficient attention to the 
numerous challenges for examination, that is, how these may correlate with one another, in 
order to determine levels of importance and preferences of a similar sample of elites. In 
essence, there has been little attention paid to the problem of analysing in detail smaller 
states such as Greece, maybe because of the state's involvement in the EC or NATO which 
may seem to provide it with adequate security and the platforms from where Greece's 
security concerns should be seen. 
Singer (1961), argues that in order to analyse a theoretical model, three goals must be 
achieved: First, an accurate description of the phenomena; second, an explanation of the 
relationships among tile phenomena under investigation; and finally, that the model offers 
the promise of reliable prediction. The focus on a specific state is a traditional style of 
analysis according to Singer, and is an advantageous method of investigation "because it 
encourages the observer to examine the national actors in detail" (Classic Readings in 
International Relations, Williams, Goldstein, Shafritz eds. , 1994, p. 
89). The description of 
the model of this study, its explanation and the variables involved along with the analysis of 
the empirical data are presented in chapters 7 and 8. 
A large number of studies were examined with a view to identifying the problems they have 
encountered and how these were overcome. The first step was to chose a sample state from 
Europe as a source of information, which is or has been involved in European institutions, 
which had and / or has security concerns, affected by and preoccupied with the 
revolutionary changes that occurred in 1989. For personal interest as well as the above 
reasons, the state chosen was Greece. However, it is essential to define the term "state". 
According to Hall (1993), "there is a great deal of agreement among social scientists about 
how the state should be defined. A composite definition would include three elements. First, 
a state is a set of institutions which possess the means of violence and coercion. 
The state 
staffs such institutions with its own personnel; the continuity of such personnel over time 
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distinguishes the state from the more transient government or administration as used in the 
context of US politics. Second, these institutions in principle, control a geographically 
bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Crucially, the state looks inward to its 
own society and outward to larger societies in which it must make its way; its behaviour in 
one area often can only be explained by its activities in the other. Third, the state 
monopolises rule - making within its territory. This tends toward the creation of a common 
political culture shared by all citizens. Differently put, the historical record witnesses an 
increasing merging of nation and state. Sometimes national sentiment is created by the state, 
but sometimes the national principle can call into existence new states" (The Oxford 
Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger, ed., 1993, p. 878). A state can also be 
referred to as a "country" or a "nation state", however this study uses the term "state" 
throughout (except in citations), and its definition is based on the above. 
Greece enjoys the three elements of the definition: It is a state with a set of institutions 
which possess the means of violence and coercion; its institutions control a geographically 
bounded territory, and Greece monopolises rule - making within its territQry. But who are 
the actors concerned with rule - making in the designated territory of the state? The actors of 
the state which perform "important roles in the governance of society, and make important 
decisions or have influence in decisions at the national and local levels of government are 
called elites" (Eldersveld, 1993, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger, 
ed., p. 263 -A detailed definition of the term "elites" is presented in chapter 7, section 
7.7). 
The state of Greece has had a recent history of activity in the European scene and has 
occupied the minds of statesmen and institutions on numerous occasions (1967 - 1974 
military coup, 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the Macedonian issue and the ongoing diplomatic 
struggles with Turkey). Greece's involvement in NATO the WEU, the EC, and the CSCE 
makes it an interesting subject for examination. Have Greece's security concerns changed? 
Do Greeks feel that the above institutions can coi-itinue to serve their security interests? How 
do Greeks feel about tile absence of threat perception identified in the literature? The 
historical parallels and examples in the review of the literature were concerned to identify 
the material conditions for the production of a theory, and to assess empirically its 
application to the state of Greece. Therefore, both historical and structural factors required 
attention and served as a starting point towards the proposition of a model. The theoretical 
assumptions and tile proposed hypotheses (examined in chapter 7) are operating as 
paradigms for analysis. Tile starting point in the development of this focus stems from a 
proposition put forward by Ernst Haas (1968, p. 33): 
A helpful, but by no means indispensable condition [for international unification] is the 
existence of an external threat, real or imagined. 
Based on this proposition, it becomes essential for Europe to perceive a threat as a 
requirement for organising the Continent's defence institutionally. 
Threats, according to 
this theory, provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international cooperation. Europe, 
having lost the clear threats perceived through NATO and the WTO has lost a focus 
in the 
field of threat perception. 
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Even the character of the term threat - its definition - is bound to change from the traditional 
military perceptions, to religion, economy or even food scarcity and defence institutions 
may be required to deal with these issues. Whatever the threat perceived, the easier the 
response in collective security terms. Threats may be perceived as immediate, remote, 
economic, military, political and so on. The type of threat involved is an important 
determinant of the type of response selected to deal with it by the decision-makers of the 
threatened state, as it seems reasonable to expect that a situation involving a military threat 
(for example) which is specific, immediate or very probable to materialise will necessitate 
an immediate response. 
Based on the assumption that each state is unique, carrying its own identity, culture, values 
and interests, it would be logical to argue that there is no "typical" state in Europe which 
could possibly represent the rest of the Continent. The field work attempts to investigate the 
topic of this thesis by using Greece as a sample. If the research was focused on another state 
of Europe, then the findings may have differed. This is one of the reasons why research is 
undertaken in various states in order to compare and contrast findings, common positions 
and policies. Therefore, Greece, in this thesis does not represent the whole Continent and it 
is not the attempt of this study to base Europe's concerns on what is found from the 
empirical work. 
A questionnaire was designed to elicit information from a sample of Greek elites mainly 
from 4 major areas, which assisted the formation of the questions. These 4 areas are 
believed to encompass an array of issues that may affect the model of this study and are 
derived from the literature review. 
- Greece's perception of threat in the 1990s and its opinion of threats facing the whole of 
Europe; 
- Greece's policy responses or solutions as a result of their perceptions of threat. 
In other 
words, which security mechanism would better serve their interests; 
- The level of importance of the challenges and possible threats that may occur 
in Europe 
in the 1990s for Greek policy makers, and their view of the same challenges or threats for 
Europe; and 
- Greece's opinion on continuing United States assistance 
for Europe and Greece, 
especially through NATO. These are the central objectives of enquiry, as stimulated from 
the review of the literature. After the constructioil of the questionnaire, it was necessary to 
choose the suitable statistical tests that would enable towards the effective analysis of the 
data. (The specific tests used and why are presented in chapters 7 and 8). 
In summary this study attempts to elicit information and analyse the current security 
debate 
from Greýece's viewpoint. Tile main thesis of tile study is that of: Re-evaluating threat 
perception as the essential or major requirement for European 
defence in the post Cold 
War era (Case study: Greece). 
The examination of the state of Greece follows in chapter 
6, to set the context which will 
help determine the shape of the specific questions to be addressed and subsequently the 
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interpretation of tile field findings. Aii attempt to question the applicability of the findings 
beyond the sample is discussed iii cliapter 8. 
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"Greece belongs to the West" 
C. Karamanlis 
"Greece belongs to the Greeks" 
A. Papandreou 
Clogg, 1992, A Concise History of Greece, p. 179 
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6.1 Introduction 
The two opening statements symbolise the protracted identity crisis Greece had experienced 
- and for many is still experiencing - during the state's transition from the military dictatorship of 1967 - 1974, to democracy. Couloumbis (1984), Woodhouse (1986) have 
identified this political difference coming from two men who have dominated the state's 
political scene: Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou. Both were prime 
ministers and are still at the time of writing in the centre of the public eye; Papandreou as 
Prime Minister and Karamanlis as President. 
In clarifying his slogan, Karamanlis consistently places Greece in the Western political and 
economic institutional nexus, while Papandreou has felt that the state would be best served 
by adopting a model of self-reliance in solidarity with other member states of the Third 
World (Couloumbis, Greece in the 1980s, p. 96). 
Karamanlis had tried, with much success, to incorporate Greece in major-western 
organisations such as the EC and NATO, while Papandreou opted to abandon such 
structures as he clearly stated in 1981 during his election campaign. However, even 
though Papandreou won these elections, Greece remained a member of both institutions 
despite Papandreou's persistent and often unclear stance about continuing membership 
(Richter, 1990; Clogg, 1992). 
Greece is a member of several Western and European Institutions, such as the EC, NATO, 
WEU, the OECD and the Council of Europe. Relations were disrupted by the dictatorship 
of 1967 - 1974, but Karamanlis and Rallis (Prime Minster between 1980 - 1981) devoted 
much time to their restoration. Karamanlis secured early entry to the EC, despite efforts by 
the commission to link its application to that of the Iberian nations. 
6.2 Greece's Security Considerations 
The post-war orientation of Greece's defence policy was predicated on the US belief that 
Greece's main security concern was of an internal rather than of an external nature 
(Veremis, 1984). According to a National Security Report of 1949, Greece was to have: 
... a military establishment capable of maintaining 
internal security in order to avoid communist 
domination, while Turkey was designated with a military establishment of sufficient size and 
cffectiveness to insure her continued resistance to Soviet pressures. 
Grcece in the 80's, Clogg ed, 1984, p. 174 
The Greek army was therefore primarily supplied and organised to face the communist 
threat from within. Greece, according to Veremis, was expected to cause some delay to 
Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war . 
In 1952, Greece and Turkey were accepted as members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, and Greece was expected to aid Turkey at the risk of attracting enemy 
reprisals. However, Greece withdrew from the integrated military structure of 
NATO 
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tollowing the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Richter (1990) described this move as a 
tactical mistake . Karamanlis believed that by withdrawing, Greece would have complete 
control of its own armed forces in the event of a Turkish attack on the Greek mainland: 
Thus Athens lost all possibility of influencing the NATO council during subsequent 
developments 
. In addition, according to Richter, Greece's withdrawal reinforced Ankara's 
claims in the Aegean (Background to Contemporary Greece, M. Sarafis and M. Eve, eds., 
p. 3 25). 
When Greece sought to rejoin and restore command and control over the Aegean, Turkey 
objected. However, in 1980, Rallis accepted a formula for re-entry which left these matters 
to be resolved in subsequent negotiations trough NATO and between the two states. 
Poor relations with Turkey have dominated foreign policy for the past decade. The Greeks 
believe that the Turks, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit report on Greece 
(1992-93), have designs on the Eastern Aegean islands and feel confirmed in their view 
because of the continuing occupation of northern Cyprus by some 35,000-Turkish troops. 
As a consequence, Greece has fortified many of the islands of the Aegean. The Turks 
claim this contravenes international treaties, though the Greeks claim that they are only 
exercising a legitimate right of self defence ( Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992-93, p. 13). 
Greece has not agreed to a new command and control arrangements in the Aegean from 
NATO because it claims they could provide justification for Turkish arguments regarding 
the continental shelf and Aegean airspace. Since 1985, Greece has not participated in 
NATO exercises in the Aegean as a consequence of a dispute over the deployment of forces 
on the island of Lemnos near the mouth of the Dardanelles. 
The Conservatives (The New Democracy Party) under Mitsotakis (1985 - 1993 and M. 
Evert 1993 -) and the Socialists under Papandreou (1981 -) follow a broadly common line 
on national issues and have indicated that they will block Turkey's application for 
membership of the EC so long as outstanding differences in the Aegean and over Cyprus 
remain unresolved. 
Greek - Turkish relations have been a major issue since ancient times as Richter states, and 
the major question is: Who controls the two continental shores and the bridge of islands 
connecting them across the Aegean (p. 317)? Much will depend on the EC, even though 
Veremis (1986) argues that: 
... EEC membership will probably 
disappoint those Greeks N%, Iio believe that it will constitute a 
guarantee against Turkish aggression. 
Greece in the 1980s, Ed. by Clogg, p. 175 
The argument that the EC will benefit Greece's security as far as the states' relations with 
Turkey is based on the weakening traditional influence of the US and NATO on Turkey of 
the 1990s. Thus, the chances for a solution via NATO, especially when the organisation 
faces new problems and dilemmas over its new character (discussed in the literature review - 
Chapter 4), are dwindling rapidly. However, are the Europeans ready to accept Turkey as 
a new member? And when are they prepared to let the 
Turks in? The answers to these 
questions could constitute the solution to the whole complex of 
Greaco-Turkish conflict and 
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simultaneously could provide the time-table for a solution to the Cypriot problem. Pierros 
and Docos (1993), Richter (1990), Clogg (1992) clearly place Greaco-Turkish relations at 
the forefront of Greece's security matters. Specifically, Pierros and Docos (1993) ill their 
article on Greece's security issues (Economicos Tahidromos, November 18,1993), argue 
that the primary occupation for Greece's defence experts should be the definition of the 
Turkish threat. They recognise the necessity of remaining a member of NATO and other 
organisations which have contained fears of a possible conflict between the two states, but 
argue that they are not enough to secure the state. They call for new advanced weaponry 
for the enhancement of Greece's defence mechanisms. 
Until December 1991, Greece and Turkey had only observer status in the Western European 
Union (WEU). Greece threatened to veto the Maastricht Treaty if they were not offered 
membership. Reluctantly, WEU member governments offered membership to Greece 
while extending associate status to Turkey, as a member of NATO. However, there is a 
debate within the WEU as to whether its guarantee of a collective response to a threat of 
aggression applies in the event of hostilities between member states or only in the event of a 
threat from an external enemy. Bearing this in mind, it seems that Greece's security 
concerns could not possibly be effectively dealt with through the EC, as it is not defensive 
in nature whereas the WEU is unclear as far as its guarantees are concerned (with tile 
possible exception of NATO). Stable relations with other Western democracies, as well as 
with Turkey become essential as a means of alleviating these concerns, and the 
strengthening of Greece's own defence mechanisms is a logical consequence. 
On tile other hand, Turkish foreign policies with Greece have been based on trying to 
develop economic relations with their neighbour as well as trying to settle Greaco-Turkish 
relations on their own (Ecevit, 1984; Mackenzie, 1990). 
History bears witness to that because whenever other countries were involved in the Turko-Greek 
differences, the Turks and Greeks ended up in conflict. But whenever they were left alone to 
settle their own differences, they showed great ability to do so. 
Ecevit, Greece and Turkey, J. Alford, ed., p. 140 - 141 
And, Mackenzie states that: 
... 
Ozal's approach has been flatly rejected by the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, a 
doctrinaire socialist. 
Turk-ey in Transition: The West's Neglected A Ily p. 47 
For Turkey, Greece is seen as a foe, and relations with Greece, according to D. 
Bazoglusezer (1984) have, since 1963, been the salient security issue in Turkish eyes. 
Veremis (1986), Pezmatzoglou and Bazaglusezer (1984) agree for both sides (Greece and 
Turkey) that three are four disputed issues: 
1. Control over airspace in the Aegean; 
2. Delimitation of the continental shelf; 
3. The limits of territorial waters; and 
4. Cyprus. 
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Control of airspace has to do with the fact that NATO, in 1952, gave control of Aegean 
airspace, by bilateral agreement, to the technical responsibility of Greece. Turkey argues 
that this was used as though it entitled Greece to establish sovereignty over tile Aegean 
airspace. After tile invasion of Cyprus, Turkey declared a "security zone" which was 
agreed by the United Nations, while Greece characterised it a "danger zone" 
(Bazoglusezer, Turkey and Greece, J. Alford, ed., p. 58). 
Continental shelf delimitation concerns who has control over resource exploitation in the 
Aegean waters. The problem became evident after the oil shock of 1973 when Greece 
started to drill for oil near the island of Thasos. 
The limit of territorial waters is the mile distance allowed (by international law) to each state 
for navigation as well as exploration purposes. The maximum is 12 nautical miles which, 
according to the Turks, would solve, by proxy, the continental shelf issue in favour of the 
Greeks and reduce the international navigable waters by more than a half. Turkey, 
according to Veremis (1984), accuses Greece of violating articles of the Paris (1961) and 
Lausanne (1962) Treaties by militarising her islands off the coast of Asia minor. Prominent 
Turks, such as former Defence Minister Sancar, former Prime Minster Demirel, former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Esenbel and former Vice-Premier Turkes, have made 
undisguised references to Turkish "rights" and claims on the Greek islands (Veremis, 
Greece and Turkey, Alford, ed., p. 5). 
Finally, the Cyprus problem has been a major issue for decades and both sides have 
differences over the control of the Northern part of the island. Bazoglusezer (1984), argues 
that the invasion was a response to the situation in the Aegean. On the other hand, the 
Greeks believe that the geo-political position of Cyprus has always been in the minds of 
Turks (since the early 1960s) and demonstrates Greece's belief of their forceful nature as 
well as place them in the list of possible threats. 
Tile differences over such issues are many and solutions cannot be found rapidly. Greece 
often denounces Turkish violation in Aegean airspace while Turkey denies the incidents. 
The Cyprus problem has complicated the relations between the two states, has blocked the 
entry of Turkey in the EC and has created additional problems in the Aegean. Turkey 
continues to be the primary defensive issue of Greece, and a "threat" in the mind of Greek 
elites. However, two more questions arise: Based on the assumption that what or who one 
state may perceive as a threat may not be for another, can defensive organisations provide 
the guarantees required? Should Greece's security be based solely on the perception of the 
Turkish threat? Although outside the context of this study, it would be interesting to see how 
Turkey perceives its threat to Greece. 
6.3 Greece and the Balkans 
Before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Greece had stable relations with its 
Balkan neighbours but the subsequent revival of nationalist and minority issues has created 
tensions. Antagonism between Serbs and Croats of the former Yugoslavia as well as the 
problem of Kossovo and Albania has posed a threat to the stability of the whole region. 
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The demise of the rigidly Stalinist regime in Albania, according to Clogg (1992), made the 
situation all the more threatening for any successor regime was likely to take all aggressive 
line in charnpioning the cause of the large Albanian populations of Kossovo and Yugoslav 
Macedonia . Moreover, the prospect of a liberalised Albania was likely to prove a strong 
pole of attraction for Albanians compactly settled along the Yugosiav-Albanian border 
(Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, p. 207). 
The beginnings of the thaw in Albania also focused attention on what is at once the 
geographically closest, yet until recently much isolated, area of Greek settlement outside the 
borders of the state, namely the Greek minority in Albania. Greek officials estimate the 
Greek minority at some 370,000 people (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992 - 1993, p. 
108), out of a total population in Albania of 3,270,000 (Webster's New World 
Encyclopaedia, 1992, - 1990 estimation), while the official Albanian figure, according to 
Clogg (1992), is 60,000 (A Concise History of Greece, p. 207). The Mitsotakis government 
of 1989 - 1993 had pressed the new democratic administration in Tirana to grant them 
human and political rights and for a time maintained a virtually open doof policy for 
migrants, both legal and illegal. However, Greek resources had been over-stretched by the 
numbers who came and when Albania acceded to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1991, Greek policy changed to permit only migrants who 
had been properly processed by consular officials. Thousands of Albanians who had 
entered Greece without legal papers were rounded-up and deported and troops were 
deployed along the border to try to prevent new illegal entries. This led to skirmishing and 
soured relations with Terana which had complained to the UN and the Council of Europe 
about Greek treatment of Albanian refugees. The Albanians, in turn, have frustrated efforts 
by the Greek minority to form a cohesive political force. 
Greece differed from its EC partners on the issue of recognition of the newly independent 
republics of the former Yugoslavia. It has traditionally maintained good relations with 
Serbia, once the dominant force in the federation, because of the ties of the orthodox 
religion and because the government in Belgrade provided a counter-weight to nationalist 
sentiment in the Southern Republic of Slovenia but Greece opposed unilateral sanctions in 
Serbia and has adamantly refused to agree a recognition of Macedonia under that name. 
The issue was important - and still is - during the 1993 elections and was the reason which 
forced the formation of a new political party (POLA - Political Spring) mainly from the 
New Democracy party of K. Mitsotakis. Greece argues that the use of the name implies 
territorial ambitions against its own Greek region of Macedonia. 
Only in 1945 did the Skopje region become Yugoslav Macedonia as part of a campaign by 
Marshall Tito to seize, according to Ogden (1994), the Macedonian portions of Greece and 
Bulgaria. During Greece's 1946 - 1949 civil war, more than 100,000 loyalists died 
fighting Greek and Macedonian communists who tried to unite the territories and occupy 
Salonika in order to give Yugoslav an Aegean port. 
The Skopjian region in 1991 produced a constitution for "a Greater Macedoniall and 
for the 
protection of "Macedonian" people in neighbouring states. 
It was not helpful that Skopje 
proposed a currency emblazoned with a picture of the white tower of 
Salonika (in Greece), 
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produced brochures extolling the FYROM's (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) beaches or that they published maps which showed their Macedonia to include parts of Greece. In addition, Yugoslav "Macedonia" adopted the 16-point star of Vergina for their 
flag which created additional tension for the Greeks: ... a nearly sacred emblern that was discovered near Salonika in the tomb of Philip of Macedonia, Alexander's father (Ogden, 
C., Time Magazine, p. 52, May 2,1994). 
The Clinton administration has recognised the new republic, which created dissatisfaction 
towards the US by Greece, but the US forbids its diplomats to call it by anything other than 
its full name or acronym, and has delayed sending an ambassador to Skopje. Newly elected 
Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, clamped an economic blockade on its northern 
neighbour which has had a crippling effect on its economy. Papandreou, in defending his 
decision, stated the importance of the issue: 
One of the possibilities that has to be kept in mind in that while Skopje by itself is incapable of 
taking over Greek territory, Skopje in alliance with another Balkan country could-easily create a 
serious security problem for Greece 
Newsweek, May 9,1994, p. 60 
Greece maintained good relations with the former communist regime in Bulgaria and, once a 
democratic administration took power, moved to consolidate these through a series of 
high-level political and military contacts. Relations cooled during the course of 1991, but 
as the non-communist Union of Democratic Forces was forced to rely on the support of 
Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms to secure electoral victory and they were nearly 
ruptured when Sofia recognised the independence of Macedonia. Greece and Bulgaria, and 
Turkey and Bulgaria have signed a series of Bilateral agreements designed to reduce the 
military presence in their common border region. However, despite the problems created 
by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War, Greece enjoyed 
stable relations with the states of the Balkan region before 1989. In addition, there is Greek 
concern about the over-reaching Turkish influence in the region as the Turkish military is 
helping to reorganise the Albanian armed forces and Ankara has developed warm relations 
with Sofia while expressing sympathies with the beleaguered Muslim minorities in Bosnia, 
Kossovo and Macedonia. 
Furthermore, along with the refugees from the Balkan region, Greece is witnessing a 
movement of immigration from the former Soviet Union. Most of these Greeks, 
numbering some 350,000 according to the most recent census (1992), were tile descendants 
of Greeks from the Pontos who, during the 19" and early 20'h century migrated to the more 
welcoming Caucasus and Northern shores of the Black Sea. During the early years of the 
Soviet regime, they had enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy and had published freely in 
their Pontiac Greek dialect. They had the misfortune, however, to be deemed by Stalin as 
one of the aggressive national minorities . 
Their intellectual leadership, according to 
Clogg, was eliminated and the bulk of them deported to the inhospitable wastes of the 
central Asian republics. 
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Through Perestroika, there was a revival of Soviet-Greek culture and many, threatened by 
the new assertiveness of larger ethnic groups, were led to emigrate. It was estimated that 
as many as 100,000 would settle in Greece during the early 1990s (A Concise History of 
Greece, Clogg, 1992, p. 208) 
6.4 Conclusion : Greece, as a sample case 
Greece, as a sample case can help clarify and add to the concept of threat perception for 
several reasons. First, Greece is a state which, because of its geographical position, has been 
preoccupied by threats throughout its history. Since 1821 (the year of Greece's 
Independence from the Turkish occupation), Turkey has been a concern and a threat which 
has not faded. The long occupation of Greece by the Turks (1453-1821), the various 
struggles between the two states (the most important being the 1922 Asia Minor war and the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974), and the continuing diplomatic clashes stated in chapter 
6 of this thesis have given the Greek state a continuous concern about its security and a 
perception of threat. Such a threat has -up to a certain point - been deflected through 
Greece's involvement in European Institutions such as NATO, the EU and the WEU. This is 
the second reason why Greece is a meaningful area for research. 
Membership of the above institutions has helped to dilute such a threat for Greece or be used 
as a balancing factor between the two states. Both states' membership in NATO has 
provided the containment required for Turkey and Greece not to go to war or let the Cyprus 
situation deteriorate. The EU has provided a platform for Greece where concerns can be 
addressed without Turkey being included (as Greece has consistently blocked Turkish entry 
in the past decade), and the WEU has been the "European" defence mechanism which 
Greece believes will assist its security concerns even though Turkey is an associate member 
and the WEU does not guarantee assistance for Greece if a possible Turkish threat arises. 
Arguably, there is a sequence in Greece's security concerns which begins with threat 
perception and conclude with the state's participation in European institutions, in keeping 
with the discussion in the literature review. 
Thirdly, Greece has also been preoccupied with other issues such as the Macedonian 
problem, the instability in tile Balkans and the Albanian refugees. There is a whole array of 
issues which require examination and have been topics believed to be relieved partly through 
international cooperation and specifically through institutions such as NATO the EU, the 
WEU and the CSCE. Therefore, Greece is a state where the variables identified in the 
literature: threat perception; International cooperation; and security option (defence 
mechanism), are matters which are live and therefore observable. 
The sample of Greek elites questioned in the field study (chapter 7) could elicit information 
on how important such concerns are for the Greek state as well as for Europe and which 
type of security is preferred. The views of the Greek elites are important, as they have 
knowledge on the subject and could be used to instigate and undertake further research. 
According to Snyder (1975), and Eldersveld (1993), the behaviour of a given state can best 
be explained in terms of the way important decision makers 
define their situation. The 
definition of the situation involves perceptions, choices and expectations on the part of the 
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decision makers (elites). " Elites do play and should play a dominant role in operating 
political systerns, with the public only having a minimal or subordinate role and elites do 
share and should share power with their publics" (Eldersveld, 1993, The Oxford Companion 
to Politics of the World, Kreiger, ed., p. 263). Therefore, based on the above and having in 
mind that the state monopolises rule - making within its territory through the actors involved 
in policy making of a specific geographical territory (the state and elites, sec. 5.1), it 
becomes somewhat easier to accept that elites can speak for "views" of tile state in which 
they perform their roles in the governance of society. Therefore, the assumption that a "state 
can have perceptions", implies that the "elites of that state" are responsible for these 
perceptions, hence (for the purposes of this thesis), these perceptions can be investigated 
through a sample of elites from Greece. 
How important are threat concerns for Greece? How do Greek elites feet about these issues 
in relation to Europe? What security preferences do Greek elites have? How essential is it 
for Greece to be included in European organisations? Greece's recent political history has 
been marked by a military coup (1967-1974), the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), five 
changes of government (1974,1981,1989,1990,1993), diplomatic clashes with Albania 
(1992-1995), Turkey and Skopje (1,990-1995). Its security concerns have been high on the 
state's agenda and therefore, a fruitful basis for examining threat perception and security 
preferences. Chapter 7 introduces the model of the study, the analytical framework, the 
sample and the questions examined. 
ill 
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7.1 Analytical framework, hypothesis and methodology 
A state's perception of threat(s) and security preferences can be determined by many 
variables, and the relationships involved can be exceedingly complex. The formulation of 
various hypotheses, could serve as starting points to suggest the nature and direction of 
relationships between variables. 
The analytical framework utilised in the present study expands on the work of Graham 
(1980) - "Threat perception, policy making and international cooperation: a comparative 
study of the British and French cases", and is composed of three main elements: 
-A specification of four categories of variables which serve as sources of and constraints 
on the defensive preferences of states; 
-A typology of the state (Greece); and 
-A typology of issue areas and foreign policy behaviour as concerning security. 
7.2 Categories of Source and Constraint Variables 
The categories identified through the review of the literature of "source and constraint" 
variables used throughout the questionnaire are as follows: 
a. Threat perception of Greek elites; variables which make up the icon surrounding 
Greece's perceptions of threat as well as their opinion on Europe's perceptions of threat. 
b. Greece's policy responses or solutions as a result of their perceptions of threat; variables 
which relate to the various opinions on European defence options, clearly through specific 
perceptions of threat. 
c. Perception of Greek elites on tile level of importance of the current instability in Europe 
and Greece, variables which make up the various challenges Europe is facing in the 1990s. 
d. Views of Greek elites on continuing US assistance in European affairs either through 
NATO or independently; variables which make up the level of consent for US assistance or 
involvement. 
7.3 Typology of State 
The second element of the analytical framework is a typology of the state in question. 
Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple (1975) argue that type of state is a (the) key mediating 
variable in foreign policy behaviour and suggest that a typology can be constructed by 
positioning a state along three dimensions: governmental structure, economic structure and 
military capability. The examination of Grrece's security concerns was presented 
in chapter 
6, which could assist in the construction of a model from the four major categories shown 
above. 
113 
Chapter Seven Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis 
7.4 Typology of Issue Areas and Foreign Policy Behaviour with Reference 
to Security 
The third element of the analytical framework is a typology of issue areas and foreign policy 
behaviour / opinion with reference to security and defence issues. As noted, the general 
issue area under investigation in this study is threat perception and European security options 
for the 1990s. The study thus deals with national policy behaviour and elite opinions with 
respect to international cooperation and defence. Hence, the specific areas of defence 
which are under study are defence cooperation through various security organisations, 
identification of threat perception and new challenges for European security. 
7.5 The Model 
The foregoing analytical framework serves as a specification of the possible variables 
relevant to foreign policy analysis. The elements of this framework, together with the 
literature review contribute to the development of a model of a state's defensive behaviour 
in relation to threat perception and the new challenges of Europe in the 1990s. 
The focus is this effort to determine how the new challenges on Europe (such as absence of 
threat perception) could affect Europe's quest for new defensive options. How much or how 
little are Greek elites affected by the new defensive dilemma in Europe? What is the best 
defensive option for the Continent as far as Greek elites are concerned? 
As stated in section 5.1 of this study (introduction to the empirical work), the starting point 
in the development of the Model stems from a proposition put forward by Ernst Haas 
(1968). 
A helpful but by no means indispensable condition (for international unification) is the 
existence of an external threat, real or imagined. 
Accordingly, in a simple stimulus-response model, it is hypothesized that: 
External threats provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international 
cooperation. (proposed hypothesis 1) 
The variables of the hypothesis may be divided into three groups: 
1. Tile independent variable, meaning the type of threat involved; 
2. The elite threat perception process; and 
3. International cooperation or the collective option (the dependent variable). 
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Therefore, the model could be designated as follows: 
TT: D TP: D S 
Where: TT represents the type of threat involved; 
TP the elite threat perception process; and 
S international cooperation or the security option. 
The independent variable of this model, drawn from the categories of source and constraint 
variables in the analytical framework, is the external threat. However, some threats may not 
be of concern to certain states. Do all threats stimulate international cooperation? For 
example, would NATO have been created around an environmental threat? If the answer is 
yes, then its character would most probably have been different and not defensive in nature. 
Therefore, due to the complexity of the threat involved, as it can be viewed as likely to 
produce severe or little damage if it materialises, as well as the complexity in the sense of 
the different nature of threats (economic, cultural, military, political or social), a new 
hypothesis has been derived: 
The type of threat involved is an important determinant of the type of response 
(option); (proposed hypothesis 2) 
This determination includes whether or not international cooperation or collective security is 
sought and, if sought, what form or option is selected. For example, between 1945 and 
19897 the type of threat(s) that dominated the European Continent were mainly three 
generally agreed in the literature, (among others): The Soviet Empire; Communism; and 
German rearmament. The identification of these types of threats enabled defence experts to 
create the appropriate structures that would be able to deal with these threats. NATO, the 
WEU and the EDC incident are examples that based their mechanism operation on these 
threats. Arguably, had the threats been different, the structure might have been built 
differently and the options would have been based on how to deter these other threats. 
Europe in the 1990s is facing the problem of not being able to clearly identify a threat. In 
view of this, the following two hypotheses are being proposed: 
As a threat becomes less specific but remains probable, it is more likely to 
stimulate cooperation than the opposite; (proposed hypothesis 3) and 
Threats which are either improbable or not serious are not likely to lead to 
new responsive action; (proposed hypothesis 4) 
Hypothesis 3 may seem confusing insofar as it is not easy to conceive of a less specific 
threat remaining probable. However, this hypothesis is proposed as the 
defence departments 
of various states as well as defence structures base their policies on possible scenaria, many 
of which may not seem likely to materialise, however the 
fact that these matters are 
discussed, as these issues may be considered as possible threats, usually stimulate 
cooperation (i. e. membership in alliances or the retainement of stable relations 
by states that 
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feel they might be threatened), than the opposite. For example, the Macedonian issue 
between Greece and Skopje is considered a clear threat to Greece but not a specific one as to 
where such a threat may lead. States like Britain or Italy discuss how their governments may 
be involved in such an issue despite the fact that their "involvement" may not be as specific 
as Greece's. As such a threat remains probable for states that are not directly affected (as in 
the above example of Britain or Italy), based on possible scenaria of involvement, such a 
threat is more likely to lead to international cooperation than the opposite. 
The basis for the above hypothesis becomes understood when Europe's current defensive 
state in the 1990s is examined and compared with the 1945 - 1989 period: As stated earlier, 
due to the East-West confrontation between 1945 and 1989 both sides were organised 
collectively to oppose specific threats. After 1989, the fall of Communism, the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact, the improbability of various threats to materialise, as well as the 
absence of clear threats have procrastinated the formation of a new security order, but the 
new challenges which are emerging (Yugoslav crisis, general instability in the Balkans and 
in the former Soviet Union) have not hampered Europe's desire to continue to collectively 
deal these challenges through institutions such as NATO, the CSCE and the WEU. In 
addition: 
The absence of threat perception makes the selection of the defence option 
uncertain, while options for international cooperation may vary; (proposed hypothesis 5) 
The response from decision makers of the various states threatened is based on their 
perception of threat. Accordingly, if there is no clear threat, the decision-making elites' 
opinions on various options or responses can become uncertain. Divisions of opinion on 
what might constitute a threat or constraint upon perceived values at a given time are 
influenced by each state's social backgrounds, past experiences, ideology and so on. 
Hypothesis 5 is best explained by the situation confronting NATO in the 1990s. With the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolvement of the WTO, analysts have suggested that 
NATO does not have a reason to exist. NATO's clear threats no longer exist and this has 
created uncertainty as to what justifies NATO's continued existence. The structure's 
involvement in the former Yugoslavia gave NATO, arguably, one reason to continue, 
however the Yugoslav issue was not only a concern of NATO, but the EU's and the 
CSCE's. Options for international cooperation on the Yugoslav crisis varied as the issue did 
not fall clearly under any of the above structures' reasons for existence. The situation may 
have been even more uncertain had the Yugoslav crisis not existed. Would other challenges 
have been matters that could justify NATO (for example), to become involved? Or would 
the absence of clear threats create additional uncertainty for options of international 
cooperation? Furthermore: 
A military threat is less ambiguous and easier perceived than an economic, 
cultural or political threat; (proposed hypothesis 6) 
Military threats have, throughout history been more specific and easier to perceive than 
economic, cultural or political threats. The military threat of the 
WTO for example was 
specific and easy to identify in order to justify NATO's 
further military build-up and helped 
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focus defence policies. Political threats are probable, however not as specific as a state 
which is governed by a militarist regime such as the Greek dictatorship of 1967 - 1974 may 
not threaten other states and may even cooperate internationally with other states. It is 
difficult to perceive where a state's policy under such a government may lead, as tile case of Greece where the state enjoyed stable relations with the United States, however Greece 
became one of the major reasons, after 7 years of military rule that stimulated Turkey to 
invade Cyprus in 1974. Greece's government did not imply such a development. 
An example of an economic threat could be seen through the situation between 1945 and 
1989 with the formation of the two blocs in Europe. The EC, as an economic cooperation 
organisation, was not overtly organised around a threat, but more as a unifying project for 
Europe. However, the Gulf War, as an extreme instance, concerned economics through its 
relationship with oil resources (such as pricing) and contradicts the expectation of hypothesis 
6. Therefore, the Gulf War must be considered as an exception to the above suggestion. 
Based on the above hypotheses and understanding the problem of perceiving new threats for 
Europe in the 1990s, which is suggested as a requirement towards the quest for the selection 
of an adequate response-option, the following hypothesis is concluded: 
Threat perception is a major requirementfor international cooperation and 
there is a relationship between the type of threat involved and the form and 
level of responsive options. (proposed hypothesis 7) 
The aggregated form of the model can be designated as follows: 
TP: D ICZ XM OP 
Where: TP represents the perception of threat, real or imagined; 
IC represents international cooperation; 
X represents intervening variables that may affect the model; 
OP represents the option. 
The model can only work when used in this form and sequence. It seems quite impossible 
to start with an option without cooperating internationally or without perceiving a possible 
threat. Tile option would most probably, in this case, be of an uncertain nature as different 
threats might have not been considered, or expected cooperation with other states might 
prove disappointing. Hypothesis 7 suggests that it is easier for states to cooperate 
internationally if a reason for cooperation exists. If a state feels threatened, then it most 
probably seeks assistance through cooperation. If it does not sense a threat and international 
cooperation is sought, then the response (option), may not have the readiness 
it should 
require if threats which have not been considered arise. 'Therefore, 
based on the sequence 
(TP, IC, X, OP), the model would have a negative output when the lack of Threat 
Perception, for example, is presented. Based on the model, the lack of threat perception 
would not (most likely) stimulate International Cooperation, and this 
in turn would not 
present options for European defence. Chapter 8 
deals with this possibility and in many 
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instances, the lack of clear threat perception or consideration for Greece and for Europe 
reinforce the defence dilemma discussed in the literature review (Chapters 3 and 4). 
7.6 The Variables 
Based on hypothesis 7 and the model presented in symbolic form, it is essential to explain 
the reasons behind the questions asked in the questionnaire, and how the questions asked 
could assist in the investigation of the model. 
Question I examines whether it makes sense to abandon membership in the EC and NATO. 
This question affects the dependent variable of the option or response towards a threat as 
the EC and NATO ( as organisations that can be seen as options for defence). If the data 
from the field study prove that elites would like to abandon these structures, the options 
become limited. 
Question 2 examines whether stable relations with other Western democracies have 
contributed to the fact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 
1974. As an independent variable, this question could help with the realisation that 
collective security, interdependence and stable relations stimulate and influence the type of 
response towards that threat. 
Question 3 examines possible threats at the present time. The external threat, based on the 
model , is a major requirement towards the development of a collective security organisation. The aim is to pin-point a possible threat or threats that could enable this study to find 
adequate solutions or responses (in collective security terms) of the dependent variable 
(option). 
Questions 4,5,6,8 (parts A and B), 9 (Parts A and B), 22,23,25,28,29 and 30 aim to 
gather information about the first independent variable : "the external threat". As in 
question 3, the focus is the identification of possible specific threats and on the importance 
of threat perception in the process of finding the appropriate option. Specifically, these 
questions aim to examine the seriousness and probability of threats arising such as Germany, 
the former Soviet Union with its nuclear arsenal, religious fundamentalism, or other 
external, out-of-area threats not only in relation to Greece, but also for Europe. The 
importance of these independent variables can help in the examination of the most felt threat 
by Greek elites and contribute to the search for the most appropriate solution. In addition, 
the above questions investigate the importance of threat perception not only in establishing a 
collective security arrangement, but also for existing collective security mechanisms such as 
NATO. The focus of the same possible threats not only for Greece but also for Europe will 
allow the study to determine how much of a problem or threat each is visualised by Greek 
elites specifically for it and as for the whole of Europe. This is based on the logical 
assumptions that what one state may perceive as a threat may not be seen or perceived as 
one by another. A relevant example is the Cypriot problem, which 
for obvious reasons is 
an issue which is of greater concern to Greece thanto other European states. 
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Questions 1,2,10,12,14,155 1.6,26 and 27 examine the independent variable "International Cooperation" which is the second step of the model. The aim of these 
questions was to gather evidence which would help determine the level of interdependence, 
as well as the level of importance attributed to membership in collective organisations such 
as the EC, WEU, NATO and CSCE. The importance of each option according to the 
ranking given could help in determining the best perceived solution or response. The 
questions above were either specifically focused on one organisation or on many to 
determine a rank - order for the one most preferred by Greek elites. Again, tile questions 
asked the same for Greece as for Europe based on the assumption that a state's interests can 
be better promoted through one mechanism, while the same mechanism might not be liked 
by other states, for some other reason. The above questions are an attempt to study the level 
of success which NATO might have in containing possible threats, continuing membership 
in NATO and the EC, the importance of the US in European affairs and the level of 
importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Europe and Greece. 
Questions 12,16,24,26,27 and 31 examine other specific issues (some have been 
mentioned earlier as they overlap with other areas of the model but these questions can be 
seen independently as well) which may affect the model. Specifically, the issues focused 
upon are concerned with continuing United States assistance in European affairs, the 
question of European defence dealing only with European matters (contributing to the 
"European" or "Atlantic" characters of European defence discussed in the literature), 
whether the US is seen as the only major superpower in the world and how important is 
agreement to the terms of the Maastricht treaty for the stability of European affairs 
(economic and defensive). These questions all relate to European defence and may affect 
the model in the sense that they address issues that could help, through their ranking in order 
of importance, to determine important aspects and issues of European affairs that elites feet 
should be taken into consideration before developing responses. 
Finally, questions 7,11, t3,17,18,19,20,21 and 32 aim to gather information about the 
dependent variables of the model, the option(s) for European defence. After the 
pin-pointing of external threats and the importance of threat perception which affect 
international cooperation, along with possible subsequent intervening variables, the ranking 
of the possible options could be examined. These questions specifically gather information 
about best forms of security either among others or independently. Again, the reason for 
this is because one option on its own may be ranked highly but when considered among 
others, it may receive a much lower ranking as being not the best option for Greece's or for 
Europe's interests. 
Question 7 examines the credibility of four possibilities for European security in general 
terms (no defence posture, national conventional arms, collective European security, 
collective Atlantic security). Question II examines whether NATO should continue to exist 
despite the fading existence of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. 
Question 13 explores the specific requirements of NATO, given that it continues. Question 
17 investigates the question of whether Europe should break away from US assistance or 
NATO and deal with the Continent's security through arrangements European 
in character 
such as the EC or the WEU. Question 18 examines which way would 
be most practical for 
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Greece to ensure its military security (NATO, WEU, combination NATO and the CSCE or 
withdrawal from all) while question 32 is concerned specifically with the WEU and if 
Greece's interests would be better promoted through this organisation. Question 19 
examines the most credible defence for Eturope (not for Greece), and examines the possible 
differences with question 18. Finally, questions 20 and 21 airn to elicit information on 
whether tile EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe and if NATO should 
acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an alliance that could serve the 
whole Continent. 
Figure 3 
MODEL (Breakdown of Variables towards the Model) 
Questions 
21 41 61819,22, 
23,25,28,29,30 
1,2,10,12, 
14,15,16,26,27 
12,16,241 
26,27131 
7111,13,17, 
181191 201 211 32 
49 
OP 
TP Threat perception 
IC International cooperation 
x Intervening variables 
OP Option 
Independent variable 
Independent variable 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable 
Note: Some questions may relate to more than one variable, as the specific 
questions 
may have two parts or touch upon more than one issue. 
7.7 Methodology - Research Activity 
Two sources and methods of obtaining data were utilised in this study during a three month 
period of field-work in Greece: 
1. Documentary and press searching; and 
2. An Elite questionnaire (survey). 
Elites 
Every political system, whatever its official ideology, 
is in fact ruled by a political elite or 
elites, according to Robertson (1993). The term elites often connotes superiority, as 
Evans 
and Newnharn (1990) state, and is a descriptive term 
for individuals and groups found at the 
120 
Chapter Seven Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis 
top of a particular hierarchy (the Dictionary of World Politics). Within the fairly permissive 
parameters set by public moods, the status above the mass of the population operate. The 
public then, by default, becomes the audience in front of which elites make and justify their 
policy. The study is therefore interested in the elite approach as they are the ones closer to 
policy making due to their access to, and interest for, the subject in question. The growth in 
tile number of state actors in world politics since 1945 has stimulated new interest in elite 
theories and elite responses according to Evans and Newnham (1990). "Elitism" assumes 
that by nature or by nurture, the majority in a population are unsuited and unqualified for 
elite status. Therefore, based on the knowledge, position, interest and involvement in the 
subject in question, elites were chosen to give their own responses in the field study. When 
the term "elites" is used, it refers to the sample of the case study which encompasses the 
above characteristics. According to Eldersveld (1993), "there are many types of elites - 
presidents or prime ministers, parliamentary deputies, judges, administrators, political 
activists, policy specialists, campaign consultants and political financiers for example" (The 
Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Kreiger ed., p. 263). 
The questionnaire was designed closely in relation to the hypothesis of the study. All the 
questions in the survey were designed solely for this study. Although the original 
questionnaire was drafted in English, it was the Greek translation that was mostly used in 
the field study, accompanied by a letter of intent. A follow-up letter as well as a telephone 
reminder to the office of the respondent were used to encourage their response (see 
appendix H for questionnaires). 
Anonymity was assured if requested by the respondent. In addition, the responses included 
elites from all major parties in Greece namely the New Democracy (ND) party, the 
Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), the Communist Party (KKE) and Political Spring 
(POLA) party. The above parties are all represented in parliament. Although stating their 
political affiliation was optional, approximately 60% of the respondents did. 
The Elite questionnaire was conducted in order to investigate tile perceptual variables and 
hypothesis of the model. The questions (including the Greek translation) were submitted 
for evaluation and criticism to six (6) knowledgeable academics and the questionnaires were 
pre-tested on a group of nine (9) no n-gover n mental nationals in Greece to determine 
possible problems or to clarify certain aspects of the translation. After the necessary 
modifications were made to ensure the questions in the Greek questionnaire conveyed tile 
desired meaning, a pilot study was undertaken using five academics. The pilot study 
revealed no problems in procedure or comprehension, so the questionnaires were then sent 
in turn to the sample of Greek elites (114). 
The survey was conducted from September 10,1993 to December 2,1993 
in Greece. 
During that time, the state of Greece held elections. These were earlier than expected as 
normally they would have been held in April 1994 but were called 
because of the weak 
majority in parliament of the ruling party and due to the 
formation of a new party called the 
"Political Spring" (POLA). The outcome of the elections gave PASOK (The Panhellenic 
Socialist Party) a majority, overthrowing the New Democracy party 
(ND). The interesting 
point to make is the lack of representation of one of the two communist parties 
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( Synasipsmos - SYN) for the first time in many years, as well as the weak representation 
of the other communist party (KKE) in parliament where it obtained only ten seats out of 300. 
According to a press search at the time of the field study, the issues that were at the 
forefront of Greece's security concerns were as follows: 
a. The Macedonian Problem 
This is an issue which has existed for decades, but has become more worrying to the Greeks 
after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia when a region of the former republic called 
upon the United Nations for recognition under the same name (Macedonia) as the region in 
the Northern part of Greece. The issue, as far as the Greek government is concerned, is 
mainly the name and the flag of the new state; they would not recognise it under any name 
related to "Macedonia". The issue is being discussed in the EC and the United Nations. 
b. Concern about instability in the Balkans 
The war in the former Yugoslavia in relation to the above Macedonian problem and the 
continuing flow of refugees from Albania have created instability in the Balkan region which 
has been affecting Greece in terms of creating new issues and threats. In general terms, 
Greece has been trying to form relationships with the newly formed states of Yugoslavia 
extending their foreign policies and seeking possible cooperation with them towards the 
Macedonian problem. The continuing war has raised fears of extension in the Greek 
northern borders especially when the region of Skopje (the region trying to use the name 
Macedonia) and Greece do not reach agreement. Great numbers of Albanian refugees are 
seeking jobs and have flooded the market with cheap labour creating new economic 
problems for professionals in the major cities and this issue has been a matter for concern as 
well. 
c. The Cypriot Problem 
The continuing deadlock since the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey has made the Cypriot 
problem ail ongoing issue for Greece. The issue has also affected Cyprus' as well as 
Turkey's applications to join the EC and a solution that would satisfy both sides of the state 
is essential for international and European cooperation economically and defensively. 
7.8 Timing 
The timing of this study is important for a number of reasons. First of all, it was 
conducted at a time when the European Continent was going through important changes. 
New states have been formed after the events of 1989, the WTO has been dissolved, the 
Maastricht treaty goals are just beginning to be approached, and Europeans no longer feel 
the impact of the Cold War. Greece, as a state in Europe, is affected by all these changes 
as its relationship with Europe has not only been in geographical terms, but also in political, 
economic and defensive terms. As a member of NATO, the European Union and the 
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Western European Union, it has created trading patterns and stable relations with other democracies which are essential towards the state's security. Therefore, it is essential for Greece to deal with, and have a say in Europe's transformation. 
Secondly, the instability in the Balkans is still a major issue in European affairs, along with 
the Macedonian issue specifically, affecting the state's security and answers on perceptions 
of threat, options for defence and outside assistance are essential at this time. 
Finally, the fact that Greece was undergoing elections at the time of the field work helped 
the this study for two reasons: First, during the election period, issues such as the 
Macedonian problem, the Yugoslav crisis, the Cypriot problem and Greece's relations with 
Turkey were concerns debated repeatedly through pre - election campaign speeches and in 
the press. It was therefore a convenient time to examine such issues and perceive possible 
differences in the way parties felt these issues should be dealt with. Secondly, during the 
election period, most elites were interested in providing their views and comfortable with 
the questions, as these were some of the topics examined constantly through the media. 
These two reasons may, partly, explain the high response rate of 87.8 %. Despite the 
initial feeling that the timing of the study would create problems, on the contrary, there 
seemed to be great interest in assisting the study and the response rate proves this point. 
Whether the same responses would have been obtained outside the elections is open to 
debate. 
7.9 The Sample 
The sample which was given the questionnaire included military officials, current and 
former cabinet officials, political appointees and academics. The reason for these four 
categories was because they were all considered relevant to the case study in terms of their 
specific knowledge about and/or participation in decision making on the policies in question. 
The military officials because of their specific knowledge on defence issues and their 
relevance to Greece's military regime history, the members of parliament because of their 
involvement in defence spending and current political and foreign affairs, the academics 
because of their ability to analyse and study international relations issues and the political 
appointees because of their involvement in public affairs through their work in the various 
ministries, as economists and lawyers (a small number of political appointees were economic 
consultants and investors of political parties). They were identified and selected mostly 
through a press search. After the press search, a list of various "essential to meet" elites was 
made. It was necessary to acquire a response from elites which had been or were being 
involved in foreign affairs and foreign policy making as the issues discussed in chapter 6 
were on top of their agendas. Several visits to the Greek Parliament were made in order to 
talk to officials that could arrange appointments with the MPs or to find out where to mail a 
questionnaire if the elite(s) could not be met in person. A significant number of elites were 
helpful enough to assist the study further, through guidance towards other former MPs and 
officials that they thought might provide more information. In most instances, their advice 
was taken. In the same manner, military officials from the Greek Pentagon were 
approached. It was decided to approach the academic elites by visiting them in their place of 
work at Universities and Colleges. Most of the Academics worked in private English - 
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speaking institutions and were lecturers in International Relations or Greek Politics. Two 
acadernics were given the questionnaire from each institution (8 institutions in total), in 
order to avoid bias. Finally, the political appointees were suggested by tile above categories 
of the sample and included a wide range of individuals discussed further on. About 40% of 
the questionnaires were sent by mail while 60% were handed in person to the office of the 
respondent (especially in the case of the Military Officials and Academics), when it was 
thought by those surrounding the elites that this method would be most effective. One 
hundred and fourteen questionnaires were distributed and exactly one hundred were returned 
(response rate: 87.8 %). The high response rate must be indicative of the empathy of the 
sample to the issues raised even though a few questionnaires were not completed fully. A 
small number of questionnaires were also sent after the field study had been completed, 
however were not taken into consideration as the processing of the data had already begun. 
The actual number of 100 responses was considered adequate after examination of other 
similar studies. 
As previously stated, respondents were categorised as follows: 
Cabinet Officials 19% 
Military Officials 49% 
Academics 16% 
Political Appointees 16% 
100 
Specifically, the Cabinet officials had all served (or were still serving) in the Greek 
Parliament. Three of the MPs had served as minister for foreign affairs and/or 
under-secretary for foreign affairs. The academic elites were lecturers in various 
Universities in Greece. A substantial number of political appointees were foreign ministry 
officials, treasury officials and individuals that have worked or were still working on 
committees formed by MPs or the PMs office to research foreign policy 
issues. Finally, the 
military officials had been, or were involved in Greece's security 
issues by serving as 
Captains in the Greek military, Chiefs of staff, Commanders, Lieutenants and were working 
in the Greek Pentagon. All of the military officials held high positions (e. g. former 
Greek 
of chief of staff" during the Gulf War). 
As presented in the breakdown of the sample, 49 per cent of tile respondents were military 
officials. This is because it was felt that these elites are 
likely to hold specific knowledge 
and be aware of Greece's security concerns, due to the nature of their occupation. 
It may 
seem that this percentage may have affected the results of the research. 
However, this is not 
necessarily true as the other half of the sample were not military officials, providing 
the 
necessary balance. In addition, the Greek military 
has a history of affecting Greek policy 
making and this was the reason for including a 
high percentage (the military coup of 
1967-1974 reinforces the above). 
124 
Chapter Seven Analytical Framework - Methodology - Descriptive Statistics (Tables) - Analysis 
Due to the fact that there are four major parties in Greece, it was considered prudent to find 
representatives from each of these parties. This was based on their breakdown in the 
outgoing Greek Parliament. Around 75 per cent of the political respondents came from the 
two largest parties in Parliament, PASOK and New Democracy, while the rest came from 
the Communist Party and the newly formed Political Spring. However, it must be noted that 
there cannot be clear evidence of party preference due to the fact that a number of 
respondents did not wish to identify their party. Party affiliation was mandatory and the 
rough estimate presented above derives from their (the respondents') activities over the 
years, as reported in the press. 
Due to geographical convenience / proximity, 40 per cent of the questionnaire was mailed 
while 60 per cent was delivered in person, as mentioned earlier. Many elites could easily be 
seen in person while others desired the questionnaire to be mailed. All were encouraged to 
make further comments on the questions asked, either in person or by mail and these 
comments have also been noted. The questionnaire did not seem to present problems in its 
Greek form, as only two (2) individuals required further clarification (one in person and one 
by phone). 
The Data 
Most of the questions from the survey did not produce unexpected results as far as security 
preferences are concerned. In some instances, however, the expectation was clear and in 
other instances no explanation of the results could be given, probably due to the unclearness 
of the perceptions of threat in Europe. Military officials sensed a greater threat than others 
in their response to the threat perception questions. This is possibly due to the nature of 
their occupation and their awareness of defence matters. In addition, the military officials' 
responses proved to be more consistent in most questions as opposed to the answers of the 
other respondents. 
It was interesting to note the level of a threat that Turkey presented to Greece, especially in 
question three where it occupied the primary position among the alternatives offered. The 
choice was expected but not the overall level (Table 3), especially when consideration is 
given to the fact that Turkey has not overtly threatened Greece and that both are NATO 
members bound by the treaty of the North Atlantic Council. It was interesting to see the 
difference in the level of importance (for Europe and Greece) when asked about the 
importance of various problems Europe may face in the 1990s. A relevant example was the 
question of the problem of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Greek elites thought 
of the problem as more important for Europe than for Greece with no clear explanation 
(Table 2). 
Another interesting result drawn from the data was the ambiguity of preferring an "Atlantic" 
or "European" option for defence (discussion in Chapter Three of the literature review). 
Although there was not a sense of abandoning NATO, Greek elites also favoured more 
Europeanised forms of defence, independent of US assistance, as presented in questions 20 
and 32 (Table 18 and Table 30). An overwhelming majority of the respondents 
favoured 
the option of the European Union offering a defence mechanism for Europe and also 
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believed that Greece's interests could be better promoted through tile Western European 
Union. However, when asked if NATO should continue to exist, its requirements and 
whether Greece should continue to be a member, the respondents answered positively. This 
is evident frorn questions 6,18 and 19 (Table 5, Table 16 and Table 17 respectively). 
NATO was preferred when a response was sought about the most credible forms among 
others (WEU, EC or new membership). This is an example of the uncertain nature of 
European defence, and can be explained by arguing that Greek officials realise the need for 
a more Europeanised form of defence in the future but understand the risk of abandoning 
NATO when the EC has not provided a defence mechanism and the Western European 
Union has not become a dominant institution for defence. The absence of threat perception 
for Europeans in the 1990s has made the problem greater. 
As far as the United States is concerned, Greek elites responded quite positively to the 
importance of the US for European defence. Their response, however, was not as 
expected. A larger percentage of importance was expected and can only demonstrate the 
belief of the respondents that it is time for the gradual transformation of European defence 
without outside assistance either through NATO or through other organisations. 
Despite the above ambiguities, the data in general terms presented "expected" results and 
reinforced the dilemmas and problems discussed in the literature review. The importance 
of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was evident, especially from the academics, 
and international cooperation was also evident as was the importance of threat perception for 
the creation of a defence mechanism. 
Chi - Square Test 
In order to analyse further the results from the tables, the "Chi - square" value of each table 
was calculated through the SPSS (Statistical Program for Social Sciences) for Windows 
(SPSS for Windows, Norusis, 1993). This was done to determine how significant the results 
from the tables were with reference to the possibility of differences among the four types of 
respondents. Although there are a number of Chi - square tests, the one which has been used 
is the "Pearsons" Chi - squqre, as defined in SPSS for Windows (Norusis, 1993). 
Essentially, such a significance test consists of calculating the risk that an observed 
correlation might be a purely accidental result, generated by the random behaviour of 
uncorrelated variables. Any indication of correlation is based on observed sample evidence, 
but chance variation can produce the same kind of "evidence", even when the variables are 
uncorrelated. The heart of all significance tests, according to Suits (1963), is the calculation 
of the probability of observing the same evidence in a hypothetical case of no correlation. 
The lower the risk, the greater is the significance of the evidence and it is natural to refer to 
the calculated risk as the significance level of the result (Statistics, p. 124). 
A significance test involves weighing evidence. The higher the significance level, the lower 
the chance of accidental occurrence, the more convincing the evidence; if the significance 
level is low, this may be unconvincing. It must be noted, however, that there is no firm 
dividing point between what convinces and what does not. In most social sciences the . 05 
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level is generally referred to as "significant", while the . 01 level is called "highly 
significant'l. 
It is essential to stress that a low significance level, for example a risk higher than . 05, 
means only that this evidence of correlation is statistically unconvincing. It does not provide 
convincing evidence to the contrary. 
The Data from the Chi - Square Test 
The Chi - square test did not give results that would indicate that there was some association 
between each pair of variables with the exception of 8 correlations (out of 48), even though 
a larger sample may have indicated significant results, however it would have been more 
difficult to obtain. Two levels of significance were used to analyse the data for this specific 
test: 
significance at the . 05 > (or smaller); 
significance at the . 10 > (or smaller). 
Each significance level is shown under the appropriate table. 
At the 95 per cent confidence level, 7 relationships were statistically significant: 
Those correlations between the various types of respondents (Military officials, Academics, 
Members of Parliament and Political Appointees) and the questions of: 
- The level of importance of religious fanaticism as a concern 
for Europe (RELG); 
- The level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis as a concern 
for Europe's security 
(AYUG); 
- NATO, as the major component that ensured European stability 
(NATO); 
- The level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht 
for Europe (MAST); 
- The level of importance of the Soviet Union as a concern 
for Greece's security ( BSU); 
- Tile level of importance of Germany as a concern 
for Greece's security (BGERU); 
- Whether European defence should only 
deal with matters of the Continent (EUDEF 1). 
At the 90 percent confidence level, one correlation was significant: that between the various 
tYpes of respondents and the most serious kind of threat facing Greece at the present time 
(STRT). 
(See variables key in Appendix Ffor specific questions) 
An analysis, presented in tabular form, of the responses to each question along with relevant 
comments follows. 
N is the total number of cases in the specific table. This number may vary 
from table to 
table, as for some questions not everyone responded 
(Total number of respondents = 100) 
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Field Study Findings / Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis 
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Tables 
Note: The English translation of the question is shown under the table title. 
Question t 
Table I presents the results given to the question concerning Greece's membership of NATO 
and of the European Community. Here the focus was on the possibility of Greece 
abandoning both organisations. From the results, inferences about the level of international 
cooperation and/or the level of neutrality of Greece could be drawn. It was found that 
uniformly and by a large margin over the two possibilities, 98 % agreed that Greece should 
remain a member of both organisations. The past decade seems to have provided the 
growing sense of Greece continuing its membership, especially after the events of 1989 and 
the "success" of the EC in its systematic and gradual move towards European Union. This 
is despite the fact that the Socialist Party in its political campaign under Andreas Papandreou 
in 1980 sought to abandon both institutions. The economic benefits of the EC along with 
NATO's success in "winning" the Cold War seems to be recognised by Greek elites. 
Table I- Membership 
Based on the assumption that Greece's security cannot rely on the country's 
own national defence mechanisms, Greece should continue its membership in 
structures such as the EEC and NATO. 
Military 
Greek MPs Academics Officials 
Political 
Appointees Cumulative 
Agree 18 16 47 16 97 
Disagree I 
... 
I 
... 2 
Missing ... ... 
I I 
N 19 16 49 16 100 
N= 100 / chi - square not significant at A0 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 2 
Table 2 presents the results of the question relating to the effect which stable relations with 
Western Democracies have had in Greece's security. Uniformly, the Greek elites surveyed 
expressed their agreement to the statement that stable relations with states such as the UK, 
France and the US have played a role in that Greece has not been overtly threatened by 
another state since 1974. Interdependence here seems clear. Greece, being a small 
democratic state is somewhat required to have stable relations with more powerful states and 
the responses received to question two demonstrate this expectation. 
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Table 2- Stable Relations 
Thefact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another countty since 
1974 has to do with the country's stable relations with Western democracies 
such as the US, Britain and France 
Strongly 
Agree 
Military Officials 
Academics 3 
Greek MPs 3 
Political Appointees 5 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
2345 response 
19 8533 
67... 
... ... 
672... 1 
4511 
Cumulative 22 35 27 835 
N= 95 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field study 
Questions 3 and 4 
Table 3 is an effort to provide areas of elite concern. From the results in Table 3, Turkey 
is seen as the primary threat to Greece. Approximately 58% of Greek elites in the sample 
believe that Turkey is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present time. This result 
reinforces an article, written at the time of the survey, by Dr. Filippos Pierros from Harvard 
University and Dr Thanos Docos, from Cambridge University (Economicos Tahidromos, 
November 18,1993). The article argued that Greece's major threat came from Turkey and 
that Greece's major occupation should be "... the definition of the Turkish Threat. " It 
questioned whether Turkey's aims had to do with occupying Greek territories and whether 
Turkey's diplomatic moves intended to sabotage Greece's prestige in Europe (Econmicos 
Tahidromos, November 18,1993, p. 106). The result obtained was as expected. There was, 
however, an expectation for a larger percentage regarding the Macedonian problem (5%). 
In addition, all respondents sensed a threat towards Greece at the present time. 
In an attempt to further specify the kind of threat or problem areas facing Greece, but not 
necessarily towards Greece's security, the state's economy occupied the primary position. 
A foreign military threat was ranked third although the Greek military officials cited this 
variable most frequently (28%). The Chi - square for this relationship was significant 
(. 09543). This is explained by the assumption that the military elites are more likely to feel 
military threats than other types of respondents, because of the nature of their occupation 
(Turkey was most probably the threat implied). It must be noted that 
Greece's economy was 
a major issue during the October 1993 elections. 
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Table 3- Greatest Threat 
Which of thefollowing is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present 
time? 
Source of Threat Greek MPs Academics 
Military 
Officials 
Political 
Appointees Cumulative 
Balkan Instability 77 12 10 36 
The Macedonian I ... 3 1 5 Problem 
Turkey 11 9 33 5 58 
Other ... ... I 
I 
No threat ... ... lo, 
N= 100 1 chi square not significant at . 
10 level 
Source: Field Study 
What is the most serious kind of threatfacing Greece at the present time? 
Source of Threat Greek MPs Academics 
Military 
Officials 
Pol itical 
Appointees Cumulative 
Domestic 16 11 24 12 63 
economy 
Domestic 3 2 6 0 11 
political 
instability 
Foreign military ... 
3 14 1 18 
threat 
Foreign 2 1 3 
economic threat 
Other 3 1 4 
No threat ... ... ... 
I I 
N= 100 / chi -square 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
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Question 5 
Table 4 presents the results of question five which enquired about the level of seriousness of 
the current European instability as a threat towards Greece's security. As expected, a 
larger percentage of Greek elites surveyed expressed the opinion that the current instability 
in Europe, in relation to Greece's security, was serious compared to those who felt that it 
was not serious. A cumulative 65 % reinforces the level of seriousness. When the Greek 
elites were asked, however, for an opinion as to how probable the threat is to arise, it was 
felt that the likelihood was rather small (52% occupying the middle area of the probability 
scale). Mazower (1994) however, argues that the scenarios for expanded war due to this 
current instability, erupting in Kosovo or "Macedonia", drawing in neighbours, including 
NATO members Greece and Turkey are real (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute 
for War and Peace Reporting, March - April 1994, # 25). 
Table 4- Current Instability 
It has been suggested that the military balance in Europe and in the world has been 
changed considerably. In your opinion, how serious is the current instability in Europe 
to Greece's security? 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
1 2 3 4 567 response 
Greek MPs 1 6 5 2 14... ... 
Military Officials 6 10 16 to 53 
Academics 3 4 4 3 11... ... 
Political Appointees 6 1 5 2 2 ... ... ... 
Cumulative 16 21 30 17 98 
N= 100 / chi square not 
significant at. 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
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Table 4 (continued) 
How probable is it for a threat towards Greece's security to arise? 
Very 
Probable 
Not at all 
Probable No 
1 2 3 4 5 67 response 
Greek MPs 1 3 7 4 1 21... 
Military Officials 7 6 15 10 6 41... 
Academics 1 5 4 3 1 2 ... ... 
Political Appointees 4 1 4 5 2 ... 
Cumulative 13 15 30 22 10 82 
N= 100 /chi -square not 
significant at. 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Questions 6 and 7 
Turning to policy preferences expressed by the Greek officials, Table 5 presents data on 
their views as to the best form of defence against a perceived military threat. Important 
differences in preferences are presented. The two options with the largest percentage 
preferences were collective security which is European in character (EC and WEU) and 
integration of Atlantic community forces (NATO). Apart from the Greek MPs, the other 
three groups were slightly more supportive of European defence efforts. In this instance, 
the defence problem expressed through the literature review as to the debate of 
"Europeanising" European defence or remaining "Atlantic" ("European ist " vs. "Atlanticist") 
is presented. The dilemma is apparent as NATO is regarded as a major option for Greece's 
defence, despite European efforts. "For the next decade or so, NATO should continue in 
some form, and the United States should back it. Europeans may rail at American leadership 
- but they still prefer to be led by the US to being headed by another 
European power" (Tile 
United States and the New Europe, Duignan and Gann, 1994, p. 261). 
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Table 5- Best Form of Defence 
Given your views on a military threat to Greece's security, what is the bestform of defence 
against this threat? 
Military Political 
Form Greek MPs Academics Officials Appointees Cumulative 
No defence posture ... ... 
112 
National conventional 1618 
arms 
Collective security 99 20 11 49 
(Europe - EEC, WEU) 
Integration of Atlantic 10 6 17 2 35 
Community Forces 
(NATO) 
Other ... ... 
56 
N= 100 / chi - square not significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 8 
Table 6 presents the results of question 8 (parts A and B) which had dealt with religion as a 
source of threat for Europe in general and for Greece specifically. In both cases, the level 
of seriousness was low, apart from the case of the political appointees who believed that 
religious fanaticism is a very serious threat for Europe (67%) and for Greece (50%). 
However, in general terms, Greek officials thought that religion for Greece was more of a 
threat than for Europe (46% compared to 40% respectively). The Chi - square significance 
level was high for the table concerning "Europe", implying that the types of respondents 
held different levels of opinion on the importance of religion as a threat for Europe (. 00587 
as a threat to Europe). The Economist (March 11,1995), reinforces the above: " Militant 
Islam is now the single most serious threat to Western Security, or so Willy Claes, secretary 
- general of NATO, recently claimed 
in a moment of hyperbole. It is possible to see part of 
his point: Islamic terrorists try to blow up Manhattan's World Trade 
Centre, America's 
airlines and the globe - trotting Pope; Algeria's civil war threatens to spread 
its nastiness to 
tile "bidonvilles" of France; freelance gunmen from the Afghan war add a touch of zealotry 
to the conflict in Bosnia; from Egypt to Pakistan angry preachers compete to 
denounce the 
satanic West" (Economist, p. 137). 
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Table 6- Religion 
Based on the religious fanaticism evident in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria and Kuwait) as 
well as in Europe (Turkey, Muslims informer Yugoslavia), how serious a threat, in your 
opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism to Europe's security? 
Very 
Serious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all 
Serious 
7 
No 
response 
Greek MPs 1 5 3 5 4 1 ... 
Academics 3 6 1 6 ... ... ... 
Military Officials 11 7 11 9 8 3 1 
Political Appointees 10 ... 1 3 ... 2 ... ... 
Cumulative 25 16 16 17 18 6 1 1 
N= 99 / chi - square significant 
at. 05 level 
Source: Field Study 
rr_ 
h6w serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism, to Greece's security? 
Very Not at all 
Serious Serious No 
1 2 3 4567 response 
Greek MPs 4 4 4 223... ... 
Academics 3 6 5 11... ... 
Military Officials 12 6 13 98... 
Political Appointees 8 3 1 21 
Cumulative 27 19 23 14 10 5 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
sipif icant at. 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
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Question 
Table 7 presents the data on Greek officials' views as to the level of seriousness of Germany 
as a threat for Europe and for Greece. Here, the emphasis was not on Germany as an 
economic threat, but as a military threat, based on Germany's legacy of war, discussed by 
analysts in the literature review, especially after the German unification. In both situations, 
the threat was not perceived as being serious, especially towards Greece's security, as 
expected. As Gortemaker (1994) argues, within the new Europe, the unification of Germany 
is as much a matter of anxiety as it is an expression of hope. German unification could bring 
new attention to the idea of "Mitteleuropa" as a bridge between East and West thus 
promoting an all - European understanding and identity apart from traditional structures of 
East - West partition and bipolarity. Given the disorientation of Eastern Europe and its need 
for economic assistance and cooperation, the unified Germany could establish the link 
between the capitalist democracies of the West and the transforming societies in the East, 
providing economic strength and political weight alike. On the other hand, the notion of 
putting Germany in the driver's seat of Europe again could provoke feelings of uneasiness, 
if not outright rejection. History remains a burden, even if European Cooperation takes 
precedence over memories of the past and gradually revises the German image (Unifying 
Germany, 1989 - 1990, p. 15). 
However, according to Duignan and Gann (1994), Europe has been fortunate because of 
Germany's unification: "The problems of Unification are difficult but not insoluble. The 
task of rebuilding East Germany will keep the Germans busy for at least a decade. In the 
meantime, they will become even further committed to transnational bodies such as the EC, 
the WEU, and the CSCE. Europe and the world have indeed been fortunate" (The United 
States and the New Europe, p. 127). 
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Table 7- Germany 
Many defence analysts present Germany as a legacy of war. How serious a threat is 
Germanyfor Europe's security? 
Very Not at all No 
Serious Serious response 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Greek MPs 1 2 4 4 3 4 
... 
Military Officials 3 3 6 13 9 11 1 
Academics 3 1 3 3 5 1 
Political Appointees 4 2 
... 3 3 3 1 
Cumulative 9 23 19 22 10 
N= 100 / chi - square not 
significant at A0 level 
Source: Field Study 
Tr- 
176w serious a threat is Germanyfor Greece's security? 
Very Not at all 
Serious Serious No 
1 2 34 5 6 7 response 
Greek MPs ... 
1 12 9 2 4 ... 
Military Officials 2 1 56 12 14 72 
Academics ... 
2 2 5 5 2 ... 
Political Appointees 3 3 ... 
2 4 2 2 ... 
Cumulative 57 12 30 23 15 2 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
significant at. 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 10 
Table 8 presents the data from question 10 regarding Greek officials' views on 
NATO as 
being the major component that ensured European stability. Here, the 
level of agreement 
was high from all types of respondents with the military officials as the 
highest (78%). The 
results suggest NATO's success in being a dominant and major component 
in Europe's 
security. Again, these results send the message of the 
difficulty in abandoning NATO for 
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another security organisation as its contribution is widely accepted from Greek elites. Veremis (1984), Clogg (1990) and Richter (1990) identify the procrastinating role that NATO has played over the years not only for Greece, but also for Europe. 
Table 8- NATO and European Stability 
According to many defence analysts, NATO has been the major component that 
ensured European stability. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
12345 response 
Greek MPs 2 12 5 ... ... ... 
Academics 5551 
Military Officials 14 24 47 
Political Appointees 5524 
Cumulative 26 46 16 12 
N= 100 / chi - square 
significant at . 05 level Source: Field Study 
Question 11 
Table 9 focuses specifically on whether NATO should continue to exist despite the 
dissolution of its counterpart, the WTO, and the fall of communism. The level of 
agreement here is high as in the previous table and quite uniform for all types of 
respondents; 68% for Greek MPs, 62% for academics, 73% for Greek military officials, 
and 75 % for political appointees. It seems clear that NATO's dominance is still present and 
required. " The NATO connection is particularly valuable to Germany, which finds that 
NATO enhances the legitimacy of German foreign policy while reassuring France. The US 
can improve its own position by proposing a number of reforms that would please the 
Germans without harming any other power" (The United States and the New Europe, p. 
261). 
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Table 9- On NATO's continuation 
Due to the current instability in Europe, NATO should continue to exist 
despite the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
1 2 3 4 5 response 
Greek MPs 4 9 3 3 ... ... 
Academics 4 6 4 1 1 
Military Officials 11 25 4 4 4 
Political Appointees 4 8 2 1 1 ... 
Cumulative 23 48 13 961 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
significant at A0 level 
Source: Field study 
Lazaridis and Branis (1993) reinforce NATO's importance in continuing to exist and 
applaud the transformations occurring in tile structure (Economicos Tahidromos, October 
28,1993, p. 3 1). Most defence analysts agree with NATO's continuation (as discussed in 
the literature review), and Kemp, chief editor of the European Wall Street Journal (August 
11ý 1993), stated: Yugoslavia may have gone, but the search for the future role of NATO is 
just beginning 
Question 12 
Table 10 presents the results on the question of continuing US involvement in European 
affairs. Although a higher percentage of agreement especially in relation to the previous 
two questions regarding NATO was expected, agreement only reached 46 %, significantly 
lower than NATO's results (which implies US assistance). The possible explanation could 
be the fact that ýGreek officials have realised the importance of NATO and the need 
for the 
organisation's continuation, but most probably, without US control. This would mean that 
NATO would probably have to acquire a European character as far as its leadership is 
concerned. Again, these results reinforce tile Europeanists' debate of "European security 
becoming more European" 
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Table 10 - US and Europe 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism, the United States 
should still continue to play a role in European affairs 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
12345 response 
ýGreek MPs ... 5761 
Military Officials 7 19 6 11 6 
Academics 
... 6271 
Political Appointees 36322 
Cumulative 10 36 18 26 9 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
significant at A0 level 
Source: Field study 
Question 13 
Table II deals with the results from question 13, which deal with NATO's requirements in 
the next decade in order for the structure to continue. 
Opinions here vary, with four of the requirements given a relatively greater importance by 
the respondents: The requirement of NATO acquiring European leadership (37%); the 
requirement of NATO including Easter European states (33%); the requirement of NATO 
amending its treaty (63 %); and perceiving new threats (16 %). The expectation here was 
the requirement of NATO perceiving new threats. However, the fourth option from the 
questionnaire, which received the highest ranking, also stated that NATO needed to set new 
goals along with amending the treaty and threat perception could have been considered by 
the respondents when choosing this option. However, the variety of requirements 
demonstrate the various new problems presented to NATO after the events of 1989 and the 
reason for the organisation's slow but gradual transformation discussed in the literature 
review. Duignan and Gann (1994), argue that NATO policy makers will have to remodel 
the alliance so as to take account of the Europeans' enhanced role. In addition, they argue 
that the structure requires restructuring: " The US should continue its NATO membership 
for at least another decade while gradually transferring power to the WEU" (The United 
States and the New Europe, p. 261,271). 
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However, lordanides (1994), argues that NATO should be cautious: "Tile danger for NATO 
can only come from the unclarity of the political goals of its leadership" (Defence and Diplomacy, March, #37, p. 4, Greek edition). This point may become a difficult problem to 
overcome, if one considers NATO's enlargement through the PFP. 
Table 11 - NATO Requirements 
Based on the assumption that NATO remains the major defensive organisation in Europe in 
the 1990s, which of the following are vital requirements for the structure's success Ifu 
continuation ? 
Greek MPs Academics 
Military 
Officials 
Political 
Appointees Cumulative 
US leadership 1 7 1 9 
European leadership 7 6 20 4 37 
Inclusion of Eastern 8 7 15 3 33 
European countries 
Amendment of treaty 12 9 33 10 64 
Threat perception 4 2 9 1 16 
Ability to deal with 5 5 1 1t 
out-of-area threats 
Other 
... ... 3 2 5 
N= 97 / chi - square = invalid data, SPSS could not calculate 
Source: Field Study 
European leadership as well as aýcquiring new members in NATO, which was also highly 
ranked, indicated tile shift from US leadership to European leadership as well as a security 
organisation for more European states. 
Question 14 
Table 12 presents the data frorn question 14 which seeks to determine whether NATO has 
been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members. Here the emphasis was to see whether Greek officials viewed 
NATO as the balance between these two states whether NATO is not responsible for the fact 
that no clear threat from either state has existed since both (Greece and Turkey), are NATO 
members. Despite the fact that Papandreou had threatened to pull out of NATO in 1981, he 
did not carry out his threats, according to Wegs (1991), primarily because the United States 
would have found it necessary to strengthen Greece's major opponent, Turkey, in NATO if 
Greece left. "This would threaten the Greeks in Cyprus where 20,000 Turkish troops were 
stationed to protect the Turkish minority" (Europe since 1945, A concise History, p. 284). 
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Table 12 - NATO, Greece and Turkey 
NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict 
between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
1 2 3 4 5 response 
Greek MPs 2 9 5 2 1 ... 
Military Officials 4 20 15 3 34 
Academics 4 5 5 1 1 
Political Appointees 4 4 3 4 1 
Cumulative 14 38 28 to 64 
N= 96 / chi - square not 
significant at , 10 level 
Source: Field study 
Despite the expectation of strong agreement to the question, Greek elites were rather divided 
with half of the respondents agreeing and the other half either disagreeing or holding a 
non-committal view. Dr F. Pierros, an EP member, also reinforces the argument that 
Greece's membership in NATO along with Turkey's has served as a procrastinating factor 
for Turkey's threats towards Greece. However, as he argues, Greece's membership in 
NATO, along with the state's membership in other international organisations, is not enough 
to secure the state from outside threats (Economicos Tahidromos, November 18,1993, p. 
107). 
Question 15 
Table 13 presents the data on whether Greece should continue to remain a member of 
NATO. The focus was to see specifically (not along with the EC as in question one) if there 
is a sense of abandoning NATO. Agreement was expected, 
however, and occupied tile 
primary position with 91 %, reinforcing the discussion 
in the review of the literature and a 
large part of the field study findings. 
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Question 16 
Table 14 demonstrates that when asked specifically about the United States' importance for 
Europe's defence in the 1990s, the responses were uniformly spread out over the seven point 
scale, with a slight edge indicating the US as important for Europe. America's fading 
presence in Europe had been argued 16 years ago by Serfaty (1980), in his study Fading 
Partnership - America and Europe after 30 years. It is assumed that Greek officials would 
probably favour Europeans taking over leadership in Europe either through NATO, by 
giving it European leadership or through other institutions. However, this view is not 
uniform, and can be partly explained by the "recent" transformation of the European 
Continent. 
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Table 13 - Greece and NATO 
Greece should continue to remain as a member of NA TO. - 
Military Political 
Greek MPs Officials Appointees Academics Cumulative 
Agree 18 43 16 14 91 
Disagree II... ... 2 
Missing ... 5 ... 27 
N= 93 / chi - square not significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Table 14 - US and European Defence 
how important is the United States, in your opinion, for European defence? 
Very 
Important 
Not at all No 
Important response 
1 2 3 4 5 67 
Greek MPs 1 5 5 3 3 1 ... 
Military Officials 13 to 9 5 6 42 
Academics 1 6 3 2 2 11 
Political Appointees 4 4 2 5 1 ... ... ... 
Cumulative 19 25 19 15 12 631 
N= 99/ chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 17 
Table 15 presents the results from the question regarding Europe 
breaking away from the 
US and NATO and dealing with the Continent's security only through arrangements which 
are European in character such as the EC and the 
WEU. In these results, the level of 
uncertainty was high, especially in the case of the 
Greek MPs (47%). The results to this 
question contradict the expectation that Greek officials would 
favour "Europeanising" 
European defence and adds reinforcement to the defence 
dilemma of choosing between 
"European" or "Atlantic". 
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Table 15 - Europe and European Security 
Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the 
Continent's security only through arrangements which are European in 
character such as the EEC and the WEU. 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree No 
12345 response 
Greek MPs, 25921... 
Military Officials 12 11 8 14 4 
Academics 53251 
Political Appointees 4155... 
Cumulative 23 20 24 26 61 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level Source: Field study 
Question 18 
Table 16 presents the results of the Greek officials' views as to the most practical way to 
ensure Greece's military security under the present circumstances. 
Table 16 - Greece and Military Security 
Under present circumstances, which do you think is the most practical way for Greece to 
ensure its military security? 
Military Political 
Greek MPs Academics Officials Appointees Cumulative 
Continue present 2 ... 
62 to 
arrangements (NATO) 
Pursue entry to the 4153 13 
WEU 
Combination of coil. 12 14 36 9 71 
sec. arrangements 
(NATO, CSCE) 
Withdraw from coll. sec. 112... 4 
arrangements 
Other ... ... ... 
22 
N= 100 / chi - square not signi ficant at - 10 level 
Source: Jýjeld Study 
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(Continued) 
The primary position was occupied by the option combining collective security arrangements 
such as NATO and the CSCE (71 %). Despite the fact that in previous questions the elites did not seem in favour of abandoning NATO and had identified its success, the option of 
continuing present arrangements was significantly low (10%). The logical explanation lies 
with the changing needs of Europe and the "out-datededness" of NATO. The results 
indicate that NATO would be preferred when working together with other security 
arrangements such as the CSCE. 
Question 19 
Table 17 shifts the focus from Greece to Europe asking the elites which alternative for 
European defence is the most credible. The results in this case indicated a high percentage 
(42%) favouring that Europe should rely on NATO with the inclusion of the United States. 
The options for this question offered no combination alternatives and NATO received the 
primary position, demonstrating that when comparing or choosing the most credible 
alternative, the respondents ranked NATO as the highest. In addition, the CSCE alternative 
was preferred by only 4% of the respondents indicating what the literature review discussed 
about the difficulty it faces in becoming institutiýonalised and its broadness in membership 
that make it a defensively weak alternative for Europe's defence. In addition, the European 
Community was favoured (24 %) over the Western European Union option (5 %), even 
though the EC does not have a defence mechanism (and is indicated on the questionnaire). 
The reason for this is partly due to the fact that Greece feels that the EU is the institution in 
which a solution to the Cyprus problem could be found. "If war between Greece and Turkey 
is to be averted, no step could be more useful than a democratic settlement of the Cyprus 
conflict" (Hitchens, 1994, Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting, p. 11). Turkey is not a member of the EU, and this can explain why Greece 
favours this platform. The chi - square significance level of this table was high, suggesting 
that the respondents had different responses than expected, and point to the assumption that 
there was some association between this pair of variables at the 95 per cent confidence level 
(chi - square value = . 04810). Although 
NATO occupied the primary position, half of the 
number of political appointees chose the EC as the most credible alternative for European 
defence. 
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Table 17 - Greece and Military Security 
Which of thefollowing alternativefor European defence is the most credible? 
Military Political 
Greek MPs Officials Academics Appointees Cumulative 
Rely on US force 214 
Rely on NATO, including 9 21 66 42 
us. 
Rely on itself independent 47... 1 12 
of US 
Rely on EEC to form a3885 24 
defence mechanism 
Rely on the CSCE 34 
Rely on the WEU 2125 
Other ... 7t8 
N= 99 / chi - square : not significant at A0 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 20 
Table 18 presents the results of question 20 as to whether the EC should provide a defence 
mechanism for Europe. Here, the level of agreement was high with 73% giving it the 
primary position as expected. The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union has identified 
the absence of a defensive dimension from the EC and has called upon the Western 
European Union to fill the gap. Whatever the case may be, Greek elites demonstrate the 
need for the EC to deal with security questions, a feeling which may be seen in relation with 
the earlier comment of the EC being the only institution in which Greece and Turkey are not 
both members, and the one in which Greece could pressure its European partners towards a 
solution to the Cyprus problem, and their own defensive concerns in relation to Turkey. 
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Table 18 - EEC and European Defence 
In your opinion, should the European Economic Community (EEC) provide a 
defence mechanism for Europe? 
Greek MPs 
Military 
Officials Academics 
Political 
Appointees Cumulative 
Agree 14 34 13 12 73 
Disagree 2 6 2 2 12 
Uncertain 2 9 1 2 14 
Missing I ... ... I 
N= 97 / chi - square not significant at 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 21 
Table 19 demonstrates that when asked about whether NATO should acquire new members 
from the former Eastern bloc to serve defensively the whole of Europe, the respondents 
indicated a relatively high percentage of agreement (67%) especially in the case of the 
academics (87%). NATO has already begun to change in character and the results from the 
questions relating to NATO demonstrate the various new challenges it faces (requirements, 
combination with other security arrangements, leadership, and membership being the most 
important). The membership option was also offered in question 13 (see Table 11), but 
along with other NATO requirements for the 1990s. However, in this instance, NATO's 
inclusion of Eastern European states was ranked higher, demonstrating that even if it is not 
ranked as the highest priority for NATO, it still remains a very imprtant one. NATO has 
already begun to discuss opening its membership to new states (NATO is Paving the Wayfor 
East Europeans to Join the Alliance, BBC 2 News, Jan 10 1994,10: 15 p. m. ). The 
Partnership For Peace plan has encompassed 24 Eastern European states to NATO (see 
Appendix E). Holbrooke (1995), argues that expansion of NATO is a logical and essential 
consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the need to widen European 
Unity 
based on shared democratic values. "PFP is an invaluable tool that encourages NATO and 
individual partners to work together. It helps newly democratic states restructure and 
establish democratic control of their military forces and learn new 
forms of military 
doctrine, environmental control and disaster relief. In the future, it will provide a 
framework in which NATO and individual partners can cooperate in crisis management or 
out - of - area peace keeping ( 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, #2, March - April, p. 42 - 43). 
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Table 19 - NATO and Eastern Europe 
NATO should acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an 
alliance that could serve the whole of Europe. 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
5 response 
Greek MPs 3 10 4 2 
... ... 
Military Officials 11 18 13 5 12 
Academics 2 12 1 ... 
I ... 
Political Appointees 5 7 2 1 ... 
I 
Cumulative 21 46 20 8 23 
N= 97 / chi - square not 
sig ni fica nt at . 10 level Source: Field study 
Question 22 
Table 20 focuses on the question of threat perception in NATO and specifically, the 
importance of perceiving new threats to ensure the organisation's continuation. As 
expected, the importance was ranked relatively high (77% cumulatively), with the military 
officials giving it their highest priority (90%). As expressed in this study, threat perception 
is among the major requirements, if not the major one, for any defence organisation's 
existence. This has been identified by the Greek elites, even if the threat perception 
ranking of NATO as one of the organisation's requirements, in question 13 (Table 11), 
among others, was not seen as the most vital one. "In the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 
dialogue and cooperation have the outmost importance; the significance of crisis 
management has increased; ... the threat which was accepted 
in a bi-polar world turned into 
risks as a result of a set of developments in Europe "( General Gures, The Rusi Journal, 
June, 1993 p. 1). The above comment can partly explain why threat perception was not 
ranked higher as one of NATO's requirements. 
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Table 20 - NATO and Threat Perceptions 
Given the fact that the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and the Communist threat has 
receded, how important is it for NA TO to perceive new threats for its continuation ? 
Very 
Important 
Not at all No 
Important response 
1 2 3 4 567 
Greek MPs 5 8 2 2 2 
Military Officials 19 16 10 3 1 ... ... ... 
Academics 4 3 6 1 1 1 
Political Appointees 4 4 4 2 1 ... ... I 
Cumulative 32 31 22 8 3 ... ... 4 
N= 96 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Question 23 
Table 21 indicates the level of importance which the respondents give to some of the 
problems which Europeans might face in the 1990s. The respondents were asked to 
indicate how important these problems were, in their opinion, for Europe (Table 21 - A) 
and for Greece (Table 21 - B). 
In the first part of the table (part A), the most pressing problem seen by the Greek elites was 
the Yugoslav crisis (90%) with the break-up of the Soviet Union following a close second 
with 87%. In the second part of the table (part B), the problems of greatest importance for 
Greece differed from those for Europe (as seen by the Greek elites). The Cypriot problem 
was believed to be of greatest importance (91 %), followed closely by the Macedonian 
problem and the Yugoslav crisis (90% each). This demonstrates the various national 
priorities for security matters and is one of the main problems when discussing common 
foreign policy or common threat perception within security arrangements. How a problem 
may be sensed by one government may not be identical to how it is perceived by another 
government and this makes the establishment of common goals or collective structures 
difficult. 
The ranking of the problem of the dissolution of the Soviet Union was different when 
perceived as a problem for Greece (47%) compared to it being a problem 
for Europe (87%). 
Greek elites mayt feel that the new republics would not present a problem 
for their state, but 
hold this view without an evident explanation for their belief (the 
Chi - square value in this 
instance was also high, . 00380 
for the former Soviet Union as a threat to Europe. The break 
- up of the former Soviet 
Union can be seen as a threat through the fact that the newly 
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formed republics have inherited weapons left in their areas by the Soviet regime. Based on Gleditsch and Njolstad's (1984) argument, that "highly armed states can use their military 
power as leverage in forcing other states to make concessions that are detrimental to their 
sovereignty, security and welfare", these republics could pose as well - justified threats for Europe and for Greece ( Arms Races, p. 353). The Macedonian problern along with the 
Cypriot problem were expected to be and were ranked as most important and this is 
understandable as these were the major issues, along with the domestic economy, associated 
with the election held in Greece during the time of the survey. 
Clogg (1986,1992), Veremis (1986), Lazaridis and Branis (1993) also identify these various 
problems that have been affecting and might continue to affect Greece more dramatically. 
Specifically, Clogg presents the problem of Albanian refugees and the Greek minority 
returning from the former Soviet Union. These minorities have created various economic 
problems for Greece, offering cheap labour causing problems for the local labour markets. 
The crime rate has risen since the refugees, especially Albanians, started to flow into 
Greece. Lazaridis and Branis identify the problems that the Yugoslav crisis has created, 
mostly for Europe and NATO, which have affected the Balkan region and created problems 
in the perception of new threats, such as the Macedonian incident, through the creation of 
new states. They conclude that Greece needs to have a say within NATO in order to 
present its own view of the problems affecting their own state. 
Veremis and Richter (1990) identify the issue of Cyprus for Greece as well as for Europe as 
it is a major factor affecting Turkish entry to tile EC. They recognise tile difference in 
importance for Greece compared to that for Europe. In addition, Bazoglusezer (1984) also 
discusses the negative effect that Greaco - Turkish relations have had especially due to the 
Cypriot problem for Turkey's Western allies (Turkey and Greece, ed. by Alford; A Concise 
History of Greece, Clogg; Greece in the 1980s, Clogg). Rizopoulos (1994), argues that "for 
over 20 years - certainly since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in tile summer of 1974 - the 
one predominant ideefixe of Greek policy makers, irrespective of party affiliation, has been 
the conviction that Greece's main, and perhaps only, vital security threat came from tile 
East: from a revanchist Turkey bent oil permanently dividing (and occupying) Cyprus and 
upsetting the Aegean balance of power". Derala (1994), states that Turkey has been 
"Macedonia's" best ally, responding to every twist of tile diplomatic battle between Greece 
and "Macedonia", interrelating the issues of Cyprus, Macedonia and Turkey presented ill 
tile tables (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of tile Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1994, 
pp. 4- 8). 
Tile above situation worsens when Greece's and Turkey's relations with Serbia are 
presented, to reinforce the importance of the Yugoslav crisis presented in the results of the 
descriptive statistics. Nenadovic (1994), and Stitkovac (1994), argue that the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia left "Macedonia" between Athens and Belgrade. As a result, the anti - 
"Macedonian" factor is the main link of Greaco - Serbian relations. In addition, Stitkovac 
argues that a Turkish - Serbian media war has raged 
for two years and relations between tile 
two states are strained (Balkan War Report, Bulletin of the Institute 
for War and Peace 
Reporting, March - April 1994, pp. 16 - 17). 
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Table 21-A 
Possible Problems 
Here are some problems that Europeans mightface in the 1990s. Please indicate 
how important each is for Europe. 
Of very great Of great Ofsome Of no No 
importance importance importance importance response 
1 2 3 4 
THE CYPRIOT PROBLEM, N= 95 f chi - square not significant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 5 4 712 
Military Officials 15 9 20 5 ... 
Academics 4 7 5 ... ... 
Political Appointees 6 2 53 
Cumulative 30 22 37 65 
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, 
Greek MPs 
Military Officials 27 
Academics 12 
Political Appointees 12 
Cumulative 62 
99 / chi - square sipificant at . 05 level 
52 
22 ... ... 
4 ... ... 
4 ... ... 
35 2 
THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM, N= 95 /chi -square not significant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 5 5 8 
Military Officials 15 12 16 5 
Academics 5 3 71 
Political Appointees 4 4 5 ... 
3 
Cumulative 29 24 36 65 
ALBANIAN REFUGEES, N= 91 / chi - square not sipificant at. tO level 
Greek MPs 1 4 9 14 
Military Officials 6 9 25 72 
Academics 1 7 7 1 
Political Appointees 4 3 5 22 
Cumulative 12 23 46 to 
9 
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Table 21-A 
Possible Problems 
Here are some problems that Europeans mightface in the 1990s. Please indicate 
how important each is for Europe. 
Of very great 
importance 
Of great 
importance 
2 
Of some 
importance 
3 
Of no 
importance 
4 
respo . nse 
............ ........... 
NEO-NAZISM, N =94 chi - square not significant at. 10 
level 
Greek MPs 10 5 2 1 1 
Military Officials 17 18 12 1 1 
Academics 6 6 6 ... 
I 
Political Appointees 4 4 4 1 3 
Cumulative 37 33 21 3 6 
THE SOVIET UNION BREAK-UP, N 94 chi - square signiticant at. 05 level 
Greek MPs 9 5 3 ... 
2 
Military Officials 22 22 4 1 
Academics 13 3 ... ... ... 
Political Appointees 9 4 ... 
3 
Cumulative 53 34 7 6 
GERMAN UNIFICATION N 94 chi-square notsignificantat. 10 level 
Greek MPs 5 6 5 2 1 
Military Officials 15 15 15 3 1 
Academics 6 7 1 1 1 
Political Appointees 7 3 2 1 3 
Cumulative 33 31 23 7 
6 
Source: Field study 
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Table 21-B 
Possible Problems 
Here are some problems that Europeans mightface in the 1990s. Please indicate 
how important each isfor Greece. 
Of very great Of great ý:: ý ý Of some Of no No 
importance importance importance importance response 
2 3 4 
THE CYPRIOT PROBLEM, N= 92 / chi - square not signiftcant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 16 11 
Military Officials 36 94 
Academics 15 1 
Political Appointees 12 1 ... ... 3 
Cumulative 79 12 1 ... 8 
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, N= 91 / chi - square not significant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 10 7 2 
Military Officials 30 13 1 ... 5 
Academics 13 3 ... ... ... 
Political Appointees 12 2 ... ... 2 
Cumulative 65 25 1 9 
THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM, N= 91 /chi-square not significant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 15 3 ... I 
Military Officials 40 3 ... 15 
Academics 12 21... I 
Political Appointees 13 1 ... ... 
2 
Cumulative 80 9119 
ALBANIAN REFUGEES, N= 90 / chi - square not significant at. 10 level 
Greek MPs 7 to I 
Military Officials 18 21 415 
Academics 11 31... I 
Political Appointees 6613 
Cumulative 42 40 62 10 
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Table 21-B 
Possible Problems 
Here are some problems that Europeans mightface in the 1990s. Please indicate 
how important each is for Greece. 
Of very great Of great Ofsome Of no No 
importance importance importance importance response 
2 3 4 
NEO-NAZISM, N= 
90 / chi square not significant at 
. 10 
level 
Greek MPs 2 6 9 11 
Military Officials 3 to 24 75 
Academics ... 3 11 2 
Political Appointees 3 5 2 24 
Cumulative 8 24 46 12 10 
THE SOVIET UNION BREAK-UP, N= 90 / chi - square not significant at . 10 level 
Greek MPs 4 3 10 1 1 
Military Officials 5 12 26 1 5 
Academics 2 11 3 ... ... 
Political Appointees 6 4 2 ... 4 
Cumulative 17 30 41 2 to 
GERMAN UNIFICATION, N 89 chi - square sipi licant at. 05 level 
Greek MPs 1 4 9 3 2 
Military Officials 4 11 21 8 5 
Academics ... 
10 4 1 1 
Political Appointees 4 6 2 1 3 
Cumulative 9 31 36 13 it 
Source: Field study 
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Question 24 
Table 22 presents the data on the opinion of the respondents as to whether the US was the 
only remaining superpower in the world at the present time. 
Table 22 - US, The only Remaining Superpower? 
The United States in the only remaining superpower in the world at the 
present time. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
12345 response 
Greek MPs 8911... 
... 
Military Officials 26 17 5 ... ... I 
Academics 96... I ... ... 
Political Appointees 97... 
... ... 
Cumulative 52 39 621 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
sig ni ficant at . 
10 level 
Source: Field study 
As expected, a large majority agreed (91 %) and this agreement was uniform among the 
various groupings of respondents. Evidently, the fall of Communism, the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact along with the break-up of tile Soviet Union has made the United States seem 
as the most dominant state in the world. 
Question 25 
Table 23 presents the results to the question of how serious a threat is Russia to Europe's 
security, despite the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Greek MPs, along with the 
military officials gave the highest ranking among the four groups of respondents (60% and 
47% respectively). In general terms, however, the results were well distributed along the 
seven point scale. Again, as in Table 21 which concerns the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
the threat which Russia poses is not seen as substantial although there is no evident logical 
explanation for this apart from stable relations and common religious beliefs (Christian 
Orthodox). 
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Table 23 - The Threat which Russia Poses 
Despite the break-up of the Soviet Union, how serious a threat is Russia to Europe's 
security ? 
Very 
Important 
Not at all No 
Important response 
12 3 4 567 
Greek MPs ... 7 5 1 42 
Military Officials 85 10 9 872 
Academics ... 2 4 5 131 
Political Appointees 3 2 2 4 3 1 1 
Cumulative 11 16 21 19 16 13 4 
N= 100 / chi - square not 
significant at . 
10 level 
Source: Field Study 
Questions 26 and 27 
Table 24 presents the results to the question of how important the Treaty of Maastricht is for 
the stability of European affairs. Without agreement to the terms of Maastricht, the EC 
would most probably create additional problems for Europe which, along with other 
problems mentioned in the literature review, would mean a more unstable Continent. As 
expected, the respondents considered the Treaty highly important (67%; 99% 
cumulatively), demonstrating the awareness and importance felt by Greek elites of the 
Treaty for European Union. The chi - square value for the correlation of the 
importance of 
tile Maastricht Treaty on European Union for Europe with the types of respondents was high 
(. 02282), demonstrating this uniformity among all categories of respondents. Similar 
findings are displayed in Table 25. For example, when asked specifically about the 
importance of tile Treaty of Maastricht for Greece, not a single respondent chose the 
"not 
important ff alternative. 
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Table 24 - Maastricht and European Affairs 
How important is agreement to the terms of Maastrichtfor the stability of 
European affairs (economic and defensive)? 
Not important Fairly 
important 
12 
Greek MPs ... 10 
Military Officials ... 9 
Academics ... 5 
Political Appointees 18 
Very No response 
important 
3 
9 ... 
40 ... 
11 ... 
7 ... 
Cumulative 1 32 67 
N= 100 / chi - square 
significant at . 
05 level 
Source: Field study 
Table 25 - Maastricht and Greece 
How important is the treaty of Maastrichtfor Greece? 
Europe will 
Not Fairly Very procrastinat No 
important important important e response 
unification 
12 3 4 
Greek MPs ... 
4 13 2 ... 
Military Officials ... 
6 30 13 ... 
Academics ... 
4 9 3 ... 
Political Appointees ... 
4 10 2 ... 
Cumulative ... 
18 62 20 
N= 100 / chi - square not 
sig ni fica tit at . 10 
level 
Source: Field study 
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Question 28 
Table 26 deals with the former Soviet Union and how serious a nuclear threat it poses to Europe despite the formation of new republics. 
Table 26 - The Nuclear Threat from the former Soviet Union 
How serious a nuclear threat does the former Soviet Union, despite its break-up into 
smaller republics, present to Europe? 
Very 
Serious 
Not at all No 
Serious response 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Greek MPs 3 3 6 2 5 ... 
Military Officials 18 11 11 4 2 3 
Academics 4 2 5 3 1 1 
Political Appointees 4 3 3 1 4 ... 
Cumulative 29 19 25 10 12 4 
N= 100 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field Study 
As expected, the overwhelming majority of the respondents felt that the possesslon of 
nuclear weapons was serious, with the military officials raking the threat as greatest. The 
various civil differences within the former Soviet Union, the coup in Russia in 1992 and the 
continuing violence in the smaller republics (i. e. Cheznia), suggest that the former Soviet 
Union should be seen as a possible threat, and Greek elites are aware of this. The results of 
this question, however, contradict the results of question 23b and 25 (as seen in Tables 21-B 
and 23), where the Soviet Union was not seen as a major problem or a threat to Europe's 
security. 
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Question 29 
Table 27 deals with the importance of perception of threat for the establishment of a 
collective security arrangement, shifting the emphasis from NATO to other defence 
mechanisms as well. As expected, the importance given to this was very high (94%), 
especially by the military officials and the political appointees. 
Table 27 - The hnportance of Threat Perception 
TT_ 
how important, in your opinion, is perception of a threat to establishing a 
collective security arrangement? 
Not important Fairly Very No response 
important important 
3 
Greek MPs 6 
Military Officials 3 16 29 
Academics 
... 88 
Political Appointees 
... 79 
Cumulative 4 42 52 2 
N= 98 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field study 
Question 30 
Table 28 presents the results to the question on whether external threats should be taken into 
consideration and precautions taken in the defence mechanism of Europe as such threats may 
arise in European affairs. The focus of this question was to determine whether there was a 
sense of European or Greek levels of involvement in out-of-area threats, given that these 
threats affected European affairs. As expected, the level of agreement was high (81 %), 
demonstrating the requirement of a defence organisation to be able, based on its treaty, to 
deal with out-of-area threats as NATO has done in the Yugoslav crisis or the EC through 
European Political Cooperation in the Gulf War which had affected Europe economically. 
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Table 28 - External Threats 
External threats (out-of-area threats) such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, should be taken into consideration and precautions taken in the defence 
mechanism of Europe as such threats may arise in European affairs. 
Strongly 
Agree 
I 
Greek MPs 3 
Military Officials 16 
Academics 4 
Political Appointees 4 
2 
13 
21 
11 
7 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
345 response 
II... 1 
83 
Cumulative 27 52 14 5 
N= 99 / chi - square not 
significant at . 10 level 
Source: Field study 
Question 31 
Table 29 presents the results to the question of whether European defence should deal with 
matters of the Continent. 
Table 29 - European Defence 
European defence should only deal with matters of the continent. 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree No 
1 23 45 response 
Greek MPs 2 13 ... 
31 
Military Officials 10 13 11 it 4 ... 
Academics ... 
42 82... 
Political Appointees 3 61 51 
Cumulative 15 36 14 27 8 
N= 100 /chi -square 
significant at . 05 level 
Source: Field study 
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Here, tile responses were divided, contradicting the results of the previous question. The chi 
- square significance level in this correlation was high (. 01307), demonstrating the level of 
uncertainty depicted in the table. However, this could be explained by revealing that tile 
respondents probably feel that the primary concern of European defence should be dealing 
with matters of the Continent, and only when affected by out-of-area threats, should they 
deal with these. 
Question 32 
Finally, Table 30 presents the results to the question of whether Greece's interests would be 
better promoted through the Western European Union. The agreement level was high 
(78 %) demonstrating the respondents shift towards a more " Europeanised " form of defence. 
However, Greece has just recently become a member of the WEU (1992) at which time 
Turkey was also accepted with associate member status and thus the other members of the 
WEU have not yet guaranteed security for Greece if threatened by Turkey (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, p. 13,1992). Therefore, the clarity of Greece's defence with the WEU 
remains unclear. 
Table 30 - Greece and the WEU 
Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European 
Union. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree No 
1 2 345 response 
Greek MPs 5 10 31... ... 
Military Officials 21 18 73 
Academics 6 5 41... ... 
Political Appointees 7 6 2 ... ... 
I 
Cumulative 39 39 16 
N= 100 / chi - square not 
significant at A0 level 
Source: Field study 
Summary - Descriptive Statistics 
Chapter 7 presented the results of the descriptive statistics as well as the methodology and 
the analytical framework of the study. In most instances the results were as expected 
especially those concerning Turkey as a threat 
for Greece and those concerning NATO as a 
significant mechanism for Europe's security. 
A significant number of responses were 
uniform such as those concerning Greece's continuing membership 
in security institutions 
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and the EC. It is essential to analyse these responses by examining them with one another 
(cross tabu I ations), through correlations. The questions related to each variable of the model 
are analysed with the next variable in sequence, based on the sequence of the model (for 
model and variables see section 7.6). The analysis of the correlations, as well as the 
statistical program used and why is presented in chapter 8. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Given the threat perceptions and various options presented in the previous chapter, is there any 
relationship between them? The model suggests that there should be a relationship between 
the perception of threat and preferences for international cooperation, through stimulation 
towards international cooperation and other intervening variables. This proposition is being 
tested in this chapter. 
This chapter is composed of two major parts; one examining the first part of the model, that of 
threat perception stimulating international cooperation (TP :) IC) and secondly, that of 
international cooperation leading to preferences for international cooperation, or options 
through intervening variables that may affect the model (IC :DX:: ) OP). 
The data was analysed though the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) by using 
contingency tables for each variable under examination of the model with those variables 
which affected the dependent variable. Some correlations were analysed separately while 
others were examined with other relevant correlations to benefit the analysis. For all cases, 
however, the variable abbreviations are listed (see appendix for relevant question) along with 
the chi square value for each correlation (specifically the likelihood ratio for each relationship) 
along with the amount of degrees of freedom exhibited in the data. 
The test is based on maximum likelihood theory and is often used in the analysis of 
categorical data. Certain conditions must be met for the chi-square distribution to 
be a good 
approximation of the distribution of the statistic in the equation. The 
data, as in this study, 
must be random samples from multi-nominal distributions and the expected values must not 
be 
too small. While it has been recommended that all expected 
frequencies be at least five, 
studies indicate that this is probably too stringent and can be relaxed 
(Everitt, 1977 in Norusis, 
SPSS inc., SPSSfor Windows, p. 208). 
In addition, two other values from the data determined the analysis of 
the correlations; the 
approximate significance value (between 0 and 
1) and the C value, or the contingency 
coefficient, where the maximum value possible 
depends on the number of rows and columns. 
For the purpose of this study, the approximate significance of 
the relationship was considered, 
as well as the C value in order to discern trends or patterns 
from the contingency table, 
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Finally, it must be noted that the significance level was considered as reflective of the 
relationship between the variables in question when the value was closer to zero (for the 
purpose of the study, between 0 and 0.35). A higher value would probably mean results by 
chance, but they are also analysed to evaluate patterns or trends from the contingency table 
responses (with the assistance of the C value. ) 
Notes: Most cases correlated with TYPE (the type of respondent) are analysed in the 
frequencies chapter (7). 
Although other statistical tests can be used to provide data for such surveys, the chi 
square test along with the C value have been used extensively for analysis on 
similar projects. 
The appropriateness of the chosen scales and the statistical tests have been discussed 
with several people with a suitable statistical background. 
See Appendix Ffor the list of the abbreveations of the variables (questions), along 
with their respective question number. 
Each questionfollows the variable name in the correlation analysis following. 
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8.2 Threat Perception :D International Cooperation 
ACYP by MELOS (importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by agreement of membership in NATO and the EEC) 
Chi square: 2.12 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.672 
C=0.12701 
There seems to be a strong positive relationship between elites who felt that the Cypriot 
problem is an issue of great importance and that Greece should remain a member of the 
European Union and NATO. However, it must be noted that the question of the issue of 
Cyprus was related with Europe, not with Greece (a separate question - variable BCYP - 
relates the Cypriot issue with Greece) where the expected correlation was higher. 
Those elites who believed that Greece should continue to remain a member of NATO and the 
EC also attributed a high level of importance to the Cypriot issue for Europe. This finding 
suggests that the elites feel that Europeans and their Atlantic partners should probably shift 
their attention more closely to the specific issue of Cyprus. 
ACYP by FNRA (importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by stable relations as a reason for Greece's 
stability since 1974) 
Chi square: 22.1 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.02073 
C=0.45638 
A statistically positive relationship is presented in the correlation between the importance of 
the issue of Cyprus for Europe with the agreement of the statement that Greece has not been 
overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to Greece's stable relations with other 
Western democracies. Those elites who felt that Greece's relations with other Western 
democracies had played a positive role in Greece's security also felt that the Cypriot problem 
was an issue of some importance for Europe. This finding assumes that stable relations have 
also played a role in the unlikely event of an escalation of the Cypriot problem. The question 
specifically stated the year 1974 (the year of the invasion) and therefore does not include the 
invasion incident. Furthermore, the fact that most elites believed that stable relations secured 
Greece from another threat, assumes that stable relations with Western democracies have 
contributed to the quest of finding a solution to the issue and the containment of further 
developments on the island. 
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ACYP by NATO (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by NATO as a major component that ensured European security) 
Chi square: 8.96 with 12 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.8173 
C=0.27176 
When examining the importance of the Cypriot issue with the level of agreement of whether 
NATO is a major component that has insured European security, a statistically positive 
relationship was presented (especially from the C value). Those elites who felt that NATO 
was the major component that ensured European security also felt that the Cypriot problem 
was of some importance for Europe. This finding assumes that NATO has played a role in the 
Cypriot issue over the years as Greece and Turkey are NATO members and this has been a 
factor in the containment of military threats between the two states. 
ACYP by US (importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of the US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 7.12 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.8980 
C=0.25133 
The importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe, when correlated with the question of the 
United States continuing to be involved in European affairs demonstrated a low level of 
correlation. Those elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of some importance did not 
necessarily feel that the US should continue to play a role in European affairs. It seems likely 
that the Greek elites' opinion is that the US should not continue to play a dominant role in 
European affairs, as the United States do not seem to affect the Cypriot issue in relation to 
Europe. 
ACYP by TUR (importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations) 
Chi square: 17.62 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1583 
C=0.39635 
As expected, a strong relationship was presented in the findings from the correlation of the 
Cypriot issue importance with the statement of "NATO as a major reason for containing fears 
of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey", as both are members of NATO. Those 
elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of great 
importance for Europe also agreed 
strongly to the statement that NATO is major reason 
for containing fears of a possible conflict 
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between Greece and Turkey. This finding contradicts the results from the previous correlation 
(ACYP with US) that demonstrated a statistically negative relationship to the possibility of the 
US continuing to play a role, as NATO could be evaluated as US involvement in European 
issues. However, this contradiction can be partly explained by the assumption that Greek 
elites feel that NATO has contributed, and still can, to the issue as a security mediator, not as a 
US involvement method. 
ACYP by MEM (importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by continuing NATO membership) 
Chi square: 8.516 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00843 
C=0.40476 
A statistically positive relationship was presented in the results of the correlation of the 
importance of the Cypriot problem for Europe with the question of whether Greece should 
continue as a member of NATO. Those elites who felt that the Cypriot problem was of great 
importance or of some importance strongly felt that Greece should remain a member of 
NATO, suggesting NATO's success in European affairs in general, containment of fears 
between Greece and Turkey and also belief in NATO's future success towards a solution to the 
Cypriot issue as a problem for Europe. 
ACYP by EUDEF (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 20.79 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.3823 
C=0.41143 
As in the correlation of ACYP by US, Greek elites, when asked of the importance of the 
Cypriot problem for Europe with relation to the question of how important the US is for 
Europe's defence, demonstrated a significant relationship. The United States was not seen as 
an important factor for European defence and presented a significant relationship to the 
importance of the Cypriot problem for Europe. This contributes to the general finding of this 
study that Greek elites believe in "Europeans leading European affairs", not 
"non-Europeans 
leading European issues" 
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ACYP by MAST (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 5.493 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.43306 
C=0.24205 
As expected, those elites who believed in the importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe 
also believed in the importance of the Cypriot issue for European affairs. This relationship 
suggests that the Maastricht Treaty goals could play a role in the solution of an issue such as 
the Cypriot problem and it could be assumed that the Treaty's goals will play a significant role 
in the solution of this specific issue. If the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is seen in 
broader terms and incorporates issues such as Turkey's application to the EU, the realisation 
of the relationship of the two variables could be comprehended. 
ACYP by GMAST (Importance of the Cypriot issue for Europe by the importance of Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 6.189 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.44716 
C=0.23967 
Not such a statistically positive relationship as in the previous correlation (ACYP by MAST) 
was presented from the relationship of the Cypriot issue for Europe with the question of the 
importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. Greek elites suggest that the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union is quite important for Greece but not as much as for Europe. 
In 
relation to the importance of the Treaty's goals for Greece and the 
importance of the Cypriot 
issue for Europe, elites presented a positive relationship. Those who felt that the issue was 
important for Europe also felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for 
Greek 
affairs. This in turn suggests that Greek elites feel that the 
Treaty can play a positive role in 
the solution to the problem of Cyprus for European affairs. 
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AALB by EUDEF 
European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BALB by EUDEF 
for European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
Test of the Model - TP 0 IC :DX :D Op 
(Importance of Albanian refugees as a threat to Europe by level of importance of US for 
20.98813 with 18 degrees of freedom 
0.41371 
0.41371 
(Importance of Albanian refugees as a threat to Greece by level of importance of the US 
16.12936 with 18 degrees of freedom 
0.56453 
0.39448 
The levels of importance of the Albanian refugees as a problem for Greece and for Europe 
were correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and rather 
statistically weak relationships were presented. Although, as expected, the importance was 
different for Greece compared to the results for Europe (more important for Greece), the 
correlations did not point in any specific direction. Most elites who felt that the Albanian 
issue was of some importance for Greece also felt that the US was important for Europe's 
defence (40%) suggesting that Greece would applaud US involvement and assistance in the 
region. However, from the contingency table of Albania as a threat for Europe with the level 
of importance of the United States for Europe's defence, the responses were distributed quite 
equally throughout the table suggesting the uncertainty of Albania as a threat for Europe 
questioning whether US assistance was required. The perception of Albania as a threat seems 
unclear in both cases and this creates problems for the model. 
AALB by FNRA 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 15.17258 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.23278 
C=0.38522 
BALB by FNRA 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 18.27567 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.12115 
C=0.41040 
As in the previous correlation, the Albanian threat was felt as more important 
for Greece than 
for Europe, despite agreement to the statement that stable relations with other Western 
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democracies have contributed to Greece's security since 1974. The assumption that what or 
who one state may sense as a threat may not be perceived by other states creates problems in 
the clarity of threat perception and in the workability of the model of this thesis. However, this 
uncertainty reflects the problem Europeans are facing in trying to perceive a threat and 
adjusting or forming an option to deter it. The dependent variable (option) would not be clear 
in this situation unless specific threats are identified for Greece and for the Continent. The 
model suggests the importance of threat perception as a major requirement towards an option 
for security: The absence of clear threat perception will not stimulate international cooperation 
and this will not lead to an option for security JP o IC :z OP) 
AALB by GMAST 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BALB by GMAST 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
AALB by MAST 
for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BALB by MAST 
for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of 
1.41654 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.96385 
0.12449 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of 
3.36685 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.74120 
0.19403 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht 
15.82779 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.00560 
0.40889 
(The importance of Nbania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht 
2.37728 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.91658 
0.14865 
As expected, from the contingency tables of the above correlations, 
Albania is seen as a threat 
for Greece more than it is for Europe while in all cases, the 
Maastricht treaty is seen as 
important for Greece and for Europe. Greek elites feel that Albania is a consideration taken 
more seriously by Greece as a threat, logically 
due to the state's geographical position in the 
Balkans and feel that the goals of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union can assist Greece's 
status and security concerns. The 
"threat" of Albania should be seen in relation to the state's 
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growing problems on the path towards democratic reform, the uncertain relations with the 
Greek minority in Southern Albania (Vorios Epirus) and the growing number of refugees in 
mainland Greece creating economic problems, corruption and unemployment. Furthermore, 
Albanian minorities are situated in the region of Skopje and this is creating further tension as 
the process of trying to adopt the name "Macedonia" now involves Albanians as well. The 
Maastricht Treaty's importance is reflected in the results of the data and seems to contribute to 
Greece's security concerns as it calls for closer union among EC members, the WEU 
"reactivation" in 1996 and, when seen Maastricht), as an interdependent and collective 
European effort, Greek elites welcome the agreement and expect some sort of understanding 
and assistance towards Albania through the EC platform. 
AALB by MELOS 
EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BALB by MELOS 
EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in the 
5.79615 with 3 degrees of freedom 
0.09402 
0.25751 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in the 
6.91275 with 3 degrees of freedom 
0.00007 
0.44356 
As expected, those elites who felt that Albania is an important concern for Greece's security 
also felt that Greece should continue its membership in NATO and the EC, presenting a 
statistically high significance level. However, when continuing membership in both 
institutions was correlated with the importance of Albania as a concern for Europe, the 
importance was lower, and a high level of significance was also presented. The findings from 
this contingency table reflect the differences in opinion of a certain concern for a specific state 
and for the European Continent. Greek elites seem to be aware of the importance of 
remaining in both institutions which could assist in deterring such threats. It is essential to 
note, however, that this specific threat (Albania) may not be on the top of these institutions' 
agenda, as it might be for Greece, and, based on this assumption, this perception of threat 
(Albania), cannot easily stimulate international cooperation or become the reason to base an 
option on. The Yugoslav crisis is a relevant example to support this assumption as it 
is a 
concern for Greece, because of the possible spill-over effect 
it might have in the Balkans, and 
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for Europe, as NATO has taken a stand and the EC has debated, and is still debating, the 
problem. Because of the importance this issue possesses for both Greece and Europe, it Is 
likely to stimulate international cooperation (as it has through NATO, the UN and between 
states by trying to find a diplomatic approach to deter escalation) and this in turn may lead to 
an option, or how to deal with it (air strikes etc. ) 
AALB by NATO (The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by NATO as a component that has 
ensured European stability) 
Chi square: 10.41968 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.69836 
C=0.30081 
BALB by NATO (The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by NATO as a component that has 
ensured European stability) 
Chi square: 15.53317 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.25853 
C=0.37465 
As in the previous correlation, a statistically higher significance level was presented when the 
statement for NATO was correlated with the importance of Albania for Greece than for 
Europe. Approximately 60 responses favoured agreement to the statement that NATO is a 
major component that has ensured European stability and felt that Albania is a concern for 
Greece as a problem that may arise. Despite agreement to the statement concerning NATO in 
the correlation that questioned Albania as a threat for Europe, responses reflected a low level 
of importance of Albania as a threat for the Continent. It is assumed that it is not likely for 
NATO to organise itself around this threat as its importance is not common for both state 
(Greece) and Continent. However, the model holds, especially in the case for Greece, as a 
concern is perceived and international cooperation is sought (NATO). 
BALB by TUR 
Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
AALB by TUR 
Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - 
16.16847 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.05270 
0.44378 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - 
23.33571 with 12 degrees of freedom 
C=0.10245 
0.42037 
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Statistically high significance levels were presented form the correlations of the importance of 
Albania as a concern for Greece and for Europe by the statement of NATO as a major 
component that has contained fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict. In the case for 
Greece, those elites who felt that NATO has served as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations 
also felt that Albania is a concern for Greece (60 responses). This suggests a belief by Greek 
elites that the same way NATO has provided security in relations with Turkey (as both are 
NATO members), NATO can serve as a mechanism that can secure Greece from other types of 
threats such as Albania, even though Albania is not a member of NATO. Again, Albania is 
not seen as a major concern for Europe when NATO's success in containing fears of a possible 
conflict between Greece and Turkey was reflected. In the case for Greece, the model still 
holds. 
AALB by US 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BALB by US 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Europe by the level of importance of the US for 
16.29595 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.31884 
0.36372 
(The importance of Albania as a threat for Greece by the level of importance of the US for 
17.52702 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.18248 
0.39236 
A significant level of uncertainty was reflected from the correlation of Albania as a concern 
for 
Europe by the level of importance of the US for European affairs. The contingency table 
responses did not point in any specific direction suggesting the concern one of minor 
importance for Europe and the US as a fading support 
for European issues. The data were 
clearer in the case for Greece although the US's 
importance was not felt as essential for 
European affairs. The questions of the US's importance 
in European affairs is consistent 
throughout the study, suggesting a fading necessity for US 
involvement in European affairs in 
general, In the case for Greece specifically, 
it is assumed from the responses given by Greek 
elites, that the US is not seen as a force 
in need, in relation to the Albanian concern. 
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ANNZ by EUDEF 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 19.45346 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.50950 
C=0.39505 
BNNZ by EUDEF 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 14.63946 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.76176 
C=0.36278 
Statistically low significance levels were presented from the results of the correlation of the 
importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and for Greece with the 
importance of the US for European defence. The responses did not point in any specific 
direction from the contingency table suggesting uncertainty and ambiguity as to the level of 
importance of the Neo-Nazi movement and the importance of the US for European defence. 
This may suggest that the US, as a force should not be concerned with such threats, or at least 
should not base itself around such a threat. Similar findings were presented from the 
correlation of the movement with the importance of the US for European affairs (ANNZ / 
BNNZ by US: Significance ANNZ by US: 0.63566, Significance BNNZ by US: 
0.70520). 
ANNZ by MELOS 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in the 
EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 2.07927 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.68149 
C=0.12613 
BNNZ by MELOS 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by continuing membership of Greece in the 
EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 1.23189 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.83448 
C=0.09797 
In both of the above correlations, continuing membership for Greece in the EC and NATO was 
expressed but the Neo-Nazi movement was not seen as an 
important concern (for Greece 
especially) presenting low levels of significance but 
high C values, reflecting a direction in the 
contingency tables of the variables. In the case of the movement as a concern 
for Europe, 
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Greek elites felt that it is a concern for the Continent and that Greece should remain as a 
member in both institutions (68 responses). As in the concern of Albania as an issue of 
importance for Greece, the Neo-Nazi movement is seen more as a concern for Europe than for 
Greece and this non-uniformity in threat perceptions is a reflection of the absence of clear 
threat perception for Europe, as well as the difference in perceptions of threat between state 
and Continent, identified in the literature review (chapter 4). International cooperation is 
somewhat stimulated by threat perceptions or concerns, but options cannot be based on these 
as they may not be concerns for other states. It becomes apparent through the analysis of 
these results that only when threat perception is clear (having in mind the situation in the Cold 
War era) and uniform, can Europeans more easily agree to an appropriate option to confront it. 
ANNZbyFNRA 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by stable relations as a major component 
that assisted Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 9.64023 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.49084 
C= 0.33595 
BNNZbyFNRA 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by stable relations as a major component 
that assisted Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 20.01833 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.19813 
C=0.39069 
The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and 
for Greece was 
correlated with the statement of Greece's stable relations as a component that 
has assisted its 
security since 1974. The results presented - in the case of 
Greece -a statistically high 
significance level. Opinions varied for both cases, however, suggesting 
that stable relations 
cannot - or should not - provide as a 
deterrent against the Neo-Nazi movement. Judging by 
the character of the movement around Europe, this seems a 
logical suggestion, as the 
movement is more like a terrorist organisation than an actual military 
threat for the Continent's 
or Greece's security concerns. 
ANNZ by MAST 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern 
for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for 
Europe) 
Chi square: 5.55260 with 6 degrees of 
freedom 
Significance: 0.51664 
C=0.22925 
177 
Chapter Eight Test of the Model - TP :Z IC :ZX: Z OP 
BNNZ by MAST 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 9.50393 with 6 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.17102 
C=0.30221 
ANNZ by GMAST 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 3.20629 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.85232 
C=0.16532 
BNNZ by GMAST 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for 
Greece) 
Chi square: 6.19574 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.59080 
C=0.22141 
The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe and for Greece was 
correlated with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe and both 
correlations presented statistically low levels of significance. Most elites who felt that the 
Maastricht Treaty is important for Greece and for Europe felt rather ambiguous as to the 
importance of the Neo-Nazi movement. This suggests that the Maastricht Treaty is not seen 
as a step that could or should contribute towards the issue of the Neo-Nazi movement as a 
concern. Despite the low levels of importance of the movement, international cooperation is 
still exhibited, reinforcing the model. 
BNNZ by NATO 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Greece by the statement of NATO as a component 
that ensured European security) 
Chi square: 15.34274 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.32181 
C=0.36321 
ANNZ by NATO 
(The importance of the Neo-Nazi movement as a concern for Europe by the statement of NATO as a component 
that ensured European security) 
Chi square: 9.88837 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.67082 
C=0.30111 
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Most responses from the Greek elites who felt that NATO is a component that ensured 
European security, demonstrated a level of uncertainty to the question of the level of 
importance of the Neo-Nazi movement for Greece and for Europe. Greek elites who agreed to 
the statement of NATO felt that the movement was more important for Europe than for 
Greece. The assumption in this case is that NATO has been successful in securing Europe 
and in deterring a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey (ANNZ by TUR - BNNZ by 
TUR), but should not be organised or based on this specific threat. International cooperation 
is sought, but due to the lack of clear identifiable threat perception, it is difficult to achieve or 
reach an option for European defence based on the model. (Values for movement by NATO as 
a deterrent: * For Greece: BNNZ by TUR, Chi square: 10.56834 with 12 degrees of 
freedom, Significance 0.49552, C=0.34380; * For Europe: ANNZ by TUR, Chi square: 
6.61319 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance 0.88122, C=0.26326) 
AGERU by EUDEF 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 28.9311 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.11409 
C=0.46323 
BGERU by EUDEF 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 26.63956 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.09950 
C=0.47765 
AGERU by US 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of the 
US for European 
affairs) 
Chi square: 2.39388 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.99861 
C=0.15742 
BGERU by US 
(The importance of German unification as aconcern for Greece 
by the level of importance of the US for European 
affairs) 
Chi square: 8.25622 with 12 degrees of 
freedom 
Significance: 0.84711 
C=0.27424 
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The level of importance of German unification as a concern for Greece and for Europe was 
correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and European affairs. 
Statistically high levels of relationship were presented in the correlations that related to 
European defence. Most responses were equally distributed in the contingency table when 
responding to the importance of the concern for Greece and for Europe, while most elites felt 
that the US is important for European defence, but not so much so for European affairs. 
These findings suggest the importance of the US being involved in European defence matters 
relating to Germany, as has been the case since 1949 with the formation of NATO. Germany 
has been a concern since 1949 and has been partly contained through American involvement in 
the former West Germany. If one relates German unification with the Neo-Nazi movement 
and the state's economic potential, a possible threat could be perceived, but not one that an 
organisation can (as seen through the literature review), organise itself around. 
AGERU by MAST 
Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BGERU by MAST 
Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of 
2.77654 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.86353 
0.16232 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of 
3.70187 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.76764 
0.189,66 
AGERU by GMAST (The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by the level of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 5.79702 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.58599 
C=0.18966 
BGERU by GMAST (The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by the level of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 1.584 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.95485 
C=0.13158 
The level of importance of German unitication as a concern 
for Greece and for Europe was 
correlated with the importance of the 
Treaty of Maastricht on European Union for Greece and 
for Europe, presenting statistically high levels of significance. 
German unification was not 
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seen as an important concern for Greece or for Europe despite the Treaty on European Union 
seen as an important step for the Continent and for Greece specifically. It is assumed that 
Greek elites do not feel that the Maastricht Treaty (or, subsequently, the EC) should take into 
consideration German unification as Germany is a member and economic partnership limits 
the threat or the possibility of a state turning against its partners. German unification is again 
not a clear concern, or a uniform concern, despite international cooperation stimulation. 
AGERU by MELOS 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by Greece remaining a member of the EEC and 
NATO) 
Chi square: 2.18773 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.68059 
C=0.12629 
BGERU by MELOS 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by Greece remaining a member of the EEC and 
NATO) 
Chi square: 1.18327 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.87205 
C=0.08914 
From the contingency tables presented from the results of the above correlations, a large 
number of Greek elites (62 responses) who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO 
and the EC felt that Germany is a concern for Europe (38 responses as a concern for Europe). 
The assumption in this case is that Greek elites may feel that Germany could be contained 
through their membership in NATO and the EC based on the assumption that members of any 
institution are not likely to turn against other members. Europe includes Greece and, 
considering this, the model holds as a perception of threat has stimulated and called for 
international cooperation (by remaining members of NATO and the EQ. 
AGERU by NATO 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by NATO as a component that has secured 
European security) 
Chi square: 13.18231 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.41508 
C=0.34123 
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BGERU by NATO 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by NATO as a component that has secured European security) 
Chi square: 22.68776 with 12 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.06031 
C=0.43161 
The importance of Germany as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated with the 
statement of NATO as a major component that ensured European security. A statistically high 
level of significance was presented in the case of Greece while a low level (of significance) 
was presented for Europe. From the responses in the contingency tables, those elites who felt 
that NATO is a major component that ensured European security felt that German unification 
is more of a concern for Europe than for Greece. NATO's success over the years has been the 
containment of West Germany, especially between 1949 and 1960. It is essential, therefore, 
as presented from the data, that NATO continues to exist and provides continuing European 
security. Germany may not be seen as a major threat for Europe or for Greece as reflected in 
the results, but international cooperation and options are chosen demonstrating the need to find 
an appropriate solution to the defence dilemma. 
AGERU by FNRA 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by stable relations of Greece with other Western 
democracies as a reason that assisted Greece's security concerns since 1974) 
Chi square: 10.27229 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.75914 
C=0.29100 
BGERU by FNRA 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by stable relations of Greece with other Western 
democracies as a reason that assisted Greece's security concerns since 1974) 
Chi square: 9.36368 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.75686 
C=0.29600 
The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece and for Europe was correlated 
with the statement of stable relations playing a role for Greece's security since 1974 as it has 
not been overtly threatened by any state since then. The significance levels from the above 
two correlations were low and no statistically significant relationship was presented from the 
contingency tables. German unification was seen mostly as a concern 
for Europe while elites 
felt that stable relations had played a beneficial role for Greece's security since 
1974. It could 
be suggested that stable relations could most probably contain the possibility of a 
German 
threat arising, as the EC and NATO could be seen as examples of 
"stable relations" through 
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their platforms of individual states. Stable relations means international cooperation and 
therefore, the perception of a security concern such as that of Germany reinforces the model. 
AGERU by TUR 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - relations) 
Chi square: 18.21824 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.26743 
C=0.37476 
BGERU by TUR 
(The importance of German unification as a concern for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - 
relations) 
Chi square: 20.61933 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.18922 
C=0.18922 
Turkish 
Turkish 
The importance of German unification as a concern for Europe and for Greece was correlated 
with the statement of NATO playing a role in containing possible fears of a Greaco - Turkish 
conflict as both are NATO members. Statistically high levels of significance were presented. 
Those elites who felt that NATO has played a somewhat important role in containing fears of a 
possible, Greaco - Turkish conflict felt that German unification does not pose an important 
concern for Greece or for Europe. However, as NATO's success in securing Greece could be 
implied in this case (more than half of the responses agreed with the statement), NATO could 
be seen as a deterring factor in Greek - German relations. 
BSU by EUDEF 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of 
the US for Europe defence) 
Chi square: 12.64953 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.61052 
C=0.38768 
ASU by EUDEF 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of 
the US for Europe defence) 
Chi square: 20.04454 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.15875 
C=0.39079 
ASU by US 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern 
for Europe by the level of importance of 
the US in Europe affairs) 
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Chi square: 2.97998 with 8 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.93243 
C=0.17764 
BSU by US 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of the US in Europe affairs) 
Chi square: 6.22 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: '0.92756 
C=0.24661 
The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece and for 
Europe was correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and 
European affairs. More than half of the respondents who felt that the break-up of the former 
Soviet Union is a concern for Europe also felt, as expected, that the US is important for 
European defence. However, the former Soviet Union was not seen as a major concern for 
Greece despite 55 respondents feeling that the US was still important for European defence. 
These findings suggest a difference in opinion as to the specific concern for the Continent, and 
for Greece, reinforcing the discussion in the literature review about the lack of clear threat 
perception. 
Significance levels were low in the correlations of the importance of the break-up of the 
former Soviet Union for Greece and for Europe with the level of importance of the US for 
European affairs. The concern was not clear and the importance of the US was un-clear for 
European affairs. 
ASU by FNRA 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by stable relations as a 
component that assisted in Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 10.94101 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.30260 
C=0.30886 
BSU by FNRA 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by stable relations as a 
component that assisted in Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 17.27905 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.38230 
C=0.38230 
The break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern was seen as more important for Europe 
than for Greece by Greek elites despite more than half of the sample feeling that stable 
relations did play a role in Greece's security concerns since 
1974. This was particularly 
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evident in the correlation of the concern for Europe (ASU by FNRA). International 
cooperation is seen here as quite essential for Greece despite the minor importance of the 
specific concern 
ASU by MAST 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 12.34680 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01101 
C=0.34923 
BSU by MAST 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 5.93276 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.57917 
C=0.22340 
ASU by GMAST 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 3.34532 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.39735 
C= 0.20358 
BSU by GMAST 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 3.44029 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.83626 
C= 0.17301 
From the correlations concerning the level of importance of the former Soviet Union with the 
importance of the Maastricht Treaty, those correlations related with Europe presented 
statistically significant values. Those elites who felt that the former Soviet Union is an 
important concern for Europe also felt that the Maastricht Treaty is important for Europe, 
suggesting that Maastricht is an important step towards European Union and could help 
through its interdependent nature to promote international cooperation and handle concerns 
such as that of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The importance of Maastricht for 
Greece and for Europe was high throughout, but the level of importance of the specific 
concerns fluctuated. 
ASU by MELOS 
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(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EEC) 
Chi square: 3.68973 with 2 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.05905 
C=0.23949 
BSU by MELOS 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greeceby continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EEC) 
Chi square: 1.03441 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: C=0.88858 
C=0.08411 
Those elites who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is an important concern for 
Europe also felt that Greece should remain as a member of the EC and NATO. Again, the 
former Soviet Union is seen as a concern that would affect the Continent more than Greece 
specifically, whereas NATO and the EC are seen as essential for Greece. Continuing 
membership is reflected in the data and it is assumed that Greek elites feel that their 
membership can secure their state from such concerns, as the continuing membership can 
probably secure them as well. This finding is more evident from the correlation of the 
concern of the former Soviet Union with continuing membership in NATO (ASU by MEM, 
Chi square: 7.30699 with 4 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00923, C-0.36606). 
Seventy-nine of the respondents who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is 
important for Europe as a concern, also favoured Greece's continuing membership in NATO. 
ASU by NATO 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Europe by NATO as a component 
that has ensured European security) 
Chi square: 10.23116 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.33259 
C=0.29733 
BSU by NATO 
(The importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union as a concern for Greece by NATO as a component 
that has ensured European security) 
Chi square: 20.63552 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.06763 
C=0.42615 
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Sixty-four respondents who felt that the break-up of the former Soviet Union is an important 
concern for Europe also felt that NATO has been a component that ensured European security. 
This indicates NATO's success over the years as it is assumed that Greek elites feel that NATO 
is an essentia mechanism for Europe's security. As NATO was formed in 1949 to deter the 
Soviet Union's expansion, it now faces no clear threat from the former Soviet empire, but its 
current requirement is reflected in the data. NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations was also correlated with the importance of the break-up of the former Soviet Union 
for Europe (ASU) and for Greece (BSU): ASU by TUR, Chi square: 14.30378 with 8 
degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.21296, C=0.32904; BSU by TUR, Chi square: 9.36982 
with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.72445, C=0.30544. As in the previous 
correlation, Greek elites felt that Europe should be more, or is more concerned about the 
former Soviet Union than Greece, while agreed with NATO's success in containing fears of a 
possible Greaco - Turkish conflict. 
RUSS by EUDEF (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by importance of US for European defence) 
Chi square: 60.167 with 36 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0227 
C=0.59722 
As expected, a statistically high relationship was presented from the correlation of the 
importance and seriousness of Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the importance of 
the United States in European affairs. Those elites who felt that Russia was a serious threat 
for Europe after the break-up of the former Soviet Union also felt that the United States was 
important in European affairs. It is suggested that the Greek elites feel that a Russian threat 
could better be looked upon and dealt with, with the help of the United States. 
RUSS by FNRA (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by NATO as a deterrent for Greece and Turkey) 
Chi square: 23.616 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.6487 
C=0.42224 
A statistically significant relationship was presented from the results of the seriousness of 
Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the statement that Greece had not been overtly 
threatened since 1974 due to the state's stable relationship with other Western democracies. 
The majority of elites who believed in the importance of stable relations were divided in their 
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levels of importance attributed to the Russian threat. This may be due to the uncertainty of the 
form of possible threats for the 1990s and reinforces the lack of clear threat perception 
discussed in the literature review. 
RUSS by GMAST (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by importance of Maastricht for Greece) Chi square: 21.693 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0154 
C=0.44622 
The correlation between Russia as a threat to Europe's security with the importance of the 
Treaty of Maastricht for Greece were rather high and in the expected direction. Those elites 
who felt that the Treaty on European Union was of some importance or great importance also 
felt that Russia was a somewhat serious threat for Europe's security. This demonstrates the 
important role of the European Union in European affairs as well as for Greece. Agreement to 
the terms of the Maastricht Treaty could help in the quest for European defence and 
specifically, in this case, in the perception of Russia as a threat and how this threat could be 
dealt with. 
RUSS by MAST (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by the importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 15.517 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1818 
C=0.37346 
Turning to the correlation of Russia's seriousness as a threat to Europe's security with the level 
of importance of the treaty of Maastricht for Europe, a statistically high relationship is 
presented. Those elites who felt that the Treaty on European Union is quite important also felt 
that Russia should be seen as a serious threat. The Maastricht Treaty deals with various issues 
and ideas and Greek elites seem aware of the positive effects the Treaty could provide in terms 
of dealing with Russia as a serious threat for Europe. Furthermore, if the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union is seen in a broader context, it encompasses the whole vision of the European 
Union, and suggests that how such threats are dealt with, or the identification of others, could 
be a matter for all EC partners in the future and this would be a positive move in the 
identification process of threats such as Russia. 
RUSS with MELOS (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by continuing membership in the EEC and 
NATO) 
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Chi square: 7.0278 with 6 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.04312 
C=0.34063 
From the examination of the relationship between Russia as a serious threat to Europe's 
security and the question of whether Greece should continue to remain a member of the EC 
and NATO, the relationship was statistically high. Those elites who felt Greece should 
remain as members (98%) also felt that Russia is a serious threat to Europe's security. These 
mechanisms (EC, NATO) are seen by Greek elites as determining factors and of great 
importance in relation to the threat of Russia. It could be suggested that the EC and NATO 
could play a positive role, in Greek elites' opinion, in dealing with the Russian threat. 
RUSS by MEM (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by continuing membership in NATO) 
Chi square: 10.2404 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00606 
C=0.47925 
Through the examination of the correlation between the level of seriousness of Russia as a 
threat to Europe's security with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of 
NATO (only), the results demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with the majority 
of the sample which felt that Russia is a serious threat suggesting that Greece should remain a 
member of NATO. Again, NATO's success is suggested and NATO's continuation as 
essential when dealing with the possible Russian threat. 
RUSS by NATO (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by NATO as a component in ensuring European 
stability) 
Chi square: 28.84 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00350 
C=0.56482 
As expected, a statistically high level of relatioship was presented from the data of the question 
of the level of seriousness of the Russian threat for Europe's security and the statement that 
NATO has been a major component in ensuring European stability. Those elites who felt that 
NATO had been a major component that ensured military stability also felt that Russia should 
be seen as a somewhat serious threat. This finding suggests NATO's success and the 
mechanism's new areas of interest, one of them being the 
Russian threat. It is most likely that 
Greek elites would prefer NATO handling the Russian issue rather than any other 
institution. 
NATO's new Partnership For Peace (PEP) plan discussed 
in Chapter 4 could be seen as a 
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method to deter Eastern European uprisings against the West as well as a deterrence method 
against one another. 
RUSS by TYPE (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by type of respondent) Chi square: 24.385 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.30871 
C=0.41194 
Correlation analysis between the types of respondents and the seriousness of the Russian threat 
for Europe presented a somewhat statistically significant relationship, as the majority of all 
respondents felt that the Russian threat was quite serious. This demonstrates the identification 
of Russia as a threat by all types if respondents which makes Russia a possible matter of 
consideration for Greek elites for the future. 
RUSS by US (Level of seriousness of Russian threat by level of importance of the US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 38.35 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.08248 
C=0.50630 
When examining the correlation between the level of seriousness of the Russian threat to 
Europe with the question of whether the United States should continue to play a role in 
European affairs, the relationship presented was rather statistically significant. Those elites 
who felt that the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs also felt that 
Russia was a serious threat. However, those who felt that Russia was not a very serious threat 
for Europe, disagreed with US involvement. The correlation is pointing in two directions, 
both fitting the expectations of the model. Identifying a threat is the first step towards 
international cooperation. In this correlation, one group agrees and one does not. 
SNUC by EUDEF 
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 35.96 with 36 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.4745 
C=0.5157 
When examining the correlation between the seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear 
arsenal with the importance of the United States for European 
defence, the relationship 
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presented was statistically lower than expected. No clear relationship is discernible, as despite 
the fact that a great majority felt the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal a threat for Europe, 
the sample's opinions on the importance of the United States in Europe were not uniform. 
However, this contradiction reinforces the defence dilemma of Europe discussed in the 
literature review (chapter 3). It is assumed that there exists a dilemma in whether the US 
should be a protagonist in European defence due to the existence of the Soviet's nuclear 
arsenal or not. 
SNUC by FNRA 
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by stable relations as a reason for Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 29.5401 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.3421 
C=0.46317 
The relationship between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal 
with the statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due 
to the state's stable relationship with other Western democracies, was statistically rather high 
and pointed in the expected direction. The results suggest that those elites who felt that the 
nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union posed a serious threat to Europe also felt that 
stable relations with other Western democracies was a major reason for Greece's security since 
1974. This in turn suggests that continuing stable relations with Western democracies can 
help limit the perception of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal as a threat. 
SNUC by GMAST (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 18.23 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.03434 
A statistically high level of significance is presented from the data of the correlation between 
the seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and the importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty for Greece. As expected, those elites who felt that the Maastricht Treaty on 
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European Union was important also felt the nuclear threat of the new Soviet republics as rather 
serious. Threats such as this one, if perceived, stimulate international cooperation. This 
statement could be comprehended by the two variables analysed. A specific threat could be 
better dealt with through common efforts (SNUC by GMAST). 
SNUC by MAST (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 17.332 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.17462 
C=0.37512 
As in the previous correlation, the nuclear threat of the former Soviet Union was seen as 
serious and the Maastricht Treaty was seen as important. Those elites who felt the seriousness 
of the threat also felt the importance of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, in this case 
for Europe. Again, this finding supports the model; a threat is perceived and collective efforts 
are required. 
SNUC by MELOS (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by continuing 
membership in NATO and the EEC) 
Chi square: 6.67132 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0496 
C=0.33613 
As expected, those elites who believed in the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's 
nuclear arsenal for Europe, also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the 
EC. The model is reinforced. A threat stimulates international cooperation and Greek elites 
point in that direction. NATO and the EC are mechanisms which could be used for the 
deterrence of future threats. 
SNUC by MEM (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by continuing membership 
in membership) 
Chi square: 11.0867 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00207 
C=0.49917 
Turning specifically to the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO 
alone, the expected relationship with the level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's 
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nuclear threat is presented. Those elites who felt the threat serious also felt that Greece should 
remain a member of NATO; the perception of a threat stimulating international cooperation. 
SNUC by NATO 
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by NATO as a major component for European 
stability) 
Chi square: 43.762 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0001 
C=0.62847 
As expected, the level of correlation was statistically high when examining the question of the 
level of seriousness of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal with the statement that 
NATO was a major component that ensured European stability. Those who believed the 
threat as serious also believed in NATO's success in European security. This statement gives 
NATO new responsibilities, and Greek elites seem to agree to continue as part of NATO. The 
mechanism suggests US involvement in European defence, but under NATO's umbrella. 
When the nuclear threat of the former Soviet Union was correlated with the importance of the 
US in European defence, the significance level was lower, suggesting continuing US support 
for Europe, but under leadership which possibly incorporates the Europeans as well. 
SNUC by TUR 
(Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by NATO as deterrent for Greek and Turkish 
confrontation) 
Chi square: 47.2098 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00029 
C=0.60624 
When examining the relationship between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet's 
nuclear arsenal with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for the containment of a 
possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, the statistical level of correlation was rather 
high. Those who believed in NATO's success in Greaco - Turkish relations felt the Soviet 
nuclear threat as more serious. Greek elites seem to recognise NATO's success and realise its 
importance in future areas of threat perception such as the new Republics of the former Soviet 
Union which possess nuclear weapons. 
SNUC by US (Level of seriousness of former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal by level of importance of the 
US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 32.857 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.18907 
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As expected, the relationship presented between the level of seriousness of the former Soviet 
Union's nuclear threat with the level of importance of the United States in European affairs 
pointed in the expected direction. Those elites who felt the threat was more serious also felt 
that the United States should continue to play a role in European affairs. Outside assistance is 
presented in this case and sought, in order to help with how a specific threat is dealt with. 
EXTT by EUDEF 
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by the level of importance of US for European defence) 
Chi square: 43.3601 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00006 
C=0.61651 
A statistically strong relationship was presented from the correlation of the level of agreement 
to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration with the level of 
importance of the United States for European defence. Those elites who felt that external 
threats such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 should be taken into consideration also felt 
that the United States were quite important for European defence. Again, a threat was 
presented and international cooperation sought, reinforcing the model. 
EXTT by FNRA 
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by stable relations as an important factor for 
Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 30.318 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00374 
C=0.51990 
A statistically high level of relationship was presented between the agreement to the statement 
that external threats required close examination as such threats may arise in European affairs, 
with the statement of Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to 
the state's stable relations with Western democracies. Those who agreed that external threats 
must be taken into consideration also agreed to the positive role played by Greece's stable 
relations with other democracies. International cooperation is sought probably as a means of 
avoiding being threatened, reinforcing the model. The sample seems to believe that external 
threats could be dealt with by cooperating internationally. 
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EXTT by GMAST (Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 14.110 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0867 
C=0.34995 
Another example of a threat stimulating international cooperation is presented by these two 
variables in the above correlations (EXTT, MELOS). Those elites who felt that external 
threats, such as the Gulf War, should be taken into consideration as such threats may arise in 
European affairs, felt that the Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe (EXTT by 
MAST, Chi square: 12.78 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.1853, C=0.34995) is 
of great importance. This correlation reinforces the first part of the model as an assumed 
threat stimulates international cooperation, in this case the EU through the Maastricht Treaty. 
EXTT by MELOS 
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in the EEC and 
NATO) 
Chi square: 9.6822 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.57719 
A statistically high positive relationship is presented from the correlation between the level of 
agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken into consideration with the 
question of Greece remaining a member of the EC and NATO. Uniformly, those elites that 
felt that external threats should be taken consideration in the quest for a solution to European 
defence, felt that Greece should remain a member of the EC and NATO. Mechanisms such as 
NATO and the EC are interdependent and collective in nature, and could be stimulated when 
such a threat is perceived. 
EXTT by MEM (Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by continuing membership of 
Greece in NATO) 
Chi square: 18.224 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.75503 
A rather similar finding was presented when correlating 
the relationship between the level of 
agreement to the statement that external threats should 
be taken into consideration in the quest 
for European security with the question of whether 
Greece should continue as a member of 
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NATO alone. The finding pointed in the expected direction and fits the model. Those elites 
who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO also felt that external, out-of-area 
threats should be taken into consideration. This demonstrates the changing character of threat 
perception for the 1990s as well as NATO's new areas of interest, as discussed in the review of 
the literature. 
EXTT by NATO 
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by NATO as a component that ensured European 
stability) 
Chi square: 36.2111 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.60256 
A statistically high relationship was presented when the correlation between the above 
variables was examined (EXTT by NATO). Those elites who believed that NATO has been a 
major component that has ensured European stability, also believed that out-of-area threats 
should be taken into consideration in quest for European security. NATO's success is 
presented as well as the assumed need to preserve the structure in order to continue to have 
success in the area of European security. It is implied that NATO can be the mechanism to 
deal with these out-of-area threats since it has been successful over the years. 
EXTT by TUR 
(Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by NATO as a major component deterring a possible 
Greaco-Turkish conflict) 
Chi square: 29.269 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00128 
C=0.53910 
A statistically high level of significance was presented from the data between the statement 
that NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Turkey 
and Greece and the level of agreement to the statement that external threats should be taken 
into consideration as such threats may arise in European affairs. Those elites who believed in 
this specific success of NATO also felt that external threats should be taken into consideration. 
Greece and Turkey, however, are not external threats, but it could be assumed that NATO or 
states such as Greece and Turkey should deal with external threats. 
EXTT by US (Level of importance of external threat perception for Europe by level of importance of US for 
European affairs) 
196 
Chapter Eight Test of the Model - TP :D IC :DX :D OP 
Chi square: 25.602 with 16 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.00243 
C=0.42764 
A statistically high positive relationship was presented from the correlation between the 
attention to external threats for Europe and the question of whether the United States should 
continue to play a role in European affairs. Those elites who felt that Europe should be 
concerned with out-of-area threats also felt, however not overwhelmingly, that the US should 
continue to play a role in European affairs. This finding also implies international cooperation 
stimulated by a perceived, or an assumed, threat. 
AMAC by EUDEF (Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by level of importance of US 
for European defence) 
Chi square: 20.323 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.27755 
C=0.42764 
Turning to the importance of the Macedonian issue for Greek elites when relating the issue to 
Europe, the results were expected when correlating the problem with the importance of the 
United States in European defence issues. Those elites that felt the Macedonian issue as 
important for Europe, felt that the US was important in Europe's defence. However, when 
correlating the importance of the Macedonian issue for Europe with the continuing US 
influence in European affairs, the relationship was slightly more pronounced (AMAC by US, 
Chi square: 30.70 with 12 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00213). Those elites that felt 
that the issue was important for Europe also felt that the US should continue to play a role in 
European issues. 
When focusing on the correlation of the Macedonian issue for Grcccc with the importance of 
the US for European defence, the statistical significance level was higher (BMAC by 
EUDEF, Chi square: 14.90 with 18 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0856). Those elites 
who felt that the issue was of great importance also felt strongly about the United State's role 
in European defence. This result suggests that Greek elites believe that the US is more 
important when relating the Macedonian issue with Greece than 
for Europe. The Greek 
government has spoken to US counterparts about the 
issue and are expecting help (Eleftheros 
Typos Newspaper, March 1994), and this reinforces this finding. 
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AMAC by GMAST 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by the level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 6.931 with 6 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.3472 
C=0.25708 
AMAC by MAST 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by the level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 6.66 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.3744 
C=0.25220 
As expected, those elites who felt that the Macedonian issue is important for Europe also felt 
that the Maastricht Treaty is important for Europe in general and for Greece specifically. 
Greek elites may feel that the European Union can help towards a solution to the Macedonian 
issue. In addition, the Macedonian issue, if seen as a threat to Greece or to European unity, 
can be used as a stimulus towards international cooperation, reinforcing the model. 
AMAC by MELOS 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by agreement in continuing membership for Greece in the 
EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 5.637 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0468 
C=0.27943 
From the examination of the relationship between the importance of the Macedonian issue 
with the question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC, most 
elites who felt that the issue was of some importance for Europe felt that Greece should 
continue as a member in both institutions. A similar finding was presented when relating tile 
issue with membership in NATO alone. Those elites who felt that the issue was of some 
importance demonstrated the feeling of continuing membership in NATO (AMAC by MEM, 
Chi square: 8.515 with 6 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.00843, C=0.00843). Greek 
elites feel that membership in such an institution is essential for the state's security and they 
assume that these institutions could help in the quest for a solution to this issue for Europe. 
A higher correlation was presented when relating the importance of the issue of "Macedonia" 
for Greece with the question of Greece remaining a member of NATO and the EC. It could 
be 
suggested that Greek elites feel strongly about the 
importance of membership in both 
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institutions as strongly as they feel about the importance of the Macedonian issue (BMAC by 
MELOS, Chi square: 8.45 with 3 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0000, C=0.57546). 
The issue is of major importance for Greece, as presented in the frequency analysis and Greek 
elites feel that NATO and the EC could help towards a solution. "Prime Minister A. 
Papandreou is pressuring his EC partners towards a solution" (Ethnos Newspaper, March 28, 
1994). The importance of NATO was also presented in the correlation between the issue of 
"Macedonia" for Greece with the question of whether Greece should continue as a member of 
NATO (BMAC by MEM, Chi square: 15.49 with 6 degrees of freedom, Significance: 
0.0000, C=0.72383). An overwhelming majority of those who strongly believed in the 
importance of remaining a member of NATO felt that the issue of Macedonia for Greece was 
of major importance. It could be suggested that NATO is seen as a channel that could help as 
Greek elites count on NATO to assist their state towards a solution. 
AMAC by FNRA 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by stable relations as a major component ensuring 
Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 14.53 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.3478 
C=0.35706 
From the findings of the correlation between the importance of the issue of Macedonia for 
Europe and the statement about the positive role which stable relations with other Western 
democracies since 1974 have had for Greece's security, it could be assumed that stable 
relations with other Western states can contribute towards a solution for this problem. 
This is 
derived from the results presented, as those elites who felt that the issue of "Macedonia" was 
somewhat important also felt that stable relations had played a major role 
in Greece not being 
overtly threatened by another state since 1974. 
From the data presented from the correlation of the issue of Macedonia as 
important for 
Greece with the same statement of the importance of stable relations 
for Greece's security since 
1974, a statistically stronger relationship is reflected. 
Those elites who felt that the issue was 
important for Greece also felt that stable relations were a major reason 
for Greece not being 
overtly threatened by another state since 1974. 
Stable relations can be seen as another way of 
finding a solution to the problem for Greek decision-makers. 
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AMAC by NATO 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by NATO as a component that ensured European stability) 
Chi square: 22.560 with 12 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.1060 
C=0.40218 
AMAC by TUR 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Europe by NATO as a major component deterring possible Greaco - Turkish conflict) 
Chi square: 18-26 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0721 
C=0.42412 
As in the previous correlation which examined NATO, a statistically positive relationship was 
presented when correlating the Macedonian issue as a problem for Europe with the statement 
that NATO is a major force that ensured security for Europe and NATO is a major reason for 
containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. In both cases, NATO's 
"success" is assumed by the Greek elites. It is suggested that NATO is seen by the 
respondents as a mechanism which could be used towards a solution of the issue and for 
mediation between Greece and Skopje (as in the case of Greece and Turkey). This suggestion 
is highly reflected through the correlation of the issue of Macedonia for Greece with the 
statement of NATO as a mechanism that contained fears of a possible conflict between Greece 
and Turkey (BMAC by TUR, Chi square: 12.48 with 12 degrees of Freedom, Significance: 
0.00874, C == 48624). The results presented in this correlation gave a higher likelihood of a 
positive relationship, suggesting that Greek elites do rely on NATO playing a role in the 
Macedonian issue, as NATO has done in the case of Greece and Turkey. However, the 
correlation of the Macedonian issue with the statement of NATO as a major reason for stability 
in Europe is of lower statistical significance, as regards the importance of the issue for Greece. 
This suggests that NATO has had a positive effect in European affairs, not specifically in 
Greece's affairs (when comparing the Continent with one specific state related to the 
Macedonian issue); (BMAC by NATO, Chi square: 8.47 with 12 degrees of freedom, 
Significance: 0.4717, C == 0.33726). 
BMAC by MAST (Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht for 
Europe) 
Chi square: 3.66 with 6 degrees of freedom 
200 
Chapter Eight 
Significance: 
C= 
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Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
Test of the Model - TP :Z IC 0X :) OP 
0.7634 
0.18851 
(Level of importance of the Macedonia issue for Greece by level of importance of 
5.164 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.3587 
0.26017 
As expected, a statistical relationship was presented from correlating the importance of the 
Macedonian issue for Greece with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union for Greece and for Europe. The data suggested a higher relationship of the 
issue with the importance of the Treaty for Greece demonstrating a slightly stronger belief that 
the Treaty could assist Greece in the quest towards a solution to the Macedonian problem. 
Focusing on the issue of Yugoslav's importance for Greece and for Europe, the variables 
related are of higher statistical significance when correlated with the issue's importance for 
Greece. 
AYUG by EUDEF 
European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BYUG by EUDEF 
European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of US for 
8.67 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.7094 
0.28889 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of US for 
19.35 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.01125 
0.47241 
Those elites who felt that the Yugoslav crisis is a concern of major importance also felt that 
the United States is still important for Europe's defence, especially when the Yugoslav crisis 
was related to Greece. This suggests that Greek elites believe that the United States could 
help towards a solution for the crisis. 
BYUG by FNRA 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured 
Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 10.00 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0001 
C=0.51181 
AYUG with FNRA 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe 
by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
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Chi square: 4.678 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.854 
C=0.20174 
As expected, a higher level of significance was presented from the relationship of the 
importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece with the statement of stable relations as a major 
reason for Greece not being overtly threatened since 1974, than with the crisis' importance for 
Europe (Significance: 0.00011). This is possibly due to the fear of Greece being drawn into 
the instability in the Balkans along with the issue of Macedonia as a consequence of that 
instability. Stable relations with other Western states is most probably seen as a way of 
protecting Greece's interests and there seems to be a relationship of this assumption with the 
problem of the instability in Yugoslavia. 
BYUG by MAST (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 14.00 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0061 
C=0.36953 
AYUG by MAST (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 7.439 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1482 
C=0.25309 
BYUG by GMAST (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 9.729 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0266 
C=0.32830 
AYUG by GMAST (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 2.1357 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.70706 
C=0.14600 
Through the correlations of the issue of the importance of the 
Yugoslav crisis for Greece with 
the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece, the statistical relationship was stronger 
when both variables were associated with 
Greece. The Maastricht Treaty is seen by Greek 
elites as a topic of major importance when relating 
it with the Yugoslav crisis and this 
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assumption rein rces the hypothesis of the model which suggests that a threat stimulates 
international cooperation. In this instance, the Yugoslav crisis stimulates the need for the 
European Union to reach its goals. 
BYUG by MELOS (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and EEC) 
Chi square: 1.3820 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.6600 
C=0.09565 
AYUG by MELOS (Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by continuing membership of Greece in NATO and EEC) 
Chi square: 4.193 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1592 
C=0.19012 
The majority of the respondents that felt that Greece should continue as a member of NATO 
and the EC felt that the Yugoslav crisis is important for Greece as well as for Europe. A 
higher statistical significance level was presented, however, when the relationship concerned 
the crisis as a problem for Europe. This suggests that the Greek elites feel that by remaining 
members of the EC and NATO, these mechanisms will probably assist Europe's interests more 
than they would specifically Greece's. However, it could also be assumed that Greece can 
contribute to the crisis for Europe's interests by retaining its membership in NATO and in the 
EC. 
AYUG by MEM 
Greece in NATO) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
BYUG by MEM 
Greece in NATO) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by continuing membership for 
10.30 with 4 degrees of freedom 
0.0000 
0.58265 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by continuing membership for 
3.20 with 4 degrees of freedom 
0.57747 
0.18012 
Those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO alone 
felt that the 
Yugoslav crisis is of great importance especially for Europe. This suggests that 
Greek 
decision-makers believe that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia can be dealt with 
internationally and collectively through NATO (reinforcing the model), 
however would 
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The assumption in this case is that Greece, by 
remaining a member of NATO can promote its own interests as regards to the problem and 
contribute towards a European solution. 
BYUG by NATO 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by NATO as a major component that ensured European 
security) 
Chi square: 11.376 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.27957 
C=0.31176 
AYUG by NATO 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by NATO as a major component that ensured European 
security) 
Chi square: 5.861 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.7792 
C=0.21493 
NATO, in this correlation, is seen as the mechanism which ensured European stability and one 
that could contribute towards a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, especially for Greece (its 
interests). Those elites who felt that NATO ensured European security - or was the major 
reason for European security - felt that the issue of the Yugoslav crisis is of major importance 
for Greece. This assumes NATO's success, and suggests NATO, in the eyes of the Greek 
elites, as a mechanism which could help in the quest towards a peaceful solution in the Balkan 
region. The relationship of the crisis as an important threat for Europe with NATO as a major 
reason for European stability was somewhat statistically lower with no logical explanation. 
AYUG by TUR 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between 
Greece and Turkey) 
Chi square: 7.193 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.6233 
C=0.24900 
BYUG by TUR 
(Level of importance of the Yugoslav crisis for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between 
Greece and Turkey) 
Chi square: 13.083 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00498 
C=0.45106 
In an effort to examine the importance of the Yugoslav crisis 
for Greece and for Europe with 
the statement of NATO being a major reason 
for the containment of fears of a possible conflict 
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between Greeceand Turkey, a statistically high relationship was presented when the statement 
was correlated with the Yugoslav crisis as important for Greece. Those elites who felt that the 
crisis was of greater importance to Greece also agreed with the statement of NATO being a 
major reason that contained fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. Despite 
the fact that the former Yugoslavia is not a member of NATO, it could be suggested that 
NATO's success in containing fears of a possible Greaco-Turkish conflict can also help in 
containing this crisis (Yugoslav crisis). As in a large number of correlations in this chapter, a 
possible problem or threat was seen as being contained by cooperating internationally, 
(NATO), thus supporting the model. 
A much lower statistical relationship was presented by the results of the statement when 
correlated to the Yugoslav crisis as being important for Europe. In can be assumed that the 
crisis is not felt by Greek elites as important for Europe as it is for Greece, or that NATO's 
success in Greaco-Turkish relations was not as evident in European affairs and therefore 
NATO is not seen as the major option for European affairs when discussing the Yugoslav 
crisis. 
BCYP by MELOS (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by continuing membership for 
Greece in EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 0.62405 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.8433 
C=0.06108 
The Cypriot issue's importance for Greece, when related to the question of 
Greece remaining a 
member of NATO and the EC, presented a statistically 
lower level of relationship than 
expected. Those elites who felt that the issue was of very great importance 
felt that Greece 
should continue as a member in both institutions, although not as overwhelmingly 
as in the 
correlation of the importance of the issue 
for Europe with the same question. 
BCYP by MEM (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece 
by continuing membership for Greece 
in NATO) 
Chi square: 11.16 with 4 degrees of 
freedom 
Significance: 0.0000 
C=0.70738 
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A statistically high level of significance was presented from the relationship of the importance 
of the Cypriot issue for Greece with the question of whether Greece should remain a 1-nember 
of NATO alone. Those elites who felt that Greece should remain as a member of NATO also 
felt in the issue's importance. NATO, in this case, could be seen as an I*nternational 
cooperation option that could contribute towards a solution to the problem of Cyprus for 
Greece. When relating the same issue with the statement of NATO as the major reason for 
ensuring European stability, a statistically high level of significance was also presented (BCYP 
by NATO, Chi square: 19.303 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.0044, C= 
0.44147). This finding assumes NATO's success as a defence mechanism for Europe and a 
major option, in the eyesof the Greek elites, for the Cypriot issue. 
BCYP by TUR 
(Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between Greece 
and Turkey) 
Chi square: 14.80 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.02017 
C=0.41541 
A statistically positive relationship was presented from the correlation of the importance of the 
Cypriot problem for Greece with the statement of NATO as a major reason for containing 
possible fears of a Greaco - Turkish conflict as both states are NATO members. Those elites 
who felt that the issue was of some importance or of great importance to Greece also agreed, 
although not overwhelmingly, with the statement. Greek elites seem to realise the importance 
of the state remaining a member of NATO and its success in containing fears of a possible 
conflict between the two states. As Turkish troops still occupy a large area of the island of 
Cyprus, it is assumed that NATO has played a role, by the fact that the problem has not 
escalated. 
BCYP by US (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by the level of importance of US for 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 6.62 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.4678 
C=0.27857 
A statistically low level of significance was presented when relating the issue of Cyprus as 
important for Greece with agreement with the statement that the United States should continue 
to play a role in European affairs despite the end of the Cold War. Those elites who 
felt that 
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the issue is important were quite evenly distributed along the five-point scale demonstrating a 
sense of uncertainty among the respondents' belief in continuing US assistance in Europe. It 
could be suggested that the United States is no longer seen as a determining factor for Europe's 
security, especially when relating their role to the issue of Cyprus. A similar correlation was 
presented when relating the issue with agreement to the statement that stable relations with 
other democracies have been a major factor for Greece not being overtly threatened since 1974 
(BCYP by FNRA, Chi square: 4.376 with 8 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.8374, C= 
0.21146). As in the previous correlation, the opinions of the respondents were quite evenly 
distributed on the five-point scale despite an overwhelming majority believing in the 
importance of the issue. It is assumed that Greek elites feel that stable relations with other 
Western democracies have not played a major role towards the Cypriot problem specifically: 
The deadlock in the issue over the last 20 years is indicative of this. 
BCYP by GMAST (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 5.32 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1092 
C=0.27550 
BCYP by MAST (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 2.93 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.5773 
C=0.17435 
The issue of Cyprus as important for Greece presented a statistically higher level of 
significance when related to the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece . Those elites 
who felt the issue as important for Greece also felt the importance of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union for Greek interests. It is assumed that Greek elites believe that the goals of 
the Maastricht treaty could play a positive role towards a solution to the Cypriot issue. A 
statistically lower level of relationship was presented when relating the issue (of Cyprus) as 
important for Europe with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe. In this case, it 
is assumed that Greek elites realise that they could focus on the issue through Maastricht in 
order to promote their own national interests. 
BCYP by EUDEF (Level of importance of the Cypriot issue for Greece by level of importance of the US for 
European defence) 
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Chi square: 16.18 with 12 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.1007 
C=0.41125 
When the Cypriot issue's importance for Greece was related to the importance of the United 
States for European defence, a statistically high significance level was presented. Those elites 
who believed that the issue was of great importance, felt that the United States was important 
for Europe's defence. This finding contradicts the earlier result of the correlation of the issue 
(of Cyprus) with the US continuing to play a role in European affairs (BCYP by US). An 
explanation, however, can be presented. This relationship (BCYP by EUDEF) was 
specifically about Europe's defence, not European affairs, demonstrating the view that the 
United States is still important for defensive issues, but not for European affairs in general. 
FNRA by EUDEF 
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of US for European defence) 
Chi square: 45.59 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0131 
C=0.55141 
A statistically high level of significance was presented from the correlation between the 
statement of Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to stable 
relations with other Western democracies (such as the United States, Great Britain and 
France), with the question of the importance of the United States for the security of Europe in 
the 1990s. 
Those elites who agreed with the statement of stable relations, was felt that the United States 
was important for Europe's defence in the 1990s. This finding suggests that stable relations 
with other democracies or, using the term in the model, International Cooperation, can help 
find an option towards an assumed threat. In this case, stable relations, or cooperating 
internationally with states such as the US, have helped Greece's security and are considered 
essential for the state's security concerns. 
FNRA by GMAST 
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of 
Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 17.58 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0272 
C=0.39062 
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FNRA by MAST 
(stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of Maastricht treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 16.366 with 8 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.0035 
C=0.43862 
Reinforcing the model, this correlation between the statement of stable relations as a major 
reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974 with the importance 
of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe, presented astatistically high level of 
significance. Those elites who felt that stable relations with other Western democracies was a 
major reason for the state's stability in defensive terms also felt that the Maastricht Treaty was 
of major importance for Greece, and for Europe as well. This finding reinforces the model as 
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is collective in nature and , in this case, is related to 
threat perception since 1974 for Greece. Greek elites seem to realise the importance the Treaty 
could have for European affairs. 
FNRA by TUR 
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by NATO as a deterrent in 
Greaco - Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 44.51 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00013 
C=0.57619 
A similar finding was exhibited in the results of the statement of stable relations with other 
Western democracies as a major reason for Greece not being overtly threatened by another 
state since 1974 with agreement to the statement of NATO as a major reason for the 
containment of fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO 
members. Those elites who agreed with the statement of the role played by stable relations 
with other Western democracies also agreed that NATO has contained a possible Greaco - 
Turkish conflict due to the fact that both states have NATO membership, and are aware of the 
restrictions and obligations this membership have placed on them. International cooperation 
has played a role in containing a possible threat thus reinforcing the model for both variables. 
FNRA by US 
(Stable relations as a factor that contributed towards Greece's security since 1974 by level of importance of US 
for European affairs) 
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Chi square: 31.83 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0122 
C=0.49788 
The correlation of the statement of the role played by stable relations for Greece (as the state 
has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974), with the importance of the United 
States in European issues despite the end of the Cold War, a statistically high level of 
significance was exhibited. A ma ority i of elites who agreed with the statement of stable 
relations also felt that the United States were still important in European affairs. Both 
variables dealt with the United States in their questions suggesting international cooperation as 
a reason of containing threats (in one case) and important in European affairs (in the other 
case), reinforcing the first part of the model and demonstrating the realisation of the need for 
international cooperation. 
STRT by EUDEF (most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of the Us for 
European defence) 
Chi square: 29.797 with 30 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.5650 
C=0.47021 
Shifting attention towards the most serious kind of threat at the present time for Greece and 
correlating it with the level of importance of the United States for European defence, there 
does not seem to be a statistically high level of relationship. However, most elites who felt 
that the most serious kind of threat to Greece was the state's domestic economy also felt that 
the United States was important for Europe's defence (49%). 
STRT by GMAST 
treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
STRT by MAST 
treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht 
14.2535 with 10 degrees of freedom 
0.14909 
0.35646 
(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by level of importance of 
Maastricht 
13.096 with 10 degrees of freedom 
0.30866 
0.32311 
From the results presented in the correlation of the most serious 
kind of threat for Greece at the 
present time with the importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe 
(GMAST and MAST respectively), a statistically 
high level of relationship was exhibited 
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when the Treaty was related to Greece. Those elites who felt that the domestic economy was 
the most serious kind of threat also felt that the Treaty on European Union was of great 
importance for Greece. It could be suggested that Greek elites believe that the goals of the 
Maastricht treaty can help Greece's domestic economy in the future. In the case of the 
seriousness of a threat for Greece at the present time and the importance of the Maastricht 
Treaty for Europe, Greek elites were somewhat divided between their domestic economy 
(60%) and the other types of threats offered as choices in the question. This possibly explains 
the lower significance level, as the findings did not point in one specific direction. It is 
suggested that Greek elites believe that the Treaty is important for Europe, but would (the 
Treaty) probably not provide any assistance for Greece's interests if Greece does not pressure 
the European Union. 
STRT by MELOS (most serious threat at the present time for Greece by continuing membership in NATO 
and the EEC) 
Chi square: 5.141 with 5 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.37374 
C=0.22659 
STRT by MEM (most serious threat at the present time for Greece by continuing membership in NATO) 
Chi square: 4.6768 with 10 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.7970 
C=0.25025 
When relating the question of the most serious kind of threat for Greece at the present time 
with the question of whether Greece should remain as a member in NATO and the EC or just 
specifically in NATO, the results were not as expected. Those elites who felt that the most 
serious kind of threat was either Greece's domestic economy, political instability or a foreign 
military threat all suggested that Greece should remain a member of both institutions. 
However, when shifting attention to NATO membership only, the significance level was lower 
suggesting that, at least for the major threats perceived in this question (STRT), both NATO 
and the EC are required as mechanisms that could contribute to the state, not just one of them. 
The finding seems logical as, for example, Greece's economy would better be assisted by the 
EC (as a predominantly economic institution), rather than NATO. 
STRT by NATO (most serious threat at the present time for Greece by NATO as a major component 
ensuring European stability) 
Chi square: 16.796 with 20 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.4746 
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0.40597 
STRT by TUR 
(Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in possible conflict between Greece 
and Turkey) 
Chi square: 16.796 with 20 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.7996 
C=0.36481 
A rather statisticaly negative relationship was reflected in the results of the correlation between 
the most serious kind of threat for Greece at the present time with the statements of NATO as a 
major reason for ensuring European stability and NATO as a major reason for containing fears 
of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both states are NATO members. Again, 
the domestic economy occupied the first position for the elites in both cases, although it did 
not show any significant relationship with either of the NATO questions. This finding 
suggests that NATO is not seen by Greek elites as a factor that would contribute to their 
domestic economy, probably because NATO does not have an economic mandate. 
STRT by US (Most serious threat at the present time for Greece by levei of importance of the US in 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 19.811 with 20 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.38689 
C=0.41976 
A statistically low level of relationship was presented from the correlation of the most serious 
type of threat for Greece and the importance of the United States in European affairs. 
Although most respondents believed that the domestic economy was the most serious threat 
for Greece at the present time, they were less certain about the level of 
importance of the 
United States for European affairs as indicated by the distribution of responses over the 
five-point scale. The United States, it could be suggested, seem not to 
be as important as they 
were during the Cold War. Their military bases 
have been removed from Greece (1991), and 
the problem of the domestic economy Is not seen to require 
US assistance. 
STRT by FNRA 
(Most serious threat at the present time for 
Greece by stable relations as the component that ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 16.155 with 20 degrees of 
freedom 
Significance: 0.40932 
C=0.42195 
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As in the previous correlation, the findings in this case did not seem to point in a certain 
direction. The responses were well distributed along the five-point scale oil the level of 
agreement to the question of whether the elites felt that stable relations with other Western 
democracies played a role in the fact that Greece had not been overtly threatened by another 
state since 1974. This was the case despite the responses leaning towards the domestic 
economy as the most serious type of threat for Greece at the present time. 
PRB by GMAST (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 10.7951 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.62845 
C=0.29955 
PRB by MAST (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of Maastricht for 
Europe) 
Chi square: 6.325 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.9309 
C=0.23199 
Shifting attention to the correlation between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with 
the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe, a significantly negative 
relationship was presented. Despite the exhibited importance of Maastricht for Greece and for 
Europe, the probability of a threat to arise for Greece's security was rather uncertain, or 
occupied the middle position of the scale. It could be suggested that Maastricht is not 
identified as a deterrent towards the probability of a threat arising for Greece's security. 
PRB by US wrobability of a threat arising for Greece by the level of importance of the US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 39.434 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.09595 
C=0.50225 
A statistically strong relationship was revealed from the results of the correlation between the 
probability of a threat arising for Greece and the importance of the United States in European 
affairs. As expected, those elites who felt that the probability was high believed in the 
importance of the United States for European affairs. The model has suggested that 
perceptions of threat influence or stimulate international cooperation, as in this case. The 
greater the probability of a threat arising for Greece, the more the important the United States 
would become for European affairs. 
213 
Chapter Eight Test of the Model - TP :D IC :DXZ OP 
PRB by TUR (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 34.27 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.05583 
C=0.52382 
A rather statistically positive relationship was revealed from the correlation between the 
probability of a threat arising for Greece with the statement that NATO has been a major 
reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, those 
elites who felt that a threat is probable also felt that NATO has been a major reason for 
containing those fears. This relationship supports the model, as the perception of a threat 
stimulates international cooperation (NATO), suggesting that NATO's success in containing 
fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey is related to the structure's perception 
of that specific threat. Logically, those elites who disagreed with the above statement for 
NATO's success in containing fears also felt that the probability of a threat arising was also 
rather low. 
PRB by FNRA 
(Probability of a threat arising for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security 
since 1974) 
Chi square: 30.44 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.28821 
C=0.47091 
By eximining the relationship between the probability of a threat arising for Greece and the 
statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the 
state's stable relations with other Western democracies, there seemed to be a statistically 
positive relationship. Those elites who believed that the probability of a threat arising was 
high, believed that international cooperation (stable relations with other Western democracies) 
has played a major role in Greece's security. Again, this finding supports the model as stable 
relations (international cooperation) contained threats which stimulated Greece to pursue 
close relations. 
PRB by MEM (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by continuing membership for Greece in NATO) 
Chi square: 10.03 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0440 
C=0.43301 
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PRB by MELOS (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by continuing membership in the EEC and NATO) 
Chi square: 4.770 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.42793 
C=0.23825 
As expected, a statistucally high positive relationship was presented from the correlation 
between the probability of a threat arising for Greece with the question of whether Greece 
should remain a member of NATO (PRB by MEM). Those elites who felt that the 
probability was high, also felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO, supporting the 
model. NATO's support seems to be required and acknowledged by Greece's elites. 
However, when the probability of a threat arising was correlated with the question of whether 
Greece should remain a member of both institutions (EC and NATO), the significance level 
was lower suggesting not that Greece should abandon the EC, but rather that NATO is more 
suitable to deal with perceptions of threat. 
PRB by NATO (Probability of a threat arising for Greece by N ATO as a component that ensured European 
security) 
Chi square: 21.20 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.57578 
C=0.42511 
A rather unusual finding was presented in the correlation between the probability of a threat 
arising for Greece with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for ensuring 
European stability. The expected result would have been agreement to the statement and a 
high probability of threat arising. However, this was not revealed by the correlation with no 
logical explanation. 
RELG by EUDEF (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GRELG by EUDEF 
European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
48.159 with 36 degrees of freedom 
0.1273 
0.56232 
(Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for 
46.886 with 36 degrees of freedom 
0.11834 
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The importance of religion as a threat towards Greece's security as well as for Europe's was 
correlated with the importance of the United States for European defence and a statistically 
strong relationship was presented. Those elites who felt that religion was important for the 
Continent's security (when perceived as a threat) as well as for Greece's security, also felt that 
the United States were important for European defence. As expected, those who did not feel 
that religion was important also felt that the US were not important for Europe's defence. 
RELG by MAST 
treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
RELG by GMAST 
treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GRELG by MAST 
treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the Maastricht 
12.6913 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.03600 
0.42750 
(Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the Maastricht 
13.682 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.3696 
0,34060 
(importance of religion as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the Maastricht 
12.800 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.01333 
0.45138 
GRELG by GMAST (importance of religion as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the 
Maastricht treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 11.316 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.46092 
C=0.32648 
The religious fanaticism in the Middle East expressed in the question as a threat for Greece 
(GRELG), was correlated with the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece 
(GMAST) and for Europe (MAST). From the results, a rather high level of significance was 
presented when the religious threat for Europe was correlated with the importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty, again for Europe. Those elites who felt that the religious threat to Europe's 
security was serious, also felt that the Treaty on European Union was important for Europe. It 
could be suggested that Greek elites may feel that religion as a threat should be a topic 
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examined more closely by Europeans as it may pose a threat to the Continent's security. A 
strong relationship was also presented when correlating the religious issue as a threat to 
Greece's security with the Maastricht Treaty as important for Europe. It is assumed that Greek 
elites feet that Greece's security may be threatened by a religious out-of-area threat and the 
goals of the Maastricht treaty should provide a platform to deal with such a threat as they 
believe in its importance. 
However, a statistically higher level of significance was expected from the correlation of both 
issues (religion and the Maastricht Treaty) when both were related to Greece. There did not 
seem to be a positive relationship, as the results did not point in any specific direction. A 
similar finding was revealed from the results of the issue of religion as a threat for Europe and 
the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. 
RELG by MELOS (importance of religion as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in the EEC 
and NATO) 
Chi square: 3.605 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.81074 
C=0.17193 
RELG by MEM (Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO) 
Chi square: 6.12309 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.83693 
C=0.27119 
GRELG by MELOS (importance of religion as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in the EEC 
and NATO) 
Chi square: 3.13672 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.87472 
C=0.15598 
GRELG by MEM (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO) 
Chi square: 7.6178 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.34732 
C=0.35544 
The issue of religion as a threat to Europe and to Greece was correlated with the questions of 
whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC, and specifically if Greece 
should remain a member of NATO. From the above four correlations, it was shown that the 
most significant finding was the issue of religion as a serious threat for Greece with the 
question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO (GRELG by MEM). More 
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than half of the respondents which felt that the issue was serious also felt that Greece should 
remain a member of NATO. This demonstrates the feeling of belief in NATO by Greek elites 
to successfully deal with the problem of religion as a threat. 
It was expected that the issue of religion as a threat for Greece would produce a statistically 
high positive correlation when examined with the question of membership in NATO and the 
EC (GRELG by MELOS). However, the relationship was weak, suggesting not that Greece 
should abandon the EC structure, but rather that NATO would be a better option to deal with 
theissue. 
However, this analysis contradicts the finding of the relationship of the issue with NATO as a 
major reason that insured European stability (GRELG by NATO, Chi square: 23.037 with 24 
degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.6406, C=0.41807). The significance level was rather 
low, suggesting a weak relationship between the two variables. 
Furthermore, a statistically higher level of significance was presented from the results of the 
issue for Europe, when related to the same question of NATO as a major reason that insured 
European security. The respondents were divided in their response suggesting an ambiguity 
and uncertainty in the relationship between the variables (RELG by NATO, Chi square: 
26.96 with 24 degrees of freedom, Significance: 0.42219, C=0.44685). 
GRELG by TUR (Importance of religion as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations) 
Chi square: 27.776 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.38560 
C=0.46105 
RELG by TUR (importance of religion as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations) 
Chi square: 35.643 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.08217 
C=0.51618 
Those elites who felt that religious fanaticism was a serious threat for Europe's security were 
divided with those who felt that it was not as serious when the issue was correlated with the 
statement that NATO was a major reason that fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict 
were contained as both states are members of NATO. The finding is important, as it 
demonstrates a level of uncertainty in the responses. NATO may have played a role in Greaco 
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- Turkish relations but can it contribute to the containment of a religious threat towards 
Europe? An uncertainty was also exhibited in the results correlating the statement about 
NATO with the religious threat as serious for Greece's security, contradicting the expectation, 
however, of a higher significance level. 
The seriousness of the possibility of a religious threat arising to Europe's security, as well as to 
Greece's security was presented when the issue was correlated with the level of importance of 
the United States for European affairs (GRELG by US, Chi square: 38.27 with 24 degrees of 
freedom, Significance: 0.17806, C=0.51896). The results did not point in any specific 
direction, demonstrating a level of uncertainty. The views were divided and distributed rather 
evenly in the contingency tables suggesting that the US is not seen as the factor which could 
contribute - or should tribute - to the containment of a possible religious threat, as the issue of 
religious fanaticism as a threat was presented with uncertainty. It was, however, higher in the 
case of religion as a threat to Greece. 
GRELG by FNRA 
(importance of religion as a threat for Greece by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security 
since 1974) 
Chi square: 21.79 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.66654 
C=0.42151 
RELG by FNRA 
(Importance of religion as a threat for Europe by stable relations as a component that ensured Greece's security 
since 1974) 
Chi square: 34.84 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1601 
C=0.49274 
Most elites who felt that the issue of religious fanaticism was serious for Europe also felt that 
stable relations played a major role in that Greece had not been overtly threatened by a state 
since 1974. This finding suggests that stable relations could be a way of deterring such a 
threat and stresses the need for Greece to continue to have good relations with other Western 
democracies (RELG by FNRA). The level of significance was expected to be higher when 
relating the statement thatý Greece has not been overtly threatened to the issue of religious 
fanaticism as a threat to Greece. However, it produced a statistically weak relationship 
suggesting that stable relations would help to deter a possible religious threat if it occurred to 
the whole Continent, not specifically to Greece. 
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NEVff H by EUDEF (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 44.99 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00921 
C=0.56567 
Shifting attention to the importance of NATO perceiving new threats for its continuation with 
the question of the importance of the United States for European defence, the relationship 
exhibited was statistically high. Approximately 62% of the respondents demonstrated the 
feeling that it was essential for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation and the 
United States was important for European defence. This finding supports the model, as the 
importance of threat perception (for NATO in this case) stimulates international cooperation 
(continuing US assistance). 
NEMH by GMAST (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 16.839 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0383 
C=0.38793 
NEVVTH by MAST (importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of Maastricht 
for Europe) 
Chi square: 4.745 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.68678 
C=0.24047 
Those elites who felt that the perception of new threats was important for NATO also felt that 
the Maastricht Treaty was important for Greece (80%). This finding supports the model as a 
perception of threat stimulates international cooperation which - in this case - is the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union. A lower significance value was produced from the correlation of 
the importance of NATO perceiving new threats for its continuation with the importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty for Europe. 
NEVVTH by MELOS (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by continuing membership in NATO 
and the EEC) 
Chi square: 5.120 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.12024 
C=0.27274 
NEVVTH by MEM (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by continuing membership in NATO) 
Chi square: 10.084 with 8 degrees of freedom 
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As expected, a statistically high positive level of significance was presented from the 
correlation of the importance of NATO perceiving new threats with the question of whether 
Greece should remain a member of NATO and whether Greece should continue as a member 
of NATO and the EC. In both cases, an overwhelming majority who agreed that it was 
important for NATO to perceive new threats, also felt that Greece should remain a member of 
both institutions. This result supports the model, as both variables are examples of threat 
perception and international cooperation. It is important for NATO to perceive new threats 
for the mechanism's continuation and Greece should continue as a member of the structure, as 
well as in the EC. 
NEVVTH by NATO (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by NATO as a component that ensured 
European stability) 
Chi square: 32.007 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00065 
C=0.55295 
NEVVTH by TUR (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 25.635 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.03237 
C=0.49287 
NATO's success is suggested from the findings of the next two correlations. Those elites who 
felt that it was essential for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation, also believed in 
the statement that NATO was a major reason that ensured European stability and that NATO 
has been a major reason that contained fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict, as both 
states are NATO members. In both cases, NATO is suggested as being able to deal with 
threats (European stability and fears of a conflict between Greece and Turkey, for example) 
and their containment. This supports the aspect of the model which deals with a threat 
stimulating international cooperation. Logically, it can be determined from the findings 
related to NATO, that the structure is seen, by Greek elites, as a possible option for European 
(and Greek) security for the future. 
NEVVTH by US (Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by the level of importance of the US in 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 29.61 with 16 degrees of freedom 
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NEWTH by FNRA 
(Importance for NATO to perceive new threats by stable relations as a component that has contributed to 
Greece's security since 1974) 
Chi square: 22.885 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1757 
C=0.43557 
From the correlations of the importance for NATO to perceive new threats for its continuation, 
with the importance of the United States in European affairs and with the statement that 
Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to the its stable 
relations with other Western democracies, rather high levels of significance were presented. 
The data suggest that those elites who felt that it was important for NATO to perceive new 
threats also felt that the United States was important for European affairs (65%) and that stable 
relations were a major reason for Greece not being threatened by another state since 1974 
(68%). Stable relations with other states implies international cooperation, as does agreement 
to continuing US assistance in European affairs, thus lending support to the model. 
TP by EUDEF (importance of threat perception by the level of importance of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 10.335 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.57806 
C=0.31162 
TP by US (importance of threat perception by level of importance of the US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 5.268 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.82180 
C=0.20774 
Attention was focused on the level of importance of threat perception (on a seven point scale) 
with the variables which affected the model. Those elites who felt that threat perception was 
fairly important to very important for the establishment of a collective security arrangement 
did not produce a statistically significant relationship with the level of importance of the 
United States in European affairs, or with the level of importance of the United States in 
European defence. This result assumes the notion that Europeans realise the importance of 
perceiving new threats on their own, and not being influenced by the United States. This is 
despite the earlier finding that the US is important for European defence, probably in military 
terms or as an ally in a major crisis. 
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TP by MELOS (importance of threat perception by continuing membership in NATO and the EEC) 
Chi square: 5.102 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00353 
C=0.32289 
TP by MEM (importance of threat perception by continuing membership in NATO 
Chi square: 8.3059 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00010 
C=0.45263 
The importance of threat perception in establishing a collective security arrangement was 
correlated with the questions of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and 
whether Greece should remain a memberof both the EC and NATO. The expected statistical 
significance was presented, as those elites who believed in the importance of threat perception 
also felt that Greece should remain a member of both institutions in both cases. The finding 
supports the model as perceptions of threat stimulate international cooperation. Threat 
perception is seen as an important factor towards the establishment of a defensive option and 
NATO and the EC are structures that can be characterised as international cooperation 
platforms. 
TP by MAST (Importance of threat perception by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 4.429 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.39715 
C=0.19959 
TP by GMAST (importance of threat perception by level of importance of Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 6.694 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.21263 
C=0.23686 
The importance of threat perception was also evident in the correlations with the importance of 
the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. In both instances, the levels of significance 
were rather high, especially in the case of the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece. 
Those elites who felt that threat perception is an important factor in the establishment of a 
collective security arrangement also felt that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Europe as 
well as for Greece. This finding, again, supports the model by suggesting that threat 
perception stimulates international cooperation. 
TP by FNRA 
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(importance of threat perception by stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security 
since 1974) 
Chi square: 6.909 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.61571 
C=0.25028 
TP by TUR (Importance of threat perception by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco, - Turkish relations) 
Chi square: 9.545 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.23646 
C=0.31596 
Those elites who felt that threat perception was important showed a statistically higher level of 
significance when correlated with the statement that NATO has been a major reason for 
containing fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict as both are NATO members, than with 
the statement that stable relations with other Western democracies are a major reason for 
Greece not being overtly threatened by another state since 1974. The feeling may be that 
threat perception is important, but does not relate to the fact that stable relations with other 
Western democracies have helped Greece's security. Stable relations may deter a threat from 
capitalising, do not necessarily relate with the perception of common threats. In the other 
case, the suggestion is that threat perception is essential as it has been for Greece (in 
perceiving Turkey as a threat) which made them feet secure under NATO's umbrella. This 
finding reinforces the model as NATO again is the international cooperation variable being 
stimulated by Turkey (as a threat). 
TP by NATO (Importance of threat perception by NATO as a component that ensured European security) 
Chi square: 9.645 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.44320 
C=0.27314 
A lower significance level (than expected), was presented from the correlation of the 
importance of threat perception for the establishment of a collective security arrangement with 
the statement that NATO has been a major reason that ensured European stability. However, 
the finding has demonstrated the notion that threat perception is important and that NATO has 
played a role in European stability. This suggestion, although not as strong as expected, still 
reinforces the model. 
GER by EUDEF (importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US for 
European defence) 
Chi square: 41.591 with 36 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.51642 
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0.51102 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the US for 
44.85 with 36 degrees of freedom 
0.20155 
0.55343 
The seriousness of Germany as a threat for Europe's security and for Greece's security was 
correlated with the level of importance of the United States for European defence. A higher 
level of significance was presented when the US was related with Germany as a threat towards 
Greece's security, as those elites who felt that Germany was not a threat towards Greece's 
security felt quite uncertain about the importance of the United States in Europe's defence. 
This finding also supports the model for, as Germany was not seen as a major threat, logically, 
according to the model, the absence of a specific threat would not stimulate international 
cooperation. A statistically low level of relationship was presented from the correlation of the 
seriousness of Germany as a threat with the level of importance of the US in Europe's defence. 
The results were distributed quite equally and did not point in any specific direction as 96% of 
the cells were under the figure 5 (total 99 for this specific correlation) suggesting uncertainty 
for both variables. 
GER by MAST 
for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by the importance of the Maastricht treaty 
7.88 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.73052 
0.28251 
GER by GMAST 
for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GR by GMAST 
for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GR by MAST 
Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by the importance of the Maastricht treaty 
14.90 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.40896 
0.33294 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by the importance of the Maastricht treaty 
14.8582 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.41487 
0.33502 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by the importance of the Maastricht treaty for 
18.991 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.10337 
0.39782 
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The level of threat Germany poses both to Greece and to Europe (separately) was correlated 
with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece as well as for Europe. The 
most statistically significant relationship was exhibited from the correlation of the possible 
German threat for Greece with the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe (GR by 
MAST). The results pointed in the direction of most elites who felt that Germany was not a 
serious threat for Greece and that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Europe (75%). It is 
suggested that the Treaty on European Union should probably not deal with Germany as a 
threat. It is unlikely that the German threat would stimulate international cooperation and, 
based on this assumption, the model would still hold. This could be assumed from the weak 
relationship presented in the remaining alternatives from the related correlations. Germany 
was not seen as a major threat for Europe and therefore there was a level of dissimilarity in the 
responses creating the notion of uncertainty as to whether Maastricht should deal with it. 
GER by MELOS (importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO and 
the EEC for Greece) 
Chi square: 7.259 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.1294 
C=0.30133 
GER by MEM 
Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GR by MELOS 
EEC for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by continuing membership in NATO for 
8.452 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.2286 
0.37523 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO and the 
8.3363 
0.03871 
0,34708 
GR by MEM (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by continuing membership in NATO for Greece) 
Chi square: 8.9164 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01720 
C=0.45883 
Relationships were more clearly reflected when the seriousness of Germany as a threat for the 
Continent as well as for Greece were correlated with the questions of Greece remaining as 
members of NATO and the EC. The results pointed to the assumption that despite Germany 
not being considered as a serious threat for either Greece or Europe, Greece should remain as 
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members of both institutions, suggesting, possibly, that there should be other threats to justify 
the institutions' continuation. The model was based on the assumption of a real or imagined 
threat that is necessary for defence structures to work successfully. Based on this assumption, 
Greek elites should have other threats in mind (many have been already analysed) to prove this 
result. 
GER by NATO (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by NATO as a component that has ensured European security) 
Chi square: 21.45 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.35266 
C=0.45433 
GR by NATO (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by NATO as a component that has ensured 
European security) 
Chi square: 14.76 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.86251 
C=0.38125 
The seriousness of Germany as a threat for Greece and for Europe was correlated with the 
statement that NATO has been a major reason that ensured European stability. Those elites 
who felt that Germany was not a serious threat to Greece did not suggest a pattern of 
correlation with the statements on NATO's success. The significance level was low 
suggesting that NATO's success in ensuring European stability had little to do with containing 
Germany as a threat for Greece. However, the significance level was rather high when 
Germany was related as a threat for Europe suggesting that NATO did play a role in 
continuing fears of a possible German threat (German rearmament containment was one of the 
reasons for NATO's creation). 
GER by TUR (Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations) 
Chi square: 40.52816 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.06648 
C=0.51958 
GR by TUR (Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by NATO as a deterrent in Greaco - Turkish 
relations) 
Chi square: 30.716 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.14281 
C=0.50236 
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GR by FNRA 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by stable relations as a component that has ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 29.40804 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.27903 
C=0.47420 
GER by FNRA 
(importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by stable relations as a component that has ensured Greece's 
security since 1974) 
Chi square: 32.91 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.20735 
C=0.48386 
A statistically high level of significance was presented from the results of the correlations 
between the seriousness of Germany as a threat for Greece and for Europe (separately) with the 
statements (for both questions) of NATO as a major reason for containing fears of a possible 
Greaco - Turkish conflict as both are NATO members, and that stable relations with other 
Western democracies has been a major reason why Greece has not been overtly threatened by 
another state since 1974. The statistical significance was higher when the statement about the 
role of NATO for Greece and Turkey was correlated with a possible German threat. Those 
elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat for Europe (60%) or for Greece (64%) 
also felt that NATO did play a role in containing fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict. 
It could be assumed that NATO has also played a role in containing fears of a possible 
German threat for the Continent, as well as for Greece, as Germany has been a member since 
1954. In addition, one of the major reasons for NATO's creation was, according to many 
defence analysts, the containment of Germany after World War 11. The issue of Germany as a 
threat arose again after the unification of East and West Germany, thus creating a much more 
powerful state in terms of its economy, population, and defence potential. 
A statistically strong relationship was presented from the correlation of the seriousness of the 
German threat for Europe and for Greece with the statement that Greece has not been overtly 
threatened by another state since 1974 due to the state's stable relations with other Western 
democracies. Most elites who felt that Germany was not a serious threat for Greece (69%) 
and for Europe (62%) also felt that the previous statement was somewhat true, suggesting that 
stable relations with other Western democracies have assisted 
by way of Greece not 
considering Germany as a threat. This may be due to their common membership 
in NATO, 
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These findings support the first part of the 
model, as international cooperation was sought after the perception of a threat (stable relations, 
NATO formation in 1949). 
GER by US 
affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GR by US 
affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Europe by level of importance of the US in European 
14.071 with 24 degrees of freedom 
0.97246 
0.33585 
(Importance of Germany as a threat for Greece by level of importance of the US in European 
29.925 with 24 degrees of freedom 
0.33878 
0.46175 
Germany's seriousness as a threat towards Greece and towards Europe was correlated with the 
question of the level of importance of the United States in European affairs. A statistically 
weak relationship, as expected, was exhibited by the level of seriousness of the German threat 
for Europe with the importance of the United States for European affairs. The United States 
have already started to move out of Germany, and therefore the finding is logical and suggests 
a limited importance of the United States in European affairs. This move by the US assumes 
that Germany should no longer be closely looked upon and this supports the model in that a 
lack of threat does not stimulate international cooperation (Germany - US). 
A closer relationship was presented from the correlation between Germany as a threat for 
Greece with the level of importance of the United States for European defence. 51 percent of 
Greek elites felt that Germany was not a serious threat but felt that the United States was still 
important for Europe. This finding does not seem to support the model at first, however it 
seems more likely that Greek elites may feel this way as other threats may require US 
assistance. 
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8.3 International Cooperation :Z (Intervening Variables) :Z Option 
US by EUDEF (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 55.66066 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00074 
C=0.58947 
A statistically significant relationship was presented from the correlation of the level of 
importance of the United States in European affairs with the level of importance of the United 
States in European defence. 50 percent of the elites who felt that the US was important in 
European affairs felt that the US was important for European defence. However, the other 
half of the elites felt the opposite creating a sense of uncertainty about the role of the US in 
Europe, thus supporting the literature review (chapter 3). 
US by EUDEF1 (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by European defence dealing with 
matters of the continent only) 
Chi square: 31.42909 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01146 
C=0.49157 
Those elites who felt that the United States was important for European affairs did not present 
a uniform pattern when correlated with the statement that European defence should only deal 
with matters of the Continent. The elites were divided in their responses suggesting a level of 
uncertainty for both questions. The finding mirrors the dilemma Europe is facing trying to 
find a mechanism ideal for Europe in the 1990s. Should the United States continue to be 
involved European affairs? Should European defence deal with matters of the Continent 
only? 
US by GMAST (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the Maastricht 
treaty for Greece) 
Chi square: 12.30941 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.2197 
C=0.31221 
US by MAST (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by level of importance of the Maastricht 
treaty for Europe) 
Chi square: 6.2944 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.22763 
C=0.31052 
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The question of the level of importance of the United States was correlated with the level of 
in-iportance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. Both correlations presented a 
statistically high level of significance suggesting that there is a level of uncertainty about the 
future role of the United States in Europe despite the Treaty of Maastricht's strong level of 
importance, both for Greece and for Europe. This finding also supports the literature review's 
discussion of the problem of continuing US assistance in Europe and the problem of choosing 
between an "Atlantisist" or a "Europeanist" approach for European defence (chapter 3). 
US by ONLY (Level of importance of the Us for European affairs by US as the only remaining superpower) 
Chi square: 15.21 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.32003 
C=0.35026 
Despite the result of this correlation, suggesting that the United States is the only remaining 
superpower in the world, elites were again uncertain on the future role of the United States in 
Europe. This finding reinforces the literature review discussion on the power the US 
possesses, but it is not certain if it is required for European defence in the 1990s. Europeans 
feel somewhat ready to form a more European in nature defence mechanism, even if this 
means little or no support from the US. 
FNRA by EUDEF 
(Stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security since 1974 by the level of importance 
of the US for European defence) 
Chi square: 34.3409 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00166 
C=0.55141 
FNRA by ONLY 
(Stable relations as a component that has contributed to Greece's security since 1974 by the US as the only 
remaining superpower) 
Chi square: 14.950 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.35477 
C=0.34926 
The statement that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another state since 1974 due to 
Greece's stable relations with other Western democracies was correlated with the statements 
that the US is the only remaining superpower and that European defence should only deal with 
matters of the Continent. In both cases, the statistical relationship was strong suggesting in 
the case of the US as the only remaining superpower in the world, that stable relations are 
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necessary for the security of Greece and continuing good relations are required for the state's 
security. In the case of the statement that European defence should only deal with matters of 
the continent, a level of uncertainty was presented. Stable relations were seen as important, 
but they did not seem to suggest an affect on the question of whether European defence should 
deal with matters of the continent. There is still ambiguity as to what form European defence 
will take in the next decade. 
NATO by EUDEF 
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the level of importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 43.80336 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00002 
C=0.62686 
NATO by US (NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the level of importance of the 
US for European affairs) 
Chi square: 33.994 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00065 
C=0.53907 
The question of whether NATO is a major reason that ensured military stability was correlated 
with the level of importance of the US in European affairs and in European defence. High 
levels of statistical significance were presented in both cases with those elites who felt that 
NATO was a major reason that ensured military stability also felt that the US is still important 
for Europe's defence, but slightly less important for European affairs (60% and 54% 
respectively). It seems logical to assume that Greek elites feel that the US is important in the 
quest towards a new security structure but not for their involvement in other general European 
issues. 
NATO by EUDEFI 
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by whether European defence should only deal with 
continental matters) 
Chi square: 20.429 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.11219 
C=0.43887 
NATO by ONLY (NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by the US as the only 
remaining superpower) 
Chi square: 27.759 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01787 
C=0.44476 
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The statement that NATO is a major reason that ensured military stability was correlated with 
the statements that European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent and that 
the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. Statistically strong relationships were 
presented. In both cases, those elites who felt that NATO is a major reason that ensured 
European stability also felt that the US is the only superpower in the world (70%) and that 
Europe should only deal with matters of the Continent (57%). NATO's success is assumed in 
this case, and it could also be assumed that US assistance is still required in NATO and that 
NATO should deal with matters of the Continent only. 
NATO by MAST 
Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
NATO by GMAST 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by level of importance of 
9.62821 with 8 degrees of freedom 
0.22834 
(NATO as a component that has ensured European stability by level of importance of 
15.86662 with 8 degrees of freedom 
0.02946 
0.30896 
The statement that NATO is a major reason that ensured European stability was then 
correlated with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Europe and for Greece. In 
both cases, those elites who felt that the statement was true also felt that theTreaty on 
European Union was important for Europe and Greece (75%). It can be suggested that Greek 
elites feel that the goals of the Maastricht Treaty are important towards the stability of Europe 
as NATO is for the Continent. 
MELOS by EUDEF1 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether European security should only deal with 
continental matters) 
Chi square: 4.1189 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.46699 
C=0.18662 
MELOS by ONLY (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by US as the only remaining 
superpower) 
Chi square: 3.789 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.37049 
C=0.17534 
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The question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC was correlated 
with the question of whether European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent 
and with whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. In the first case, 
elites felt divided in their opinions, as they were uncertain if Europe should only deal with 
continental matters, despite their overwhelming agreement that Greece should remain 
members of both institutions (98%). In the second case, the relationship was stronger as those 
elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC also felt that the US 
is the only remaining superpower. These findings suggest a level of uncertainty about the new 
roles for NATO and the EC as to whether they should include out-of-area threats in their 
mechanisms. However, the elites feet quite certain that the US is the only remaining 
superpower in the world and that the US should probably continue to play a role within NATO 
and pursue, along with the EC, a good partnership. 
MELOS by MAST (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 4.60455 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.11802 
C=0.20343 
MELOS by GMAST (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of 
Maastricht for Greece) 
Chi square: 1.6378 with 2 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.45075 
C=0.12587 
The question of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and the EC was correlated 
with the level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, 
for Europe and 
for Greece. Overwhelmingly, those elites who felt that Greece should remain a member of 
both institutions also felt that the Treaty was as important for Greece as for Europe. The 
Maastricht Treaty is seen as a major step towards European unification and Greek elites seem 
to feel positive about its consequences towards European security. 
MELOS by EUDEF (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by level of importance of the 
US in European defence) 
Chi square: 6.395 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.16945 
C=0.29111 
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MELOS by US (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the level of importance of the US in European affairs) 
Chi square: 4.10821 with 4 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.29711 
C=0.21834 
Those elites who felt that the US is important for European defence also felt that Greece 
should remain a member of NATO and the EC (70%). However, opinions were divided when 
membership in NATO and the EC was correlated with the level of importance of the US for 
European affairs. These findings suggest ambiguity in the new role of the US in Europe but 
also highlight the importance of the US in European defence matters. 
MEM by EUDEF (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of the US in European 
defence) 
Chi square: 8.40976 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.13161 
C=0.39981 
MEM by US (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of the US in European 
affairs) 
Chi square: 7.824 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.06270 - 
C=0.37250 
A higher level of significance was presented when the related question of whether Greece 
should remain a member of NATO (mentioned alone in this question to reflect the influence of 
the EC from question 1), with the importance of the US in Europe's defence and in European 
affairs. Those elites who felt that Greece should continue as a member of NATO also felt that 
the US is still important in European defence matters (68%) but were divided as to whether the 
US was important in European affairs. This reinforces the findings from the previous 
correlations (MELOS by EUDEF, MELOS by US). 
MEM by ONLY (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the US as the only remaining superpower) 
Chi square: 3.938 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.76650 
C=0.18689 
MEM by EUDEF (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether European security should deal with 
continental matters only) 
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Chi square: 4.224 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.88177 
C=0.19602 
A statistically low level of significance was presented to the correlations of whether Greece 
should continue as a NATO member with that of whether the US was the only superpower in 
the world and whether European defence should only deal with matters of the Continent. The 
contingency table presented an uncertainty in both correlations and these point towards 
Europe's defence dilemma. 
MEM by MAST (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
MEM by GMAST 
Greece) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
4.7591 with 4 degrees of freedom 
0.34127 
0.21508 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the level of importance of Maastricht for 
7.53425 with 4 degrees of freedom 
0.03107 
0.32026 
A statistically high level of significance was exhibited from the correlation of whether Greece 
should continue as a member of NATO with the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union for Greece and for Europe. In both cases, those elites who felt that Greece 
should remain a member of NATO also felt that the Treaty was important for Greece and for 
Europe. This finding suggests that it is important for Europe to continue to remain a member 
of NATO. Europeans feel the urgency for closer European cooperation despite NATO's 
presence. Europe has changed considerably and it is essential to work as a European 
community and as an Atlantic community. 
MAST by CONT 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether Europe should deal with its defence with European in 
character arrangements) 
Chi square: 10.6649 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.25908 
C=0.30406 
The level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Europe was correlated with the 
statement that Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the 
Continent's security only through arrangements European in character such as the EC and the 
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Western European Union. The significance level was rather high, as most elites who felt that 
the Treaty on European Union was important for Europe felt rather uncertain as to whether 
Europe should break away, suggesting a dilemma as to which option to choose for European 
defence. Greek elites seem to recognise the importance of achieving the goals of the 
Maastricht Treaty, but they do not seem firm about an Atlantisist or a Europeanist option for 
defence. Maastricht alone may not be seen as a credible alternative for European defence and 
US assistance is still debated as a good idea. An even higher level of significance was 
presented from the results of the correlation of the level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty 
for Greece with the same statement on Europeans dealing with matters of the Continent and 
breaking away from the US and NATO (Chi square: 14.436 with 8 degrees of freedom, 
Significance: 0.10923, C=0.34158). Despite the elites' recognition of the Treaty's 
significance as important for Greece, the division in their opinions was clear (57% for breaking 
away, 43% for not breaking away). These findings demonstrate the problem Europe has in 
finding the new character for European defence, reinforcing the literature review. 
MAST by CRD (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the most credible defence for Europe) 
Chi square: 15.18991 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.46905 
C=0.32525 
GMAST by CRD (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the most credible defence for Europe) 
Chi square: 11.993 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.70202 
C=0.28883 
Greek elites presented a level of uncertainty as to which alternative for European defence was 
most credible when the alternatives were correlated with the level of importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe. The statistical significance level was low, 
suggesting a low level of relationship. From the contingency tables presented, those elites 
who felt that the Treaty was important for Europe and for Greece seemed uncertain as to which 
alternative was most credible for European defence. Elites were divided through all 
alternatives given by the question although NATO (NATO and US) and the EC options carried 
the majority of elites (the EC in this case was given as the alternative that should deal and form 
a mechanism for European defence). The alternative from the question support the dependent 
variable of the model, as they deal with options for European defence. 
The fact that the 
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options werc suggested reinforce the model, but the uncertainty as to which would be most 
credible reinforces the argument in the literature review (Chapter 3) due to the lack of clear 
threat perception. Clear threat perception, elaborating on the model of this study, would 
stimulate international cooperation and a commonly suggested alternative. The lack of clear 
threat, especially for Europe, creates this problem. The questionnaire deals with possible 
threats felt by Greek elites towards their own state and for Europe. Aside from the clarity of 
the Turkish threat for Greece, the remaining possible threats are important, but not as clear. 
Therefore, the option becomes more difficult to find. 
MAST by EUDEF (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the level of importance of the US for European 
defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GMAST by EUDEF 
European defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
8.229 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.62475 
0.30151 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the level of importance of the US for 
19.448 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.10352 
0.39607 
The level of importance of the Treaty on European Union for Europe and for Greece was 
correlated with the question of the importance of the US for European defence. A statistically 
high level of significance was presented for Greece and a low one for Europe. Sixty-five 
percent of the respondents who felt that the Treaty was important for Greece also felt that the 
US was important for Europe's defence. In the case of the importance of the Treaty for 
Europe with the above statement, the results presented an uncertainty as to whether the US was 
important for European defence, despite the elite's strong belief in the importance of the 
Maastricht Treaty. It seems that the Greeks feel certain that the US is still required for their 
interests but they are not as certain for Europe's interests. The new character of Europe's 
defence is still unclear, again reinforcing the discussion in the literature review (Chapter 3). 
MAST by EUDEF1 
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(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether European security should only deal with continental issues) 
Chi square: 15-882 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00520 
C=0.42345 
GMAST by EUDEF1 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether European security should only deal with continental 
issues) 
Chi square: 6.95124 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.53709 
C=0.25570 
Elites also felt uncertain as to whether European defence should only deal with matters of the 
continent, despite their belief in the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for 
Europe. The statistical relationship was high in the case of the importance of Maastricht for 
Europe with the question of Europe dealing with matters of the Continent only. Maastricht 
has been an important step towards closer cooperation between member states,, but when 
looking closely at the nature of European defence in the 1990s, the question remains 
unanswered. The Gulf War and the crisis in Yugoslavia where Europeans have taken 
positions, are examples of Europe dealing with out-of-area threats and Europe's position 
remains unclear. 
MAST by ONLY (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the US as the only remaining 
superpower) 
Chi square: 11.169 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.09437 
C=0.31378 
GMAST by ONLY (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the Us as the only remaining 
superpower) 
Chi square: 10.759 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.15927 
C=0.29252 
Significance levels wee high when the Treaty's importance for Europe and for Greece was 
correlated with the statement that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. 
Those elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht was important for Europe and for Greece 
also felt that the US is the only remaining superpower in the world. The recognition of this 
statement suggests that close cooperation with the US is essential but, using the 
findings from 
the previous correlations, the way in which the US should be involved 
in Europe is uncertain. 
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MAST by US 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
GMAST by US 
European affairs) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the level of importance of the US for 
6.294 with 8 degrees of freedom 
0.22763 
0.31052 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the level of importance of the US for 
12.309 with 8 degrees of freedom 
0.21974 
0.31221 
Following from the previous correlations, those elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht 
was important for Europe and for Greece felt rather uncertain as to whether the US should 
continue to play a role in European affairs. The previous correlations recognised that the US 
was the only remaining superpower in the world, however Greek elites feel that this does not 
mean more US influence and involvement. The nature of European defence is changing and 
despite the finding that Maastricht is as an essential and important step towards closer 
cooperation in many ways among European partners, there is still a dilemma in whether the 
US, as a superpower, should continue to play a role in European affairs. 
MAST by FORM (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by the best form of defence for Greece) 
Chi square: 7.3007 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.09590 
C=0.34483 
G MAST by FORM (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by the best form of defence for Greece) 
Chi square: 6.7619 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.76653 
C=0.21646 
The level of importance of the Treaty of Maastricht was correlated with the best form for 
Greece's defence against their option as the most possible military threat. Turkey occupied the 
first position as a military threat, but this quite clear perception of threat by Greek elites did 
not present a clear option, as would be suggested by the model. Despite them believing in the 
importance of the treaty for Greece and for Europe, elites were divided between the option of 
"Integration of all Atlantic forces" (NATO) and "Integration of all European forces" (WEU, 
EQ. The suggestion is that Maastricht has not done enough for European defence. The 
Turkish threat has stimulated options (98% of the respondents gave an option), but Greek 
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elites were not clear as to which form of defence would be best to deal with the threat. Greek 
elites may hold the assumption that what one state may see as a threat may not be so perceived 
by another. Therefore, Turkey may not be a clear threat for Europe, and as all options are 
collective in character, choice of options varied. The important note to make, however, is that 
when a clear threat was presented, even for one state, options were presented and this clearly 
reinforces the model. 
GMAST by GMIL 
defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
MAST by GMIL 
defence) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by most practical alternative for Greece's 
13.554 with 18 degrees of freedom 
0.14510 
0.32901 
(Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by most practical alternative for Greece's 
7.54471 with 8 degrees of freedom 
0.14821 
0.32815 
The importance of the Treaty of Maastricht for Greece and for Europe was also correlated 
with the question of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security, 
presenting high levels of significance. Responses were uniform, (71% in both cases), those 
elites who felt that the Treaty of Maastricht was important for Greece and for Europe felt that 
the combination and collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE) would best ensure 
Greece's security among others. This finding contradicts previous correlations, which 
presented uncertainty for continuing US assistance (NATO implies this), but this may also 
imply that Greek elites would favour a more "Europeanised" NATO with European leadership. 
The model holds from these results as an option was again chosen based on a previous 
question of threat perception. It is assumed from this correlation that the Maastricht Treaty 
has not done enough for European defence and cannot stand alone to defend Europe. 
MAST by WTO (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether NATO should continue) 
Chi square: 6.724 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.50028 
C=0.26275 
GMAST by WTO (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether NATO should continue) 
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Chi square: 10.5610 with 8 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.24944 
C=0.30599 
The importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe was also correlated with 
the question of whether NATO should continue to exist, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact and the end of the Cold War, presenting a rather high relationship in the case which 
involved the importance of Maastricht for Greece. Those elites who felt that the Treaty on 
European Union was important for Greece also felt that NATO should continue to exist 
despite the dissolution of its rival, the WTO. NATO is still required, especially for Greece, 
and, along with the strong belief in the importance of Maastricht, European stability can be 
ensured. 
GMAST by GRWEU 
defence interests) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
MAST by GRWEU 
defence interests) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
(Importance of Maastricht for Greece by the WEU as an option to promote Greece's 
3.708 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.70107 
0.19274 
(Importance of Maastricht for Europe by the WEU as an option to promote Greece's 
8.73 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.2167 
0.27750 
A statistically high level of relationship was presented in the results of the correlation of the 
level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe with the question of 
whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western European Union. In 
both cases, the contingency table showed that those elites who felt that the Treaty was 
important for Greece and for Europe also felt that Greece's interests would be better promoted 
through the WEU. Although Greece became a full member of the WEU in 1993, the 
organisation has not yet guaranteed Greece's security from the possible threat of Turkey as the 
latter holds a position of an associate member in the WEU. The model still holds, however, 
as options are presented (WEU) which have been stimulated by international cooperation 
(Maastricht treaty). However, options seem to be varied, especially in the correlations 
regarding threats to Europe. This supports the literature review as it shows that Europeans are 
having trouble in determining a security mechanism due to the apparent lack of clear threat 
perception. 
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MAST by EEC (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether the EEC should provide a defence 
mechanism) 
Chi square: 10.548 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01277 
C=0.33733 
GMAST by EEC (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 9.19807 
Significance: 0.11862 
C=0.26285 
Those elites who felt that the Maastricht treaty was important for Greece and for Europe also 
felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism (73% in both cases) for European 
security. This complicates but reinforces the defence dilemma of Europe as Greek elites agree 
to NATO's continuation, probably with European leadership, feel ambiguous as to whether the 
US should continue to be involved in European affairs but feel that they are still important to 
European defence, agree that the EC should provide a defence mechanism and also feel that 
Greece's interests could be better promoted through the Western European Union. Options 
are presented, stimulated by international cooperation (Maastricht Treaty on European Union), 
however but there is not an option which receives uniform support in the Greek elites' 
responses. Europe alone has not done enough to ensure its own security and, with the lack of 
clear threat perception, options may vary. 
MAST by EEUR (Level of importance of Maastricht for Europe by whether NA, ro should enlarge) 
Chi square: 2.532 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.97489 
C=0.14835 
G MAST by EEUR (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by whether NATO should enlarge) 
Chi square: 8.3490 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.48064 
C=0.26840 
The level of importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Greece and for Europe presented 
statistically low levels of relationship when correlated with the question of whether NATO 
should acquire new European members in order to become an alliance for the whole of 
Europe, suggesting uncertainty for new membership in NATO. The US have not yet allowed 
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expanded NATO membership despite Eastern European's requests (and the PFP plan), and this 
is probably due to the uncertainty over the new role to be played by NATO In Europe. 
GMAST by MAST (Level of importance of Maastricht for Greece by level of importance of Maastricht for Europe) 
Chi square: 34.279 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.50509 
As expected, those elites who felt that the Maastricht Treaty was important for Greece also felt 
that the Treaty was important for Europe. There is a statistical relationship suggesting that 
Maastricht is an essential step towards closer international cooperation and could help towards 
the problem of European defence. 
MEM by CONT 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether European security should be dealt with by European in 
character arrangements) 
Chi square: 8.8013 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01872 
C=0.40783 
MELOS by CONT 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether European security should be dealt with by 
European in character arrangements) 
Chi square: 3.46402 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.59775 
C=0.16567 
The questions of whether Greece should remain a member of NATO and whether Greece 
should remain a member of NATO and the EC were correlated with the statement that Europe 
should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security through 
arrangements which are European in character such as the EC and the WEU. The elites felt 
positive about remaining members of both institutions but the contingency tables presented 
uncertainty on the five point scale as to whether Europe should break away from the US and 
NATO. It is suggested that Europeans feel that the Continent's defence is still in its early 
stages of dealing with it alone, without outside interference, reinforcing the literature review 
(Chapter 2 and 3) and supporting the argument of the lack of clear threat perception. 
MEM by CRD (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the most credible defence for Europe) 
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Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
MELOS by CRD 
Europe) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
Test of the Model - TIP :Z IC :)X :) OP 
5.756 with 12 degrees of freedom 
0.78698 
0.28246 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the most credible defence for 
3.19078 with 6 degrees of freedom 
0.76804 
0.18096 
As expected, the correlations of the questions of remaining members of NATO and the EC and 
of NATO alone with the most credible defence for Europe presented uncertainty. The 
significance levels were low and elites were divided, especially among those who felt that the 
most credible defence for Europe was NATO, including US forces, and the EC (to form a 
defence mechanism). International cooperation has stimulated options (even if they are the 
same ones), but no particular one stands out due to the lack of clear threat perception. The two 
major options of this dependent variable (CRD) reinforce respectively the "Atlantisist" and the 
"Europeanist" dilemma as discussed in chapter 3. Greek elites feel that membership in the 
EC and NATO is essential, but there is uncertainty as to which option stands out. 
MEM by EEC (continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether the EEC should provide a defence 
mechanism) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
MELOS by EEC 
a defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 
Significance: 
C= 
5.059 with 4 degrees of freedom 
0.07230 
0.29217 
(Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether the EEC should provide 
1.24819 with 2 degrees of freedom 
0.69168 
0.08641 
Seventy percent of the respondents who felt that Greece should remain a member of NATO 
and the EC felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe. It is assumed, 
along with the previous findings, that Greek elites recognise the importance of NATO, but feel 
that it is essential for the European Union to provide a defence mechanism which is European 
in character. The model is again reinforced, as international cooperation (IQ has stimulated 
another option (the EC to provide a new defence mechanism). 
MELOS by EEUR (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether NATO should 
enlarge) 
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Chi square: 6.4395 with 4 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.10071 
C=0.27350 
MEM by EEUR (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether NATO should enlarge) Chi square: 4.7613 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.75299 
C=0.22914 
The question of membership within NATO and the EC and NATO alone was correlated with 
the question of whether NATO should acquire new members in order to become a security 
structure for the whole of Europe, presenting a statistically high level of relationship. Those 
elites who agreed to continuing membership also felt that NATO should acquire new members 
suggesting that NATO should "change", and this can be seen as a new option for European 
defence, supporting the model in this study. The variety of options felt credible under various 
correlation examinations, suggesting the uncertain nature of European security. If there was a 
clear threat, the option may have pointed in one direction. Despite this, the model still holds. 
MELOS by FORM (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the best form of defence for 
Greece) 
Chi square: 4.4390 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.11477 
C=0.26424 
MEM by FORM (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the best form of defence for Greece) 
Chi square: 6.9589 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.04872 
C=0.37885 
The questions of membership in NATO and the EC were then correlated with the best form of 
defence for Greece against its first choice of a military threat (Turkey). Options 3 and 4 (the 
EC with the WEU and NATO respectively) held the majority of responses; 48% for the EC 
and WEU and approximately 35% for NATO in both correlations. As in previous 
correlations', the dilemma is evident, despite regarding membership in the EC and NATO as 
essential. This finding contradicts the model, as Turkey was seen by a majority of 
respondents as the major threat, one would expect a clear option to emerge. 
MELOS by GMIL (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by most practical alternative for 
Greece's military security) 
Chi square: 8.6972 with 4 degrees of freedom 
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Significance: 0.00091 
C=0.39846 
MEM by GMIL (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by most practical alternative for Greece's military security) 
Chi square: 12.6124 with 8 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.60436 
The model was reinforced from the correlations of membership in NATO and the EC, and 
NATO alone, with the question of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military 
security. The options did not mention the EC, but the WEU, and the responses were more 
uniform, choosing the "combination of collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE)". 
This finding suggests that NATO and the CSCE are seen as the better options compared to the 
WEU, and also the more practical. An option is chosen again, stimulated by international 
cooperation (NATO, EQ and various threat perceptions, as the question stated "under present 
circumstances" implying the consideration of the issues Greece was facing at the time of the 
study (Cypriot problem, Macedonian issue, instability in the Balkan region and Turkey). 
MEM by GRWEU (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by the WEU as an option for Greece's security) 
Chi square: 9.5580 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.0104 
C=0.44229 
MELOS by GRWEU (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by the WEU as an option for 
Greece's security) 
Chi square: 5.273 with 3 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.02580 
C=0.29410 
Approximately 70% of the respondents who felt that Greece should remain a member of 
NATO and the EC also felt that Greece interests would be better promoted through the 
Western European Union, giving another highly agreed upon option (however among no other 
alternatives). Greek elites suggested that NATO and the EC were the most practical ways of 
ensuring their military security, over the WEU, but still fancy the idea of the WEU promoting 
Greece's defence interests when questioned alone. This reinforces the defence dilemma over 
which option to choose to best deal with the state's, and the Continent's, security problems. 
International cooperation has stimulated yet another option for defence, reinforcing the model 
but at the same time creating more problems. 
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MEM by WTO (Continuing Greek membership in NATO by whether NATO should continue to exist) Chi square: 9.73606 with 8 degrees of freedom Significance: 0.01566 
C=0.41241 
MELOS by WTO (Continuing Greek membership in NATO and the EEC by whether NATO should continue to exist) 
Chi square: 3.52578 with 4 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.33569 
C=0.21082 
The questions of continuing membership of Greece in NATO and the EC, and in NATO alone, 
were correlated with the question of whether NATO should continue to exist despite the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. In both cases, a statistically high 
level of significance was presented. 70 percent of the elites who felt that Greece should 
remain as a member of NATO and the EC, and NATO alone, felt that NATO should continue 
to exist suggesting its success throughout the years and the difficulty (when analysed with 
previous correlations) in abandoning such a structure along with US assistance. International 
cooperation variables have stimulated the option of NATO's continuation, reinforcing the 
model of the study. 
EUDEF by ONLY (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the US as the only remaining 
superpower) 
Chi square: 33.259 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00818 
C=0.51565 
The question of the importance of the US in European defence was correlated with the 
question of whether the US was the only remaining superpower in the world, presenting a high 
level of significance. Those elites who felt that the US was important for European defence, 
also agreed with the US being the only superpower in the world, suggesting that the US is 
important as a superpower for Europe's security. It is assumed that Greece and Europe would 
continue stable relations with the US because of the belief that the US would assist in the event 
of a crisis. Such US assistance seems to meet with the approval of the Greek elites mainly 
when it is related to the defence of the Continent. This intervening variable assumes that the 
character of European defence in the 1990s will include the US. 
EUDEF by CONT 
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(Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether European security should deal with Continental matters only) 
Chi square: 40.410 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.02221 
C=0.53765 
US by CONT 
(Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether European security should deal with Continental 
matters only) 
Chi square: 50.713 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.60748 
Significance levels were high when the question of whether the US should break away from 
the US and NATO and deal with matters of the Continent only was correlated with the level of 
importance of the US for European defence and for European affairs. In both cases, the data 
presented uncertainty supporting the dilemma of what would be the new character for 
European defence; there was no clear indication. Should Europeans keep the Americans 
involved or excluded and should Europe deal with European affairs only? These questions 
remain unanswered, despite the statistically high significance of the relationship between them. 
EUDEF by CRD (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the most credible alternative for 
European defence) 
Chi square: 51.5038 with 36 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.07578 
C=0.57648 
US by CRD (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the most credible alternative for 
European defence) 
Chi square: 49.93304 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01186 
C=0.54921 
The dilemma of which option to choose was reinforced through the results of the correlations 
of which alternative for European defence was the most credible with the level of importance 
of the US for Europe's defence and in European affairs. The apparent lack of a clear threat 
perception for Europe - the study has suggested various possible issue areas with different 
levels of importance for Greece and for Europe - does not assist the model towards the quest 
for the most credible alternative for European defence. The options with the highest 
percentages are those of NATO and the EC, two completely different institutions in nature, 
with 65% in both cases. This reinforces the dilemma of choosing between an "Atlantisist" or 
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The involvement of the US, however, was 
unclear in the contingency tables analysed, especially in the case of the US importance in 
European affairs. The responses of the Greek elite's mirror the problem of finding an option to 
fit the Europe of the 1990s, but they still reinforce the model, in its negative direction 
however, as the apparent lack of clear threat perception does not (according to the model), 
assist in the quest towards an option. The first part of the model holds better, as the 
identification or assumption of possible threats stimulate international cooperation, even if 
these threats are not as clear as the former Cold War threats. This statement can be considered 
as a general finding of the study. 
EUDEF by EEC (Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether the EEC should provide a 
defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 15.4927 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.28538 
C=0.35624 
US by EEC (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether the EEC should provide a 
defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 9.727 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.32316 
C=0.29341 
Those elites who felt that the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe also felt that 
the US was important for European defence while those elites who felt the EC should provide 
a defence mechanism for Europe felt rather uncertain of the future role of the US in European 
affairs. The EC is seen as an option for defence by Greek elites, despite their quite strong 
feelings about continuing US assistance in European defence matters. The indication is that 
the US is still important for defensive issues in Europe, but it is time for the EC to deal with 
security. This finding also supports the discussion in the literature review about which option 
to choose (Chapters 3 and 4) and gives the EC a responsibility for security in Europe from its 
own part. 
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EUDEF by EEUR (Level of importance of the US for European defence by whether NATO should enlarge) Chi square: 39.255 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.67940 
US by EEUR (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by whether NATO should enlarge) 
Chi square: 23.87 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.08636 
C=0.44830 
The question of whether NATO should acquire new members to its mechanism in order to 
become an alliance that could serve the whole of Europe was correlated with the level of 
importance of the US in European defence and in European affairs in general. The attitude 
was that NATO should include more members and that the US was still important for 
European defence, but not so much so for European affairs. NATO has broadened, including 
Eastern European members in the alliance, but not as full members. This has occurred 
through the Partnership for Peace plan (PEP) as discussed in chapter 4. It seems likely that 
the US will continue to play a role in Europe mostly through NATO, and use NATO as an 
umbrella that could deter Eastern European states from threatening the West or creating 
instabilities in their own areas. 
EUDEF by FORM (Level of importance of the US for European defence by best from of defence for 
Greece) 
Chi square: 38.04262 
Significance: 0.05060 
C=0.51829 
US by FORM (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by best from of defence for Greece) 
Chi square: 23.686 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.06854 
C=0.44954 
As far as which was the best form for Greece's defence against their first choice of military 
threat, when correlated with the importance of the US for European defence and for European 
affairs, it appeared that an integration of all European continental forces (EC and WEU with 
49%) and NATO (with 34%) occupied the majority. Those elites who felt that these two were 
the best options for European defence also felt that the US was still important for the 
defence 
of the Continent. NATO implies US involvement, but the EC and the 
WEU do not (the WEU 
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could possibly be seen as a NATO structure as discussed in chapter 3), creating uncertainty 
and differences in opinion as to which option to choose. 
EUDEF by GMIL (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the most practical alternative for Greece's security) 
Chi square: 24.104 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.45143 
C=0.44304 
US by GMIL (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the most practical alternative for 
Greece's security) 
Chi square: 23.65762 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.19510 
C=0.41488 
The question of which would be the best way for Greece to ensure its military stability was 
correlated with the level of importance of the US for European defence and for European 
affairs in general. The results suggest that the combination of collective security arrangements 
such as NATO and the CSCE as the best way to ensure military security for Greece and that 
the US is important for European defence issues. NATO seems to occupy the primary 
position among others, but the Greek elites recognise the importance for Europe to find other 
ways and mechanisms to secure the continent, as seen in the findings of previous correlations. 
The US is considered important again for Greece's military security and for Europe's defence 
but not necessarily in other areas. 
EUDEF by GRWEU (Level of importance of the US for European defence by the WEU as an option for 
Greece's security) 
Chi square: 24.65802 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.17089 
C=0.44005 
US by GRWEU (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by the WEU as an option for Greece's 
security) 
Chi square: 12.928 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.50115 
C=0.32187 
Most elites who felt that the Western European Union would best promote Greece's interests 
also felt that the US was important for European defence, supporting the previous 
finding. 
Greece's elites recognise that Europe should deal with security through institutions "European" 
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in character but do not seem to want to abandon other structures such as NATO which has 
contributed to their security. 
EUDEF by WTO (Level of importance of the US for European defence by NATO should continue to exist) 
Chi square: 51.00319 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00025 
C=0.60225 
US by VVTO (Level of importance of the US for European affairs by NATO should continue to exist) 
Chi square: 76.3961 with 17 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00000 
C=0.67295 
The results from the correlations of whether NATO should continue to exist despite the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the level of importance of the US in European affairs and 
for European defence presented, as expected, statistically high levels of significance. NATO 
was considered as essential for Europe, despite the dissolution of its counterpart and the US 
also as important for European defence. NATO is assisted by the US and it can be assumed 
that the US importance for European defence is reflected from this connection. The 
mechanisms continuation is necessary to filter US assistance in Europe in that character. 
Furthermore, elites felt rather uncertain, as reflected from the contingency table, about US 
involvement in European affairs in general. 
ONLY by CONT 
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether European security should only deal with matters of the 
continent) 
Chi square: 24.35809 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.02502 
C=0.43854 
ONLY by EEC 
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether the EEC should provide a defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 24.402 with 6 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00150 
C=0.42406 
The correlation between the question of whether the United States was seen as the only 
remaining superpower in the world was correlated with the questions of whether 
Europe 
should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the Continent's security only through 
arrangements which are European in character, such as the EC and the 
WEU, and the question 
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of whether the EEC should form a defence mechanism for European security. All of these 
correlations presented statistically high levels of significance. 70 percent of those elites who 
felt that the US was the only remaining superpower In the world also felt that the EC should 
provide a defence mechanism for Europe. This suggests that Greek elites recognise the power 
of the US in world affairs, but it does not mean that Europeans should only rely on the US and 
not embark towards the creation of a defence mechanism for Europe. This feeling is reflected 
from the results of the correlation ONLY BY CONT. The elites were not uniform in their 
opinions as to whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with the 
Continent's security only through "European" in character mechanisms. This reflects the 
dilemma of which option to choose and is being considered despite them agreeing with the 
statement of the US as the only remaining superpower in the world. The US is a superpower 
and is important and therefore there is a dilemma as to whether Europe should break-away 
from NATO and the US and let the EC provide a defence mechanism. 
ONLY by EEUR (The US as the only remaining superpower by whether NATO should include new 
members) 
Chi square: 16.8120 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.28401 
C=0.35970 
ONLY by WTO (The US as the only remaining superpower by NATO should continue to exist despite the 
fall of the VVTO) 
Chi square: 14.834 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.34981 
C=0.3453 
The correlations of the question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the 
world with the questions of whether NATO should include new members for its continuation 
as an alliance for the whole of Europe and how important is it for NATO to perceive new 
threats for its continuation. These correlations produced statistically high levels of 
significance. Most elites who felt that threat perception is important for NATO's continuation 
also felt that the United States is the only remaining superpower in the world. Apparently, 
Greek elites recognise the importance of NATO for European security along with US 
assistance (probably, based on previous assumptions, through NATO) and NATO's new 
responsibilities in expanding and perceiving new threats. These two points reinforce the 
literature review and the model, as threat perception is an essential requirement towards 
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determining a credible option. The PFP (Partnership for Peace) plan of NATO has led in that 
direction by including new Eastern European members, although without full membership, and 
has tried to adjust to become a "crisis management mechanism", as discussed in the literature 
review, for European security and to deal with threats as they evolve. The Yugoslav crisis is 
one example, but it remains to be seen if the lack of clear threat perception will create 
problems. 
ONLY by GRWEIJ 
(The US as the only remaining superpower by whether Greece's interests could be better promoted through the 
WE-= U) 
Chi square: 24.767 with 9 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00224 
C=0.45621 
The question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world was correlated 
with the question of whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western 
European Union, presenting a statistically high significance level. Those elites who felt that 
the US is the only remaining superpower in the world also felt that Greece's interests could be 
better promoted through the WEU. Again, as in the previous correlations, Greek elites strive 
towards a European solution for their defence interests, while at the same time they recognise 
the need, as suggested, for stable relations with the US. This creates more ambiguity as to the 
shape of the future European character. 
ONLY by CRD (The US as the only remaining superpower by the most credible defence for Europe) 
Chi square: 21.825 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.10767 
C=0.45556 
ONLY by FORM 
(The US as the only remaining superpower by the best form of defence against Greece's first option of a military 
threat) 
Chi square: 19.2195 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00428 
C=0.47444 
ONLY by GMIL (The US as the only remaining superpower by the most practical way for Greece to ensure 
its military security) 
Chi square: 15.7263 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.14482 
C=0.38405 
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The question of whether the US is the only remaining superpower in the world was correlated 
with the following different statements: the most credible option for Europe's defence; the 
best form of a defence against Greece's first option of a military threat; and the most practical 
way for Greece to ensure its military security. In all cases, statistical significance was high. 
As far as the most practical way to ensure Greece's military security, those elites who felt that 
the US is the only remaining military superpower in the world felt that the combination of 
collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE) was the best option (65%). The options did 
not include the EC, as practicality implies existing structures, and the choice of option was 
clear. In the other two cases, however, a difference of opinion among the options appeared as 
NATO and the EC occupied the primary positions. 39 respondents felt that NATO, including 
the US, is the most credible alternative and that the US is the only remaining superpower in the 
world. The option of the EC providing a defence mechanism for Europe had the second 
strongest following (23 respondents) among those who also believed that the US is the only 
remaining superpower in the world. Furthermore, as for what would be the best from of 
defence against Greece's perception of a military threat (Turkey occupied a primary position as 
a threat for Greece), 44 respondents would rely on NATO and 34 on the EC with the Western 
European Union, among those who also felt that the US is considered the only remaining 
superpower in the world. These divisions in opinion were expected, and the reason that some 
options were omitted in specific questions was to better determine the option most relied on. 
From these cases, a clear dilemma has arose; between a "Europeanist" or an "Atlantisist" 
structure. This diversity comes from the apparent lack of clear threat perception. It would be 
logical to say that during the period of the Cold War, NATO along with US assistance would 
have been preferred to deter European or, for the purpose of the case study, Greek threats, at it 
had deterred the Soviets and the expansion of communism. It is likely that Europeans would 
not tinker with other options at such a time. These findings reflect and represent the changing 
character of European security. Threat perceptions vary in their levels of importance, and 
Europeans striving towards the establishment of the new nature of their defence option (not 
necessarily abandoning existing structure such as NATO) are having trouble providing a 
uniform answer due to the apparent lack of clear threat perception. 
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EUDEF1 by CONT 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether Europe should break away 
from NATO and deal with security with mechanisms European in character) 
Chi square: 36.8811 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01005 
C=0.49414 
A statistically high significance level was presented from the correlation of whether European 
security should only deal with matters of the Continent with the question of whether Europe 
should break away from NATO and deal with security only through European in character 
institutions such as the EC and the WEU. The contingency table presented a division in 
responses to both questions. The correlation did not point in one direction suggesting a 
diversity and uncertainty about whether European security should, after breaking away from 
NATO, only deal with European issues and whether Europe should deal with the Continent's 
security through "European" in character arrangements. These findings reflect the general 
discussion in the literature review of the dilemma facing European security in what would be 
its new face. 
EUDEF1 by WTO 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether NATO should continue to 
exist) 
Chi square: 19.72913 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.33495 
C=0.39050 
EUDEFlbyEEUR 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether NATO should include new 
Eastern European members) 
Chi square: 24.95124 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.05115 
C= 0.46122 
The question of whether European security should only deal with matters of the 
Continent was 
correlated with the question of whether NATO should continue to exist, 
despite the end of the 
Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and whether NATO should 
include Eastern 
European members in order to become an alliance for the whole of the 
Continent. 
Statistically high levels of significance were presented, especially for the 
latter. The majority 
of elites who felt that European security should only 
deal with matters of the Continent also 
felt that NATO should continue to exist despite the above changes 
in Europe. However, elites 
were rather uncertain as to whether NATO should 
include new East European members. 
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These findings suggest that an ambiguity exists as to the character of European security in the 
1990s. Elites would like to see NATO expanding and continuing to exist, but it is unclear 
whether European security (even through NATO) should only deal with matters of the 
Continent. It could be assumed, based on the Cold War era character, that if there existed a 
clear threat, responses would have been more uniform as to the question of whether European 
security should deal with matters of the Continent only. 
EUDEFI by CRD 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the most credible defence for 
Europe) 
Chi square: 42.777 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01843 
C=0.44109 
EUDEF1 by FORM 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the best form of defence for 
Greece's perception of a military threat) 
Chi square: 24.0856 with 18 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.08615 
C=0.44109 
EUDEFI by GMIL 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by the most practical way for Greece to 
ensure military security) 
Chi square: 20.86596 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.30298 
C=0.39389 
The question of whether Europe should only deal with matters of the Continent was correlated 
with the questions of the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security, the most 
credible alternative for European defence, and the best form of defence for Greece against the 
elites' perception of a military threat. All three options presented statistically high 
significance levels and a diversity in the alternative of the dependent variable (the option). As 
in previous correlations, those elites who felt that Europe should only deal with matters of the 
Continent also felt that NATO and the CSCE would be the most practical way to ensure 
Greece's security. This suggests that elites expect NATO to deal with European issues only, or 
at least for it to be dominated by them. Furthermore, Greek elites feel that NATO, when 
dealing with European issues, would be able to secure Greece's military security. 
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The results from the contingency table of the other two correlation (EUDEFI by FORM, 
EUDEFI by CRD) reflected a division in opinions of the elites questioned. Those elites who 
felt uncertain as to whether European security should only deal with matters of the Continent 
were also uncertain in their choice between the two major alternatives (NATO and the US, and 
EC with the WEU) for the most credible defence for Europe and the best for defence against 
Greece's perception of a military threat; in other words, between "Atlantisists" and 
"Europeanists". International cooperation is sought through these institutions, but should they 
deal only with European matters? It must be noted that the NATO option in both instances 
occupies the majority of responses, although the EC and the WEU hold a significant 
percentage (49% and 35% respectively for FORM, and 42% and 24% respectively for CRD). 
These findings reflect the defence problem for Europe in the 1990s and reinforce the relevant 
discussion in the literature review. The model still holds as intervening variables that 
influence international cooperation, along with the apparent lack of clear threat perception, 
create problem in choosing a uniform and consistent option. Questions such as the inclusion 
of new members for NATO, if the EC should provide a defence mechanism and whether 
European security should deal with matters of the Continent only, negatively stimulate the 
dependent variable, as these and other relevant questions reflect the dilemma and questions for 
European defence in the 1990s. Consequently, uniform responses are limited. It would be 
logical to assume that if these questions could be uniformly answered, the option would have 
been clearer. For example, there was no issue as to whether NATO should expand to the East 
or whether it should continue to exist as during the Cold War era due to the East - West 
confrontation. Therefore, NATO would most probably occupy the primary position in 
responses. 
EUDEFI by EEC 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether the EEC should provide a 
defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 13.7126 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.30350 
C=0.29561 
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EUDEF1 by GRWEU 
(Whether European security should only deal with matters of the continent by whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the WEU) 
Chi square: 26.81686 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00138 
C=0.49425 
The question of whether European security should deal with matters of the Continent only was 
correlated with the questions of whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for 
Europe and whether Greece's interests would be better promoted through the Western 
European Union, presenting rather high levels of significance. Despite the results reflecting a 
positive feeling towards the EC providing a defence mechanism for Europe, and the WEU as 
an institution where Greece's interest could better be promoted, the question of whether 
European security should deal with matters of the Continent only demonstrated divisions in 
opinion. The Gulf War, the Yugoslav crisis and the instability in the Balkan region seem to 
have left Europeans with a question of whether to deal with out-of-area threat or 
out-of-Continent threats. Greek elites applaud the efforts of the WEU and would like to see 
the EC providing for defence with possibly a separate institution. However, the great 
interdependence of the world in the 20"' century implies that issues, even out of the Continent, 
have an influence on Europe, as the Gulf War did in 1990. The EC had to eventually deal 
with it through European political cooperation. The manner, and with what option to deal 
with such issues is, however, problematic. 
TURbyCONT 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by whether Europe shouid break away from the US and NATO and deal with 
European security through "European" in character mechanisms such as the EEC and the WEU) 
Chi square: 35.3475 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00421 
C=0.51990 
TUR by VVTO 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by whether NATO should continue to exist despite the dissolution of the WTO and 
the end of the Cold War) 
Chi square: 43.70301 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.00005 
C=0.58106 
TUR by EEUR 
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(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by whether NATO should include Eastern European members to become an alliance 
for the whole of Europe) 
Chi square: 24.06282 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.06265 
C=0.46533 
As expected, those elites who felt that NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a 
possible conflict between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO members also felt that NATO 
should continue to exist despite the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact and that NATO should include Eastern European states in order to become an alliance for 
the whole of Europe. These findings reflect NATO's success throughout the institution's 
existence and the need for it to continue as an enlarged security organisation for Europe and 
specifically for Greece (to contain fears of a Turkish threat). 
However, when the question of whether NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a 
possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members, was correlated 
with the question of whether Europe should break away from NATO and the US and deal with 
the Continent's security only through institutions "European" in character such as the EC and 
the WEU, divisions in opinion were presented. Most elites believed in NATO's success in 
Greaco - Turkish relations but were uncertain, as would 
be expected, as to whether Europe 
should break away from NATO and the US. It is assumed that Greek elites would 
like to see 
Europeans taking more responsibility as far as defence is concerned either through NATO or 
the WEU. They felt uneasy, however, about the thought of abandoning US assistance through 
NATO. Again, options are presented, reinforcing the model of the study. 
TUR by EEC 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between 
Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by whether the EEC should provide a 
defence mechanism) 
Chi square: 10.006 with 8 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.23056 
C=0.31572 
TUR by GRWEU 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict 
between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by whether Greece's interests would 
be better promoted through the WEU) 
Chi square: 21.3407 with 12 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.09945 
C=0.40616 
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Both of the above correlations presented statistically high significance levels. Those elites 
who agreed with the statement that NATO is a major reason for containing a possible Greaco - 
Turkish conflict as both states are members, were uncertain as to whether the EC should 
provide a defence mechanism for Europe (37%), but felt that Greece's interests would be better 
promoted through the WEU (64%). This finding is explained by the assumption that NATO 
has done a successful job in containing a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict and therefore the 
WEU could do the same due to Greece being a full member and Turkey having associate 
membership status. Based on this, there is no reason for the EC to provide another forum, 
especially for the idea of containing the Turkish threat (in the opinion of the Greek elites as 
related to the Turkish issue). 
TUR by CRD 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by the most credible defence for Europe) 
Chi square: 36.16535 with 24 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.10660 
C=0.50907 
TUR by FORM 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by the best form of defence against Greece's perception of a military threat) 
Chi square: 42.02561 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: C=0.00015 
C=0.56563 
TUR by GMIL 
(Whether NATO had been the major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey 
as both are NATO members by the most practical way for Greece to ensure its military security) 
Chi square: 26.246651 with 16 degrees of freedom 
Significance: 0.01573 
C=0.49277 
The question of whether NATO is a major reason for containing fears of a possible Greaco - 
Turkish conflict as both are NATO members was correlated with the questions of the most 
practical way for Greece to ensure its security; the most credible alternative for European 
defence and the best form of defence against the elites' response to the most probable military 
threat for Greece at the present time (question 3). Significance levels were high, reflecting a 
level of uncertainty as to a clear alternative in all three correlations, based on the contingency 
table data. Although a relatively high percentage of elites felt that NATO is a major reason 
that contained fears of a possible Greaco - Turkish conflict, the options did not point in one 
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specific direction. NATO and the EC occupied the primary position, reinforcing the defence 
problem of choosing between European or Atlantic. The interesting note to make is that 
Turkey, as the most clear threat for Greece's security, did not present NATO as a deterrent, at 
least not uniformly. 
In the related question of the best form of defence against this threat, 40 responses were for 
NATO and 30 for the EC, of those elites who felt NATO had been, and still is, a deterrent 
between Greece and Turkey. 
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Summary 
This thesis has aimed to contribute to the issue of European security by examining the importance and necessity of threat perception towards the management of security in the 
post Cold War era. 
The Problem 
The problem which stimulated this study was derived from the geo - political developments 
which have been taking place since 1989 in Europe. The events of 1989 marked the end of 
the Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of a "new era" in relations 
among European states. From the review of the literature, it was observed that the 
perceptions of threat which were determining factors for the creation of collective security 
arrangements between 1945 and 1989 might no longer apply for Europe in the 1990s, or at 
least that perceptions of threat might be assuming a different role in stimulating a defence 
posture. 
European states, during the Cold War, formed alliances in order to face one or several of 
the following threats: 
- The Soviet Union; 
- Communism; 
- Germany. 
Many ideas were advanced and explored to collectively secure states, starting with the 
formation of the Western European Union, NATO, the ECSC, the EDC attempt, the 
Warsaw Pact, and the CSCE. All of these had something in common: they all had certain 
perceptions of threat. Some have failed to contribute to security, while others, such as 
NATO, are thought to have played an important role in European defence. However 
successful these organisations might have been, they all displayed perceptions of certain 
threats which led them towards international cooperation (TP :0 IC). 
The situation after 1989 has been one of great uncertainty due to the perceived 
disappearance - or changing nature - of the above threats for Europe. The changing 
character of Europe, either related to the formation of the new democracies of the former 
Eastern bloc and the gradual disintegration of the former Soviet Union, have created an 
area where there is no longer a clear threat for Europe. Issues and crises will undoubtedly 
continue to exist, but these are unlikely to be the same as those issues which dominated the 
period from 1945 to 1989. Structures which were formed to deter Germany, the Soviet 
Union, and the expansion of Communism are called upon to provide defence for many states 
against which they were originally formed to deter. Arguably, some of the structures 
mentioned above may be characterised as being out-of-date in the spirit and letter of their 
original constitutions. 
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Therefore, keeping in mind the essential need of states to collectively secure their existence, 
as discussed in chapter I of this thesis, has the absence of clear threats affected the 
existing security structures? How important is it for states or structures to perceive 
threats? 
Western Europe is preoccupied with integration, high levels of rnaterial well being and 
political stability, whereas the states of the former Eastern bloc are characterised by political 
turbulence, the destruction of civil society by Communism, economic stagnation, an 
outmoded industrial structure and a revival of ethnic and nationalist tensions. The new 
European architecture is being built on three pillars or forms of integration and cooperation: 
economics, politics and security. Complex agendas of inter - state relations are being 
addressed in a number of different forums: the EC, NATO, CSCE, and WEU, a few which 
have concerned this study. The problems of political reconstruction in Eastern / Central 
Europe are no less formidable than those of economic reconstruction. The experiences of 
totalitarian rule, the weakness of democratic traditions and the disappearance of most aspects 
of civil society under Communism have left these states ill - equipped to make the transition 
to stable democracies. This concern has created dilemmas about how these states will 
eventually transform and how their transition may or not affect the security of the Continent. 
The end of the Cold War does not mean an end to security threats (Laffan, Integration and 
Cooperation in Europe, 1992). Are these developments in Europe important enough for 
states or structures to take into consideration? Are these developments the areas of 
threat perception in the 1990s? 
The Evidence 
The European Continent still has a heavy concentration of troops, tanks and weapons. The 
former Soviet Union republics, Russian power and the Gulf War issue highlight some of the 
concerns that may affect the Continent. The existing institutions discussed in the review of 
the literature as options for European security are attempting to grapple with the profound 
changes affecting security and defence. This implies that these institutions, as discussed in 
the literature review, have identified new areas of concern, different from those during the 
Cold War era, and are attempting to adjust. The security options examined in chapter 4 
carry important reasons for continuation of their "services", by providing security for their 
member states either militarily or through "negotiating" security issues through their 
platforms: 
- The CSCE is tile only platform which is concerned with security 
issues that incorporates 
the "whole" of Europe, even the former Soviet Union Republics with the United States and 
Canada. 
-Based on history, NATO carries with 
it the American commitment towards Europe's 
security, an essential requirement for Europe's transitional period. As discussed through the 
literature, Western European analysts see a US presence as a prudent and necessary 
counterweight to future Russian power. 
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- The WEU and the EC have a "European" character and are forums in which Europe can 
take over its own security issues if the US decides to reduce its commitment. The WEU can 
be seen as the bridge between NATO and the EC while the EC could eventually tackle 
issues such as arms control and disarmament as a part of developing a common foreign 
policy. The Maastricht Treaty refers to the WEU as the implementing arm of the EU 
concerning defence and security. However, the future shape of a European security policy 
will depend - partly - on what happens to NATO and on developments in the wider 
Continent, especially in the former Eastern bloc and how involved the United States would 
wish to be in Europe. One of the problems that these structures are encountering is that they 
have an unclear threat perception, or at least their perception of threat does not appear to be 
as clear as it was during the Cold War era. 
After the dissolution of the WTO in 1994, NATO created the Partnership For Peace plan 
(PfP) and called on Eastern European states to cooperate defensively, offering them possible 
full membership (in NATO) in the future. Furthermore, NATO's character is now one of a 
crisis management mechanism, with the task of assisting in arising situations that may affect 
the security of its members. The CSCE has become a debative platform which includes 
more than four dozen states, all with equal vote. Therefore, despite the absence of clear 
perceptions of threat, structures have continued to cooperate internationally and 
efforts have continued to exist in order to provide for Europe's defence. This 
assumption was made in hypothesis three (3), which dealt with the probability of a threat, 
even if seen as less specific, as most likely to stimulate rather than hinder, international 
cooperation. 
Lack of clear perception of threat has created doubts on the ability of these organisations to 
justify their continued existence. The EC and NATO have been concerned about the 
Yugoslav issue almost since it began (1991 - 1992). Therefore, it is essential to question 
whether the Yugoslav crisis provided a way for NATO (for example), to focus on a crisis 
and thus justify its continued existence and military build-up. The reason for this assumption 
is based on the fact that the former Yugoslavia was not a NATO member, and therefore 
NATO's involvement was not a matter that was based on the treaty is articles. Arguably, if 
the Yugoslav crisis had not materialised, the situation of justifying the purposes and 
existence for these institutions might have been even more difficult (NATO, CSCE, 
EC, 
WEU), and especially for NATO, to survive intact. 
For analysing Europe's new face and challenges, it was essential to 
investigate the options 
for European defence, their strengths and weakness, and to make an attempt to explain 
whether the absence of a clear threat is creating difficulties 
for their managernent. It was 
therefore essential to ask: 
-Whether the US was still required 
for Europe's defence; 
-The level of importance of threat perception 
for Europe of the 1990s; 
-Which alternative would 
best provide for Europe's defensive concerns; 
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-Which areas of concern would be most likely to materialise; 
-What type of requirements are essential for NATO's continued success; 
General Conclusions 
-Whether external threats should be included on the European defence agenda; 
-Whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism; 
-Whether the absence of a clear and specific threat was causing any problem to the existing 
security institutions. 
The literature review endeavoured to demonstrate the importance threat perception had for 
the management of the Cold War era, and it served as the basis for building the model 
(presented in figure 3 of chapter 7 and figure 5 of this chapter), which was proposed with a 
view to providing an insight to the above questions if examined empirically. The model was 
derived from the literature review examination which pointed out two important findings: a) 
the importance of threat perception for security mechanisms through history and b) the 
absence of clear threat perception in the 1990s, expressed by defence analysts, which may 
create problems for security structures to successfully deal with these. The model 
hypothesises that threat perception is an essential requirement for the management of 
the post Cold War era. The model suggests the continued importance of threat perception 
as a stimulus which may lead to international cooperation and systematically towards an 
effective option for security (either from the existing structures or from a new one). 
"Effective cooperation is easiest in the face of a clear common threat. Remember that NATO 
was notformed until 1949, when it had become apparent that the Soviet Union presented a 
serious threat to the West... Now, holding the alliance together is difficult precisely because 
the Soviet threat has disappeared" ( The Economist, June 10,1995, p. 15). 
Empirical Work 
The state chosen to examine the above hypothesis was Greece due to convenience and 
personal interest. The sample of Greek elites was believed to be an effective way of 
examination into such a hypothesis for the reasons presented in chapters 5&7. It is noted 
that the sarnple was sought to elicit information on the wider topics of European defence and 
threat perception and must be seen in this manner (see figure 4). 
Figure 4 
'111REAT PERCEPTION 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
CASE STUDY 
SAMPLE 
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A questionnaire was developed in order to gather information which would help test the 
model. The method of "direct gathering" (collecting evidence at first hand through 
questions) was determined as a convenient and effective way for examining such 
propositions. Statistical testing was undertaken with the intention of: 
a) establishing the extent to which there were relationships among identified variables, 
explaining the data in descriptive terms, and 
b) examining the possibility of differences in opinion stated among the various types of 
respondents, as discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
The statistical tests used were decided after discussion with individuals with a research and 
statistical background. The statistical programme used was the SPSS for Windows. 
Additional interviews with a number of London based international elites from 6 different 
European states were undertaken. The reason for these interviews was to further discuss the 
credibility of the model and the findings from the field study. The respondents from this 
'second research enquiry f were relevant to the study based on their interest and knowledge 
on the subject matter. Most interviewees were defence attaches in their respective embassies 
in London while the rest were relevant in an academic manner (Director of Atlantic Council 
- Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS). Excerpts from these 
interviews are presented in this chapter while more extensive notes are presented in 
Appendix A. It was believed that the interviews could provide important personal viewpoints 
on security concerns and specific threats from various European states (Greece, Turkey, 
Russia, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Cyprus), as the case study was concerned with one 
European state (Greece). In addition, it was essential to notice whether any threats were 
perceived as "common" (to Europe and to Greece). 
(It must be noted, as earlier in chapter 5, that Greece does is not used in this study to 
represent the whole of Europe. As argued in chapter 5, there is no "typical" state that could 
possibly represent the whole Continent. Each state enjoys its own culture, identity, values 
and interests and therefore the findings of this thesis represent the Greek sample chosen and 
must be seen in this manner. ) 
The field study has provided a considerable amount of information related to the model. The 
methodology has allowed for a quantitatively based approach which could uncover rankings 
of importance, seriousness of threats, the importance of threat perception and structure 
preferences. In sum, the results of the research do provide some support for the model, 
despite the change in the strategic context of Europe. Specifically, in the case of the 
perception of threats, those which were perceived as important appeared to have a 
statistically positive relationship with international cooperation and options for defence. 
For example, as Turkey was seen as the most important threat for Greece's security, the 
relationship with the best form of defence against this threat was high, and the first option 
chosen was clear (NATO at 70%). 
There is support for the six proposed hypotheses presented in Chapter 7 which served as 
stepping stones towards the evolution of the model. Before the discussion of each of the 
result areas is considered it is germane to review how these hypotheses held: Hypothesis I 
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stated that external threats provide a stimulus for a state to engage in international 
cooperation. From the results of the analysis of the questionnaire data, in the majority of 
situations that dealt with external threats or any possible concern, international cooperation 
was sought (7 out of 8 questions). Areas of concern such as Turkey (for Greece 
especially), Macedonia, or the Yugoslav crisis clearly stimulated international cooperation. 
In these cases where a threat appeared improbable or was seen not as important, 
international cooperation was again sought for, thus supporting hypothesis 3, which dealt 
with the probability of a threat, even if seen as less specific, as most likely to stimulate 
rather than hinder international cooperation. German reunification is a relevant example as 
Germany remains of concern although not one thought likely to materialise in the 
foreseeable future. US involvement in European defence and "stable relations" as a method 
of securing a state as well as structures such as the EC or NATO were presented when the 
related correlation was undertaken. The above findings were supported by the interviews 
undertaken as well. Apart from Lieutenant Commander Theophanides from the Greek 
embassy, who felt that Germany should be a major concern for Europe because of the 
state's economic power, geographical position and history, the other interviewees felt that 
Germany was not a preoccupation for their states. In addition, "stable relations" were also 
seen as essential for securing states and especially Captain Yordanov of the Bulgarian 
embassy who felt that closer relations between states, could provide the "necessary balance 
required to avert threats". Taking his argument further, Captain Yordanov felt that stable 
relations of states could be achieved through collective security institutions such as NATO, 
as " the possibility of Bulgaria becoming a member of NATO could make his state the 
balance between Greece and Turkey". 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that the improbability of a threat arising, or a threat which is not 
seen as serious, is not likely to lead to new responsive action. In all the relevant questions 
in the questionnaire, new options were not presented by the respondents when threats were 
not seen as serious (for example Germany, Albania and the Neo - Nazi movement). 
Hypothesis 5 proposed that the absence of threat perception makes the selection of a defence 
option uncertain, as options for international cooperation may vary. From the field study, 
apart from the case of Turkey as a clear threat for Greece, Greek elites felt rather uncertain 
about clear threats for Europe. Levels of importance differed to concerns that were linked 
to Greece and to Europe. The Yugoslav crisis, the break-up of the former Soviet Union, 
and Russia specifically, seerned important but did not yield statistically significant results. 
The above uncertainty in perceptions of threat was identified by all the interviewees 
presented in Appendix A. Chakallis, First Secretary of the Cyprus High Commission, 
Duncan of the IISS and Daukes of the UK Ministry of Defence all related this uncertainty to 
the continuing instability on the Continent. Chakallis argued that " the situation in Europe 
was still vague" while Daukes and Duncan supported the differences in perceptions of threat 
concerning Europe and Greece when presented with this empirical finding: "A threat 
is a 
subjective judgement different for each statesman and state " (Daukes), " Issues of concern 
such as Macedonia or Turkey logically concern Greece to a greater extent 
due to geography 
and history" ( Duncan). As some threats or concerns were perceived as more 
important for 
Greece than for Europe (from the case study), a variety of responses were offered for the 
dependent variable (option): 
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- NATO was seen as a successful security organisation which secured Europe; tile EC was 
seen as an institution that should provide a defence mechanism for Europe; and tile Western 
European Union as an institution which could promote Greece's interests, but only when 
considered alone as an option. When among others as an option, NATO and tile EC were 
preferred to the WEU. Based on hypothesis 2 which proposed that the type of threat 
involved is an important determinant of the type of response (option), it is suggested that the 
lack of a clear threat, despite leading to international co-operation (based on the above 
hypothesis), impedes the quest towards a clear defence option. Developing this argument 
further, the more numerous the threats, the more difficult it would be to choose an option as 
attention would have to be focused on various areas and readiness to deal with possible 
crises would have to be certain. This finding was reinforced and identified by the London 
based elites interviewed and presented in Appendix A. Specifically, the Greek military and 
naval attache, Theophanidis and First Secretary to the Cyprus High Commission, Chakallis 
stated that the continuing instability in Europe due to the transformation of the former 
Eastern bloc has created uncertainties and a number of new issues that needed to be 
addressed. It was believed that only when this instability was removed would Europe be able 
to more easily focus on an option for security. However, in most instances, NATO was seen 
(by all the interviewees apart from the Turkish official), as the only structure which would 
continue to dominate the European scene despite the accepted absence of clear perceptions 
of threat which did affect the choice of a defence option: "NATO only has the military 
capability and will continue to dominate in thefuture" (Daukes); "NATO is a good option as 
time is essential and required, until problem areas are settled" (Ivanovich); "NATO will be 
able to cope with the instabilities in Europe and serve as a crisis management mechanism" 
(Williams). 
Focusing on the general findings of the study, the following observations could be noted in 
relation to perceptions of threat and security options: 
- Greek elites felt that continuing membership in NATO, the EC and the Western European 
Union is essential for the state's security; 
- Stable relations with other Western democracies have proved effective for Greece's 
security and international co-operation can provide the basis towards collective security. 
Threat perception or the common identification of threats by Europe can indeed stimulate 
collective concern and lead towards an option for defence; 
- The levels of importance attributed to the specific threats listed in the questionnaire 
(Albania, Macedonia, Germany, former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia), varied in their 
perception as threats for "Greece" and as threats for "Europe", demonstrating a level of 
uncertainty as to which was the more essential. This finding reinforces the argument 
developed in chapter 4 as well as that developed by the London interviewees, concerning the 
difficulty in abandoning national interests. In most cases, however, international 
cooperation was stimulated by the listed threats, thus supporting the model; Captain 
Yordanov stated that "many issues have nothing to do with Europe" and that each state has 
its own approach and level of seriousness for a specific threat, affected by history. 
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- The dependent variable, or a defence option for Europe's security, was presented in all 
instances in tile responses from the questionnaire, and apart from tile necessity of NATO, 
the EC was seen by Greek elites as an institution that should provide a defence mechanism 
for Europe. This finding was not held by the elites interviewed in London as they did not 
see the EC as an important option for Europe's defence. Brigadier Daukes (MOD), cited 
common foreign policy as the major obstacle of the EC, whereas Theophanidis (Greece) and 
Williams (Atlantic Council), were sceptical about the EC providing for Europe's defence. 
Captain Yordanov (Bulgaria), felt that there was no reason for the EC to provide for 
Europe's security when other structures such as NATO still existed. This is probably due to 
Greece's concerns about Turkey, as the EC and the WEU do not include Turkey ( at the 
time of writing Turkey is an associate member of the WEU only). 
- The United States was seen as important for Europe's defence but not necessarily 
important for European affairs in general. (The fading presence of the United States was felt 
in Greece through the closing of a number of US bases). Williams (Atlantic Council) argued 
that "the US was the cement in the NATO partnership. If the US commitment in Europe 
through NATOfades, there would be a problem with dealing with out - of area threats. 
European defence would require more investment by Europeans and this is unlikely" - 
- NATO has played a key role in the containment of Greaco - Turkish relations as both 
states are members and this has deterred them from making overt threats towards each other. 
Although this finding was heavily supported by the Turkish official, Yordanov (Bulgaria) 
and Daukes (MOD), Theophanidis (Greece) stated an interesting question of disagreement: if 
Wouldn't it have been betterfor Greece if Turkey was not a member of NATO? 
- There is uncertainty in the findings as to whether European defence should deal with only 
matters of the Continent and uncertainty as to whether issues of concern should be dealt 
through arrangements European in character, such as the EC or the WEU. This is probably 
due to the changing situation in Europe of the 1990s. Greek elites felt more clear in their 
defence structure preferences than their views on perception of threat from outside the 
Continent, and this point is not in keeping with the sequence of the model; Tile Turkish 
military official suggested that the UN would be the most efficient platform to deal with 
such areas of concern. 
NATO requires transformation and adjustment in various areas, tile major ones being the 
identification of new threat(s), membership (enlargement) and leadership. Enlargement was 
also pointed out by Ivanovich (Russia) and Yordanov (Bulgaria) as essential for NATO and 
these responses are logical if seen in conjunction with Russia's and Bulgaria's of application" 
to NATO through the PfP. 
- The Maastricht Treaty is seen as an important step for 
Europe's security and unification, 
and one that could promote Greece's interests, probably due to the fact that the EU 
does 
not, at the time of writing, include Turkey. 
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Finally, there is a difference of opinion as to the most practical way to ensure Greece's 
security and the best form of defence against Greece's most important military threat (as 
presented in the related question). NATO was seen as the best form whereas tile EC along 
with NATO occupied primary responses as being the most practical way. NATO and tile 
EC were seen as the most credible options for Europe's security. This could be attributed to 
the fact that NATO provides a defensive arm and could also manage Greece's concerns 
through its forum as it includes Greece's first choice of military threat: Turkey. The 
inclusion of the EC with NATO in the questions which were concerned with "practical" and 
"credible" defence is explained by the "conditioned" style of the question avoiding specific 
threats in the options offered. The assumption is that Greeks feel more secure defensively 
through NATO because of its military ability and US involvement. 
The findings above provide support for the model presented in figure 5 and are in keeping 
with the literature. The absence of clear threat perception created by the break-up of the 
Cold War security order has generated a sense of uncertainty about the dependent variable 
(option for European security). The fact, however, that alternative options were given by 
the respondents, reinforces the model's assumption and sequence in most cases. The EC, 
Maastricht, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, despite their character isation as defence 
options, are also interdependent in nature, as identified in the literature review. The variety 
of states involved in the above platforms brings a whole array of concerns that may or may 
not be of equal importance to all. As discussed in the general findings, the Macedonian 
issue, for example, was seen as more important for Greece than for Europe, while German 
unification was a more important threat for Europe than for Greece. 
The status quo of the Cold War era as E. L. Morse (1976), stated, had become a 
comfortable retreat... 
... in which governments 
knew how well off they were rather than think of the risks they 
would confront in an unknown future. 
Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations, p. 18 
As shown in chapters 3 and 4 (and largely supported in the subsequent analysis), the 
European defence dilemma is a consequence of the absence of a clear threat. "The post 
Cold War era is left to be managed by Cold War era mechanisms" (Pugh, 1992). The 
rapidly changing European environment seems to require additional time to adequately 
create a credible and overwhelming option as there is the need for adjustments. Should 
NATO deal with out-of-area threats? Should it include new members? Will the EC 
provide a defence mechanism? Can NATO continue being credible despite the absence of a 
clear threat such as the former Soviet Union? How much should the US be involved 
in 
European affairs? What should be the level of contribution of each state? These questions 
are just a few of the issues Europeans are confronting as discussed in this study. 
The 
research findings have served as a reinforcement of the existing European 
defence dilemma 
and provided an insight into the importance and necessity of threat perception 
for the 
(successful) management of a European defence alternative. This was the case 
during the 
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Cold War even though the research findings did not manage to answer the above questions 
clearly due to the inevitable limitations of statistical analysis discussed further oil. 
Discussion of the Model / Limitations 
Figure 5 llighlights the model sequence. The main proposition expressed in the model is 
that threat perception provides an impetus towards international cooperation and towards the 
formation of a security option (or continuation of an adjusted security option). Yet, this 
assumption should not be over-emphasised, as it is by no means uniform. As Kuhn (1964), 
has argued, " there is no such thing as research without counter - instances" (The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, p. 79). It is useful to identify some instances in which the model 
might not be as helpful. 
Identification of a common threat may not be the only way to stimulate International 
Cooperation. Most West European states and even Austria, Switzerland or Sweden, which 
have been considered by themselves and by a number of analysts as "neutral" states, have 
cooperated with their European neighbours through institutions such as EFTA or the EU 
which are "economic" in their nature. However, there is a tendency, as suggested in the 
literature review and supported by the field study, for states to also cooperate collectively 
when identifying a common threat (for example, Communism, the Soviet Union, Germany, 
or the Yugoslav crisis) which makes threat perception a stimuli for International 
cooperation. 
Figure 5- Model of study 
Importance of Turkey 
German unification 
Yugoslav crisis 
Albania 
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2ý- Russia 
Out - of - area threats 
Possession of nuclear 
power 
ý- Stable relations 
Maastricht goals 
European Union 
US support 
Interdependence 
2! - NATO 
EEC 
WEU 
CSCE 
New mechanisms? 
US leadership 
Transformed NATO 
Transformed CSCE 
A good part of this thesis was taken up with tile effort to develop and test a model of threat 
perception. With it, it was sought to account for variations and attitudes towards perceptions 
of threat and security preferences. Aside from the qualified success of tile first part of the 
model, narnely that threat perception can influence states towards international cooperation, 
tile model was limited in helping with the prediction of new challenges. This difficulty is 
probably the result of tile political changes on the European Continent and tile uncertainty of 
its needs. 
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Issues that may affect European security remain unclear and this was supported by the field 
study, where no new or "other" challenges were put forward. This i-nay have been due to the 
questionnaire not naming challenges apart from those which have been of concern to 
Greece. 
Another possible influence on the findings and the suitability of the model is related to the 
specific period of time of the study. The events of 1989 which have transformed Europe 
have not filtered down politically on a uniform basis. It was believed that it is useful to 
concentrate on "classic" threats for the state instead of "revolutionary" issues as it also 
believed that this should be the starting point for such an investigation. "Classic threats" in 
this case implies threats that concerned the Cold War era, while "revolutionary" threats are 
defined as a radical movement towards other areas of concern, basically non - military. It 
was essential to determine whether the importance of threat perception has decreased and 
whether the existing security organisations are still desired in order to determine the 
direction of change (if security preferences are different) before embarking on the 
examination of possibilities that may seem unrealistic (i. e. new defence option). As Jervis 
(1969) points out, "whether quantitative studies try to suggest new hypotheses or whether 
they attempt to supply convincing evidence, they will make a greater contribution if they 
keep in mind the results of traditional research and case studies rather than turn inward" 
(The costs of Quantitative Study, essay, Contending Approaches to International Politics, 
Knorr and Rosenau, eds., 1962, p. 217). 
In general terms, the sequential nature of the model appeared to be supported by the 
evidence examined, but it is important to enquire to what extent the model would be 
applicable to other settings, specifically in a few years time or in a decade's time? Politics 
and issues of concern change and acquire different levels of importance from day to day and 
therefore if the same model was investigated in the future, the findings produced might 
prove to be quite different and the model not as helpful or even more helpful. This appears 
to be a common problem with such studies, as international relations change in a rapid 
manner. As Duvall (1976) has pointed out, there is a problem of the principal temporal unit 
of observation: "There is nothing intrinsically compelling about the year as a time unit for 
international relations research" (An Appraisal of the Methodological and Statistical 
Procedures of the Correlates of War Project, Linnes and Hoole, eds., 1976, p. 67). 
The use of tile field study data, collected to supplement the analysis of the importance of 
threat perception towards the effectiveness of an option for European defence, was critical to 
this study. Obtaining adequate response rates from elites required some effort but this is 
necessary as such a field study is one of tile few practical ways available to collect primary 
data. Although attempt was made to avoid bias in this study, it is certainly possible. Tile 
use of data through the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS), can also create 
constructive argument, as the use of aggregate data may cause one to reject a model "which 
is a valid representation of reality" (Cushak, 1978, The Major Powers and the Pursuit of 
Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 267). This is mainly due to the fact 
that "numbers" are called upon to explain actions and perceptions of states (as in the case of 
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this thesis), and associations of variables may sometimes have illogical explanations or may 
not represent reality and this can stimulate debate. 
Statistical analysis was applied to what are, essentially, perceptual variables. For example, 
the indicator for threat perception used three classes of such data: 
- Different types of elites to determine possible differences in their perceptions of threat 
with one another; 
- Different types of variables (proxies), representing options for security to generate 
estimates of preferences; and 
- The combination of the two to estimate levels of importance of threat perception and 
preferences of various options for security (chi square test, contingency tables, C value). 
All of the above indicators are plausible in social sciences, as is the statistical procedure for 
combining them. However, Jervis (1969), highlights some of the pitfalls of quantitative 
studies in general: "The methods used to measure several important concepts seriously 
distort the more common meaning of those terms. Quantitative methods lack the faults of 
subjectivity, lend themselves to the systematic treatment of large amounts of data, facilitate 
comparative analysis, and are amenable to treatments to discover unusual and unexpected 
relationships" ( Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches To International Politics, 
p. 203). Despite this reservation, such testing is used widely and was chosen after regular 
consultation with persons with a statistical and research background. 
Depending on the degree of confidence in the manner in which the concepts have been 
operationalised in chapter 7 of this study, different conclusions could be drawn about the 
practical limitations of the findings. For example, if there is little confidence in the 
procedures taken, reserve judgement might be taken in this matter, for example if there was 
little confidence in the statistical tests used. Such a lack of confidence would entail 
reservations about the findings presented and in turn, the conclusions that follow from them. 
Whereas there could be limitations on the ability to generalise from these findings, it would 
be imprudent to ignore their (internal) validity within the context of this work. 
Tile finding that held across the field study, particularly the association between threat 
perception and international cooperation, entails a number of implications if questioned and 
analysed in a practical manner. This association (Threat perception.... International 
Cooperation) is one link in tile chain of the model. Thus, the first point that arises is 
whether Greek elites were detached when responding to perceptions of threats for Europe, 
having in mind their own national security concerns. The Greek elites were asked to give 
their views on issues concerning Europe and their responses may have been biased. For 
example, the Macedonian issue was clearly seen as a more important concern for Greece 
than for Europe. Therefore, when asked to respond on how important this issue was for 
Europe, concerns for Greece's national security are not easily avoided. This is similar to the 
problem of national interests obstructing common a foreign policy from being formed in the 
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EC, identified in chapter 4 (Ifestos and Nuttall) and by the respondents interviewed in the 
validation study presented in Appendix A. 
Tile field study has provided an insight into the importance and effect of threat perception 
as a determinant towards international cooperation and collective effort. Tile various types 
of respondents did not seem to show a significant difference in their opinions, this point also 
expressed through the Chi - square test presented in chapter 7. The percentages for each 
category of respondents were quite uniform in the descriptive statistics, suggesting that the 
uncertainty and concerns were associated. This also suggests that the military elites, even 
though they constituted the largest sub - sample, have statistically similar concerns as the 
rest of the sample, thus reducing the concern about bias from sub - groups or sub - samples. 
Further Research 
The model of this study needs to be modified in certain respects as a result of the field 
study findings. This modification would introduce another variable in sequence, that of a 
specific threat and how that specific threat may affect a state. For example, instead of threat 
perception as the initial variable of the model (TP), the Yugoslav crisis could have been the 
independent variable: Yugoslav crisis ..... International Cooperation ..... Intervening Variables ..... Option, therefore examining how a specific threat could stimulate international 
cooperation and how, this cooperation of different states could lead towards an option for 
defence (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 
c 
Yugoslav Crisis Intcmational Option for 
Coopcration Defcnce 
w 
Another modification would be the inclusion of national interests and the state of the 
economy as variables which may affect decision - making through collective institutions 
(Threat Perception .... National Interests .... Economics.... 
International 
Cooperation .... Security Option). 
National Interests were clearly presented through the 
findings and it is worth examining the extent to which such interests affected collective 
interests through institutions (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 
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Furthermore, it seems appropriate to examine the same issues with respondents from another 
state in Europe in order to determine the perceptual differences on the topic as well as the 
extent to which the model is sensitive to elites or the case of another state's national 
interests. Another justifiable area of investigation would be a cornparative study with data 
frorn two or more European states with a view to comparing and contrasting perceptions of 
threat (differences in levels of importance) and security preferences. A "follow - up" field 
study in Greece would also be fruitful, as it could be determined how the same issues 
examined in this study hold over time in the light of continuously changing environmental 
stimuli as well as the direction of change. 
Finally, it would be incomplete not to propose the examination of Turkey and its own 
perception of threat. Turkey was the major concern presented in the field work for Greece 
and it would be interesting to see whether Turkey sees Greece as a threat to its security. 
This could be done through a comparative study of two matched samples: of Greek elites 
and of Turkish elites responding to issues of common concern or options for common 
defence (figure 8). This model would aim to investigate not only how one is perceived from 
the other, but also how the elites of each state "think" it is perceived by the other. Specific 
threats could be investigated in order to determine which are common and which options are 
preferred. 
Figure 8 
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In sum, the findings of this study have contributed to the theory of threat perception, as its 
importance, despite the problems such studies encounter, does not seem to have effaced. 
History - it could be argued - has demonstrated that 
it repeats itself. Based on this widely 
accepted statement, it is important that the importance of threat perception be 
acknowledged, which could assist alliances and institutions to prepare for, or avoid, crises. 
However, the changing environment in Europe since the end of the Cold War does not 
imply peace: 
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"The absence of war and military conflict among states does not in itse4r insure 
international peace and security. The non - military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security " 
(Roche, 1993, Disarmament, United Nations Panel, April 20 - 23,1993, p. 141). 
Threats are constantly changing and evolving and security structures may be required to deal 
with "non - traditional" areas of concern: from military threats to economic threats, 
environmental threats or humanitarian efforts. These should also be investigated and 
examined as these threats may prove to be of even greater impact for humanity than war has 
been in the past. 
"To a predominant school of thought, known as political realism, war is an inevitable 
outcome of human insecurity and the desperate questfor power it generates. In realist 
thinking, most saliently represented by American historian Hans Morgenthau, the world is a 
violent, hostile environment, in which the will to seoý'- preservation rules. In such a setting, 
one must remain constantly on the alert, making others cower so that they do not attack, 
always ready to kill before being killed" ( Karsh, War, Freedman, ed., p. 66,1994). The 
only way, according to Karsh (1994), to alleviate this bleak human condition is to establish a 
'common power' that will keep mankind in awe. The above suggests "insecurity" which is 
usually derived from perceptions of threat. The common power suggested by Karsh is also 
known as collective security through alliances, usually formed, according to Brown (1987), 
against a common opponent or set threats. On the basis of the historical record, whether 
alliances tend more often to cause or to deter wars remains an open question. 
"The profound changes in Europe since 1989 do not imply peace. "The next decades in a 
Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this 
century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years. 
This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of 
military power are the root causes of war" (Mearsheimer, 1990, from War, Freedman, ed., 
p. 304,1994). 
The above two citations support the contradiction attributed to Roman wisdom : 
Si vis pacem, para bellum 
If you want peace, prepare war]. 
Note: No similar research topic has been submitted in the UK at thisspecific point in time. 
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Summary of the Interviews 
For the purpose of verifying some of the issues raised and examined in this study, it was 
decided to undertake a small number of interviews with U. K. based elites interested in 
European security, particularly related to the findings of this thesis. Arranging appointments 
with the various elites proved difficult as many military attaches were busy as were defence 
researchers. Persistent approaches had to be made before an appointment could be secured. 
The following sample is a cross section of those who could be reached and agreed to be 
interviewed and comprises of 
1. Lieutenant Commander D. Theophanidis, Military and Naval Attache. Greek Embassy, 
London, UK (May 25,1994,4: 30 pm); 
2. Brigadier C. D. Daukes, Director, NATO and European defence directorate, Ministry of 
Defence, London UK (May 27,1994,11: 30 arn); 
3. Alan Lee Williams OBE, Director, (Former MP), Atlantic Council of the UK, London, UK 
(May 27,1994,3 -30 pm); 
4. George Chakallis, first Secretary to the Ambassador of the Cyprus High Commission, 
London, UK (6 June, 1994,11: 00 arn); 
5. Captain Ivan Yordanov, Military, Naval and Air Attach6, Bulgarian Embassy, London, UK 
(June 7,1994,11 -. 00 am), 
6. A Turkish military official, Turkish Embassy, London, UK (June 14,1994,11 -. 00 am); at his 
request, anonymity has been respected, 
7. Colonel Andrew Duncan, Director of Information, International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, London, UK (June 17,1994,3 . 
00 pm), 
8. Captain Alexander Antropov Ivanovich, Assistant Defence Attache, Russian Embassy, 
London, UK (July 4,1994,10: 00 am). 
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The interviews were conducted in the UK during the period between May 15 and July 5,1994. 
Despite the distances and congested diaries of the interviewees, it was possible to conduct the 
interviews on a face to face basis. 
Efforts were made to contact the following Institutes and individuals, but due to congested 
diaries or limited personnel, these were unsuccessful: The Institute of European Affairs; Lord 
Finsberg, former Vice President of the WEU; the Republic of Northern Cyprus Office in 
London and the "Macedonian" office in London. 
The aim of the interviews was to get a response and add some dimensions in the major findings 
of the study, as well as to question the feasability of the proposed model. The areas discussed 
were: 
-the difference in the levels of importance given by Greek elites from the field study when 
questioned on specific concerns for Greece and for Europe, 
-the respondents' opinion on continuing US assistance in Europe as the findings indicated, 
only in terms of defensive purposes; 
-the respondents' attitude towards the importance of threat perception in the European 
security equation; 
-the respondents' views about the uncertainty reflected from the field study on the Greek 
elites' choices for European defence; 
-whether NATO requires further transformation in order to deal with external threats and the 
absence of clear threat perception; 
-whether the EC should provide a defence mechanism for Europe; and 
-if the respondent felt that the proposed model was a logical explanation for the uncertainty 
of an option in the field study, due to the lack of clear threat perception in Europe. 
Extracts from the interviews are presented below ( anonymity has been respected wherever it 
was requested)- 
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Lieutenant Commander Theophanidis 
Military and Naval Attach& Greek Embassy, London, UK 
He felt that the uncertainty in the structure alternatives for European defence in the study was 
logical due to the geographical changes in Europe. Only when borders and tensions are settled 
would Europeans be able to reach a common agreement. He also felt that the United States' 
presence in Europe, through NATO, continues to be essential for Europe's defence as it, being 
the only remaining superpower in the world, would be able to motivate other states towards a 
common purpose. He felt that NATO would continue to dominate European defence concerns 
and that Maastricht's attempt to reactivate the WEU would be unsuccessful. Lieutenant - 
Commander Theophanidis' opinion on the uncertainness in the levels of importance of various 
concerns for Greece and for Europe were related with geo-politics as Greece's geographical 
location in the Balkan's threatens the State more than the whole Continent, As far as the EC is 
concerned, he though that it was not necessary for the structure to provide a defence 
mechanism as NATO still exists and provided US assistance. External threats should be taken 
into consideration as situations such as the war in the Gulf in 1991 affected the world economy. 
Future threats for Europe include Germany and Russia depending on its relation with NATO 
and the PFP plan. Finally, he agreed with the sequence of the model as the apparent lack of 
clear threat perception has created uncertainty towards an option. 
Brigadier C. D. Daukes 
Director, NATO and European Defence Directorate, MOD, UK 
The Brigadier felt that the differences in the levels of importance of the various threats 
proposed in the study for Greece and for Europe was related to the fact that a threat is a 
subjective judgement. Europe "needs to create" a threat but not as in the Cold War era as the 
ingredients of the Cold War no longer exist. US involvement "is still essential" as the US 
through NATO provides the European - Atlantic link and NATO and the US are interrelated. 
Newly formed Eastern European srates want NATO more than the existing members do. 
NATO's summit in January 1994 has demonstrated the need to deal with external threats, or 
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taking on jobs that are not article #5. " 
management mechanism. " 
He also felt that NATO can survive as a "crisis 
Brigadier Daukes felt that NATO has been essential for Greece as it has become the balancing 
factor in Greaco - Turkish relations. As far as the differences in structure preferences from the 
field study, he felt that elites would be able to choose if there was an actual clear threat. 
However, NATO will continue to dominate as it has an integrated military staff (unlike what 
the WTO had) and unlike the situation in the WEU. The EC requires common foreign policy 
in order to promote defence, but if this is achieved, there would be no benefit for Greece to 
have Turkey in the EC. 
Finally, the model was seen as logical and the absence of clear threat perception was seen as the 
major reason why there seemed to be an uncertainty towards an option for European defence. 
Alan 1AT Williams, OBE 
Dimctor, Atlantic Council, UK 
Mr Williams felt that the US is the "cement" in the NATO partnership. The challenge of 
statesmanship for NATO is difficult to hold together without the US. If the US commitment in 
Europe through NATO fades, there would be a problem in dealing with out-of-area threats. 
European defence would require more investment by Europeans and this is unlikely. He 
stressed the importance of the US for Europe and felt that if the WEU was reactivated and 
eventually dominated the European defence equation, this would mean that the US would be 
out of Europe. The US is also the umbrella for the German question. The changes of 1989 
took NATO by surprise... How can we hold the Alliance together without clear threat 
perception9" It was felt, however, that the respondents believed that NATO would be able to 
survive as a crisis management mechanism, despite the lack of a clear threat. 
Mr Williams was sceptical about the WEU gaining more power. "It is separate, but not apart 
from NATO. " The Western European Union's binding treaty obliges states to assist another 
member state without putting the issue on the table as in NATO. As far as the EC is 
concerned, this respondent was also skeptical about political union as he felt that a "common 
approach" would be better. The variety of options presented from the study were due to the 
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lack of clear threat perception. The model was seen as logical and the absence of clear threats 
is creating the problem in finding the best alternative, 
-4 
Finally, the respondent felt that NATO will be able to cope with the instabilities in Europe and 
serve as a crisis management mechanism. 
Mr George Cliakaffis 
Firsit Secretary to the Ambamador of the Cýyprus HiL4i Commimion, UK 
Mr Chakallis thought that the whole European defence question is still uncertain and unclear 
due to the continuing instability in the Balkans and the Russian continuing transformation 
towards democracy. He felt that the focus on a threat is still an ongoing process: "Things in 
Europe are still vague and there is no actual identification of threat. " However, Mr Chakallis 
was uncertain as to whether there is a need for identifying new threats. NATO has been able, 
in the respondents' opinion, to transform into a crisis management organisation and could thus 
survive in this manner. He sees NATO dominating European defence in the future as the 
Western European Union does not include the United States even though the WEU, as a 
stepping stone, can deal with European matters before they get transferred to NATO. He felt 
that the United States' interests are not parallel with those of the EC as far as defence is 
concerned, and based on the assumption that Europe "needs" America, it is not yet feasible for 
the EC to form a defence dimension. On the whole, he favoured NATO and continuing US 
involvement in Europe for defensive matters. 
He felt that "geopolitics" was the reason for the differences in threat perception for Greece and 
for Europe as It is difficult to make a state's own domestic interests the same as those of 
Europe. He sees the CSCE as the "talking shop" that did play a role during the Cold War but 
with no actual power to threaten other organisations. Threat perception, or specifically the lack 
of it, was felt as causing the problems for European defence, and especially for the existence of 
the various organisations. 
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Captain Ivan Yordanov, Military, Naval, and Air Attach6 
Bulgarian Embissy, UK 
Captain Yordanov used history and geopolitics as the major reasons for the differences in threat 
perception for Greece and for Europe. He said that many issues "... have nothing to do with 
Europe" and that each state has it own approach and level of seriousness for a specific threat; 
Greece's historical concerns are logically more intense than Europe's on the same issues. 
He felt that there exist too many security organisations and characterised the CSCE as a 
structure which is "not well organised" , and the VVEU as not being clear about its security 
responsibilities and with no clear objectives. NATO's new character would be that of a crisis 
management organisation and its enlargement through the Partnership for Peace Plan will help 
European defence. He saw Bulgaria as a PFP signatory that could become the balancing factor 
in the Balkan region and specifically between Greece and Turkey. If Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Greece become allies through NATO, that could bring stability to the whole Balkan peninsula. 
He felt that NATO does have the experience to lead European defence as it is a "well built 
structure. " However, he sees Russia as a necessary ally for the West through NATO and if 
Russia does not sign the PFP plan, the effects for European defence would be disastrous. 
Russia would become isolated and the West might have a new threat to deal with based on 
capabilities. He felt that there is no reason for the EC to provide a defence mechanism for 
Europe and characterised this possibility as one that " ... would 
increase bureaucracy and bring 
no solutions. " He sees the United States as essential for Europe as they are the only defensive, 
but not the only economic, superpower in the world. The situation in Europe is not yet ideal 
for the United States to withdraw its support and he does not see this happening for a long 
period of time. On the whole, he felt that the absence of clear threat perception is the reason for 
the variety of alternatives given in this study. 
Turkish Military Official (anonymity requested) Turldsh embassy, UK 
This official felt that threat perception has become a very difficult task for Europe, but that it is 
essential for Europeans to identify common concerns in order to be able to deal with threats 
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when they arise. NATO must now change due to the absence of a clear threat- "It is easier to 
unite for a common purpose than to unite with no clear purpose. " 
He sees the United Nations as a body that could gain more power and, through a revised 
decision-making process, one that could become an important actor for world defence. NATO 
was seen as an arm of the UN as were other defence structures such as the WEU and the 
CSCE. 
Even though the respondent felt that "no state would like to be the police of the world" the 
United States remains the only superpower that has relatively clear policies in Europe and must 
still continue to play a role in European defence. However, all states in NATO should share 
military expenses in order to feel involved. The respondent cited the interesting example of 
Germany as a state that has become economically dominant due to fact (according to the 
respondent), that it has never spent large sums of money for its military. Therefore, the US 
and other Western European partners, by controlling Germany, allowed the state to enjoy 
economic progress which may lead towards a future threat. 
He felt that the difference in levels of perception for issues concerning Greece and Europe are 
due to "own national goals, as all states have different national concerns and priorities". If it 
was easy for all states to accept concerns or have mutual interests, then the world would be in 
peace. The identification of threat is essential for the balance of military power. 
On the whole, he felt that the absence of clear threats in Europe has created the uncertainty in 
the options reflected in this study. 
Colonel Andrew Duncan, Director of Infonnation 
International institute of StrAtej; ic Studies, London, UK 
Colonel Duncan felt that the various differences in levels of perception of concerns for Greece 
and for Europe were related to the "directness" of concerns. Issues such as "Macedonia" or 
Turkey logically concern Greece to a greater extent due to geography and history. "The threat 
of war in the Balkans is more direct. " He sees too many structures for security existing and 
overlapping. He felt, however, that only NATO has the military capability and "... will 
continue to dominate in the future. " The Western European Union was seen as an essential 
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structure that may assist NATO in various tasks. As the WEU obliges its member states to 
assist in the event of an armed attack on one of its members, NATO takes the issue to the 
council first. This point was seen as a drawback of the WEU as most states would favour 
putting the issue on the table rather than immediately interfering. 
He felt that the US is essential for European defence: "After all there have been no cries for the 
US to get out. " He sees NATO's new character as a crisis management mechanism as 
successful and one that has proved it can work through its involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. 
However, whether it could continue without clear threats "... in order to justify its forces" is a 
difficult question. 
Finally, he felt that the absence of clear threat perception has created a problem in justifying 
security structures' existence, but "... even if there was not Yugoslavia, there would have been 
something else to base their reason of existence. " 
Captain Alexander Antropov Ivanovich 
Assisfitnt Defence AttacW, Russian Embm-y, Undon, UK 
The Captain felt that the difference in levels of importance on the various issues of the study 
was logical due to the fact that national interests do not always coincide with "European" 
interests. "If humans were able to want the same at the same time, then there would be a 
world government. " As the Russian Assistant Defence Attache, the respondent expressed 
Russia's good intentions vis -a- vis Western Europe and the state's intention on signing the 
PFP plan of NATO. His opinion on the PFP plan was that it was a good step for Russia to join 
but expected full membership and a logical "key - role" based on Russian capabilities. As far 
as Russia combining efforts with other parts of the world, the feeling was negative. 
In addition, the respondent felt that the uncertainty in structure alternatives from the study was 
logical due to the ongoing transformations in Europe. And as far as Russia was concerned, 
NATO is a good option but time is essential and required, until problem areas are settled. 
Finally, the respondent's opinion on the model of this study was that threat perception is a 
major problem creating this uncertainty, and especially for the Eastern European states. 
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Appendix B 
The Partnership for Peace Agreement 
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: INVITATION 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, 
We, the Heads of State and Government of the 
member countries ofthe North Atlantic Alliance, build- 
ing on the close and longstanding partnership among 
the North American and European allies, are commit- 
ted to enhancing the security and stability of the whole 
of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with 
the democratic states to our &st We reaffirm that the 
alliance, as providedfor in article 10 of the Washing- 
ton Treaty, remainF open to the membership of other 
E uropean states in a position to further the principles 
of the Treaty and to contribute to the security qf the 
North Atlantic area We expect and would welcome 
NATO expansion that would reach democratic states 
to our &zvt, as part of an evolutionary process, IdAing 
into account political and security developments in the 
whole qfEurope. 
Ke have today Immched an immediate and 
practical programme that will tranyform the relation- 
ship between NATO andparticipating statem 7henew 
programme goes bejvnd dialogue and cooperation to 
fiorge a real partnership -a Partnership for Peace. 
We therefore invite other states participating in the 
NACC and other CSCE, countriav to contribute to the 
programme, tojoin with ay in thispartnership. Active 
participation in the Partnershipfir Peace will play an 
important role in the e-volutionary process of the ex- 
panvion (? fNA TO 
7he Partnership for Peace, which will olxrate 
under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will 
forge newsecurit arrangements, between the North At- 
lantic Alliance and its pariner. y. for Peace. Partner 
states will be inwied by the North Atlantic Council to 
participate in political and military bodies at NA TO 
Headquarters with re. vjxcI to Partnership actiWies. 
I he Partnership will expand and intensify political and 
military coo[vration throughout [Turope, increase sta- 
bility, diminish threats to peace, and build 
strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of 
practical cooperation and commitment to democratic 
principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will 
consult with any active participant in the Partnership if 
that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial 
integrity, polifical independence, or secunýy At a 
pace or scope determined by the capacity or desire of 
the individual participating states, we will work in con- 
crete ways towardv transparency in defence budgeting, 
promoting democratic control (? f defence ministries, 
joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating 
the ability to operate with NATO with NATOforces in 
suchfieldy as peacekeeping, search and rescue and hu- 
manitafian operations, and others as may be agreed. 
To promote closer military cooperation and in- 
teroperability, we will propose, within the Partnership 
framework peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 
1994. Tb coordinatejoint military actiWties within the 
pa Partnership, we will invite states partici ting in the 
Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to 
NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Co- 
ordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under 
the authoilty of the North Atlantic Council, carry out 
military planning necessary to implement the Partner- 
ship programmes. 
Since, its inception two yvars ago, the North A t- 
lantic Cooperation council has greatly exjxff0ed the 
depth and scope to its activities. We will continue to 
work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative 
relations-hips across the entire spectrum oj'lhe Alli- 
ance ý activities. With the expansion (? fNA CC activi- 
ties and the establishment oj'the Partnershipfor Peace, 
we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO 
Headquartersfor personnelfrom NA CC countries and 
other Partnership for Peace participants in order to 
improve out worAing relationships andfacilitale closer 
cooperation. 
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT 
1. Ilurther to the invitation extended by the NATO 
Heady qf'Stafe and Government at their meeting on the 
101h, 111th January, 1994, the member states qf the 
North Atlantic Alliance and other states subscribing to 
this document, resolved to deepen their political and 
military ties and to contributefurther to the strengthen- 
ing of security within the Euro - Atlantic area, hereby 
establish, within the fiamework of the North Atlantic 
cooperation Council, the Partnershipfor Peace. 
2. This Partnership is established as an expression 
of a joint conviction that stability and security in the 
Euro - Atlantic area ran be achieved only through co- 
operation and common action. Protection and pro- 
motion offundamental fteedoms and human tights, 
and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace 
through democracy are shared values fundamental to 
the Partnership. In joining the partnership, the mem- 
ber states qf the North Atlantic Alliance and the other 
states subscribing to this document recall that they are 
committed to the preservation of democratic societies, 
theirfreedomfirom coercion and intimidation, and the 
maintenance of the principles qf international law. 
7hey reaffirm their commitment to fuýfil in goodfaith 
the obligations of the charter of the United Nations 
and the principles qf1he Universal Declaration on Hu- 
man Rights; specýfically, to rtfrainfrom the threat or 
use of force, against the territorial or political inde- 
pendence, oJ'any state, to resýect existing borders and 
to settle disputes by peaccfiil means. 7hey also reaf- 
firm their commitment to the HeLvinki I; inal Act and all 
subsequent CSCIT documents and to the fuýilment (? f 
the commitmena and obligations they have undertaken 
in thefield of'disarmament and arms control. 
3.7he other sfateýv subscribing to this domment 
will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation in Inirming thefollowing objectives: 
d. the development (? f cooperative military relations 
with NATO, for the purpose qfjoint planning, 
training, and exercises in order to strengthen 
their ability to undertake missions in the fields of 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian 
operations, and others as many be subsequently 
agreed; 
e. the development, over the longer term, offorces 
that are better able to operate with those of the 
North Atlantic Alliance. 
4. The other subscribing states will provide to the 
NATO A uthorities Presentation Documents identi&ng 
the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of 
the Partnership and the military and other assets that 
might be usedfor Partnership activities. NATO will 
propose a programme of partnership exercises and 
other activities consistent with the Parfnershipý objec- 
tives. Based on this programme and its Presentation 
Document, each subscribing state will develop with 
NATO an inch vidual Partnership Programme. 
5. In preparing and implementing their indhidual 
Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states 
may, at their own expense and in agreement with the 
Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgium authon- 
ties, establish their own liaison office with NA TO 
Headquarters in Bravsels. This will facilitate their 
participation in NA CC / Partnership meetings and ac- 
tivities, as well as certain others by invitation. They 
will also make available personnel, assets, facilities 
and capabilities necessary and appropriate. for carry- 
ing out the agreed Partnership programme. NATO 
will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and 
exec7iting their individual Partnership Programmc-ýY. 
7he other subscribing states accept the follow- 
ing understandings: 
a facilitation of tranvparency in national dcfence 
planning and budgeting processeýv; 
b. envuring democratic control ofdefenceforces; 
C. maintenance of the capability and readineýss to 
contribute, subject to conytifutional convidera- 
tiony, to operationy under the authority ofthe UN 
and/or the res[vnvibility of the CSCI-, ', - 
those who envisage participation in missiony 
referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where 
appropriate, take part in relevant NATO 
exercises; 
they willfind their own actiOliev in Partnership 
activities, and will encJeavour otherwise to share 
2C 
the burdenv of mounting exercises in which they 
take part; 
7hey may send, after appropriate agreement, 
permanent liaison (? fflcerv to a separate 
Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons 
(Beýgium) that would, under the authority ofthe 
North Atlantic council, carry out military 
planning necessary to implement the 
Partnership programmes; 
those participating in planning and military 
exercises will have access to certain NATO 
technical data relevant to interoperability; 
building upon the CSCE measures on defence 
planning, the other subscribing states and 
NATO counftles will exchange information on 
the steps that have been taken or are being 
taken to promote transparency in defence 
planning and budgeting and to ensure the 
democratic control ofarmedforces; 
they may participate in a reciprocal exchange 
of information on dqfence planning and 
budgeting which will be developed within the 
framework of the NACC / Partnership for 
Peace. 
7 In keeping with their commitment to the objec- 
tives qf the Partnershipfor Peace, the members qf the 
North Atlantic A Iliance, will: 
develop with other subscribing states a 
planning and review process to provide a basis 
for idenfifjft and evaluating forces and 
capabilities that might be made available by 
them for multinational training, exercises, and 
operations in conjunction with Alhanceforces; 
promote military and political coordination at 
NA TO headquarters in order to provide 
direction and guidance relevant to Partnership 
actiOties and the other subscribing states, 
including planning, training, exercises and the 
&-velopment ofdoctrine. 
8. NATO will consult with any active participant 
in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct 
threat to its territorial integrity, political independence 
or semilly. 
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Appendix C 
Highlights of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Article 2 
Article 2 of the Washington Tre'aty axtends its scope beyond d(fence 
matters and includes the promotion of conditions of stability and 
well-being and economic collaboration among Alliance member 
countries. 
Article 5 
Based on Article 51 of the United Nations charter, which confirms "the 
inherent right of individual or collective seýf-defence ", the North 
Atlantic treaty states that all its signatories desire to live in piece with 
all peoples and govemments. In Article 5 they agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Ef urope ofNorth America shall be 
considered an attack against them all. 
Article 9 
Article 9 established the North Atlantic Council. 7-hIS was the only 
. 
ficial body directly created by the Treaty. 7-he council ltseýf was 
given the task of creating "such subsidiary bodies" as might be 
necessary. 7-his led to the establishment of the North Atlantic 
Organisation which implements the Council's decisions and provides 
the practical means of collaboration between member countries in all 
areas ofmutual interest or concem. 
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Appendix D 
Defence Highlights from the Maastricht Treaty 
PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
ic e 
A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the 
following provisions. 
Article J. 1 
1. The Union and its member states shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, 
governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy. 
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy sliall be: 
)! - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; 
ý- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; 
to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Objectives of the Pans 
Charter; 
)!, - to prornote international cooperation; 
to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect fo Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
3. The Union sliall pursue these objectives: 
by establishing systematic cooperation between members states in the conduct of policy in accordance 
with Article J. 2; 
by gradually implementing, in accordance Nvitli Article J. 3, joint action in the areas in which the Member 
States have important interests in common. 
4. The Member States sliall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in the 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. they shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of 
the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. the council sliall 
ensure that these principles are complied with. 
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Article J. 2 
1. Member States sliall inform and consult one another within the council on any matter of foreign and security 
policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible 
by means of concerted and convergent action. 
2. Whenever it deems necessary, the Council sliall define a common position. 
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. 
The shall uphold the common position in such forums. 
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, 
those that do take part shall uphold the common positions. 
Article J. 4 
The common foreign and security policy sliall include all questions related to the security of the Union, 
including the eventual fraining of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. 
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the 
Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The 
council sliall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. 
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out 
in Article J. 3. 
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States and sliall respect the obligations of certain Member 
States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework. 
5. The provisions of this article sliall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more 
member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such 
cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for In this Title. 
6. With a view to furthering the objectivity of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of 
Article X11 of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article 
N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which sliall 
include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then. 
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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEAa PARTICIPANTS 
(as at 30 April 1995) 
(ountry Framework Doc Signed by Presentation Doc IPP* agreed 
Albania 23 February 94 Sali Berisha, President 22 September 94 25 January 95 
Armenia 5 Odober 94 Vahan Papozion, foreign Minister 
Austria 10 February 95 Alois Mo(k, Foreign Minister 
Azerbaijan 4 May 94 Geidar Aliyev, President 
Belarus II January 95 Uladzmir Syanko, Foreign Minister 
Bulgaria 14 February 94 Zhelyu Zhelev, President 6 June 94 28 November 94 
(ze(h Republic 10 Mar(h 94 V6dav Klaus, Prime Minister 17 May 94 25 November 94 
Estonia 3 February 94 J uri Luik, Foreign Minister 8 July 94 1 March 95 
Finland 9 May 94 Heikki Hoavislo, Foreign Minister 10 May 94 12 October 94 
Georgia 23 Mar(h 94 Alexander Chikvoidze, foreign Minister 
Hungary 8 February 94 Giza Jeszenszky, Foreign Minister 6 June 94 15 November 94 
Kazakhstan 27 May 94 Kanat Saudaboyev, foreign Minister 2 December 94 
Kyrgyzstan I June 94 Askar Akayev, President 
Latvia 14 February 94 Voldis Birkovs, Prime Minister 18 July 94 8 February 95 
Lithuania 27 January 94 Algirdas Brazauskos, President 10 June 94 30 November 94 
Malta 26 April 95 Guido de Mor(o, Deputy Prime Minister 
Moldova 16 March 94 Mircea Snegur, President 6 September 94 
Poland 2 February 94 Waldemar Pawlak, Prime Minister 25 April 94 5 July 94 
Romania 26 January 94 Teodor Meles(anu, Foreign Minister 28 April 94 14 September 94 
Russian Federation 22 June 94 Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Mnister 5 July 94 
Slovakia 9 February 94 Vladimir Medar, Prime Minister 25 May 94 24 November 94 
Slovenia 30 Mor(h 94 Janez Drnovsek, Prime Minister 20 July 94 
Sweden 9 May 94 Baroness of Ugglas, foreign Minister 10 May 94 22 August 94 
Turkmenistan 10 May 94 Boris Shikmuradov, Deputy Priam MinIster 
Ukraine 8 February 94 Anatoly Zlenko, Foreign Minister 25 May 94 
Uzbekistan 13 July 94 Saidmukhtar Saidkosimov, Foreign AliaMer 
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Appendix F 
Question Variable Question Variable 
I MELOS 23a ACYP 
2 FNRA 23a AYUG 
3 TRT 23a AMAC 
4 STRT 23a AALB 
5 INST 23a ANEONZ 
6 PBR 23a ASU 
7 FORM 23a AGERU 
8 RELG 23b BqYP 
8b GREW 23b BYUG 
9 GER 23b BMAC 
9b GR 23b BALB 
10 NATO 23b BNEONZ 
11 WTO 23b BSU 
12 us 23b BSUBGERU 
13 REQ 24 ONLY 
14 TUR 25 RUSS 
15 MEM 26 MAST 
16 EUDEF 27 GMAST 
17 CONT 28 SUNUC 
18 GMIL 29 TP 
19 CRD 30 EXTT 
20 EEC 31 EUDEFI 
21 EEUR 32 GRWEU 
22 NEWTH 
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Appendix G 
Greek Defence Figures 
7he armed. forces have permanent and reýverve (fficers and the other ranks, consist chiqfly (? I'convcnpty (125,800 out (? fa. fbrce (? f 158,000 in 1991) serWng 19-23 months. 7he length (? f conscription was being rechiced but the process has been stopped because of the upheavals in the Balkans. Ihe anny consists of 113,000 soldiers (100,000 conscripts) dh4ded intofour corps, comprising one armoured dh4sion, one mechanised dh4sion, nine in- fiantry dh4sions and one marine btigade, together with armoured, artillery and missile battalions. Its armaments have been programmed to upgrade its substantial numbers of Korean war i4niage M-48s. Ae country has been 
developing a domestic armaments industry including the manufacture of weapons, artillery, missiles and ar- 
mouredpersonnel carriers. 
The navy, consisting of 19,500 sailors (11,400 conscilpts), has mq/or bases at Salamis, near Athens, Patras 
at the mouth of the Guý(ofContith, and at Suda Bay on the northern coast of Crete. It is equipped with 10 subma- 
tines, II destroyers and sevenffigates, plus missile, torpedo andpatrol crafi and helicopters. The country has em- 
barked on afilgate building programme utilising German designs and US technology. 
The air force, comprising 26,000 personnel (14,400 conscripts), consists of seven combat wings and one 
transport wing. Eighter aircrafi include the US F-I 6 and the Rrench Mirage 2000, though there have been prob- 
lems with the radars supplied with the latter crafi. Other aircraft include the A-7H, F-104G, F-4E and F-5A1B. The 
airfirce is equipped with modem missiles offoreign and domestic manufacture. Nuclear missiles are deployvd in 
Greece under treaty arrangements with the USA and NA TO. 
Despite difficulties with NA TO over command and control arrangements in Aegean, Greece is part of the 
NA TO A ir Defence Ground bvironment (NADGEO and provides a fonvard operating base at Preveza for the 
NA TO A irb orne Early Warning Force (NA E WI, ). 
In 1985 the Greek Socialist government introduced a New Defence Doctrine redirecting force planning 
eastward towardv Turkey rather than the Balkan states. This apparently did not involve redeployment of troops 
though a number of island airfieldy were hardened to take fighter aircrafl and priority was given to the acquisition 
qf equipment which would allow rapid reinforcement and supply qf the islandy. 7-he New Democracy government 
has embarked on an equipment acquisition programme including heavy lifl, attack and anti-submarine helicopters, 
200 modem (ffiensive and defensive combat aircrafi, and 950 tankv and 550 anti-aircrafi guns to be supplied by 
Germany. 7he navy is to acquire nine vessels (? f various typesftom Germany, threefiigates with helicopter decks 
firom the Netherlandy plus threefilgates andfour Adams class destroyvrsftom the US4.7-here are threefiigates 
andfive lank camers under construction in Greekyurdy. In thefirst two. Wars a reported $1 billion wasspent on 
the programme. 
I he International Institute fiv Strategic Studies, using a NA TO dcýinifion (? I'military vlvnding, estitnates 
Greek oullays in 1991 at Dr777 bn ($4.5 bn), or 6 per cent qf GDP 7he 1992 state budget estimate showed de- 
fince spending qfDr324.5 bn in 1991 and projected Dr3O4.2 bn for 1992, respectively 2.5 and 2.4 per cent of' 
CrDR 7hesefigures do not take into account costs (#'proc7irement of the repayment of US. /breign militarysales 
credits. 
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Appendix H 
Greek and English Questionnaires 
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Department of International Studies 
University of Surrey 
Questio alre 
Constantine V. Kiritsis 
Name: 
Occupational status: 
Party affiliation: 
(if desired) 
PAGE 1 OF 8 
NOW TURN TO PAGE 2 
Based on the assumption that Greece's security cannot rely on the country's own 
national defence mechanisms, Greece should continue its membership in structures 
such as the EEC and NATO. 
AGREE [-] 1 DISAGREE 1-1 
2. The fact that Greece has not been overtly threatened by another country since 1974 
has to do with the country's stable relations with Western democracies such as the 
US, Britain and France. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
2345 
3 
4. 
Which of the following is the greatest threat to Greece's security at the present time? 
(Please tick only one) 
I 
1- 
2- 
3- 
4- 
5- 
El Instability in the Balkans 
El The Macodonia problem 
El Tufty 
El Other (Mmsespecify: 
El No thrxmt 
What is the n-vost, serious kind of threat facing Greece at the present time? 
(Please tick only one) 
1- 
2- 
3- 
4- 
5- 
6- 
Domestic eoonomy 
Domestic political Instability 
El Foreign military threat 
0 Foreign economic threat 
El Other (Please specify: 
C3 No threat 
It has been suggested that the military balance in Europe and the world has been 
changed considerably. In your opinion, how serious is the current instability in 
Europe to Greece's security? 
VERY NOT SERIOUS 
SERIOUS AT ALL 
1267 
6. How probable is it for a threat towards Greece's security to arise? 
VERY NOT PROBABLE 
PROBABLE AT ALL 
1234567 
Do not write in this 
column 
11 
-I 
12 1 
13 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
PAGE 2 OF 8 
NOW TURN TO PAGE 3 
Do not write in this 
7. Given your views on a military threat to Greece's security. what is the best form of 
column 
defence against this threat? 
(Please tick only one) 
1-1: 1 No defence posture 
2- 0 National onventional arms 
3- El Collective securfty 
(Integrated European Conventional Forces: EEC, WEU) 
4- 0 Integration of all forces of the Atlantic Community (NATO) 
5- El Ottxw (Please specify: 
8. A. Based on the religious fanaticism evident in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, 
Kuwait) as well as in Europe (Turkey. Muslims in Yugoslavia), how serious 
a threatý in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism to Europe's security? 
VERY NOT SERIOUS 
SERIOUS AT ALL 
1234567 
1 1 1 1 1 11 1 18 
B. How serious a threat, in your opinion, is Islamic fundamentalism for 
Greece's security? 
VERY NOT SERIOUS 
SERIOUS AT ALL 
1234567 
- IIIIII1 1 19 
9. Many defence analysts present Germany as a legacy of war. How serious of a threat 
is Germany for. 
A. Europe's security. 
VERY NOT SERIOUS 
SERIOUS AT ALL 
1234567 
III-I --1 110 
B. Greece's security. 
VERY NOT 64ERIOUS 
SERIOUS AT ALL 
23467 
..... ... .. 11 
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Do not write in this 
column 
10. 
12. 
According to many defence analysts, NATO has been the major component that 
ensured European stability. 
STRONGLY NEITHER STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE AGREE NOR DISAGREE DISAGREE 
DISAGREE 
12345 
Due to the current instability in Europe, NATO should continue to exist despite the 
fall of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. 
STRONGLY NEITHER STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE AGREE NOR DISAGREE DISAGREE 
DISAGREE 
2345 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism, the United States stv: >uld 
continue to play a role in European affairs. 
STRONGLY NEITHER STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE AGREE NOR DISAGREE DISAGREE 
DISAGREE 
234 
13. Based on the assumption that NATO remains the major defensive organisation in 
Europe in the 1990s, which of the following are vital requirements for the structure's 
successful continuation. (Tick more than one box, if desired) 
1-0 it needs to be led by the US. 
2- C3 it needs to acquire European k3adorship. 
3- 0 it needs to include Eastern European counbios. 
4- El It needs to set now goals (make arnendnvwft to the current treaty) 
5- El It needs to perooive now threats. 
6- E) it needs to have the ability to deal with outskie-of-NATO 
conflict areas. 
7- 0 Odw. (Please spechT. 
14. NATO has been a major reason for containing fears of a possible conflict 
between 
Greece and Turkey, as both are NATO members. 
STRONGLY NUTHER 
AGREE AGREE AGREE NOR 
DtSAGREE 
23 
ENSAGREE 
4 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
5 
112 1 
113 
1 14 1 
115 
-I 
J16 
- -1 
PAGE 4 OF 8 
NOW TURN TO PAGE: 5 
is. Greece should continue to remain a member of NATO. 
AGREE [: ] I 
16. 
DISAGREE [: ] 
How important is the United States, in your opinion, for Europe's defence in the 
1990s. 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
NOTIMPORTANT 
AT ALL 
1234567 
IIIII 
IT Europe should break away from the US and NATO and deal with the Continent's 
security only through arrangements which are European in character such as the EEC 
and the WEU. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
12345 
III 
18. Under present circumstances, which do you think is the most practical way (or 
Greece to ensure its military security? 
1-0 To continue present arrangements (NATO) 
2- El To pursue entry in the WEU 
3- El Combination of collective security arrangements (NATO, CSCE) 
4- El Withdraw from collective security arrangements 
5- El Ottw. (Please specify: 
19. Which of the following alternatives for European defence is the most credible? 
(Please tick one only) 
1- 0 Europe should rely on US force 
2- El Europe should My on NATO, Including Ow US 
3- El European counties should rely on "r own defence and form 
a joint nuclear force Indepenent of US control 
4- C3 Europe should My on Ow European Eoomn-dc Convmntty (EEC) to 
fonn a defence ffmchantsm 
5- 0 Europe should rely on the Contemnce on SewdtY and 
Cooperadon In Europe (CSCE) 
7- El Eusape should rely on the Westom European Union (WEU) 
8- 0 Odw. (plea" specifT. 
Do not write in this 
colum 
117 
118 
119 1 
r2 -0 1 
121 
_ __ 
I 
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20 
21. 
In your opinion, should the European Economic Community (EEC) proyide a defence 
mechanism for Europe? 
YES I AGREE F] I NO f DISAGREE 
1-1 2 UNCERTAIN 1-1 
NATO should acquire new Eastern European members in order to become an 
alliance that could serve the whole of Europe. 
STRONGLY NEITHER STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE AGREE NOR DISAGREE DISAGREE 
DISAGREE 
12345 
1111 
22. Given the fact that the Warsaw pact has been dissolved and the Communist threat 
has receded, how important is it for NATO to perceive new threats for its 
continuation? 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
NOTIMPORTANT 
AT ALL 
1234567 
IIIII 
23. Here are some problems that might face Europeans in the 1990s. Please indicate 
how important each is for. 
OF VERY OF GREAT OFSOME OF NO 
GREAT IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE 
IMPORTANCE 
1 
Europe 
Cypdot problem Ll U 0 C) 
Yugoslav crisis L) L) Li L) 
Macedonian problem LI U LI 
LI 
Nbanian refugees U L) 
C1 U 
Ll 
Neo-nazism U U L. 1 
LI 
Soviet Union b(eak-up U U U Ll 
Gorman rour0fication L) L) 
U 
B: Greece 
Cypriot woblem U U Lj 
U 
U Yugoslav crisis U U LI Ll 
Macedonian problem U U U 
Nbanlan re"s U U 
U 
U Noo-nazism U U 
U U LI Soviet Union break-up U 
U 
German reunAcation U 
U 
122 1 
123 1 
124 
25 29 
26 30 
27 31 
28 
32 36 
33 37 
34 38 
35 
PAGE 6 OF 8 
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24. The US is the only remaining superpower in the world at the present time. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
12345 
1 'I 
Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, how serious of a threat is Russia to Europe' 
security? 
138 
VERY NOTIMPORTANT 
IMPORTANT AT ALL 
23467 
139 
25. How important is agreement to the terms of the treaty of Maastricht for the stability 
of European affairs (economic and defensive). 
I- El Not important 140 
2-0 Fairly important 
3- El Very important 
26. How important is the treaty of Maastricht for Greece? 
1- El Not Impodant 1141 1 
2- El Fairly Important 
3- El Very Important 
4- EJ Wdhout Maasuicht, the EEC and In general Europe will procrastinate 
its unification 
27. How serious a nuclear threat does the former Soviet Union. despite its break-up into 
smaller republics, present to Europe? 
VERY NOTIMPORTANT 
IMPORTANT AT ALL 
2467 
-F -1 [42 
28. How importam in your opinion, is perception of a threat to establishing a col(ective 
security arrangement? 
1- El Not impottant 
El Fairty importwit 
El V(wy ImporWd 
K=: = 
PAGE 7 OF 8 
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29. External threats (out-of-area threats) such as the lr-aqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
should be taken into consideration and precautions taken in the defence mechanism 
Europe as such threats may arise in European affairs. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
2345 
30. European defence should only deal with matters on the Continent. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
2345 
31. Greece's interests would better be promoted through the Western European Union. 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE DISAGREE 
2345 
Do not write in this 
column 
144 
14ý 1 
146 1 
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KQN/NO2 KYPIT2H2 
ANAPOYT20Y 3 
MEAMIA, 15 127 
AOHNA 
In ZewcepOptou 1993 
AT,. L6TLVC/rj KOPLE: /a, 
OvopdcýopaL Kwvcr-ravTLvos KupLTCFng KaL EtpaL (POLTnT6G-EPEUVn- 
Tns ROXLXLKOV EULaTnpOv aTo flavemGTOPLO TOU SURREY (University 
of Surrey) aTnv Meydkn BpeTTavLa. 
Aux6v To p6va tXW 'ýEKLV60EL pLa tpEuva udvw aTo Bt[ia Tns 
EupwuaLKtls a(y(pdXELaS KaL dtiuvas ýLe Bdon Tnv EXXd6a. rLa aux6v Tov 
X6yo tXw auvTdTet tva epwTnpaToX6yLO TO OUOLO 8a 68eXa va 
aupuXnp(ý(jeTE pE Tn acOaaT6 KaL Ev6La(ptpou(ya yv(; jtin cyas. 
ME aTiauXoXEL p6vo. n ouala -cou Otpaxos YL 'aur6 KaL va EC(YTE 
alyoupoL 6TL 5ev 6a 6nVOGLEUTOOV ov6paxa, KOpVaxLKtS UPOTLVOCTELS 
6 GUYKCKPLptvcs auavxOaeLs. AXXwaxE eLvaL npoaLPETLKd ypapptva 
axnv up(3Tn aeXL5a -cou cpwTngaToXoyLou. 
las F-uXaPLU-CO yLa -CnV KaTavv6nGn KaL ROOOCLd oas, 
-1- 
EPQTHMAT0Aorio 
Kwv/vos Bac. Kup[Tans 
ONOMA 
EIIArrEAMA -. 
KOMMA 
(TTpoa L PC TLK do 
- 
): -CfjPLý6pE: voc-; /rj cy-cr)v uTT68E: cyrl 6-UL rl ac(pdXELa Tris EXXd5os 6Ev 
PUOPEI va CYTnp L X8 EC p6vo (gTous 5LK009 Tns apUVTLK00G 
p nXaV L CYPOOS, CYUV(PWVELTE 6 6La(pwvELTE 6TL n EXXd5a Ba UptHEL 
va napapELVEL ptXos xou NATO KaL Tng EupwuaLK6g KOLv6xnxas; 
2YM(DUNQ AIAIM9 
mIM2 
2. To yEyov6s 6TL n EXXd5a 5ev tXEL allELXnBEL OANEPA au6 6XXn 
X6pa auo xo 1974, tXEL va KdVEL PE TLG KaXts OXtOELS TnS 
EXX65os pc dXXEs AUXLKtG AnPOKpaTLcs 6nws n BpExxavLa, n 
raXXLa KaL OL H. n. A. 
2YM0QN2 AnOAYTA 2YMýQN2 ABEBAI02/H AIkPQNQ AIA-tQNQ AnOAYTA 
2345 
3. rIoL6 an6 -ca TTapaKdTW eLvaL, KaTd Tn yv(ýVn cas, n peyaXOTepn 
anELX6 nPOG Tnv a(yTdXeLa Tns EXX65og Tnv napoOca OTLypt); 
(flapaKaW anýLCL6aTE tva g6vo) 
1H aaTd8ELa crTa BaXKdVLa 
2. To MaKE60VLK6 
3. El H ToUPKLa 
4. El AXXn AnELXO (napaKaW Ka8opLaTe): 
5. 
r--l 
AEV UUdPXEL avELXO 
4. rIapaKaX6 crnpE: L OUT Exnv TTLO ao5apt) anELX6 UOU 6LaTptxEL n EX- 
Xdcf>a -cnv TTapo6aa cyxtypO ("apaKa X(ý cr n gCL(ýGTE tva g6vo) 
1. 
D 
H OLKOV041a Tns X(ýpas gas 
2. El H ROXLTLKO aaTdOcLa 
3. Mla E'F. WXEPLKO (TxpaTLWXLKt) auCLX6 
4. Mta E*EWTEPLKO OLKOVOPLKO aVCLXT) 
5. AXXn AnELX6 ("apaKaW Ka8 op((YTE): 
6. F-I ACV UUdPXCL a"ELXO 
-3- 
5. KaTd YEVLK6 opoXoy(a n apUVTLK6 ýuyapLd ins EUPýMnG KaL KaT' 
EntKTacyn 6Xou TOU K6crpou t)(EL aXXdT. EL PLýLKd. KaTd in yv(; jpn 
cas, r6(yo ao0ap6 yLa Tnv acy(pdXELa ins EXXd5os ElvaL n TWPLVO 
auTd8ELa nou XapaK`TnPLýEL Tnv Eup(ýun; 
MAY 2OBAPH KA6OAOY IOBAPH 
1234567 
6. ITOLd n nLBav6TnTa Tns aaTdcOCLas auT6s va anELXOGEL xnv aa(pd- 
XELa Tns EXXd6os; 
ROAY MErAAH ROAY MIKPH 
HOANOTHTA nIeANOTHTA 
123456 -7 
11111111 
7. ME: OdIGEA -unv dinoytj cas 6crov a(p: opd KdnOLa ULOav6 aTpaTLWTLK6 
anELX6 (rpos Tnv EXXd6a), VOLd KaTd Tnv yvtýpn oas EtvaL n 
KaXOTEpn (p6ppouXa aVTLVcT(bnLans auT6s Tns anELX6S; 
(napaKaW anpELOOTE tva p6vo) 
I. rI KappLa apUVXLKII cr-rdicyn/avT L ýIET(ýn Lan 
2. 
rI EOVLKd aupOaTLKd 6nXa (xwpLs 'Etvn 0068CLa) 
3. F-- I 2UXXOYLKtl aa(pdXCLa (A) 
(EupwTTaLKt. S aup5a'CLKtG 5uvdpcLs: E. O. K. , 
hLUTLKOEUPW- 
TTaL Ktj Evwcyn-, &. E. E. 
4. El IUXX0YLKtj ac(pdXcta (B) 
(A-cXavTLKtg aupDaTLKtS 6UVd(VELS: NATO - AAIE) 
5. AXXn AvxLpET(brLan (napaKaMb KaBopLaTc): 
8. A) 2-cnpLý6pevos; /n TTdVW CYTOV KaTa(pav6 OpnCKEUTLK6 (pavaTLa46 
xns Wang AvaToXOs (Ipd(K lupta, laou6LK6 ApaVa), 6nws 
Entang KaL axnv EupOnn (ToUpKta, MouaouXgdvn aTnv np(ýnv 
PLOUKocyXaa[a) 
, n6cro cyo0apO auELX6, 
Kacd xn yvOgn cras, 
E) E: wpo(jv-t; a L0L "BaULKts apXt(; " IaXapLapoO TTpos -cnv aa(pdcXE: La 
ins EUPO"na; 
MAY IOBAPH KAOOAOY 20BAPH 
1234567 
B) n6(yo co0apO 
"DaULKts apXts" 
ROAY XOBAPH 
12 
ancLX6, Kac dc 'r n yv(. ýPn cas, 
IcrXapLapoO upos Tnv au(pdXcLa 
345 
() cwpoýjwra L0L 
xns EXXd6o. %; 
KAOOAOY IOBAPH 
67 
-4- 
9. IloXXot aguvTLKOL EpEuvnrts napoucyLdýouv Tnv Evwptvn rEppavLa 
WS PLd UOXEVLKO anELX6, KXnPOVOPLd TnS XLTXEPLK6s reppavLas. 
n6co cyoBapO allELXt) eEwpe[TaL n reppavLa yLd 
A. Tnv aa(pdXELa Tns Eup(-ýrns 
MAY XOBAPH KAeOAOY 20BAPH 
1234567 
B. Tnv ao(pdXELa Tns EXXd6os 
ROAY IOBAPH KAeOAOY 2OBAPH 
1234567 
10. KaTd xn yv(; jpn E: v6s pE: ydXou apLOpoO agUVTLK(ýv avaXuTaiv, To 
NATO uu6pTe To DaULK6 (ju(yTaxLK6 cyyOnans Tns EupwnaLKOS 
apUVTLK69 axa8cp6xnTas 
IYWDQNQ 2YM-: QNQ OYTE 2YM-ZQN2 AIA02N2 AIkM2 
AROAYTA OYTE AIA02NQ AnOAYTA 
2345 
LIIII 
11 
12. 
TOU TTapdc TrIV Ka-rdppE: uan 
(YUV86Kns Tns BapcoRtas; 
IMM9 IMM2 
AROAYTA 
12 
A6yw -uns -CWPLvtls aa-rdiectas 
ue Tnv dnouin 6TL xo NATO Ba 
KoVVOUVLGtIO0, OL Hvwgtvcs ROXLXELES 
va auveX[(7ouv va naLýOUV Kd"OLO p6Xo 
ZYMIM2 IYM<DQNQ OYTE IYMQNQ 
AROAYTA OYTE AIAOQNQ 
123 
-uns Euponns, Ka-cd n6co aup(pwveLTc 
TTptTT E: L va auvExlae: i. -rnv OuapT. 6 
KoVVoUVLajlOO KaL Tn 5LdXuan xncs Tou 
OYTE ZYMQN9 
OYTE AIMM9 
3 
AIkDQNQ 
4 
AI kPQ. NQ 
AnOAYTA 
5 
llaodc -co "-rtXoq" TOU YUYOOO 11OXtUOU KaL -c nV Ka-ctppeucrn 
-rns ApepLKfjS 19a 
crunv EupOTTn; 
Irou 
UP It TTE L 
AIkPQNQ &IAIýQNQ 
AfIOAYTA 
45 
-5- 13. IunpLý6pEvog/n (Yxn duoyn 6TL xo NATO napaptVEL o peyaXu-rEpoG 
apUVTLK6s opyaV L cyp6G cyTnv Eup(ýun yLa Tn 6EKaexta Tou 1990, 
nOLd aRo xa napaKdTW eLvaL -Kaxd xn yvOpn craG- ýWT LK t)G 
onpaa L as cTuaTaTLKd YLa TrIV CULTUXnptVn CUVtXELa Tou opyaVLCFPOO; (2npCL(. ýGTE UEPLcya6Tepa an6 tva -av XPELauxet 
1. 
m 
Ka8o5Oynon auo TLG H. R. A. 
2. F-I KaBo66ynon au, o EupwnalouG 
3. 
M 
Na (7UPnCpLXn(p806V X(ýPES Tns 
ptxn 
AvaToXL KOs EupOuns ws 
4. El Na OPLG-106V VtOL CYKOUOL (va 
GUVE)tjKn -uou NATO) 
5L0p8W8E1 n undpXouaa 
5. Na av-ULXn(P806V vtcs aTtELXtS A-cXaV-CLKtlc-; EuppaXtas) 
UPOS TLG XOPES TnS 
6. E3 Na tXE: L 5uvaT6TnTa XT)4JEWS VtTPWV KaL CFE UEPLOXtS 
E: K-c6s rwv xwp(; )v -rou NATO 
7. El AXXo (uapaKaX(ý Ka8opLcyTe): 
14. To NATO uTTt)pT. E: o OaCTLK6s X6yos TnS CYUyKpdTnang (p6Bwv yLa 
nL8av6 6LaVdXn ýieTaF. 6 EXX66og KaL ToUPK(as, pLa KaL OL 66o 
XOpes clvaL ptXn Tou NATO. 
ZYMOM ZYMM OYTE IMM2 AIAIý2NQ AIAUN2 
AnOAYTA OYTE AIAIý2N2 AROAYTA 
2345 
15. H EXXdr6a ea TTPtTTE L va TTapaveLVEL 4tXog xou NATO; 
ZYMM9 El I AIA(DQNQ F] 2 
16.116co anpavxLK6 E: (vaL n a-cdcan -rns ApCPLK69 (H. n. A. ), Kaxd 
xn yv0pn aas, yýa xnv acr(pdXELa Tns EupOnns cyunv 6EKaETta vou 
5LavOouge (1990) 
nOAY 2HMANTIKH KA60AOY 2HMANTIKH 
1234567 
f 
17. H Euip(bun 8a TTPtTTF- L va anoavaaTEL auo Tnv 
ApEPLKO Ka L TO 
NATO Ka t va aVTL pETWULGE L To np6BXnpa Tns ampdXELas Tns 
nuELpou Tns u6vo pr:, pnXavLapoOs "EupwTTaL KOCJS; 
I' (TE XapaKT6pa 
6"ws n E. O. K. KaL n A. E. E. 
ZYMIM9 AnOAYTA XYWPQNQ ABEBAIOZ/H AIA0QNQ AIA0QNQ AnOAYTA 
12345 
-T 
- 
18. Kd-uw aTTo -ULC-; napoOcyEs CYUVE)IIKEC3, nOL6c-; Ka-rd -un yv(ýpn cras E: L- 
VaL 0 TTL 0 "PaKTLK6g Tp6nos cyTpaTLWTLK6S (IG(PdXELas YLa Tnv 
EXXd6a; 
1. 
Fl 
Na (JUVEXtOEL ws VtXos Tou NATO govo. 
2. Na K&VEL TTPOCYU68ELa CLa65ou (jTnv 
3. Na 0aCFLGTEt CIE C7UV5LaCFP06G apUVTLK(ýV pnXaVLaV(! )V 
(NATO, AAZE (CSCE) 
4. 
M 
Na anoaupBeL ano 6Xous TOUS CTUXXOYLKOOS 
apUV'ULK06S PnXaVL(YV06G 
5. AXXos -up6nos (uapaKaX(b Ka8opLa-rE: )- 
19. ROLdc ano -uLs TTapaKd'UW EKXOytG-A, 6aELS yLa EupwnaLKO ac(pdXELa 
eLvaL n ULo aF. L6nLaTn; (napaKaX(; J an4EL(30TE tva p6vo) 
1. 
mH Eup(3un npt"EL va OaCLOTCL axnv 50vapn Twv H. fl. A. 
2. H EupW'TTri TTPtUEL va BaCYLUTEI oTo NATO, nOU GUPVEPL- 
XapadVEL TLs H. H. A. 
3. OL EupwnaLKtg X(bPES 6a VptUCL va OaaLoToOv GTLs 6L- 
KEG TOUS KaL ý16vo aýLUVTLKtS 5UV611ELS KaL va GUYKP0- 
TIGOUV EVVLata nUpnVLKO 60vagn, avcýEdpTn-cn ano 
APCPLKaVLK6 6LEUBUV(ln 
4 H Eup(ýTTri Ba nptneL va ßaataTc( a-rnv E. O. K. yca va 
(YUYKPOTA(JEL KäUOLo apuvTLKÖ gnXavLcrg6 EupwraLKOÜ 
XapaKTApa. 
5. 
F1 
H Eupw'TTn Ba nptpEt va ßaatoTe( aTov pnXavtag6 Tns 
AASE. 
6. H Eupünn Oa nptnet va ßacrLaTEL CTnV AUTtKOCupwnaCK1 
Evwan (A. E. E. ) 
7. KäTt äXXo (UapaKalÜ Ka80pLaTE): 
20. Ka-ud( -cri yv6pn cias, 19a TTPtTTE: L n EupwTTaLKI) 
OLKOVOPLKý KOLv6- 
'un-ra (E. O. K. ) va "TTapd(yf: L" KdTTOLov apUVTLK6 VnXaVLap6 yLa 
xnv EupOun; 
NAI/IYWVS2NQ El I OXI/AIA<DQNQ El 2 ABEBAI02/H 
M3 
-7- 
21. To NATO 8a UptUCL va aVOK'rt)CFEL vta ptXn-KpdTn Tns AvaTOXLKOS 
Eup(ýuns yLa va pvoptcret va YIVEL pLa auppaXCa nou Ba 
unnpETOCYEL oX6KXnpn Tnv Eup6jun 
2YMQNQ 2YWD2NQ OYTE 2YMIMQ AIAýDQNQ AIAýDQN2 
AnOAYTA OYTE AIAýDQNQ AROAYTA 
12345 
22.116oo anpaVULK6 E: LvaL yLa uo NATO n av-uLknyn vtwv ancLWv 
yLa xnv CTUVtXLCIn Tou opyavLcFVoO VLa KaL n 2UV86Kn Tns 
BapaoVas tXeL 6taXueet KaL n KopV0UVL(3TLK6 anELX6 tXCL 
unoxwpL(YEL; 
ROAY 2HMANTIKO KAOOAOY 2HMANTIKO 
2345 
23. lIapaKd-uw avaypd(povTaL ýIEPLKd npo0Xtj4aTa nou Laws auaaXoXtj- 
aouv Tnv Eup(; jnn oxn 5EKaET[a nou 6LavOoupe. HapaKaX(; ) 
OnVEL(bOTE r6cFo anýiaVTLK6 etvaL TO Ka8tva yLa: 
UOAY Wan Wiwi MOM KIXXIII 
IHKIIIII IHXLIILI laxilill NXIIIII 
1 2 3 4 
1. THX EYF2UH 
To luiptad 
............................... 
iptaq rtoumiastas 00 
................... ........... 
To KaidovtO 11 11 11 
............................... 
Wavo( ptlaydoics 0000 
............................... 
xto-Ka(lolts 0000 
............................... 
ltdiuoq Tqs vp4qy loo(ETLOS 
EYWoqs 
........................ 
Eyyptyq rcpp4via 0 
............................... 
-8- 
MY KERAHI 
THK RAW 
To luiptard 
............................... 
iptan rLoutociastas 
............................... 
To KaIE60VL96 
.............. I ................ 
Aloavol PETaydaTES 
............................... 
Ktola(toxts 
............................... 
Ildluan ins lOny loom(Os 
Eyvans ........................ 
Eyuptvo rwavia 
............................... 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
kErmi 
IHNAIIII 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IAHOIAI 
IHNIIIAI 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Mill 
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